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Starkey, Jennifer Sara (Ph.D., Classics) 
Sophocles the Honeybee: Dramatic Context and Interaction 
Thesis directed by Associate Professor John C. Gibert 
 
 There have been very few large-scale studies of Sophocles’ poetic interactions with the 
other playwrights of the fifth century B.C.  This project seeks to fill that gap by putting 
Sophocles in contact with both tragic and comic poets and offering new readings of his work 
from that angle.  By examining Sophocles as an exploiter of other poets’ dramatic ideas and 
strategies, I hope to demonstrate his versatility and creativity; by viewing him as a source of 
inspiration for other dramatists, I aim to show his relevance and significance within his own 
time. 
 The ancient Life of Sophocles claims that he was nicknamed melitta (“honeybee”) for his 
ability to glean the best elements from the work of other poets and integrate them effectively into 
his own plays.  Taking this idea as my starting point, I explore the “immediate dramatic context” 
of each of Sophocles’ late tragedies (Electra, Philoctetes, and Oedipus at Colonus) to show how 
they draw extensively on specific plays of Aeschylus and Euripides.  I also aim to complicate 
common views of dramatic intertextuality, which, in light of the competitions at the festivals, is 
often understood in terms of simple imitation or rejection; in particular, the relationship between 
Sophocles and Euripides has frequently been reduced to one of polemics and polarity.  My 
interest is rather in a type of engagement that was basically collaborative and constructive, and I 
argue that Sophocles and Euripides, as a result of working closely with each other’s material 
iv 
 
over the course of several decades, were actually much more similar in terms of style and interest 
than is usually recognized. 
 Finally, drawing on recent work on comic intertextuality, I argue that all fifth-century 
playwrights were essentially honeybees in their own right, eager to experiment with recent 
innovations and developments in the theater.  Sophocles thus becomes the basis for a more 
general model of dramatic inspiration and composition in the late fifth century: in contrast to the 
view that tragedy was becoming exhausted or even dying out, the poets continued to find new 
ways to exploit, expand, and build on each other’s material. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This project is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, 
Kay Mathias, 
who passed away on the Ides of March, 2011. 
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Introduction: Contextualizing Sophocles 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sophocles was a man of the theater.  He produced more plays and won more victories in 
the competitions at the Dionysia and Lenaea than any other ancient dramatist.
1
  Aristotle 
commends Sophocles’ use of the chorus and cites his Oedipus Tyrannus as a paradigm of proper 
tragedy more often than any other play.
2
  Ancient critics mention his sweet style, his ethopoiia, 
his dramatic power.
3
  What was it, other than innate talent, that made Sophocles a great 
tragedian?  According to the ancient Life of Sophocles (20.87-9), one trait that contributed to his 
success as a poet was his ability to glean the best features from both previous and contemporary 
poets and combine them profitably in his own work: 
 καὶ ἄλλοι μὲν πολλοὶ μεμίμηταί τινα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν καθ’ αὑτούς, μόνος δὲ Σοφοκλῆς 
 ἀφ’ ἐκάστου τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀπανθίζει·  καθ’ ὃ καὶ μέλιττα ἐλέγετο. 
 
 And many others have imitated one of those before them or in their own time, but only 
 Sophocles gleans what was splendid from each; for this reason he was also called “honeybee.”
4
 
 
                                                 
 
1
 The Vita (8, 18 = Soph. T 1) gives him 20 victories and 130 plays (17 of which are spurious).  The Suda (s.v. 
“Sophocles” = Soph. T 2) gives the more conventional numbers of 123 plays and 24 victories.  It is not known how 
many were satyr plays, or how many were produced at the Lenaea versus the Dionysia. 
 
 
2
 Chorus: 1456a; OT: Poetics 1452a, 1453b, 1454b, 1455a, 1460a. 
 
 
3
 E.g. Vita 20-2, Σ Soph. Aj. 693b, Σ Soph. OC 668, [Longinus] De Subl. 33.5. 
 
 
4
 The translation is mine. 
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Though this explanation of Sophocles’ nickname is at odds with other sources, who typically 
associate him with the honey rather than the bee and call him sweet with reference to his poetic 
style,
5
 it suggests a useful way to think about his aims and methods of dramatic composition.  No 
poet works in a vacuum, perhaps especially when he lives in Athens for the better part of the 
fifth century B.C. and writes texts for public performance. 
 But Sophocles’ debts to contemporary dramatists – or as we might rather think of them, 
the bits of literary nectar he gleaned from them – have received surprisingly little scholarly 
attention.  It is the aim of this study to sketch in some of the dramatic context in which Sophocles 
wrote his plays, including a few items that have been almost completely neglected by modern 
scholarship; we will be interested both in what Sophocles gleaned from his peers and how he 
used those bits of literary nectar, and in what the other dramatists found useful about Sophocles’ 
work.  In other words, this is a study of dramatic intertextuality and inspiration.  Moreover, I 
hope not only to offer new readings of select plays and fill important gaps in the scholarship, but 
also to prompt a larger-scale reassessment of Sophocles’ work and how it relates to that of other 
playwrights, especially Euripides.  Though these two have often been viewed as representatives 
of fundamentally different types of tragedy, I shall try to bring them closer together by showing 
how closely and frequently they engaged with one another’s material.  Finally, I will argue that 
essentially collaborative and constructive types of interaction between poets enabled drama to 
continue to develop and flourish through the late fifth century – a time of widespread creativity, 
experimentation, and growth fueled by the poets’ constant attention to what was happening in 
their theater. 
 
                                                 
 
5
 The ancient critics are collected in TrGF IV under the heading “Sophocles suavis” as testimonia 108-14.  For a 
skeptical approach to the ancient biographical traditions, see Fairweather 1974 and 1984, Lefkowitz 2012. 
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The Scholarly Background: Comedy 
 Recent work in Old Comedy provides us with a basic model for tragic interaction.  The 
comic poets interacted with each other most conspicuously by hurling creative insults in their 
parabases.  But, though the context is undeniably agonistic and polemical, the comic poets’ 
insults are not as straightforward as they appear.  Scholars have come to see the comic parabasis 
and its invective as participating in a system of “ritualized insults” in the iambographic tradition, 
a sort of game of one-upsmanship in which, though there was something to be gained from a 
rival’s discomfiture, the terms were partly or even entirely artificial.  Comic poets constructed 
personae both for themselves and for each other, and as they continued to develop those personae 
on a yearly basis, they even appropriated and built on their rivals’ insults.  Malcolm Heath was 
the first to describe this atmosphere of competitive creativity:
6
 
 “Reading through the comic fragments in bulk gives the impression that there was a common 
 pool or repertoire of comic material: anything put on stage in a comedy would become public 
 property and be absorbed into the repertoire, so that all comic poets contributed to it; and all 
 drew on it, although each would aim to give a new and original twist to the material which he 
 borrowed, so that the repertoire constantly evolved. … The charges of plagiarism are part of a 
 system of ritualized insults; they are not meant to be believed, but to make the other party lose 
 face.” 
 
In short, the comic poets’ interactions are polemical on a competitive level, as they attempt to 
score points at each other’s expense in pursuit of the prize in the dramatic competition, but 
constructive on a compositional level, as they develop material already tried out in earlier plays. 
 Zachary Biles and Ian Ruffell have both built on Heath’s point in their readings of the 
intertextual relationship between Aristophanes and Cratinus in the 420s.
7
  Though the parabasis 
                                                 
 
6
 Heath 1990: 152. 
 
 
7
 Biles 2002 (reprinted in Biles 2011: 134-66) and Ruffell 2002 (reprinted in Ruffell 2011: 361-426).  Biles 
links his project explicitly to Heath’s; Ruffell (pp. 138-9) apparently tries to distance himself from Heath, though it 
is not entirely fair to reduce Heath’s argument to suggesting that the poets merely drew on “a common stock or 
repertoire of jokes,” since he, like Ruffell, duly considers the role of innovation in contributing to the pool.  Ruffell 
(p. 141) also compares comic composition to the speeches in Pl. Symp., which “each take off from the previous 
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of Knights and then Cratinus’ Pytine were written with polemical intent (on the competitive 
level), both poets in turn creatively exploited each other’s ideas in the development of Cratinus’ 
persona.  Cratinus first created an image of himself as one who, in the tradition of Archilochus, 
drew poetic inspiration from wine;
8
 Aristophanes’ Knights put a new twist on that persona by 
attacking Cratinus as a washed-up drunk; and Cratinus responded by making himself the subject 
of an entire play about alcoholism, comedy, and poetic inspiration.  Each poet scored a point on 
the other, as it were, but they did so by creatively building on ideas that had been introduced in 
previous plays.  Moreover, the development of the image of Cratinus is not limited to a pair of 
plays but extends through at least three, and in the end Cratinus returns to his own material while 
also taking into account Aristophanes’ manipulation of it.  This particular example of comic 
intertextuality, then, is both polemical and constructive. 
 In moving beyond simple ideas of personal rivalry and antagonism, scholars of comedy 
have made sound progress toward achieving a better understanding of the mechanisms and 
purpose of comic invective, as well as illuminating the creative environment of comic 
composition.  Scholars of tragedy, I suggest, have much to gain from this basic approach, 
especially since interactions between tragedians tend to be oversimplified.  For instance, it has 
often been imagined that tragic intertextuality (even between poets not actually competing with 
                                                                                                                                                             
player’s, using a new perspective and new resources to reinterpret the old material.”  See also Halliwell 1993, Rosen 
2000. 
 
 
8
 That Cratinus was the orginator of this image of himself is the argument of Biles 2002; Ruffell 2002 thinks 
that the image first appears in Ar. Eq., but he is looking at other comic poets’ abuse of Cratinus rather than Cratinus’ 
own work. 
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each other
9
) is characterized by outright rejection rather than creativity.
10
  Burnett’s summary of 
Euripides’ Orestes is a good example of this general attitude:11 
“The sequence of Orestes’ adventures … allows the poet to make a commentary upon the 
Oresteia.  Aeschylus had based the successful resolution of his trilogy upon a pair of related 
premises, arguing that political institutions could reflect divine Dike in an earthly 
administration of justice and that pious, innocent human beings do exist.  Now Euripides, after 
half a century, uses his Orestean play to challenge both of these assumptions.  He attacks the 
secular optimism of the Eumenides by showing a tyrant, a wise aristocrat, and a democratic 
polis, all equally unable to act justly in Orestes’ case, and meanwhile he makes a fundamental 
criticism of the view of human nature that is found in the Choephoroi.” 
 
Words like “challenge,” “attacks,” and “criticism” all suggest that Euripides means to refute 
Aeschylus’ views, while the substance of Burnett’s discussion really only shows that the world 
of the Oresteia is different from that of Orestes; the clash between those two worlds in 
Euripides’ play is what causes the failure of a number of dramatic actions (to use Burnett’s 
terms) and creates an atmosphere of absurdity.  It seems to me that rather than criticizing 
                                                 
 
9
 One difficulty in imagining that comic expectations of competitive one-upsmanship applied equally to tragedy 
is that Euripides, who repeatedly “parodies” Aeschylus, never actually competed against him directly.  His use of 
Aeschylean material may be intended to demonstrate his poetic σοφία (on which see Winnington-Ingram 1969a), 
thus promoting his bid in the dramatic competition, but he has less at stake in seeing Aeschylus lose face as well. 
 
 
10
 Such arguments often employ the idea of parody, apparently equating it with a rejection of the model text, as 
if parody is inherently critical; e.g. Bond 1974, Hammond 1984, Silk 1993; Hammond even suggests (p. 386) that 
Euripides’ “parody” of Aesch. Cho. was provoked by his recent loss in the dramatic competition to a reperformance 
of the Oresteia and, if I follow his logic correctly, seems to think that Soph. El. was meant as a reassertion of serious 
tragedy in the face of Euripides’ antics.  However, modern theories of parody generally assume a more constructive 
model of interaction (e.g. Hutcheon 1985, Goldhill 1991: 206-22, Rose 1993, Dentith 2000).  Thus, Aristophanes’ 
tragic parodies are not simply critical but acknowledge tragedy as a serious genre and use it to raise comedy to the 
same level.  Aristophanic parody, while assuming an aggressive tone to assert the dominance of comedy over 
tragedy, also necessarily acknowledges a comic debt to tragedy (see e.g. Taplin 1983, Silk 2000b; Cratinus (fr. 342) 
found enough similarity between Aristophanes and Euripides to make a joke out of it). 
 
 
11
 Burnett 1971: 205.  Owen 1936: 146-7 similarly imagines two main arguments for dating the Electra plays in 
one order or the other: “Of one thing, however, we may feel confident, that whichever was the first impelled the 
other dramatist to show his opposition.  If Sophocles had written his play before Euripides, the latter would have 
been bound to feel indignation at the matricide being followed by little compunction and no punishment; equally the 
εὐκολία of Sophocles would have been upset by a drama which made the tragic heroine so repulsive and brought the 
heroic legend into such a squalid environment;” cf. Segal 1966: 521 n. 61 on the same topic.  Cf. Fuqua 1976, who 
carefully and thoroughly examines the relation between Soph. Phil. and Eur. Or. but still concludes that Euripides 
means to reject Sophocles’ view of heroism and society; Winnington-Ingram 1980: 299 n. 60, who essentially 
suggests that Soph. Phil. is meant to show Euripides how to write proper tragedy; Falkner 1983, who speaks (p. 290) 
of Eur. Or. as “little short of parody” of Soph. Phil. and adds (p. 300) that “Euripides rejects this Sophoclean 
optimism;” and Dunn 1996: 176, who says of the opening of Or. that “[t]he sustained parody, here as throughout the 
play, rejects the model of Aeschylus, defacing rather than deepening the tragic predecessor.” 
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Aeschylean dramaturgy, Euripides is using the Oresteia to bring out the immorality and 
powerlessness of his own characters, and in this way his reworking of the other poet’s material 
contributes fundamentally to the unique dynamic of Orestes. 
 Indeed, even when a poet designed his play in a way that ran directly counter to what his 
predecessor had done, we should not automatically think of it as a rejection of the earlier poet’s 
ideas.  The Electra plays, for instance, certainly draw their inspiration from Aeschylus’ 
Choephoroi, even though both Sophocles and Euripides have made very different choices with 
regard to plot and character.  Both decided, in contrast to Aeschylus, to make Electra instead of 
Orestes the central figure, the one who pushes most vehemently for vengeance.  This does not 
mean that Sophocles and Euripides reject the Aeschylean version but that they noticed the 
dramatic potential in what he did not do.
12
 
 So the comic model provided by Heath, Biles, and Ruffell will allow us to move beyond 
ideas of simple rejection and put us in a better position to appreciate the creativity and 
sophistication of the tragedians’ engagement with their dramatic context.  But a comic model 
must of course be adapted when applied to tragedy.  I have suggested, for instance, that parabatic 
interaction in Old Comedy operates on two levels, a polemical competitive level and a 
constructive compositional level.  Biles and Ruffell stress the importance of the first level in 
determining the dynamics of comic invective: the audience expected to see the poets compete 
with each other, and the genre’s tradition of “ritualized insults” become formalized as the 
parabasis, a part of the play where the poet could, in the manner of a Homeric warrior, take the 
                                                 
 
12
 Cf. Sommerstein 2012, who argues that Sophocles often attempted to surpass Aeschylus in theatricality or 
complexity; this does not imply rejection of Aeschylus’ ideas but that Sophocles used Aeschylean tragedy as a 
starting point for further innovation.  Indeed, the current study suggests that the poets’ desire to improve on each 
other’s work is what motivated the development and growth of drama throughout the fifth century. 
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opportunity for extensive self-presentation and attempt to out-boast his opponents.
13
  As a genre, 
comedy puts a high premium on transgression, and the parabasis almost seems specially 
designed to showcase the poet’s transgression of both social and dramatic boundaries.14  But it is 
not clear that the same competitive expectations apply to tragedy – which, after all, has no 
formalized arena for polemic such as the comic parabasis
15
 – nor that we are justified in 
interpreting tragic interactions in a polemical light.  Therefore, the current project sets aside the 
competitive and polemical level of interaction in order to explore tragic intertextuality as 
constructive on the level of poetic composition. 
 
The Scholarly Background: Tragedy 
 This study applies the comic model of constructive interaction to Sophocles in order to 
examine his engagement with contemporary playwrights of both tragedy and comedy.  Rather 
surprisingly, this is not a common endeavor in modern scholarship, which tends to treat 
Sophocles in relative isolation from other dramatists.  The vast majority of monographs on 
Sophocles are just that – they have little or no interest in any other playwright and seek instead to 
offer a new reading of extant Sophocles from a particular perspective.
16
  Blundell’s Helping 
Friends and Harming Enemies (to take one example) offers new interpretations of all seven 
surviving Sophoclean tragedies from the angle of ethics and naturally has little to say about 
                                                 
 
13
 On “flyting” in Homer, see e.g. Muellner 1976, Martin 1989: 65-77, Lowry 1995. 
 
 
14
 Biles 2011 offers a new formulation of the comic parabasis as a venue for poetic transgression and self-
advertisement. 
 
 
15
 There is an ancient tradition that Sophocles and Euripides experimented with parabases in their tragedies 
(Pollux 4.111), but see Cairns 2005. 
 
 
16
 Books about Sophocles alone include Bowra 1944, Knox 1964, Long 1968, Gellie 1972, Hay 1978, Reinhardt 
1979, Burton 1980, Winnington-Ingram 1980, Segal 1981, Seale 1982, Gardiner 1987, Greengard 1987, Blundell 
1989, Segal 1993, Wilson 1997, Ringer 1998, Visser 1998, Ormand 1999, Budelmann 2000, Lefèvre 2001, 
MacLeod 2001, Ahrensdorf 2009. 
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Aeschylus or Euripides.  Relationships between playwrights also receive little attention in studies 
that do not focus solely on one playwright but instead analyze a particular idea, theme, or device 
in all three of the tragedians.  Buxton’s Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, for example, is an 
excellent study of the Greek concept of πειθώ, Greek attitudes toward speech and rhetoric, and 
how these ideas are exploited in tragedies by all of the “big three” tragedians; but it is not a book 
about the style of individual poets, much less an investigation of dramatic interaction.  Books 
like Blundell’s and Buxton’s add much to our understanding of ancient dramaturgy and the 
poets’ use of important themes and devices; individually, they have no reason to expand the 
study to include dramatic interaction.  Nevertheless, the accumulation of work that adheres to 
one basic pattern or the other has made us accustomed to reading Sophocles apart from his 
dramatic context.  It seems to me that if we remain unaware of his relation to other playwrights, 
we risk missing out on some of his creativity and complexity, as well as his significance to the 
people who lived and wrote during his own time. 
 So, like Blundell’s, this study seeks to read Sophoclean drama from a new angle, that of 
contemporary tragedy and comedy.  While we will be interested in several different playwrights, 
putting Sophocles into his dramatic context inevitably means devoting a significant amount of 
space to the relationship between Sophocles and Euripides, whose careers overlapped for about 
fifty years and whose late work is relatively well represented in the surviving texts.  Of late, 
Euripidean critics have rightly stressed the variety and versatility of their poet, but where 
Sophocles comes in, he usually serves as little more than a foil for Euripides – the paradigm of 
tragedy that Euripides characteristically seeks either to surpass or to undermine. 
 A good example of this position is Ann Michelini’s book on Euripides and the Tragic 
Tradition, which opens with a history of Euripidean scholarship that demonstrates the difficulty 
9 
 
many critics have had in describing Euripides’ tragic style.  Michelini characterizes Euripides’ 
attitude toward Sophocles as one of jealous rivalry, whereby Euripides responded to the other 
poet’s regular success in the dramatic competitions by continually creating types of drama that 
were opposite to Sophocles’.17  We have already glanced at the competitive environment of 
ancient tragedy and concluded that there is no sure basis for presuming that rivalry influenced 
the tragedians’ composition of their work in this way; and in fact Michelini has been criticized 
for making Euripides into a “poor sport.”18  She does, however, put her finger on an important 
point of tragic criticism by arguing that Euripides is essentially indefinable.  One effective way 
to demonstrate the extent of his variety is to compare his work to the more “consistent” (and 
smaller) corpora of Aeschylus and Sophocles: describing Sophoclean work as “ideal,” 
“balanced,” or “classical,” shows how extreme, non-traditional, and provocative Euripidean 
dramaturgy could be.  As a result, the notion of a polarity between Sophoclean and Euripidean 
dramatic styles persists in much modern scholarship.
19
  Michelini thus makes explicit a number 
of critical assumptions about Sophocles and Euripides that are quite common but usually remain 
unacknowledged and unexamined. 
 A recent challenge to this position has been made by Mastronarde in his book on The Art 
of Euripides.  While Mastronarde does not deny Euripidean variety, he is willing to consider his 
engagement with other tragedians in a more positive light.  Mastronarde is able to bring 
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 Michelini 1987 (esp. pp. 52-69). 
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 It is noteworthy that the most critical reviews of Michelini’s book (Dunn 1993 and esp. Diggle 1989) have 
nothing to say about her presentation of the polarity between Euripides and Sophocles.  Another recent book on 
tragic intertextuality, Janka 2004, notes (p. 69) that Michelini emphasizes Euripides over Sophocles and focuses on 
his “generalisierbare künstlerische Aussage oder politisch-philosophische Tendenz” rather than dramaturgy or 
development; Janka seeks to redress the balance by examining more precisely the dialogue between two plays, 
Soph. Trach. and Eur. Hipp.  However, he still sees the relationship between Sophocles and Euripides as one of 
reaction and response rather than construction and expansion. 
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Euripides back into the “mainstream” of fifth-century tragedy both by examining his interest in 
older tragic techniques and by granting that poets like Sophocles could be equally experimental 
and provocative.  Though Mastronarde is primarily interested in Euripides and therefore has little 
discussion of Sophocles specifically, his view of Euripidean dramaturgy as constructively 
engaged with its own tragic tradition is fundamentally similar to my take on Sophocles.  In this 
study, as we reconstruct Sophocles’ dramatic context and explore his interactions with 
contemporary playwrights, we will also be bringing him closer to Euripides.  Where Sophocles is 
often idealized, I will not be trying to demonstrate his flaws but rather his variety, his curiosity, 
his provocativeness, because in the end it is Sophocles who suffers more from idealization and 
polarity than Euripides.  Euripides is allowed to provoke his audience, question their values, 
surprise them, anger them, disgust them, while Sophocles (we imagine) simply continues to give 
them what they want. 
 In fact, I will be arguing basically that Sophocles and Euripides often made similar points 
and aimed at similar effects, but that Sophocles did so less overtly than Euripides; he was thus 
equally bold in his conception but less aggressive in his manner of presentation, and that is why 
the similarity between the two poets has often gone unnoticed.  If we are to bring these two poets 
together, we must be willing to see Sophocles as changing, developing, and experimenting, and 
we must be willing to see Euripides as constructively interested in what his fellow dramatists had 
to say. 
 
Sophocles Μέλιττα 
 This project finds its roots in the model of interaction set forth in recent comic 
scholarship and in Mastronarde’s more expansive and constructive view of Euripidean 
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dramaturgy.  But as a study of intertextuality, it could assume various forms along a spectrum of 
possibilities.  The basic division is one of scale:  do we focus on verbal echoes in individual 
words and lines or on central themes and concepts?  Though tragic intertextuality is seldom 
studied on a large scale, the best representatives of these two models are Richard Garner’s From 
Homer to Tragedy: The Art of Allusion in Greek Poetry and R.P. Winnington-Ingram’s book-
length interpretation of Sophoclean tragedy.
20
  Garner’s main interest is in the various techniques 
used by the tragedians to create specific allusions to their literary tradition (including early lyric 
and epic as well as tragedy).  Since he covers so much ground (all of fifth-century tragedy!), he 
cannot devote much space to interpretation of any one play, and his discussion often reads rather 
like a commentary as he collects and surveys allusions on a play-by-play basis.  By contrast, 
Winnington-Ingram ranges beyond allusions and verbal echoes to explore Sophocles’ 
preoccupation throughout his career with Aeschylean ideas and patterns.  He offers full 
interpretations of most of Sophocles’ surviving plays, as well as individual discourses on such 
topics as the poets’ views on fate and the gods. 
 In terms of scope and conception, the current project falls somewhere between the 
approaches represented by Garner and Winnington-Ingram (though closer to the latter).  I am 
interested less in specific allusions and more in how the poets interacted on the level of theme 
and concept.  Further, where Garner observes the “gap” between texts that keeps them distinct 
from each other, thus allowing the reader to notice the allusion and prompting him to think about 
its meaning, I focus on the integration of different poetic styles within individual texts.
21
  This is 
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 Garner 1990, Winnington-Ingram 1980. 
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 In this respect, my approach is somewhat akin to that taken by Fuqua 1976, which traces dramatic interaction 
between Soph. Phil. and Eur. Or. through “mythical paradigms” rather than verbal correspondences.  By paying 
attention to similarities of theme and narrative structure, he is able first to show how the Sophoclean Neoptolemus is 
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not to say that all plays become essentially identical to one another but that the point of contact 
between two texts is not single and discrete.
22
  Rather, a play can be a complex combination of 
Sophoclean and Euripidean (and other) elements from a number of previous plays so that it is 
neither easy nor particularly meaningful to try to sort out the Euripidean from the Sophoclean.  
To borrow Hutcheon’s definition of parody,23 all intertextuality is also in some way “repetition 
with a difference,” even if the difference is only one of context.  But parody and allusion can 
only be recognizable and effective if the audience notices that difference and is curious about it; 
the difference itself is what encourages them to seek further meaning.  By contrast, larger-scale 
intertexuality which involves an exchange of themes, ideas, or dramatic strategies tends rather to 
efface the difference or at least not to rely on it to prompt interpretation and create meaning. 
 On the other hand, my study is in some ways less broad than Winnington-Ingram’s.  
Where I focus on one or two themes that are important to individual plays in the late fifth 
century, Winnington-Ingram identifies a number of Aeschylean ideas and reads most of extant 
Sophocles through this lens while generally leaving specific connections between plays 
unexamined.  For instance, the tragedy of Creon in Sophocles’ Antigone evokes the pattern of 
hubris and punishment generally associated with Aeschylus and represented perhaps most clearly 
by Xerxes in the Persians, but does not necessarily depend on any one source; it is rather 
                                                                                                                                                             
patterned after the Homeric Telemachus, and then to explore Euripides’ subversion of the Telemachean paradigm, 
even though Telemachus is mentioned only once in these two plays. 
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 Fuqua 1976: 29-30 defends his “paradigmatic” approach (see previous n.) thus:  “Most current studies of 
individual dramas or the genre as a whole are relatively conservative in their approach; interpretation is, for the most 
part, restricted to the direct evidence of the text, analogies with other texts, and studies of particular techniques such 
as examinations of plot types and different forms of dramatic action.  While this restraint has placed our 
understanding of the genre on a secure footing, I believe that there are certain important aspects of the medium for 
which it is not totally suited.  The most important of these in my opinion concerns the evocation of mythical 
paradigms which, while they may lie beyond the immediate context of the drama, nevertheless shaped the author’s 
conception and the audience’s response to the characters on stage.” 
 
 
23
 Hutcheon 1985. 
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Sophocles’ general response to a general Aeschylean tendency – which is not unlikely, but one 
wonders whether the argument can be taken farther.  Of course, since all of Aeschylus’ surviving 
plays were produced before the extant Sophoclean corpus, it is often difficult to find specific 
links between plays, and Winnington-Ingram’s study nevertheless offers valuable material for 
anyone attempting to reconstruct the dramatic ideas that were most important to Sophocles when 
he sat down to write his plays. 
 Studying small and specific allusions has one marked advantage in that it is fairly easy to 
establish a secure connection between plays on the basis of verbal similarity.  Since the current 
project does not explore such similarities, except in the final chapter, it may not always be self-
evident that certain plays should be put into contact with one another and the burden of proof 
will be on me to provide a persuasive justification in each case.  In order to lighten that burden 
somewhat, I have chosen to study plays that might reasonably be expected to have influenced 
one another, especially those that are close in date or that deal with the same mythical material.  
By focusing on late Sophocles as a relatively firm foundation for this sort of investigation, I do 
not mean to imply that early work should not or cannot be studied in the same way; but as 
uncertainties of dating and disparity of subject matter would make the task more tenuous, the 
overall argument about dramatic engagement offered here would be less compelling.  I therefore 
begin with the more tractable material. 
 The primary aim of this study is to situate Sophocles (or at least, late Sophocles) within 
his immediate dramatic context.  When I speak of a play’s “immediate dramatic context,” I have 
in mind something like the “pool” of available dramatic material described by Heath.24  This 
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 See above, p. 3.  Recent work on Herodotus has also been interested in the historian’s interactions with 
contemporary writers; see esp. Thomas 2000 and Raaflaub 2002, who speaks of a “pool of knowledge” and  the 
“pool of ‘intellectuals’.” 
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pool was constantly growing as playwrights modified and experimented with material that 
seemed to have additional dramatic potential.  If a poet developed an idea (as Aristophanes 
developed Cratinus’ persona), the result, upon being produced in the theater, also entered the 
pool where others could find it and develop it further.  This was the literary environment 
frequented by Sophocles the honeybee in his search for likely material.  So in my interpretations 
I will be asking what was in the pool when Sophocles sat down to write certain plays, what he 
did with the material that he found there, what he contributed in turn, and what other playwrights 
found appealing about his contributions.  The goal, in other words, is to (begin to) understand 
how Sophocles interacted with other playwrights who were active at the same time – both as a 
source of inspiration for them and as an exploiter and developer of their ideas. 
 It would be impossible to reconstruct in full the immediate dramatic context of any one 
Sophoclean play, both (paradoxically) because of the sheer amount of potentially relevant 
material and because of how little has actually survived.  No doubt Sophocles’ dramatic context, 
and how he engaged with that context, would look infinitely more complex if we had his and 
Euripides’ lost plays (both tragedies and satyr plays) as well as the work of their numerous 
contemporaries.  Therefore, with the acknowledgement that the treatment given here is inevitably 
smaller and simpler than the reality must have been, this project attempts a survey of Sophocles 
and his immediate dramatic context at the end of the fifth century:  how he made use of well-
known Aeschylean material and recent Euripidean material, how he responded to important 
changes in the way tragedy was written and produced, how he contributed to the development of 
Euripides’ dramatic style (and vice versa) in this most innovative period of Greek drama, and 
how he contributed to the comic poets’ creation of humor and their discourse on the dramatic 
genres. 
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 Finally, this project is intended as a study of the method of dramatic composition and 
production in the fifth century.  Though Sophocles was by far the most successful of the Greek 
tragedians in the festival competitions, what we discover about his dramatic context and how he 
fit into it can inform our understanding of other poets as well, both by filling in specific points of 
contact between them and Sophocles and by altering our basic conception of the development of 
fifth-century drama.  Just as Sophocles drew from the pool of available material, modified what 
he found there, and returned it to the pool, so did other playwrights, continually and 
contemporaneously with Sophocles.  Though the metaphor should not be stretched too far, I 
would like to think of all fifth-century playwrights as honeybees in their own right.  Dramatists 
in this period regularly found useful material in a range of earlier and contemporary writers, and 
though a great deal of their activity can no longer be perceived due to the accidents of survival, it 
seems likely that they were also acutely aware of what was happening in their own genre and 
their own theatrical space from one year to the next.  Dramatists who succeeded in getting their 
plays accepted by the archon could be expected to reflect the latest developments in the theater.  
Some ideas did not take hold, but those that did could be expanded, inverted, experimented with, 
and built upon.  If all of this is so, then the world of ancient theater was one in which every 
active member was always alert to what other members were up to; we might say that the ancient 
dramatists worked in an atmosphere of “extreme interaction,” where literary dialogues could 
span multiple plays and multiple poets.  Sophocles, then, provides a very prominent and 
accessible model of the sort of intertextuality undertaken by every playwright in fifth-century 
Athens. 
 Except for the last (which is more comprehensive), each of the following chapters has a 
dual focus:  Sophocles’ relationship with a particular poet in terms of a particular point of 
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dramaturgy.  While every poetic relationship examined here has two sides to it, since each poet 
influences and is influenced by the other, we are not always in a position to be able to explore 
both sides.  For instance, all proposed dates known to me for Sophocles’ earliest surviving plays 
are later than Aeschylus’ Oresteia; even though we know that those two poets competed with 
each other for ten or fifteen years, we cannot say much about how Aeschylus adapted 
Sophoclean material beyond the tradition that Sophocles added the third actor, which Aeschylus 
used very effectively in the Oresteia. 
 Chapter 2 examines the divine apparatus of Sophocles’ Electra and posits an Aeschylean 
inspiration.  Though Aeschylus’ career ended some forty years before Electra is thought to have 
been written, the Oresteia continued to be immediately relevant to later generations of 
playwrights, both because it was the best-known dramatization of the myth and because it was 
probably still being performed after Aeschylus’ death.  My focus is on Choephoroi, which is 
characterized by a relatively transparent divine world and a convergence of divine and human 
powers; Electra, on the other hand, reverses those ideas, fragmenting the divine world among the 
human characters, problematizing the gods’ relation to the human world, and even questioning 
their relevance to the action of the play.  Sophocles’ use of Aeschylean material is oppositional 
but constructive:  he appreciated Aeschylus’ strategy with respect to the gods and noticed the 
dramatic potential in using the reverse strategy in his own version of the myth.  Further, 
Sophocles’ relatively agnostic and critical vision of the gods is more akin to what we normally 
expect to find in Euripides and perhaps shows a commonality of interest between those two 
playwrights in the 410s. 
 Chapter 3 explores the dramatic self-consciousness of much late tragedy, and especially 
the “untragic” plays of Euripides.  I trace a dialogue between Euripides and Sophocles 
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concerning the nature of dramatic composition and performance in three tragedies written in 
close succession (Helen, Philoctetes, Orestes), all of which contain a “play within a play.”  
Though modern scholarship has occasionally noticed the connections between Philoctetes and 
the so-called “romances” on the one hand, and Philoctetes and Orestes on the other hand, it is 
very seldom that the entire cluster is treated together.  This chapter attempts to show how 
Philoctetes acts as a bridge of sorts between the romances and Orestes by adapting and 
expanding Euripides’ metadramatic concerns in Helen and then providing material for further 
adaption in Orestes.  Philoctetes can thus be viewed as a Sophoclean take on Euripides’ recent 
dramaturgical preoccupations, while Orestes, “the most Euripidean of Euripidean plays,”25 then 
becomes a Euripidean take on a Sophoclean take on Euripides’ thoughts about drama.  This is 
the essence of extreme dramatic interaction. 
 Chapter 4 explores Sophocles’ final play, Oedipus at Colonus, and its relation to 
Euripides’ recent Theban plays.  Of the two dramatic contexts most relevant to Sophocles’ 
treatment of this myth (his earlier Antigone and Oedipus Tyrannus, and Euripides’ more recent 
Phoenissae, Hypsipyle, Oedipus, and Antigone), the first has been widely recognized while the 
second goes all but unmentioned.  This chapter examines three figures in Phoenissae and 
Oedipus at Colonus, arguing that Euripides’ dramatization of the Labdacid myth contributes key 
ideas to the characterization of Antigone, Polyneices, and Oedipus in Sophocles’ latest play.  We 
are thus able to see not only the continuity of Sophocles’ thought from Antigone and Oedipus 
Tyrannus to Oedipus at Colonus, but also how significantly his conception of the characters 
changed under Euripides’ influence.  Rather than being quintessentially Sophoclean types, the 
characters of Oedipus at Colonus are amalgamations of several tragedies by both poets. 
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 Zeitlin 1980: 51. 
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 My final chapter attempts to fill an especially large gap in Sophoclean scholarship:  
Sophocles’ relation to comedy and comic parody.  This chapter surveys the comic poets’ use of 
Sophoclean drama (both tragedy and satyr play), organizing examples in order of increasing 
complexity, and this allows me to demonstrate the types of interaction I have had in mind 
throughout this study.  Many instances of comic-Sophoclean intertextuality deal with specific 
words and phrases, but there are many others that contribute to a deeper level of meaning; the 
comic poet adopts Sophoclean ideas or strategies and manipulates them to suit the themes of his 
own play or even builds entire scenes on the basis of Sophoclean themes.  This far-reaching 
discussion of Sophocles’ relation to an entire genre also illustrates some of the main themes of 
this study, such as the danger of oversimplifying and idealizing Sophoclean drama, which may 
explain why a thorough investigation of Sophocles and comedy has not yet been performed:  the 
assumption that Sophocles was “too tragic” to be mocked has discouraged scholars from even 
looking at the evidence. 
 In short, what this project seeks to do is situate Sophocles with respect to established 
spheres of scholarly inquiry and within dramatic contexts that are frequently discussed.  Given 
that Aristophanes (and other comic poets, such as Strattis) were growing increasingly interested 
in tragedy and its potential to create comic material, how does Sophocles fit into this?  Given that 
Aeschylean tragedy continued to be performed and thought about even well after that poet’s 
death, how does Sophocles fit into this?  Given that tragedy (especially Euripidean tragedy) was 
becoming especially innovative and experimental in the last decades of the fifth century, how 
does Sophocles fit into this? 
 This study aims to provide a few glimpses of that complex world of dramatic interaction 
using Sophocles as an exemplar.  It must be acknowledged that there were many other dramatists 
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active in the fifth century than just the “big three;” there were many, many more tragedies than 
the thirty-two that have come down to us.  This goes without saying, but it bears repeating: the 
world of fifth-century drama (both tragedy and comedy) was infinitely more complex, richer, 
and more elaborate than we can now see, so in the end, this study can only scrape the tip of the 
iceberg.  Where I have examined Sophocles’ use of one or two plays, there may have been many 
others that he found useful, though we know nothing (or almost nothing) about any of them.  
Nevertheless, my goal is to offer an approximate model of how the poets developed and 
experimented with each other’s ideas near the end of the fifth century.  Though he was more 
prominent and more successful in competition than many of his peers, I take Sophocles’ work to 
be basically representative of these dynamics.  How Sophocles dealt with other playwrights’ 
work, and how they responded to or exploited his work, is essentially how all drama happened in 
that period. 
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Sophocles Θεοφιλής?: 
Fragmentation and Agnosticism in Electra 
 
 
 
 
 
 We open our study with the earliest of Sophocles’ late plays, Electra.  While most 
scholars agree that this tragedy belongs to the 410s,
1
 it is uncertain whether it came before or 
after various of Euripides’ late plays (especially his Electra) and therefore whether it influenced 
or was influenced by them.  For this reason, it would inevitably be contentious to construct an 
argument about how Sophocles’ Electra relates to these contemporary plays, so I turn instead to 
a different part of Electra’s immediate dramatic context: the Aeschylean context, represented 
chiefly by Choephoroi.  Sophocles’ engagement with late tragedy will be dealt with in the next 
two chapters, where we are on firmer ground with Philoctetes and Oedipus at Colonus. 
 It is both convenient and credible to relate Choephoroi and Electra because they both 
treat the same story and there is little doubt that the one influenced the other,
2
 though it is not 
entirely clear how an audience of the late fifth century would have known Aeschylus’ work.  It is 
possible that the Oresteia (or its individual plays) was read in the schools, recited at symposia, or 
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 Friis Johansen 1964 (placing it after Eur. El.), Jebb lvi-lviii, Kamerbeek 1974: 5-8, Vögler 1967: 187-8.  
Klimpe 1970: 161-2 places it from three to ten years prior to 414/3 (his accepted date of Eur. IT); Owen 1936 
represents the opposite extreme and dates it between 413 and 408.  Post 1953 and Konstan 2008 (apparently 
independently) date El. precisely to 410, after the coup of the Four Hundred; rather less plausibly, Post sees Phil. the 
following year as a retraction.  Finglass 2007: 1-4 remains cautiously agnostic. 
 
 
2
 See esp. Garner 1990: 117-27. 
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reperformed in the deme theaters;
3
 Aristophanic parodies show that it was still known in the late 
fifth century.
4
  Thus, even though Choephoroi was originally produced some forty years before 
Electra, it was still topical when Sophocles sat down to write his play and thus should be 
considered an important part of Electra’s immediate dramatic context.  In this case, however, the 
Aeschylean influence operates oppositionally:  rather then simply imitating or even building on 
Aeschylus’ depiction of the divine world, Sophocles takes exactly the opposite approach, thereby 
producing a play with very different implications.
5
  The neat reversal suggests that Sophocles 
had Aeschylus in mind when he wrote, though it need not be polemical.   Sophocles does not so 
much reject Aeschylus’ view as create a new vision of his own, a new world for new characters 
to inhabit and interact with in new ways. 
 The focus of our examination will be religion, or better, the presentation of the divine 
world in each play.  An ancient tradition regarded Sophocles as the most pious of all (θεοφιλὴς ὁ 
Σοφοκλῆς ὡς οὐκ ἄλλος),6 and older scholarship duly tried to categorize him as either “pietist” 
or “humanist.”  But Sophocles’ personal religious beliefs are of course unknowable, and more 
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 For Aeschylus in the Athenian curriculum, see Hutchinson 1985: xl-xlii, Sommerstein 1996b: 868n. (adducing 
Pl. Resp. 2.383c).  It has long been assumed that Aeschylus’ plays were revived for competition in the Theater of 
Dionysus; but see Hutchinson 1985: xlii-xliii and esp. Biles 2006/7.  Reperformances in the deme theaters is still 
quite likely (this may be what Dicaeopolis refers to at Ar. Ach. 9-11; cf. Biles 2006/7: 226-7), and Csapo 2010: 89-
95 is able to cite evidence that Sophocles and Euripides produced tragedies in the demes (where both they and their 
audiences may have come into contact with Aeschylean drama).  Nub. 1353-72 reflects an interest in tragic 
recitation (including both old and new plays) at the symposia; see further Lai 1997.  In a slightly different vein, see 
Rosen 2006. 
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 E.g. Ar. Ran. 1126-8 = Aesch. Cho. 1-3; the parabasis of Nub. (534-6) appears to draw on the recognition 
scene of Cho., and there may also be an echo at Ach. 478 (~ Cho. 750). 
 
 
5
 E.g. the prologue, where Orestes considers staying to hear Electra’s lament but ultimately does not, gestures 
toward Aeschylus’ treatment while signaling that Sophocles’ play will take a different tack (thus Segal 1966: 515, 
Finglass 2007: 6).  Finglass also (pp. 7-8) briefly sketches Sophocles’ preference for Homer’s version of the story 
over Aeschylus’, on which see also Davidson 1988, 1999/2000. 
 
 
6
 Vita 12.41 (= Soph. T 1).  See also the sources collected in TrGF under “Sophocles et Aesculapius;” 
Sophocles is said to have received a prophetic dream from Heracles, welcomed Asclepius into his house, and been 
heroized himself under the name Dexion (but see Connolly 1998). 
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recently it has become standard to emphasize the opacity of Sophoclean gods:  they are rarely 
brought on stage in his extant plays, and while we might suspect that they are working behind the 
scenes somehow, we are rarely sure how or why.
7
 
 A good example is provided by Oedipus Tyrannus.  Though no god actually appears in 
this play, Apollo is thoroughly implicated in the action.  He has given two critical oracles, one to 
Creon regarding the plague and one to Oedipus concerning his parents.  The first motivates 
Oedipus’ curse upon, and search for, the murderer of Laius, while the other has prompted him to 
leave Corinth for good and travel to Thebes, where the oracle is then fulfilled.  No few readers 
have suspected Apollo’s direct involvement in Oedipus’ fate, since his oracular response (“you 
will kill your father and lie with your mother”) is not the expected answer to Oedipus’ original 
question (“who are my parents?”) and in fact seems designed to make him react in such a way 
that the prophecy will be fulfilled.  Throughout the play, characters are vitally concerned with 
interpreting Apollo’s will and finding out all the details that he already knows.  The prophet 
Teiresias is summoned on the grounds that he “sees the same things as Phoebus” (284-5); but he, 
like the god, refuses to help.  When Oedipus accuses him of plotting his downfall, Teiresias 
responds ἱκανὸς Ἀπόλλων, ᾧ τάδ’ ἐκπρᾶξαι μέλει (377).  After Oedipus has put out his own eyes 
and the shocked chorus asks how he could do such a thing, he says Ἀπόλλων τάδ’ ἦν, Ἀπόλλων, 
φίλοι, ὁ κακὰ κακὰ τελῶν ἐμὰ τάδ’ ἐμὰ πάθεα (1329-30).  But in the very next lines, he goes on 
to say that he did the deed himself.  We are told that Apollo possesses the knowledge and the 
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 E.g. Whitman 1982: 115, Bristol 1987, Parker 1999, Budelmann 2000: 133-94.  Many critics seem to find 
“inscrutability” to be a key part of Sophoclean religion; cf. Lee 1997: 8, Scullion 1999/2000: 230, and Segal 1993: 
34-5, who summarizing others’ interpretations thus:  “Sophocles’ traditional piety is not to be understood as a 
complacent acceptance of beneficent gods but rather as a recognition of the inscrutable and mysterious ‘other’ in 
divinities who exist in a far-off realm untouched by age, change, or time.”  Other scholars measure the piety of his 
characters’ words (e.g. Mikalson 1991; cf. Hammond 1984: 387, who asserts that Soph. El. displays “an untroubled 
faith in Apollo”) or overlay his work with an “Aeschylean” scheme whereby fateful events are the product of divine 
justice (e.g. Kovacs 2009).  For a more agnostic reading, see Ahrensdorf 2009: 14-25. 
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ability to manipulate human lives; is he actually doing so?  Is he causing the future or merely 
predicting it?
8
 
 Sophocles has involved Apollo very closely in the action of the play without making him 
directly or manifestly responsible for any of the human decisions or suffering that we witness on 
stage.  He has provided an Apolline lens through which the spectator may interpret the play, if he 
chooses; but ultimately the spectator will have to decide for himself where the responsibility for 
Oedipus’ fate lies.  Perhaps Apollo is unjustly persecuting an innocent mortal.  Or perhaps 
Apollo is indifferent to human affairs altogether, simply performing his oracular duties and 
becoming the vehicle through which the characters interpret their own actions.  What 
characterizes the religious attitude of Oedipus Tyrannus is its very obscurity, its refusal, despite 
numerous hints, to give any clear indications of divine guilt or causality. 
 Sophocles’ Electra deals with many of the same ideas as Oedipus Tyrannus:  
intrafamilial conflict, murder, and justice, with a particular concentration on the relation between 
the living and the dead.  It has been common to interpret it along the same lines as well, with 
Apollo overseeing the action and directing Orestes’ hand (or being tragically ignored).9  
However, Apollo’s role and the characters’ understanding of the divine world are treated very 
differently in these two plays, and we must not ignore the distinctive religious framework that 
Sophocles constructs for Orestes’ vengeful matricide.  I will try to show that in this play 
Sophocles’ mysterious, distant gods are even more distant than usual – so distant, in fact, that 
they might not even be there at all.  Thus, rather than creating a tension between human action 
and an opaque divine will, Sophocles problematizes religious belief and the way humans act on 
                                                 
 
8
 See e.g. Winnington-Ingram 1980: 178, 319; cf Segal 1966: 482, Gellie 1972: 102-5. 
 
 
9
 E.g. Kitto 1961: 131-7, Seale 1982: 56-83; cf. Budelmann 2000: 180-2.  The first “dark” readings of El. were 
based on the idea that Orestes has failed to ask Apollo whether he approves of the matricide in the first place (see n. 
74 below). 
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it; the play explores different human understandings of the divine (without confirming that they 
are correct), human motivations for murder and revenge, and human attempts at justification.  In 
other words, Sophocles updates Aeschylus’ story of archaic blood vendetta by applying a 
psychological focus and a skeptical religious attitude of the type more commonly associated with 
Euripides. 
 In particular, I am interested in the religious views expressed by the various characters in 
each play (including the choruses), and especially in how they view the process of revenge, its 
relation to justice, and the role of different divine powers, especially Olympian and chthonic.
10
  
In Choephoroi, I argue, the religious beliefs held by the characters are homogeneous, and the 
divine and human worlds unified, with all forces tending toward the same end:  punishment of 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus.
11
  This unity can be seen on two levels.  First of all, the characters 
                                                 
 
10
 Recent scholarship has been cautious in distinguishing a characteristically “chthonic” side of Greek religion.  
Parker 2005: 424-5 fears that “chthonic” is often used too imprecisely; Schlesier 1991/2 represents a more extreme 
approach which denies the validity of the term altogether.  While both raise important points, I prefer the stance 
taken by Scullion 1994 that “chthonic” and “Olympian” are still useful ways to describe different types of rites (e.g. 
libations with wine vs. without) which, he argues, may be used either alone or in combination, depending on the 
perceived character of the deity.  Thus, a “chthonic” deity is one of dangerous and ambivalent disposition who must 
be appeased rather than worshiped (though chthonic deities may be worshiped with more festal rites in certain 
contexts, e.g. when the Furies are approached as Eumenides rather than Erinyes (Scullion 1994: 91-2); Winnington-
Ingram 1980: 269-70 has good remarks on the tragic use of the Olympian/chthonian dichotomy).  Though I will not 
be concerned in this chapter with the niceties of historical Greek ritual, I will be relying on the difference between 
powers that are basically Olympians and chthonians (without implying an essential opposition between them).  As a 
general rule, this is not a distinction that should be insisted upon too firmly, but in the case of Cho. and El., most of 
the powers which I will be describing as “chthonic” are straightforwardly so – either associated directly with the 
earth/underworld (e.g. Hades, Furies, the dead), or actually labeled “chthonic” (e.g. Hermes χθόνιος, whose 
connection with the earth lies in his role as psychopomp).  Thus, I hope that the basic distinction between, on the 
one hand, gods and beings who are addressed with lamentation and associated with death and the underworld and, 
on the other hand, gods who are approached with prayer and thanksgiving will be unproblematic. 
 
 
11
 My primary interest in Aeschylus lies with Cho., since this play is likely to have been more influential on 
Sophocles than the rest of the Oresteia.  Furthermore, while close examination of a play as complex and subtle as 
Ag. would lead me far from my task, I would venture that the portrayal of the relation between human conceptions 
of the divine system and its dramatic actuality are much the same in that play as in Cho.  Characters may debate 
whether or not a particular act is just – at least in part because all retributive acts in the house of Atreus thus far have 
been in some sense both just and unjust.  But all seem to imagine the divine world operating along similar lines 
(especially as laid out by the chorus):  Zeus upholds justice, Zeus has laid down the laws of πάθει μάθος and παθεῖν 
τὸν ἔρξαντα (Dodds 1960 (reprinted in Dodds 1973), Sommerstein 1996a: 273-88), Zeus sends the Furies to enforce 
these laws.  Crime begets crime, and Zeus works through those crimes, producing a sequence of acts that constitute 
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generally express religious beliefs consonant with one another, and where there are underlying 
tensions or contradictions, these are glossed over or go unnoticed altogether.  Second and to the 
extent that such can be known in a play, the characters’ beliefs are shown to be correct:  the 
various gods and supernatural powers do operate according to a system that normally runs 
smoothly and without internal conflicts.  Winnington-Ingram, employing a term I find attractive, 
summarizes thus:  “Whereas Eumenides (till near the end) is marked by a divergence of divine 
powers, Choephoroi is marked by a convergence of powers all driving Orestes towards the same 
act” (emphasis mine).12 
 In Electra, conversely, the religious views are more disparate and more emphasis is put 
on the variety of motivations for the characters’ actions.  Orestes and Electra stand in marked 
contrast to each other, the one driven chiefly by worldly, human motives, the other caught up in 
her vision of chthonic vengeance.  Clytemnestra, a pragmatic user of religious rituals of all types, 
represents a third position.  My argument here is that Sophocles fragments the unified religious 
system of Aeschylus into the figures of distinct characters to explore human motivations and 
human conceptions of justice.  Different religious attitudes are brought to bear on the business of 
revenge (and matricide), and as these attitudes are juxtaposed and brought into conflict with one 
another, the audience is constantly discouraged from privileging any one of them.  In the end, I 
                                                                                                                                                             
both just punishment and fresh hubris.  Though no gods appear on stage, there is nothing to be gained, for 
interpretation, by doubting that they stand behind events more or less as the characters imagine them to.  When we 
come to the third play in the trilogy, the divine world appears much less unified.  But comparison with El., at least 
on the terms that I will use in this chapter, is no longer possible, since Eum. is not about the human conception of the 
divine and how it squares with the reality.  The divine system of Eum. shows some stress fractures; but in the end it 
is the divine reality, and we do not find ourselves wondering whether or not the human characters understand it 
correctly.  Therefore, I feel justified in overlooking both Ag. and Eum. on the grounds that 1) Cho. itself offers 
sufficient and suitable comparative material, 2) Ag. gives us rather the same dynamic, and 3) Eum. is built upon so 
different a design as to be of little help when set beside El. 
 
 
12
 Winnington-Ingram 1983: 136.  He concentrates on the role of Apollo, which he sees as problematic, since 
Apollo is represented as both healer and destroyer.  I do not deny the popular interpretation of the Oresteia as a story 
of “crime punished by crime.”  That Orestes’ act is dangerous or even unjust does not change the fact of divine 
support for it. 
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suggest, Sophocles presents us with an agnostic view of vengeance – a world in which we cannot 
know what absolute justice is and matricide must be understood solely on human terms, since the 
divine apparatus is at best unknowable and at worst an opportunistic invention. 
 
Aeschylus’ Choephoroi: Convergence 
 My stance with regard to Aeschylus may be clarified by a brief discussion of two recent 
articles by Mark Griffith and Robert Parker.
13
  Both scholars address very similar questions 
relating to the “authority” of the characters’ words and the degree to which they can be counted 
on to communicate the “dramatic reality” faithfully.  While Griffith especially ranges widely, 
both are concerned with the nature of divine involvement in Aeschylean tragedy.  This is, after 
all, what we are usually after when we ask questions about what the audience can or cannot 
know:  is there a god behind all this?  Which god?  What are his/her motives?  Does he/she 
approve the characters’ actions?  And by extension, are those actions just? 
 Parker begins with those statements which seem most straightforwardly reliable:  the 
words of seers, prophets, oracles, and other intermediaries of the divine.
14
  He proceeds from 
there to explore other situations in which a character, or more often the chorus, declares 
something that we know to be true within the dramatic world, even though that character/chorus 
does not possess the divine pedigree of a Cassandra or a Calchas.  Griffith surveys several 
registers of authoritative speech and shows how they may be deployed alone or in combination 
to lend credence to a character’s words.  If I understand him correctly, he sees this use of 
language as operating on the audience in a more or less subconscious way:  they recognize the 
                                                 
 
13
 Griffith 2009, Parker 2009. 
 
 
14
 Though he acknowledges in the following discussion that even these statements may be colored by their 
context and must be considered together with characterization. 
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traces of authority in the word choice, phrasing, and even meter, and thus instinctively accept the 
content as reliable.  But Griffith is particularly interested in the way the authority shifts 
constantly from character to character:  for example, from Clytemnestra describing the beacons 
to Cassandra describing the bloody history of the Atreids.
15
  This shifting provides a multiplicity 
of perspectives throughout a play, different angles from which we are allowed to view the action 
(55): 
 “I would suggest that the Aeschylean techniques of indeterminacy that I’ve described lead the 
 audience not so much to ‘deconstruct’ reality or mistrust the power of language to identify and 
 describe things as they ‘really are’, but rather to appreciate that ‘reality’ tends to comprise an 
 immensely thick and many-layered package of meanings, and that any individual’s insights or 
 inspired visions, even when uncannily accurate and revealing, will present only one momentary 
 glimpse of that reality – and the glimpse of another speaker or singer may present startlingly 
 different facets and wrinkles, without necessarily contradicting or undermining the ‘reality’ of 
 the first one.  This is, as you say, not so much a matter of ‘ambiguity’, or irony, as of 
 polyvalence and multiple perspectives, and of the audience’s sense (if not always awareness) of 
 competing authorities (vocal, visual and musical, as well as political) that are striving to express 
 themselves within this one play.  All of these voices speak (or sing) ‘Aeschylus’’ poetry, and at 
 times we come to believe – if only briefly – that one of them is communicating to us, and to 
 other characters, with almost complete authority.  But a moment later that authority may slip 
 away, and we find ourselves listening instead to another voice that commands our attention 
 with equal insistence and persuasiveness.” 
 
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex and subtle argument, part of Griffith’s point seems to 
be that the poet’s voice can be heard throughout the play, but not always in the mouth of any one 
character, a tactic which allows Aeschylus to impart greater depth to our understanding of action 
and characters alike.  The fact of different perspectives does not necessarily imply that they are 
contradictory; they may even be complementary or simply distinct from one another, depending 
on the poet’s purpose. 
                                                 
 
15
 In the end, Griffith and Parker both emphasize the human consequences of Aeschylean tragic myth, the latter 
even referring to the divine apparatus as “almost a metaphor for a purely human chain of causality” (140) – though 
he backs off from this fomulation in the subsequent discussion  and adopts rather a stance of double (or even 
multiple) determination.  He does not so much aim to deny the involvement of the gods as to stress human guilt or 
innocence. 
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 The chorus of Agamemnon is a central example for both Parker and Griffith due to its 
ability to shift from profound insight (e.g. in the parodos) to timorous obtuseness (e.g. in the 
scene with Cassandra).  It is striking to me that both scholars take for granted that there are 
passages in which we are surely meant to privilege the chorus’ (or a character’s) understanding 
of the action.
16
  The issue is exactly how we are to know when a passage is conveying to us “the 
poet’s voice” (to use Griffith’s phrase) as opposed to the character’s limited perspective.  My 
contention is that in Choephoroi, Aeschylus generally harmonizes the different perspectives:  the 
action is to be understood along the lines of one comprehensive and cohesive divine system
17
 to 
which all of the characters subscribe.  Sophocles, on the other hand, keeps the various 
perspectives distinct, and he effects this by consistently associating them with the same 
characters. 
 I have singled out these two articles because they complement each other so well, each 
bringing out the nuances of the other’s argument.  They also broadly support my thesis, for while 
they are not addressing quite the same issue as I am, both suggest that there is a kind of unity to 
Aeschylean tragedy, a reliable thread of interpretation that may be traced through a drama if we 
are careful with our methodology.  The religious dimension is of course only one aspect of “the 
poet’s voice,” which may communicate to us many other ways of interpreting the play in 
                                                 
 
16
 I have observed a tendency in Aeschylean scholarship to take every mention of deity as reliable theodicy, 
with little or no consideration of the speaking character’s motives.  I think that this is generally the correct 
instinctive response to his tragedy, where we are meant to construct a larger divine world on the basis of chorus’ and 
characters’ words. 
 
 
17
 Seaford 2003 discusses the “unity of opposites” and the need to escape from it, dramatized in the Oresteia as 
a whole.  According to his reading, the union of divine powers in Cho. is problematic on the human level (since this 
system guarantees that the cycle of vengeance will continue ad infinitum); the divine dispute in Eum. is problematic 
on the divine level (since the Olympians have ceased to punish murderers); and by the end of the trilogy, Olympians 
and chthonians are successfully differentiated, with the Furies subordinated to Olympian authority.  I am not sure of 
the validity of problematizing both the union of powers in Cho. and the disjunction of powers in Eum., since they 
seem to be problematic from the perspective of different parties, but in the end, I am concerned only with the fact of 
convergence in Cho., which leaves little question of how various divine powers factor into the action of the play. 
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different spheres.  But for now, I am only interested in the convergence of divine powers in 
Choephoroi and the characters’ acceptance of it as a fact within the world of the play.  I therefore 
find support for my thesis in the combination of multiple perspectives and unity of “poet’s 
voice” discovered by Parker and Griffith, the idea that there is one “message” (in my argument, 
divine unity) which is communicated through many different voices at different times. 
 The blurring of boundaries between different spheres of divine influence and the 
convergence of various powers into the process of vengeance have an immediate and lasting 
effect on our experience of this play.  Throughout, we gain the impression of a host of divine and 
semi-divine forces working on different levels, but working together, to achieve the deaths of 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and the restoration of Orestes to his birthright.
18
  I hope that most of 
what I have to say here about Choephoroi will be uncontroversial and will provide us with a 
clear model against which to set Electra. 
 Agamemnon is the center of attention for the first six hundred lines of the play.  The 
action takes place at his tomb,
19
 where Orestes immediately (14-5) notices women approaching 
with offerings meant to appease his angry spirit.
20
  Both siblings invoke chthonic Hermes in 
close connection with Agamemnon and other infernal powers.
21
  Electra’s prayer to her father 
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 The justice of Orestes’ act (on which see Dodds 1960, Goldhill 1984: 158, Sommerstein 1996a: 434-42) is 
not so important for my argument as the fact that various divine powers are seen to drive him toward that act – and it 
is acknowledged that the gods may drive humans to perform an injustice. 
 
 
19
 On the staging of Cho. and the question of “fluidity” in Aeschylean staging, see Taplin 1977 (esp. 338-40), 
Scullion 1994: 67-88.  Whether the tomb is imagined as being near the palace or far away has no bearing on my 
argument. 
 
 
20
 We are told of Clytemnestra’s nightmare (38-41: κριταί <τε> τῶνδ’ ὀνειράτων θεόθεν ἔλακον ἑπέγγυοι 
μέμφεσθαι τοὺς γᾶς νέρθεν περιθύμως τοῖς κτανοῦσί τ’ ἐγκτεῖν), though its content is not yet disclosed.  
Agamemnon is not quite treated as a hero in either Aeschylus or Sophocles, though in practice, it can be difficult to 
distinguish between basic funeral rites and hero cult.  The Greeks attributed certain powers and attitudes to their 
dead, and the distinction between dead polloi and dead hero may not be important here.  For further discussion of 
hero cult, see Burian 1972, Henrichs 1993, Parker 2005, and especially Jones 2010. 
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(130-48) includes requests for:  pity toward her and Orestes,
22
 salvation (in the form of light), 
Orestes’ return,23 piety and self-control for herself, a deserved death for the murderers, and good 
things in general.
24
  The chorus, mourning Agamemnon as a good man (even though he was their 
captor), describes his tomb as an altar (106)
25
 and sings a paean for him at Electra’s urging 
(151ff.).  They expect him to further his own vengeance by sending an ἀναλυτὴρ δόμων (160-3), 
and they call for justice and retribution on his behalf.
26
  The dead Agamemnon, a κατὰ χθονὸς 
ἐμπρέπων σεμνότιμος ἀνάκτωρ πρόπολός τε τῶν μεγίστων χθονίων ἐκεῖ τυράννων (355-9), is 
imagined to be capable of delivering all of these things, either by himself or in conjunction with 
other powers (as at 147-8).
27
  These passages also give us an idea of how and why living people 
believe they can communicate with the dead, and on what terms the dead might respond. 
 Orestes’ most compelling reason for undertaking vengeance is the threat of his father’s 
Furies, who would pursue him if he failed to do his filial duty.  He seems to suggest (285; the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
21
 Orestes: 1-5 (where Goldhill 1984: 104 also finds in the phrase πατρῶια κράτη a link between Agamemnon 
and Zeus Pater).  Electra: 124-30.  Other passages mention residents of the netherworld more generally (such as line 
886, just cited), and though the reference must be to Agamemnon first and foremost, we should not forget other 
beings like the Furies (and Ἀραί, if they are distinct), chthonic Hermes, Persephone, Earth, and perhaps other spirits 
as well (e.g. 124-6, 476-8). 
 
 
22
 Cf. 502. 
 
 
23
 Goldhill 1984: 117 does in fact see Agamemnon’s agency in the return of Orestes: “The irony of this 
coincidence, the answer to the prayer coming before the prayer – the tense of the infinitive also allows the sense that 
Orestes ‘has come’ (cf. ἥκω, 3) – invests her prayer with the sanction of success, and Agamemnon with having 
heard and brought about the fulfilment of the prayer.” 
 
 
24
 147-8: ἡμῖν δὲ πομπὸς ἴσθι τῶν ἐσθλῶν ἄνω σὺν θεοῖσι καὶ γῇ καὶ δίκῃ νικηφόρῳ. 
 
 
25
 Cf. the more elaborate description at 154-5:  ῥεῦμα τόδε κεδνῶν κακῶν τ’ ἀπότροπον.  At 483-8 Orestes and 
Electra negotiate with him in much the same way as they might with a god, with promises of offerings to come and 
the threat that there will be no more if he does not help now. 
 
 
26
 Orestes also asks him to send Justice (497) and to see that Clytemnestra’s dream is fulfilled (540-1).  
Clytemnestra herself obviously believes that he will perform the latter task if she cannot dissuade him with libations 
over his tomb (cf. 538-9, where the libations are called an ἄκος for the dream). 
 
 
27
 In fact, Orestes attributes his own return to the gods and Electra’s prayer, which was offered to Agamemnon 
and chthonic Hermes (212-3). 
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text is corrupt) that Agamemnon’s spirit is constantly watching him to see if he will kill the 
murderers, for if he does not, then Agamemnon will send the Furies with their “madness and 
empty fear in the night” (288).  Even Agamemnon’s wrath, which may or may not be 
synonymous with the Furies, will pursue Orestes, keeping him away from altars and other living 
people (293-4).  When Orestes finally does carry out his task, he declares to Clytemnestra τὸν 
ζῶντα καίνειν τοὺς τεθνηκότας λέγω (886)28 and πατρὸς γὰρ αἶσα τόνδε σοὐρίζει μόρον (927), 
thus clearly placing his actions under the purview of Agamemnon.  In fact, Orestes is conflated 
with his father on several occasions.  For instance, at 508-9 Orestes stresses the unity of his 
actions and his purpose with those of Agamemnon:
29
 
   ἄκου’· ὑπὲρ σοῦ τοιάδ’ ἔστ’ ὀδύρματα, 
   αὐτὸς δὲ σῴζῃ τόνδε τιμήσας λόγον. 
 
   Hear us; they are for your sake, we tell you, these laments of ours, 
   and by respecting our words you gain security for yourself. 
Mourning and vengeance become cyclic, the one feeding the other, Orestes inciting Agamemnon 
to incite him in turn to complete his mission on behalf of his father,
30
 and, like his father, Orestes 
is urged to keep his anger at a steady boil (454-5).
31
 
                                                 
 
28
 “The dead” can of course refer to Agamemnon as actually dead or to Orestes, who has supposedly come back 
to life after being reported dead – and the plural may suggest the viability of both readings simultaneously (Garvie 
1986 ad loc.). 
 
 
29
 See also 119, 238-43.  At 471-8, the chorus states that vengeance in this case can only come from within the 
household (which must mean Orestes, since it is never suggested that Electra might take up the sword) and then 
prays for assistance from μάκαρες χθόνιοι. 
 
 
30
 Line 517 has long been a problem; see the discussion of Garvie 1986 ad loc.  It is indeed inconceivable that 
Orestes should claim a lack of sentience for Agamemnon immediately after the kommos, but corruption may lie in 
any of the words θανόντι οὐ φρονοῦντι.  For lamentation and revenge, see McClure 1999: 4-5, Foley 2001: 151-5 
(following Seremetakis 1991), McHardy 2004 (which borrows from McHardy 1997), Parker 2005: 145-6.  Holst-
Warhaft 1992: 127-70 discusses the power of lamentation to raise the dead, though she is more interested in two 
other arguments:  the subversive portrayal of women’s lament in Aeschylus and the power of lamentation to rouse 
anger and spur the living to vengeance. 
 
 
31
 The purpose of Clytemnestra’s libations is to assuage Agamemnon’s anger; the purpose of his children’s 
lengthy kommos is to remind Agamemnon of why he should be angry and why he should act on that feeling (esp. 
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 Clytemnestra’s dream illustrates very clearly the union of vengeful powers.  The dream is 
mentioned briefly in the parodos as the chorus’ motivation for coming to Agamemnon’s tomb, 
and so we have been prepared to think that he has something to do with it.  But not until after the 
kommos (at line 523) does Orestes ask about the reason behind the libation-bearers’ libations.  
The chorus outlines the nightmare stichomythically:  Clytemnestra gives birth to a snake, which 
bites her when she tries to suckle it.  The snake is a chthonic creature and regularly an attribute 
of the Furies (e.g. 1049-50), and I think it quite proper to read them into this dream.  
Nevertheless, nobody in the play suspects that the Furies are actually responsible for the dream; 
Clytemnestra assumes that Agamemnon is, and that is why she sends him libations.
32
 
 In fact, several strands of religious belief come together here.  Near the end of the 
kommos, Electra mentions that Agamemnon was a victim of maschalismos,
33
 her intention 
probably being to stir Orestes’ anger and spur him on to the horrifying task at hand.34  But the 
                                                                                                                                                             
491-2, which smacks of magic and necromancy, particularly in the anaphoric couplets).  It is hardly surprising that 
the Furies are always angry as well (e.g. 1054: Clytemnestra’s ἔγκοτοι κύνες). 
 
 
32
 I therefore heartily disagree with the assessment of George 2001: 82: “Clytemnestra seems willing to believe 
in the initial superficial interpretation of her dream; since she has resolutely kept herself apart from the realm of 
dreams and the subjugated status it has signified, she lacks the perception to read her own dream independently.  
Perhaps it seemed easier to try to appease the dishonored ghost of Agamemnon than to face the ugly implications 
her birth-dream offered.  Indeed, Clytemnestra does not perceive the dream’s most logical interpretation, as is 
apparent in her sending of libations to the tomb.”  George apparently understands the dream as referring only to 
Orestes, while Clytemnestra willfully misinterprets it with reference to Agamemnon.  It is not clear how 
Agamemnon enters into a “superficial interpretation” (since he does not appear in the dream at all).  Rather, I think 
that Clytemnestra has understood the dream exactly as Orestes has:  he is coming to kill her, and Agamemnon is the 
impetus; if he can be appeased, then perhaps Orestes will falter. 
 
 
33
 Maschalismos takes place only after the murder is done.  It consists of cutting off the victim’s extremities 
(minimally, hands and feet, but sometimes also including ears, nose, even breasts and genitalia) and stringing them 
together around his neck and under his arms.  Modern sources on maschalismos include Ceulemans 2007, Jebb (El. 
445n., with further comments in the appendix), Kittredge 1885, Parker 1984, Teufel 102-26, Vanderpool 1970, 
Vermeule 1979: 236 n. 30, and Versnel 1973; the most important ancient sources are Aesch. Cho. 439, Soph. El. 
445, and Ap. Argonautica 4.477-9, together with the scholia on these passages. 
 
 
34
 Kittredge 1885: 154-5.  Parker 2009: 144-5, with n. 54 is interested in the complicity achieved with the 
audience through the kommos, which he says “has nothing to do with shaping Orestes’ resolve to kill his mother, a 
resolve already formed.  It is a ritual designed to secure the dead Agamemnon’s support by reminding him of the 
33 
 
motive imputed to Clytemnestra deserves a little more thought.  The ritual of maschalismos 
presupposes a belief in the vitality of dead spirits – principally, the angry spirit of the victim who 
seeks to revenge himself on his murderers.  Chthonic deities also play a role by joining with the 
victim in his vengeful endeavors (hence the association of maschalismos with appeasement or 
sacrifice).
35
  The primary purposes of maschalismos are thus to weaken and bind the spirit of the 
victim and appease the Furies, and we should assume that this was Clytemnestra’s intent.36  At 
the same time, the chorus says that she wanted to make Agamemnon’s fate unbearable for 
Orestes (441-2: μόρον κτίσαι μωμένα ἔφερτον αἰῶνι σῷ); it seems that what she was really 
hoping for was Orestes’ suicide as a result of intense shame.37  Given the conflation in this play 
of Agamemnon the victim and his avenger Orestes, this would be the predictable result of 
maschalismos as such, where the same magic works on both men at once:  a successful attempt 
to bind Agamemnon’s spirit would also effectively “bind” his avenger.  We might further note 
the implication that the vengeful spirit cannot work without a human agent.
38
  What affects one 
must affect the other. 
                                                                                                                                                             
outrages inflicted on him by Clytaemnestra.”  The audience is also “reminded” of these outrages and as a result 
sympathizes with Orestes throughout the action. 
 
 
35
 It cannot be said for sure just which deities these are, and even whether they need be chthonic.  The most 
obvious candidates are the Furies, and so will I designate them throughout this chapter, though the uncertainty 
surrounding their identity must be noted. 
 
 
36
 The elaborate binding bears a marked similarity to a medical procedure described by Hippocrates (De 
Articulis 47.20-8), suggesting that it was based on an actual means of restraint; this realistically symbolic binding 
evokes other magical rituals and indicates that maschalismos belongs primarily to that provenance.  Therefore, while 
I would not deny that it could be used (e.g.) politically to make an example of a rebellious individual, it must have 
always had the defensive magical purpose outlined here.  For the murderer interested in making an example, there 
were other (less elaborate) types of mutilation available such as impalement and decapitation. 
 
 
37
 See Garvie 1986 ad loc. 
 
 
38
 Consider, for example, the description of Agamemnon as listening to his children’s prayers ἐξ ἀμαυρᾶς 
φρενός (157-8).  It is not always the case that these supernatural forces require a living human agent (such as 
Clytemnestra and her Furies in Eum.). 
34 
 
 Aeschylus has constructed this segment of his play so that we experience events in the 
same sequence as Clytemnestra.  During the kommos, we learn about her maschalismos and its 
rationale (while also suspecting its failure).
39
  Then in the episode after the kommos, we learn the 
content of her dream, which has suddenly ruptured her illusion of safety.  The snake is indeed 
Orestes, as he declares,
40
 but it also represents a Fury.
41
  Just as Orestes is an avatar of 
Agamemnon, so is he of the Furies:  in addition to the snake imagery, a Fury is said to have 
brought him home (648-51), and both of these “spiritual” beings, Agamemnon and a Fury, 
individually ineffective in the world of the living, join forces to urge their human agent to take 
vengeance on their behalf.  Clytemnestra’s dream indicates just how utterly her maschalismos 
has failed (as it must):
42
  Agamemnon has not been bound, and the Furies have not been 
appeased; instead, they are free to aid their living agent of vengeance, Orestes. 
                                                 
 
39
 The maschalismos comes up too late in the kommos to be a serious objection to what Orestes and Electra are 
trying to do with their lamentation; the chorus is not suggesting that their prayers will fail because Agamemnon is 
bound and unable to help. 
 
 
40
 And note the process implied in the word ἐκδρακοντωθείς, a process set in motion by forces of vengeance, 
like the Furies.  Orestes is also figured as a snake because he is the son of Clytemnestra, who is elsewhere described 
in terms reminiscent of a snake.  Orestes himself thus possesses both the serpentine nature of his mother and the 
aquiline nature of his father (Winnington-Ingram 1983: 135); all forces, even those which ultimately come to 
contradict one another, converge into the figure of Orestes, and this internal conflict becomes the catalyst to the plot 
of Eum. 
 
 
41
 It could also represent Agamemnon, as it seems to have done in Stesichorus (PMG 219).  A snake could be 
viewed as the spirit of a dead hero, (Jones 2010: 56-8), though we would then have to be careful of reading the 
dream (especially the relationship between Clytemnestra and the snake) too literally. 
 
 
42
 Winnington-Ingram 1983: 140 n. 28 also presumes that the maschalismos simply failed (even though 
Agamemnon does not visibly rise from the dead), describing it here as “gruesome – and futile.”  Garvie 1986 ad 
loc.:  “Lesky rightly points out that [the use of maschalismos to disable the spirit] cannot have been in Aeschylus’ 
mind, since it is assumed that Agamemnon is in no way prevented from taking vengeance upon the murderers.”  
This of course ignores the possibility that the maschalismos could have simply failed (as Kittredge (1885: 163 n. 3) 
assumes, though he does not distinguish between the treatments of Aeschylus and Sophocles).  Magic and prayer 
often do not have the hoped-for result, but that does not stop people from believing in them.  In fact, I think it 
important that we understand Clytemnestra’s maschalismos to have failed:  she has been living all these years in 
relative security, thinking that Agamemnon, his Furies, and his avenger were all taken care of, until she receives this 
dream.  It frightens her not merely with its content, but with the implication that she is not as safe as she had 
previously assumed. 
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 Quite a few Olympians and other deities are also involved in the action of the play, or 
expected to be involved, including:  Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Fate, Kratos, Justice, Punishment, 
and Persuasion.
43
  They are generally asked for the same types of things as the chthonians, 
sometimes in the same line or in back-to-back strophes, as my citations show, and they are 
sometimes given chthonic titles (especially Hermes).  Orestes is conflated not only with 
Agamemnon, but also with Zeus.  He famously refers to himself and Electra as eagle chicks 
(246-9) – the eagle being symbolic of the king of the gods as well as the king of Mycenae.  Lines 
436-7 point succinctly to an alliance of human and divine on Agamemnon’s behalf. 
 All divine and occult powers – and we have seen that there are many – are called upon to 
assist Orestes’ endeavor, and as far as the audience can tell, they do so.44  It is true that a 
playwright can only inform his audience of actual divine activities through a seer or by bringing 
the gods on stage,
45
 and it should be acknowledged that all of what we know about the gods in 
this play comes from various characters who may be biased.  Still, the playwright does not 
appear to be deploying that bias as a means of problematizing any one point of view.  If 
anything, he may be using it to confirm the validity of the characters’ beliefs.  Take the chorus, 
for example.  They consist of slave women, probably taken from Troy (75-7).  As such, they 
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 Zeus: 18-9, 245, 246, 306, 382, 395, 409, 644, 783-93, 855; Apollo: 269 ff., 953, 1030-60; Hermes: 1, 124a-
b, 727; Fate (as Μοῖρα/αι): 306 and 910-1, (as Αἶσα): 647; Kratos: 244; Justice: 61, 244, 311, 497, 641, 646, 949; 
Punishment (Ποινά): 947; Persuasion: 726. 
 
 
44
 For various articulations and assumptions of this convergence of powers, see Fowler 1967: 58-9, 63; Goldhill 
1984: 99-207; Winnington-Ingram 1983: 221-3.  Goldhill argues for an “open” reading whereby the slipperiness of 
language makes it impossible to pin down any specifics of causality.  Practically speaking, this sounds very like 
double motivation, with the usual caveats against assuming that any one cause or agent is primary. 
 
 
45
 The starting point of Parker 2009.  Kovacs 2000 argues that, as a way of getting around this difficulty, the 
playwrights used their characters’ speculations about the gods to signal to the audience instances of divine activity – 
though this method must be used cautiously and on a case-by-case basis. 
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have little reason to feel any affection for their captor, Agamemnon.  Yet even in their opinion, 
he was a noble king and warrior, and to avenge his death is completely moral.
46
 
 We should also consider the effect of the first six hundred lines on the audience’s 
interpretation of events.  For over half of the play, they have heard little besides laments for 
Agamemnon and prayers for revenge directed at a variety of divine powers.  It may not matter 
that these all come from the mouths of Agamemnon’s children and their loyal choral 
companions; the fact remains that the audience is bombarded with the same sentiments over and 
over again and are given no reason to understand events any differently.  That Agamemnon does 
not actually rise from the dead might have surprised some in the audience,
47
 but need not 
indicate his unwillingness or disapproval.
48
  The chorus’ account of Clytemnestra’s terrifying 
dream comes immediately after the invocations of Agamemnon have finally been concluded, and 
none of the characters doubts that he is responsible for sending it. 
 My discussion of Sophocles’ Electra will be centrally concerned with the discrepancy of 
religious views and strategies expressed from one character to another.  The same topic deserves 
brief consideration with regard to Choephoroi as well – brief, because there is not much 
discrepancy to be found.  I have mentioned that the first half of the play consists of Orestes, 
                                                 
 
46
 Alexiou 2002: 10 briefly discusses the use of captives in lamentation; see also Dué 2006.  Here, the chorus is 
given ample opportunity, free of Clytemnestra’s supervision, to express their true (favorable) feelings toward 
Agamemnon.  On the theme of freedom versus slavery in Cho., see Patterson 1991: 111-5. 
 
 
47
 Sommerstein 1980a: 67-9. 
 
 
48
 The argument of Sommerstein (ibid.) strikes me as inconsistent in the joint claims that because Agamemnon 
does not actually appear, he is not aiding his avenger, but that Hermes, who does not appear, is helping him (because 
Orestes uses a trick).  It seems to me that we must treat Olympian and chthonic powers with the same criteria:  if 
appearance equates with effectiveness, then none of the powers invoked in this play is effective – and I doubt many 
readers have this experience of Cho.  Indeed, it would be a tricky venture for Aeschylus to bring the ghost of 
Agamemnon on stage, for ghosts can be held to account, and for the purposes of this play, it is safer to idealize 
Agamemnon from a distance.  I believe that Clytemnestra’s dream confirms his involvement on the spiritual level; 
surprise, then, does not result from the ghost’s failure to rise at all, but from the delayed revelation of his ongoing 
influence in the world of the living. 
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Electra, and the chorus lamenting Agamemnon and calling upon a series of divine powers to aid 
the revenge.  There is no real indication of religious disagreement among these figures, no 
preference shown by any character for one brand of sacrifice over another, one type of prayer 
over another, one breed of god over another.  They all pray indiscrimately to Olympian and 
chthonic beings.  They all believe in the efficacy of human prayer and lamentation, whether 
directed at gods or the dead (320-2, 376-8); they all believe in the efficacy of occult powers in 
human life.  If anyone shows a preference, it is Orestes for Apollo, and this is mostly because he 
has received specific orders from that god and, as we eventually learn,
49
 has had his safety 
guaranteed thence; but Orestes is as fully committed to the idea of chthonic vengeance as Electra 
or the chorus.  Though he has human and material motives as well as religious, Apollo’s oracle 
and the Furies receive four times as much space (lines 269-97 versus 298-305).  The more 
worldly motives range from sorrow over his father’s death and funeral (from which he was 
absent perforce) to the loss of his inherited property to shame on behalf of the Argives, who are 
now ruled by “two women” (298-305), and even these less patently religious motives evince 
Orestes’ emotional commitment to the revenge. 
 Any questioning of this system would have to come from the usurpers themselves, 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, and we are not told much about their religious stance in this play.
50
  
Clytemnestra obviously shares a belief in the power of the dead, which is why she initially 
mutilated Agamemnon and then attempts to appease him with libations.  Her interpretation of the 
dream shows that she also believes in the mechanisms of chthonic vengeance:  the activity of the 
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 See Sommerstein 2010c:  191-4 on what we know and when about Apollo’s relationship with Orestes. 
 
 
50
 What we learn of Clytemnestra in Ag. generally confirms the picture given here (e.g. she is motivated by 
justice, Ate, and a Fury (1432-3), as well as the Atreid curse (1569). 
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Furies in conjunction with Agamemnon’s spirit and their ability to motivate an avenger.51  She 
understands that her own death will result in the same process, and we soon see that her threats 
to that effect (e.g. 912, 924) are not empty.  Even Aegisthus’ slave sees justice in Orestes’ deeds 
(883-4), and the unity of religious beliefs is seen to extend even from the highest to the lowest 
elements of society. 
 So Aeschylus has created a play in which the power of absolute, divine justice is strongly 
felt, even though no god or prophet appears on stage.  He accomplishes this through the 
commonality of beliefs among characters, the consistency with which they plead for justice, and 
the sheer range of divine powers invoked throughout the play.  All gods, all chthonic powers are 
perceived to have a hand in vengeance.  And this unity of purpose is passed on to the human 
agent, Orestes, who duly accomplishes his divinely sanctioned mission.
52
  The tragedy lies in the 
impossibility of Orestes’ situation – of being compelled to murder his own mother – and in the 
Atreid curse that has doomed this wretched family to tear itself apart.
53
 
 
Sophocles’ Electra: Fragmentation 
 Sophocles approaches the same story from a very different angle.  He adopts the same 
basic religious system, but fragments it among various characters, using these different 
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 Cf. Orestes’ very similar attitude at 927 (quoted above, p. 31). 
 
 
52
 Cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 83:  “The human duty to requite is certainly paramount even in that most Erinys-
ridden of works, the Oresteia – but it is paramount in close conjunction with divine causation;” Winnington-Ingram 
1983:  143:  “It might seem that there are three distinct and separable directions from which Orestes is impelled 
towards matricide.  There is Apollo’s oracular command; there is the infernal world crying out for vengeance and 
lending its powers to secure it; there are human resentments at work in the mind of the avenger.  Now one, now 
another, is highlighted in the economy of the play; and it is futile and superfluous to try to relate them in terms of the 
psychology of Orestes.  It is superfluous because they are in essence one and the same or, at the least, aspects of the 
same homogeneous tragic justice which has met us at every point in the drama:  retaliation based upon human 
resentments, yet leading to the punishment of offenders and so a law upheld by Zeus, but operated by Erinyes.” 
 
 
53
 On the combination of necessity and free will in Aeschylean tragedy, see e.g. Lesky 1966. 
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perspectives to problematize and explore different motivations and systems of belief.  Orestes is 
most interested in the human world, while Electra displays an obsession with chthonic 
vengeance, and Clytemnestra is shown to be a religious pragmatist, professing a belief in gods of 
all temperaments (and their rituals) if they have any chance of securing her safety and well-
being. 
 Many readers have felt a certain disjunction among the characters of this play, especially 
(though not exclusively) Orestes and Electra.
54
  For Kitzinger, this disjunction arises from a 
variance in dramatic authority:  for most of the play, Electra speaks with an authoritative voice, 
guiding our interpretation of the vengeance, but she becomes unreliable when Orestes is reported 
dead (and she is duped along with the rest) and altogether silent when Orestes reappears and 
takes control of the action.
55
  For Dale, the disjunction is a dramaturgic issue, the juxtaposition of 
a relatively shallow and a more filled-out character, of the exciting revenge plot captained by 
Orestes and the truly tragic circumstances experienced by Electra.  For Wright, the two 
characters clash on the emotional level, the one passionate in the extreme, the other calm and 
detached.
56
  For my part, I will argue that this general reaction results at least in part from the 
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 See Kitzinger 1991: 302 n. 13 for a synopsis of others’ views. 
 
 
55
 Kitzinger 1991: 301 states that “[f]or an audience whose understanding of justice has been fashioned by the 
first half of the play, the acts that end it cannot constitute justice – at least not human justice.”  I am not sure what 
she means here by “human justice;” n. 12 acknowledges Apollo’s oracle as well as the fact that “the play, in contrast 
to the Choephoroi and Euripides’ Elektra, so studiously avoids exploring the nature of this divine command that, if 
it is to be a justification, it is one that remains incomprehensible.”  I take her main point to be that by the end of the 
play there is no reliable human figure to articulate a vision of justice for us and we are thus left with an interpretative 
void on that particular level – a conclusion which I am happy to endorse. 
 
 
56
 Dale 1966, Wright 2005b.  Cf. Reinhardt 1979: 139:  “At the beginning the brother and sister are worlds apart 
in nature and emotion.”  We might also mention Woodard 1964 and 1965, who draws a fundamental distinction 
between the words of Electra and the deeds of Orestes, Segal 1981 (cf. pp. 278-80 on the recognition scene), who 
associates Orestes with the outside and Electra with the inside, Seale 1982: 58-9, who contrasts their physical 
appearances, Sorum 1982, who notes their different attitudes toward family and household, and Hutchinson 1999: 
56-7, who points out that for Electra, Orestes’ return means the end of her suffering while for Orestes, it means the 
beginning of his greatest task.  Foley 2001: 158 (with Aeschylus for comparision) detects a separation of traditional 
male and female roles in revenge; cf. 167: “By putting the traditional male and female roles in vendetta in conflict 
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characters’ different religious attitudes.  In the contentious encounters of various characters 
(especially Electra), Sophocles simultaneously juxtaposes different aspects of a comprehensive 
religious system such as that of Choephoroi and keeps them evenly balanced against each other.  
The audience is thus prevented from privileging any one view and thereby deprived of an 
important interpretative tool.  From their perspective, it becomes questionable whether there is 
any divine involvement at all in the action of the play, especially as neither deus ex machina nor 
Furies appear at the end. 
 That the divine powers in this play remain distant and dependent on human subjectivity is 
first noticeable through a very simple fact of staging:  the absence of Agamemnon’s tomb on 
stage, and hence the diminishment of his importance in the play.  Where Aeschylus made 
Agamemnon a major focal point around which the action turned, in Sophocles, he has become a 
central concern for Electra alone.  His tomb is located somewhere off stage and thus no longer 
functions as a constant, visible reminder of his wrath, lending substantiality to his presence and 
his children’s necromantic lamentation.57  Sophocles’ Agamemnon, lacking an independent 
existence of his own, is in effect created by the lamentation of Electra and the imagination of the 
audience.
58
  Her lamentation, in turn, lacks the concrete focus that the kommos of Choephoroi 
had.
59
  Instead of a tomb, there is an altar to Apollo on stage, and probably a statue as well 
                                                                                                                                                             
with each other, the play in a sense fragments and disrupts the coherence of the system of vendetta justice presented 
by Aeschylus.” 
 
 
57
 For Electra’s lamentation, see Winnington-Ingram 1980: 335-9 and n. 30 above. 
 
 
58
 Cf. Seaford 1985: 22:  “[Electra’s] anomalous lamentation…, apart from inflicting pain directly on the 
usurpers, also had the role of sustaining the reality of the dead Agamemnon.  This is a more defensive role than the 
lament has in Aeschylus, where the assistance of the dead Agamemnon, whose independent reality is not at stake, is 
invoked for the coup.  The Sophoklean Elektra on the other hand implies that if she does not lament, ὁ μὲν θανὼν γᾶ 
τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὢν κείσεται τάλας (245-6).  This does not mean merely that the dead man will be treated as if he were 
nothing: there is also the implication that without her lamentation he will actually be no more than earth.” 
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(suggested by τῷδε in line 635).  It is difficult to know the size and quality of the statue used in 
the original production; given that many in Sophocles’ audience were sitting some distance away 
in the auditorium, they may not have been able to discern the statue’s identity until the moment it 
is named.
60
  In the prologue, the Paedagogus points out the ἀγορά of Apollo Lyceius (6-7),61 but 
there is no particular reason at this point to believe that he is describing anything actually visible, 
for he also mentions the grove of Io and the temple of Hera.
62
  The altar, then, remains a 
figurative tabula rasa for much of the play and only becomes an altar of Apollo when 
Clytemnestra names it such at 635-7.  The altar (and its statue) may be taken as emblematic of 
my reading of the play as a whole:  the gods are a blank until humans begin to construct them.
63
 
 Electra opens with two speaking characters, Orestes and his Paedagogus (as well as the 
mute Pylades), who will turn out to have rather different conceptions of their joint mission.  The 
Paedagogus addresses Orestes as the son of Agamemnon (2)
64
 and describes the physical 
features around Argos (4-10).  Though Apollo Lyceius will be invoked three times later in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
59
 Add to this the fact that she actually spends more of the play talking about lamentation than actually 
lamenting. 
 
 
60
 The statues of Artemis and Aphrodite are identified in the prologue of Hipp. (74, 101); Phoen. 631 requires 
an image of Apollo, though it is clearly one of several (ἀγάλματα, 632) and serves only as the object of a brief 
apostrophe.  The closest comparandum to Soph. El. is the scene of Jocasta’s prayer in OT (919-21), which probably 
includes both altar and statue, neither which has been explicitly identified before this.  On the other hand, Apollo 
hangs over the action of OT so strongly that the audience might have already suspected that the statue is his, and if 
not, I doubt that they would be very surprised to learn it. 
 
 
61
 See Finglass 2007: 635n. for discussion of the altar and statue.  He does not connect it to the Paedagogus’ 
words in the prologue, understanding it instead as an altar to Apollo Agyieus (though Clytemnestra addresses Apollo 
Lyceius – 645, 655).  Whether the statue would have been recognizable as Apollo or more generic (or even visible 
to most of the spectators) is unknown.  On Apollo Lyceius, see also Graf 1985: 220-6, Gershenson 1991. 
 
 
62
 Neither of the temples was visible from Mycenae (Finglass 2007 ad loc.). 
 
 
63
 A similar argument is made by Dunn 2006 regarding the landmarks mentioned in the Paedagogus’ opening 
lines:  each locale (potentially) establishes a different meaning for Orestes’ revenge, but this early in the play we 
cannot be sure in which sphere he will choose to act. 
 
 
64
 Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1997 ad loc., following Carrara, note that the authenticity of the first line was disputed 
in antiquity, but that “we have no good reason to believe the doubters.”  For a response and further discussion, see 
Finglass 2007 ad loc. 
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play, his appearance here is unmarked; as he seems to have been an Argive deity,
65
 it is natural 
that the Paedagogus should mention him alongside Io and Hera in a physical description of the 
city.  Though the Paedagogus himself does not directly address Apollo Lyceius, he offers an 
etymology of the epithet (λυκοκτόνος, “wolf-killer”) that may inform those later invocations.  A 
wolf-killing god is a particularly appropriate ally for the murderers of Aegisthus (who was 
famously labeled a wolf by Aeschylus’ Cassandra at Ag. 1259).66  Orestes, however, never calls 
upon or even mentions Apollo Lyceius, who is thought to have had chthonic associations;
67
 
rather, Orestes’ relationship with Apollo, to the extent that he has one, is with Apollo as the 
Delphic god.  The Paedagogus attributes to Orestes a desire to see the parts of the city he 
describes, but we might suspect that the desire is really the Paedagogus’, especially as he goes on 
to describe how he fled from the city when Orestes was but an infant and reared the boy to be an 
avenger.
68
  He urges both Orestes and Pylades to take counsel, since the critical time is at hand 
(22:  καιρός, ἀκμή).  This is the moment he has been waiting for, and all his concern is directed 
at the accomplishment of vengeance for its own sake; his two companions are thus seen, at least 
initially, as conduits for his vengeful energies.
69
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 See Graf 1985: 222. 
 
 
66
 On the Apollo’s lupine associations, see esp. Gershenson 1991.  Segal 1966: 477 notes that by interpreting 
the epithet as “wolf-slaying” instead of “light,” “Sophocles thus invokes at the beginning of the action not the god’s 
restorative clarity, but his associations with an ambiguous, destructive power.”  Segal sees this as part of the 
interplay throughout the tragedy of light and darkness as well as of life and death. 
 
 
67
 Thus Scullion 1994: 109-12, who remains cautious about putting Apollo in either category. 
 
 
68
 Kitzinger 1991 discusses the educative aspect of the Paedagogus’ character and its impact on the presentation 
of Orestes (302):  “Orestes’ mission and Elektra’s voice are at cross-purposes from the very start, in their mode if 
not their aim. … the act of vengeance appears to be a lesson that Orestes has learned, its necessity a product of 
others’ words, not his own experience or understanding.” 
 
 
69
 This is not to say that the Paedagogus is necessarily as “sinister” as Wright and others have found him.  I 
mean only to suggest the ordering of the Paedagogus’ priorities:  he feels that vengeance (qua justice) is primary and 
has tried to educate the two boys to feel the same way. 
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 Orestes’ response confirms the Paedagogus’ role as motivator of their current 
undertaking.  But overall Orestes is less concerned with vengeance as such than with the 
restoration of his household and inheritance.
70
  He must establish his own legitimacy by killing 
the usurpers and showing himself to be the true son and rightful heir of Agamemnon.  His 
mission requires him to avenge Agamemnon,
71
 but he shows little personal interest in vengeance, 
since it is only a means to his real end.
72
 
 Orestes proceeds to give an account of his visit to the Delphic oracle, with the admonition 
that the Paedagogus should correct him if he says anything “untimely” (31).  Kitzinger sees in 
this speech a young student repeating his latest lessons back to his tutor.
73
  Certainly it does show 
Orestes’ faith in the Paedagogus and the influence the latter has had on him; at the same time, we 
need not attribute to the Paedagogus the stimulus to visit the Delphic oracle, much less the 
specifics of Orestes’ plan as he lays it out in the following lines.  The passage as a whole 
simultaneously reveals something of Orestes’ background and motives as they have been molded 
by the Paedagogus and his independence in devising a plan and duly marshalling his allies. 
 So we discover that at the beginning of the play Orestes already has a relationship with 
Apollo, though a very limited one in comparison with Aeschylus’ version.  Prior to arrival in 
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 For instance, when Electra says of him (168-9) ὁ δὲ λάθεται ὧν τ’ ἔπαθ’ ὧν τ’ ἐδάη, she is right; he was too 
young to remember the murder of his father and only sees himself as an avenger because that is what he has been 
brought up to believe.  For Orestes’ material motives in various versions of the myth, see McHardy 2008: 103-12. 
 
 
71
 Winnington-Ingram 1980 sees Orestes as a chthonic agent – chthonic, because he seems to rise from the dead 
after the false messenger report to avenge another dead man.  But Orestes does not think of himself as a chthonic 
avenger; those strange eight lines of the prologue (59-66) hardly amount to a chthonic manifesto, especially since 
the lingering image is that of a shining star.  If we are nevertheless meant to see him as chthonic, then I think that 
also affects the way we understand the play on a broader level. 
 
 
72
 As Bowman 1997: 143 puts it, “Orestes’ plans on his return to Mykenai similarly exclude Klytaimnestra, or 
include her only incidentally as an ally and co-usurper, to be cleared out of the way en route to his main objective, 
the killing of Aigisthos and the transfer of the rule to himself.”  See also Segal 1966: 513. 
 
 
73
 Kitzinger 1991: 302-4. 
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Argos, he has traveled to Delphi to ask Apollo how he should go about the duty of vengeance 
(32-7).  An old interpretation, which emphasizes the darker implications of the plot, argues that 
Orestes asks the wrong question:  not whether he should avenge Agamemnon, but how.
74
  By 
asking the wrong question, this argument continues, Orestes has made a dangerous assumption 
and not given Apollo the opportunity to warn him off his current course.  But in my view, 
Orestes’ question shows his confidence and independence:  he does not need to be urged on by 
Apollo, nor does he count on his help throughout the action of the play.  He merely asks about 
the best approach to a task already decided upon – which illustrates his independence not only 
from the Paedagogus (in visiting the oracle in the first place) but also from Apollo (in asking this 
particular question).
75
 
 It is difficult to know just how involved Apollo is supposed to be in the events of the 
play, or just how close is his connection to Orestes; the evidence for both seems slight.  Orestes 
has asked the god’s advice on a specific point, has received a specific response, and crafts his 
own plan accordingly.  Apollo’s advice is that Orestes should use trickery, but Orestes devises 
the trick himself.  He recommends that the Paedagogus strengthen his false messenger report 
with an oath
76
 and expects that in addition to his ancestral possessions this route will win him 
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 Sheppard 1918 and 1927.  Other “dark” readings of the play (though not always accepting Sheppard’s point 
about the oracle) include Winnington-Ingram 1954/5 (expanded in Winnington-Ingram 1980: 217-47), Friis 
Johansen 1964, Segal 1966 (and again in 1981: 249-91), Gellie 1972: 106-30, and Kells 1973 ad loc.; see Stevens 
1978 for response.  March 2001: 16 n. 59 has a very thorough list of both “light” and “dark” readings. 
 
 
75
 Other critics take a slightly different tack from mine, arguing that Orestes’ question proves the morality of the 
matricide, as the issue is never even raised directly.  That is, to ask whether Clytemnestra should be killed would 
allow the possibility that she should not; to ask how she should be killed takes for granted that she should be and the 
only thing in question is how.  I am not (yet) interested in the morality of the matricide, but only Orestes’ attitude 
toward Apollo, which in Sophocles is not made out to be one of total dependence. 
 
 
76
 It is noteworthy, given the Paedagogus’ pious attitude, that he discreetly refuses to obey Orestes on this 
count. 
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glory and safety.
77
  He says of himself that he returns to Argos as a purifier (70: δίκῃ καθαρτὴς 
πρὸς θεῶν ὡρμημένος) and hopes to be welcomed back into his ancestral wealth as a restorer of 
his house (72).  His concern seems to lie primarily not with any ideal of vengeance or justice for 
its own sake, but with a righting of the social order.  He offers a generic prayer to his homeland 
and native gods (67-72) to receive him with good fortune; the last lines of his prayer are wholly 
taken up with the social and political repercussions of his actions, and he nowhere asks for divine 
support in the business of revenge.  His language overall suggests little of the personal injury felt 
by the Paedogogus and (as we soon discover) Electra. 
 At this point, comparison with the Aeschylean Orestes is fruitful.  In his opening words 
he addresses chthonic Hermes, and throughout the play, he is seen as an instrument of the gods – 
all of the gods, not just Apollo or Hermes.  As far as named Olympians, Sophocles’ Orestes 
speaks only of Apollo, and his “alliance” with that god is of a fairly normal variety.  Aside from 
Apollo, he refers to non-specific θεοί, and so where he does reveal a religious attitude, it is 
unexceptional and unmarked.  His segment of the prologue concludes with a departure to 
Agamemnon’s tomb to offer libations – which he does only at the urging of both Apollo 
(apparently: 51-3
78
) and the Paedagogus, since it seems that he would rather stay and listen to 
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 I have already noted the presence of an altar and statue of Apollo on stage, though we cannot use these to say 
that Apollo is “overseeing” the action, since they are not identified as his until almost half way through the play.  
The closest Orestes comes to attaching responsibility for the outcome to Apollo is at 1424-5 (ἐν δόμοισι μὲν καλῶς, 
Ἀπόλλων εἰ καλῶς ἐθέσπισεν).  At the play’s conclusion, Orestes declares himself a μάντις (1498) of Aegisthus’ 
end, though this remark comes as a partner to his mocking comment at 1481, after Aegisthus has deduced his 
identity:  καὶ μάντις ὢν ἄριστος ἐσφάλλου πάλαι; 
 
 
78
 Alexiou 2002: 20-2 provides a reason for Apollo’s command:  “There is evidence that throughout Greek 
antiquity the right to inherit was directly linked with the right to mourn.”  Orestes was not present to attend to 
Agamemnon’s funeral rights, and if he wants to lay a legitimate claim to his inheritance, then presenting offerings at 
the tomb is a good start.  Alexiou suggests that the restriction of mourning to immediate kin only was meant as a 
way of keeping property within one family:  “It is significant to note that the homicide laws restrict the initiative in 
prosecution to those who are ‘within the degree of cousins’ children’, that is to the same relatives who were 
considered legal heirs and were permitted to lament at the dead man’s funeral.” 
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Electra (80-1).
79
  Orestes’ interests, again, seem to lie with his living and suffering sister more 
than his dead and buried father.  Of course, I do not claim that Orestes has no religious 
tendencies at all, but they largely subsumed by his focus on the world of men.  What is 
significant about Orestes’ religion is its very colorlessness vis-à-vis the various beliefs that 
others hold about him specifically.  The Paedagogus, for instance, shows much stronger religious 
feeling, advocating vengeance as equally the work of Apollo and Agamemnon, though Orestes 
does not see his task in quite these terms.
80
 
 Electra’s views contrast with those of both the Paedagogus and Orestes.  Before the 
chorus enters, she sings a short monody describing the death of Agamemnon and her lamentation 
for him.
81
  But her obsession with him has a purpose beyond annoying the usurpers and honoring 
her father:  to rouse Agamemnon’s spirit to participate in its own revenge.82  She believes that 
her lamentation keeps the spirit of her dead father vital and attentive so that it may come to the 
aid of his human avengers when the time is right.  In contrast with the elaborate, three-way 
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 Some have attributed these lines to the Paedagogus rather than Orestes.  See Finglass 2007 ad loc. for 
refutation.  Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1997 also retain the attribution used here.  But cf. Blundell 1989: 153 n. 16:  
“Lines 82-5 are perfectly appropriate to the Paedagogus, but Sandbach’s proposal to give him 78-81 and 82-5 to 
Orestes is still tempting.  If he is right, the scene would foreshadow Orestes’ rather than the servant’s subsequent 
coldness towards Electra, and confirm his practical, rational concern with ‘victory.’” 
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 82-4:  μηδὲν πρόσθεν ἢ τὰ Λοξίου πειρώμεθ’ ἔρδειν κἀπὸ τῶνδ’ ἀρχηγετεῖν, πατρὸς χέοντες λουτρά.  The 
Paedagogus thus acknowledges the importance of both chthonic and Olympian powers and implies a union of the 
two. 
 
 
81
 The exceptional thing about Electra is the sheer extent of her mourning.  She claims to be doing it as an honor 
to Agamemnon and because no one else will, yet that cannot be a complete explanation.  It may be worthwhile to 
recall Antigone, who was satisfied to perform a much scantier funeral for Polyneices (without any lamentation) than 
Electra is for Agamemnon.  But lamentation for Electra is a tool of revenge, whereas Antigone is not interested in 
revenge at all. 
 
 
82
 Winnington-Ingram 1980 fails to connect the business of the Furies with the murder victim, Agamemnon.  
Instead, Electra is seen as “at once the victim and the agent of the Furies” (p. 228), preying upon Clytemnestra’s 
mind and preventing her from sleeping at night.  It might be possible to read Electra as an agent of the Furies, 
though she is also an agent of Agamemnon, and it is harder for me to see her as their victim, or to see that the Furies 
have already been worrying Clytemnestra for an extended time (rather, her fear in this play is the immediate result 
of her dream).  For tragedy’s depiction of women as being more eager for revenge for its own sake than their male 
counterparts, see McHardy 2008: 37-42. 
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kommos of Choephoroi, Electra alone among the characters fully understands and exploits this 
system of chthonic vengeance, and she is repeatedly compelled to explicate and defend her 
stance.
83
 
 She feels that Agamemnon has not received his due lamentation, as she is the only one to 
perform that task, and adds the important detail that she will never cease mourning (103-9).  She 
moves directly from this vow to an invocation of a series of divine powers, all chthonic (110-
2):
84
 
    ὦ δῶμ’ Ἀίδου καὶ Περσεφόνης, 
    ὦ χθόνι’ Ἑρμῆ καί πότνι’ Ἀρά, 
    σεμναί τε θεῶν παῖδες Ἐρινύες, 
    αἳ τοὺς ἀδίκως θνῄσκοντας ὁρᾶθ’, 
    αἳ τοὺς εὐνὰς ὑποκλεπτομένους, 
    ἔλθετ’, ἀρήξατε, τείσασθε πατρὸς 
    φόνον ἡμετέρου, 
    καί μοι τὸν ἐμὸν πέμψατ’ ἀδελφόν. 
 
    O house of Hades and Persephone, 
    O Hermes of the underworld and powerful Curse, 
    and Erinyes, revered children of the gods 
    who look upon those wrongfully done to death, 
    who look upon those who dishonour the marriage bed in secret, 
    come, bring help, avenge the murder 
    of our father, 
    and send to me my brother! 
The prayer is quite thorough, including the rulers of the underworld, Hermes in his chthonic 
manifestation (probably as psychopomp), and both Furies and Curse.  It should be noticed that 
the second of these lines provides what was missing from Orestes:  chthonic Hermes, who was 
invoked by both siblings in Aeschylus (Cho. 1, 124b).  Electra’s three-line address is amplified 
with relative clauses specifying the deities’ spheres of activity, evincing her concern with both 
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 Swift 2010: 336-50 has a similar reading of the play (especially the parodos), though she does not draw out 
the particular religious implications discussed here. 
 
 
84
 Cf. Finglass 2007: 110-20n.:  “All these deities are named elsewhere in tragedy:  what is remarkable here is 
their sheer concentration.  Electra needs the attention of these figures, and so she calls on them directly without fear 
of the consequences.” 
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the crime and the punishment, which should originate with this group of chthonic deities.  The 
prayer concludes with an impressive sequence of imperatives in asyndeton. 
 The basic tenets of Electra’s beliefs are clear:  she expects supernatural powers, several in 
number and all chthonic, to notice acts like the murder of Agamemnon, judge them unjust, and 
render punishment.  It is not clear whether she expects Orestes to be the avenger; she specifies 
that her reason for missing him is that she can no longer bear the burden of lamentation alone 
(119-20).
85
  I have suggested that Electra’s purpose in mourning (in addition to honoring her 
father) is to rouse Agamemnon’s spirit so as to aid an avenger when he comes.  We have learned 
that her lamentation has been going on for quite some time, and it may be that she is simply worn 
out from the constant effort – not to mention the social strain that comes with rebelling against 
the current rulers.  If Orestes were to return and kill the usurpers, Electra would be freed from 
both the burden of grief and the task keeping Agamemnon’s spirit alert; she would be able to 
cease mourning at last. 
 So when the chorus enters, Electra’s continual lamentation has been placed in a context 
of anger and resentment over Agamemnon’s treatment (in life and in death) and invocation of 
chthonic gods for the sake of vengeance.  Whoever the avenger may turn out to be and whatever 
the precise role to be played by her lamentation in that process, it is plain that her preferred 
religious system is almost wholly chthonic. 
 The parodos consists of an exchange between Electra and the chorus on the topic of loss 
and lamentation, with the chorus offering consolation and Electra rejecting it.  She gives several 
reasons for her behavior, but in the end, though they agree to follow Electra’s lead, the chorus is 
                                                 
 
85
 Lamentation is usually the task of the female kin (Alexiou 2002: 10-4, Hame 2008), and so it might seem 
unlikely that Orestes is expected to ease her burden by joining her in mourning.  However, as next of kin, Orestes 
does join Electra in the kommos of Cho., but even if we import this context into El., she is still drawing a connection 
between lamentation and chthonic revenge. 
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not quite convinced that it is a good idea to antagonize the current rulers.
86
  They do not 
completely grasp the concept of lamentation as a type of vengeance in itself, or as a stimulus to 
vengeance.  For instance, when they attempt to console Electra with the standard line that 
endless laments cannot raise the dead (137-9), Electra censures them rather sharply (145-6): 
νήπιος ὃς τῶν οἰκτρῶς οἰχομένων γονέων ἐπιλάθεται.  Foolish?  Not unjust, wicked, 
dishonorable?  The chorus means the sentiment literally, and Electra does not dispute this simple 
fact; but she appears to understand the purpose of lamentation differently.  Electra’s words also 
introduce the theme of remembrance in connection with lamentation and revenge,
87
 a 
conjunction which will be explored further in the first scene with Chrysothemis. 
 As an indication that she is interested in action and not just mourning for its own sake, 
she expresses frustration with Orestes’ inactivity.  She does not know that he has recently 
returned, yet her sentiments confirm what we learned in the prologue:  Orestes is emotionally 
detached from the situation, feeling no particular urgency to act.  The implication is that Electra 
perceives her only possible role as being that of mourner and motivator, while actual vengeance 
must be left to Orestes or another.
88
  This is a milder form of the argument Electra will have later 
with Chrysothemis, though the outcome is slightly different:  the chorus may not fully 
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 233-5:  ἀλλ’ οὖν εὐνοίᾳ γ’ αὐδῶ, μάτηρ ὡσεί τις πιστά, μὴ τίκτειν σ’ ἄταν ἄταις. 
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 Electra goes on to recall Procne and Niobe as examples of faithful mourning.  Finglass 2007 is rightly 
skeptical of Winnington-Ingram’s assertion (1980: 336) that Procne’s title “messenger of Zeus” is a reference to 
vengeance (on which see also Kamerbeek 1974 ad loc.), for this is not spelled out in the text.  But both Procne and 
Niobe do also feature in stories of revenge: Procne murdered her son in revenge on her husband, and Niobe’s 
offspring were killed by Apollo and Artemis, avenging their mother’s honor.  Electra’s story, while not an exact 
parallel to either, clearly resonates with both in this respect, and perhaps highlights the difference between her 
understanding of lamentation and the chorus’. 
 
 
88
 Sommerstein 2010d: 224-49  tries to show that Sophocles maintains uncertainty throughout most of the play 
as to who will be the one (or ones) to kill the usurpers.  While I am generally sympathetic to such a reevaluation of 
old assumptions, in the end I do not find his argument convincing.  I know of no tradition in which Orestes did not 
kill Aegisthus and Clytemnestra (though Homer is reticent as to the latter’s death).  The fact that no playwright ever 
changed this aspect of the myth does not mean that no playwright could have changed it; but given precedents like 
Homer, Stesichorus, and Aeschylus, it is hard to imagine that the audience would not have expected Orestes to fill 
the role of avenger. 
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understand her position, but they are confident that the gods (and here they cast their net more 
widely than Electra) bring all things to pass in time (173-8).  The thought underlying these lines 
is revenge, which for Electra is inextricably bound up with lamentation and remembrance of 
Agamemnon. 
 The chorus’ string of deities and vengeful agents at 173-8 recalls the divine convergence 
of Choephoroi.  Olympian, chthonic, and human powers are all there;
89
 the only one missing is 
Agamemnon, Electra’s primary interest.  As she describes the sorry conditions of her present 
life, she adds οἰκονομῶ θαλάμους πατρός, reinserting the critical figure omitted by her 
interlocutors.
90
  Throughout the play, the chorus evokes Aeschylean convergence; but this time 
they are alone, and they continually act as a foil to Electra’s thorough chthonicism.  She shows 
no interest in their vision of justice, which does not appear to be as carefully worked out as her 
own and recommends that she play an unsatisfyingly inactive role.  The chorus in turn 
simultaneously underscores the narrowness of Electra’s system and calls it into question, as they 
neither understand her motives nor endorse her strategy of lamentation.
91
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 Finglass 2007: 184n. comments that “the chorus’s reluctance to name the god [Hades] contrasts with Electra’s 
willingness to invoke a whole series of chthonic deities.”  The chorus will maintain this comprehensive view 
through the second stasimon, contrasting first with Electra’s chthonic enthusiasm, then with her sudden humanism.  
Only in the third stasimon, when it looks as though Electra’s religious views are broadening, does the chorus cease 
to be comprehensive and focus instead on chthonic powers.  Thus, they are used consistently as a foil to Electra, 
always questioning the validity of her views (and she theirs) by the very fact of their disagreement. 
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 Cf. Finglass 2007: 173-84n.:  “The chorus’s consolation takes on a cosmic aspect:  it points to Zeus at the 
beginning of its song and Hades at its end, with the mighty Orestes standing between them.  Electra’s response 
breaks away from this larger vision and insistently returns to reality.”  See also Ormand 1999: 62-8 on the 
significance for Electra of her father’s thalamos. 
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 The dynamic here is comparable to that of the prologue, where the Paedagogus’ interest in both Apolline and 
chthonic vengeance contrasts with Orestes’ more practical attitude.  See Foley 2001: 156; while the chorus’ attempts 
at consolation are conventional, their failure to support Electra’s lamentation here runs counter to the normal 
practice.  I cannot fully agree, however, with her claim (157) that “[t]he play reconstitutes for the isolated Electra a 
chorus that, despite occasional criticisms and calls to moderation, hears and responds to her lament in a traditional 
fashion and becomes fully identified with the heroine.” 
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 The first scene with Chrysothemis expands on the same themes as were raised in the 
parodos.  She expresses sympathy for Electra’s position – both her physical abuse and isolation, 
and her commitment to justice.  However, she is all too aware that she is merely a young woman 
ill-equipped to resist authority.  Electra is a case in point:  her unceasing lamentation has only 
gotten her threatened with imprisonment.  Scholarship usually sees Chrysothemis as a foil to 
Electra’s much stronger beliefs and personality, and this is not unreasonable.92  She claims to 
want the same things as Electra, and she probably does (marriage, for instance), but she can see 
no way to success.  One point of contention between the two sisters stands out:  the question of 
the efficacy of various ritual actions, such as Electra’s lamentation and Clytemnestra’s offerings 
to the dead.  Electra readily convinces Chrysothemis that the offerings are in vain, for 
Agamemnon is unlikely to accept them after his treatment at Clytemnestra’s hands.93  
Chrysothemis does not argue this point, and is ready to sabotage the offerings by pouring them 
out on the ground, as Electra recommends. 
 But what about Electra’s laments?  It is Chrysothemis’ opinion that they are a waste of 
time (esp. 330-1:  κοὐδ’ ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ διδαχθῆναι θέλεις θυμῷ ματαίῳ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι κενά;) 
and worse, since the current rulers, wearied by Electra’s complaints, intend to lock her up 
somewhere far away (379-82).  In sharp rebuttal, Electra declares that she is in the process of 
avenging their father (349, reiterated at 399),
94
 and then lays out more clearly by what reasoning 
lamentation equates with vengeance (355-6):
95
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 As she is a rather weak figure, it is difficult to know whether the opinions she expresses are really her own or 
Electra’s echoed back at her.  Indeed, Electra accuses her of merely echoing Clytemnestra’s arguments (343-4). 
 
 
93
 Electra makes her argument very aggressively, almost as though she has forgotten that it is Chrysothemis and 
not Clytemnestra herself standing before her. 
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    λυπῶ δὲ τούτους, ὥστε τῷ τεθνηκότι 
    τιμὰς προσάπτειν, εἴ τις ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ χάρις. 
 
    And I give pain to them, so that I do honour 
    to the dead, if any pleasure can be felt where the dead are. 
This short sentence deserves close attention.  First, Electra causes pain to the usurpers, whom she 
despises; by the lex talionis, it is considered a good thing per se to cause pain to one’s enemies.  
The result is to pay honor to Agamemnon;
96
 while we can be confident from earlier passages that 
this is also one of her purposes, it is appended here as something of an afterthought, subordinated 
to the idea of inflicting pain on her foes.  The protasis εἴ τις ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ χάρις should probably be 
taken as qualifying both preceding statements so that Agamemnon is imagined as being pleased 
both by the infliction of pain on the usurpers and by his resulting honors.  The use of the word 
χάρις suggests a system of exchange97 in which Electra’s laments are a sort of down-payment for 
the help that Agamemnon should send in return.  Thus, her payment of honor to him is not (or 
not only) an end in itself but a means to an end agreeable to both parties:  the elimination of 
Aegisthus and Clytemnestra.  But the effect of placing this sentiment in a protasis is that Electra 
seems to admit the possibility that such a system, on which she has based her whole strategy of 
lamentation, is in fact nonexistent.
98
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 She challenges Chrysothemis to find a better course of action for her (352-3):  ἐπεὶ δίδαξον, ἢ μάθ’ ἐξ ἐμοῦ, 
τί μοι κέρδος γένοιτ’ ἂν τῶνδε ληξάςῃ γόων.  Profit is imagined as Chrysothemis’ chief motive, in contrast with 
Electra’s attitude of honor and revenge. 
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 Seaford 1985: 317 takes Electra’s lamentation as a sort of retaliation for Clytemnestra’s festival, which 
catches them both up in a suspension of ritual:  “So far from contributing to the restoration of normality, it renews 
every month the insult to Agamemnon, and thereby contributes to the dual impossibility of incorporating Elektra 
back into the world of the living on the one hand and her angry, suffering father into the world of the dead on the 
other.  She must respond to the perverted and protracted rites of her mother with anomalously protracted lamentation 
of her own.” 
 
 
96
 Seaford 1985: 320. 
 
 
97
 On the concept of reciprocity in Greek (and especially Euripidean) tragedy, see Yunis 1988, Belfiore 2000 
and on El. specifically, Blundell 1989: 149-83. 
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 But Chrysothemis does not see any of this and so is unable to understand why Electra 
laments so much in the first place.  Chrysothemis possesses a relatively simple brand of piety, 
the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, but not the will to act on that distinction 
(except in secret; cf. 468-9), nor the imagination to put her helplessness to good use.  This is the 
dynamic underlying Electra’s discussions with Chrysothemis and the chorus, as I have sketched 
them above.  They do not understand what use there could be in ceaseless lamentation,
99
 and 
they do not understand why Electra values lamentation over her own safety.  The answer is that 
she does not.  Keeping Agamemnon’s spirit wakeful means vengeance one day, which in turn 
means salvation for herself.  But since Chrysothemis does not grasp the significance of vengeful 
lamentation, she is able to privilege her own safety above anything else; the higher priority 
inherent in lamentation simply never occurs to her one way or the other. 
 As the argument comes to an end, Electra asks where Chrysothemis is off to and is told 
that Clytemnestra has ordered libations to be poured at Agamemnon’s tomb because she has had 
a fearsome dream.  Even before hearing the content of this dream, Electra exclaims 
optimistically ὦ θεοὶ πατρῷοι – not necessarily an appeal to Agamemnon himself, but clearly her 
thoughts turn in his general direction.  That she does not immediately think of Apollo or some 
other god as the source of the dream is significant, as we shall see later. 
 Clytemnestra has dreamed of Agamemnon’s return to his palace and the world of the 
living.  He plants his scepter in the hearth, and it sprouts a shoot that grows and spreads rapidly 
to overshadow all of Mycenae.  Bowman has discussed the allegories at play in this dream:  
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 Finglass 2007 ad loc. in a comment that could well summarize my argument on this play:  “Electra devotes 
her existence to honouring a dead man, when she cannot be sure that such devotion brings him any joy.”  With this 
passage we might pair Orestes’ more famous words at 1424-5:  ἐν δόμοισι μὲν καλῶς, Ἀπόλλων εἰ καλῶς 
ἐθέσπισεν. 
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 The practical futility of mourning is a regular part of consolationes; cf. Hom. Il. 24.602-20. 
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Clytemnestra as the hearth from which (with the help of Agamemnon’s “scepter”) springs the 
Orestes-shoot.
100
  But Agamemnon remains the only named person in the dream.  He is 
presented as the source, the motivator of all the action, and though there is nothing particularly 
dire in the dream, Clytemnestra’s immediate reaction to it is fear (427).101  She suspects that 
Agamemnon himself is responsible for sending the dream, and therefore her first move is to offer 
(through Chrysothemis) libations at his tomb in an attempt to appease him. 
 Electra’s response to Chrysothemis’ account of the dream is twofold.  She instructs her 
sister to pour the offerings out on the ground and offer their own instead.  And she scoffs at 
Clytemnestra’s attempt to appease the angry spirit of a man whom she killed and mutilated (444-
6).  It is left unclear just who is most immediately responsible for his death,
102
 but as the 
maschalismos is not mentioned elsewhere, we are justified in attributing it to Clytemnestra alone.  
From the angle of characterization, it is likely that such a ritual would be performed by 
Clytemnestra, since we are given no indication that Aegisthus has much thought for chthonic 
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 MacLeod 2001: 70-2 briefly analyzes this dream with a view to its political meaning:  the confirmation of 
Orestes as legitimate heir and condemnation of Clytemnestra’s sexual liaison with Aegisthus.  Segal 1981: 251 
describes the dream in terms of “inversions of fertility in nature.” 
 
 
101
 Ormand 1999: 70-2 argues that the dream effectively removes Clytemnestra from the equation altogether, 
replacing her with “an endogamous oikos in which the father directly generates the son.”  Bowman 1997: 136 notes 
that we are never given a single, authoritative interpretation of the dream, as we are in Cho.  The gist of the dream is 
clear enough, and Sophocles does not go so far as to give contradictory interpretations of it; but his refusal to explain 
it is consistent with his tendency throughout the play to leave religious questions open to interpretation. 
 
 
102
 At 97-9, both Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are the murderers.  Here, Electra is only concerned with her 
mother’s religious views, and so it is perhaps to be expected that she receives all of the blame.  However, this does 
demonstrate the difficulty in using Electra (a heavily biased source) in reconstructing other characters’ views.  For 
instance, she claims to have rescued the infant Orestes from death (1131-5) at the time of their father’s death and 
accuses Clytemnestra of being the would-be murderer (601), while the Paedagogus says simply that Orestes was 
taken πατρὸς ἐκ φόνων.  At 964-6, Aegisthus is said to have kept both Electra and Chrysothemis from marrying 
because he feared a male rival (a point missed by Seaford 1985: 318), and in fact, he is more likely to be concerned 
with a challenge to his rule from Orestes or other male kin; Clytemnestra, on the other hand, seems more occupied 
with her own personal safety, which is guaranteed  by Aegisthus’ protection and Orestes’ absence – whether in death 
or in exile. 
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powers.  I would suggest that she performed this ritual primarily as a defensive measure.
103
  For 
Clytemnestra – as, in theory, for any murderer – the maschalismos need not be intended as 
abuse, humiliation, degradation, or a political example.
104
  Her revenge depends upon 
Agamemnon’s death; her safety lies in binding him and his Furies.105  So this detail about 
Agamemnon’s demise offers us some insight into Clytemnestra’s religious views and suggests 
that they are much in accord with Electra’s.  Both believe in the ability of the dead to influence 
the world of the living and are vitally concerned with manipulating Agamemnon’s wrath; it is 
significant, moreover, that Electra also understands Agamemnon to be the source of 
Clytemnestra’s ominous dream (459-60, quoted below).  But there are differences.  For instance, 
Clytemnestra must think that her libations could be acceptable to Agamemnon.  She evidently 
views his wrath as an isolated threat, to be neutralized by a particular ritual, and other facets of 
her religion will be revealed later in the play. 
 The final lines of Electra’s speech effectively summarize her view of chthonic χάρις and 
vengeance (453-63): 
    αἰτοῦ δὲ προσπίτνουσα γῆθεν εὐμενῆ 
    ἡμῖν ἀρωγὸν αὐτὸν εἰς ἐχθροὺς μολεῖν, 
    καὶ παῖδ’ Ὀρέστην ἐξ ὑπερτέρας χερὸς 
    ἐχθροῖσιν αὐτοῦ ζῶντ’ ἐπεμβῆναι ποδί, 
    ὃπως τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτὸν ἀφνεωτέραις 
    χερσὶ στέφωμεν ἢ τανῦν δωρούμεθα. 
    οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, οἶμαί τι κἀκείνῳ μέλειν 
                                                 
 
103
 Maschalismos seems to have been a combination of binding the victim and appeasing the Furies.  I would 
avoid the word “expiation,” however, particularly in this context.  We are told that Clytemnestra wiped off the gore 
on Agamemnon’s head for this reason; why would she need to do that if maschalismos had already served the same 
purpose? 
 
 
104
 It is a despicable act, just as murder itself is a despicable act.  But like murder, the despicable-ness lies in the 
fact of performing the act, not in how it is done (for it is always done the same way). 
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 And in fact, we are told that she sleeps with Aegisthus Ἐρινὺν οὔτιν’ ἐκφοβουμένη.  Electra means to mark 
her hubris, but it may be simply (or additionally) that Clytemnestra has successfully negotiated a peace with the 
Furies and need not fear them.  Clytemnestra’s concern with distancing herself from the murder (or its attendant 
guilt) is also evinced by lines 445-6. 
56 
 
    πέμψαι τάδ’ αὐτῇ δυσπρόσοπτ’ ὀνείρατα· 
    ὅμως δ’, ἀδελφή, σοί θ’ ὑπούργησον τάδε 
    ἐμοί τ’ ἀρωγά, τῷ τε φιλτάτῳ βροτῶν 
    πάντων, ἐν Ἅιδου κειμένῳ κοινῷ πατρί. 
 
    Kneel and pray him to come in kindness from below the earth 
    to help us against our enemies, 
    and pray that his son Orestes may get the upper hand 
    and may trample, alive and well, upon his enemies, 
    so that in the future we may honour him with hands 
    richer than those with which we now bring him gifts! 
    I believe, yes, I believe that it is he who was concerned 
    to send these ugly dreams to her. 
    But none the less, my sister, perform this service 
    in aid of both yourself and me, and of the dearest of all mortals, 
    the father of us both who lies in Hades. 
Chrysothemis is given thorough instructions on what to pray for when she makes the offering at 
Agamemnon’s tomb.  She is to ask for Agamemnon himself to rise from the earth and send 
Orestes as well.  That Orestes is not merely seen as a bearer of grief (a possible interpretation of 
some earlier passages) but as an avenger, indeed, as a living agent of the dead Agamemnon, is 
plain from lines 455-6:  Agamemnon sends Orestes, his living son, who is to approach his 
enemies ἐξ ὑπερτέρας χερὸς; even the description of his movement (ἐπεμβῆναι ποδί) evokes the 
activity of the Furies.
106
  Orestes’ act of vengeance will neatly complete the cycle of χάρις by 
which father aids son in his own vengeance in return for Electra’s mourning and anticipated 
future offerings (458).  Electra spells out the interconnectedness of living and dead family 
members in lines 461-3, where Chryosthemis’ offerings will be of help to both sisters 
(presumably in their ability to call up Agamemnon and so gain revenge and liberty) and to 
Agamemnon himself.  It may be significant that the identity of τῷ φιλτάτῳ βροτῶν πάντων is 
held until the end of the prayer; taken by itself, that phrase would be an appropriate way to refer 
to Orestes – again, father and son, dead victim and living avenger, are melded in Electra’s 
imagination. 
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 Cf. e.g. Aesch. Ag. 1468-9. 
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 Like the parodos, the choral ode at 472-515 constitutes a partial reiteration of Electra’s 
view, but also an expansion of it in terms that would be unfamiliar to her.  The chorus attempts 
to interpret Clytemnestra’s dream as portending the arrival of ἁ πρόμαντις Δίκα, δίκαια 
φερομένα χεροῖν κράτη.  They go on to claim that neither Agamemnon nor the axe that killed 
him is unmindful – of what, we are not told, but the dream is again taken as evidence that 
Agamemnon’s spirit is stirring, while the axe suggests a reciprocal fate for his murderers.  Likely 
Electra would agree with the basic sentiment that vengeance is just, though she never goes so far 
as to personify Δίκη, normally an Olympian figure, nor does she suggest that “Justice” might be 
yet another source of Clytemnestra’s dream (the clear implication of the epithet πρόμαντις).  In 
fact, the system sketched here sounds very Aeschylean:  a vague conjunction of Olympian and 
chthonic figures, all of equal valency, none well defined.  It is not clear exactly who sends the 
dream, who wields the axe, or what is the relationship between prophetic Justice and the dead 
Agamemnon, not to mention the adultery-punishing Fury of the antistrophe.  Vagueness is 
perhaps to be expected in a choral ode, yet this is just how Aeschylus avoided fragmentation of 
beliefs in his play – by the repeated invocation of a series of ideas, without spelling out the link 
between them. 
 However, unlike Choephoroi, the scope and flexibility of the chorus’ system is not 
symbolic of the play’s larger religious movement, being instead juxtaposed with Electra’s 
concentrated chthonicism.  The chorus has picked out elements of her system, but they have also 
broadened it and explained certain phenomena differently.  This same dynamic is evident, on 
another level, in their brief account of Pelops and Myrtilus, which expands the mythical scope 
beyond what we see elsewhere in the play.  For a moment, the chorus is allowed a more 
comprehensive view of family history and of divine activity than any of the characters; but we 
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have been given reason to think that the characters do not share these comprehensive views and 
may even disagree on particular points.
107
 
 The agon at first sight could tell us much about Clytemnestra’s religion, but in the end it 
is difficult to tell whether she or Electra (or indeed, either one) is ever giving us a full and correct 
version of events.
108
  While it reveals some profound differences of opinion on the matter of 
justice,
109
 it cannot tell us conclusively what really motivates either character.  Thus far, then, we 
know that Clytemnestra believes in chthonic wrath and its power enough to commit 
maschalismos.  Further details are reserved for the exchange following the agon, since the debate 
itself is more concerned with the motives and morals of the past than with the coming 
vengeance. 
 Clytemnestra is a difficult figure to assess accurately, as most of what we hear about her 
in this play comes from Electra.
110
  Clytemnestra is acknowledges a greater range of divine 
involvement than other characters and is more willing to participate in a variety of rituals to 
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 Sewell-Rutter 2007 has less interest in Sophocles’ version for the very reason that it is concerned more with 
a snapshot of the myth than with an intergenerational family curse. 
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 On the construction of Clytemnestra’s character in this passage, see Budelmann 2000: 66-71.  He draws 
attention to the personal quality of her words, which create a sense of depth for her as a character while also keeping 
the audience ignorant of the exact circumstances surrounding Iphigenia’s death.  Thus, we are not given enough 
information to know whether or not the sacrifice was “really” justified (and by extension, whether or not 
Agamemnon’s death was justified).  His point regarding lines 788-96 (two different perceptions of Nemesis) is 
similar; again, the audience is deprived of a sure religious angle for interpretation. 
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 Blundell 1989: 162:  “But while Clytemnestra claims that her actions are justified, they are condemned by 
Electra and the chorus as unjust (113, 521, 561), ‘unlawful’ (494), hubris (271), a ‘most disgraceful outrage’ (487; 
cf. 559), ‘evil villainy’ (1387; cf. 126) and an affront to both aidos and reverence (249f.; cf. 124, 1383).  If they are 
right, then Clytemnestra’s particular application of Help Friends/Harm Enemies, based on her own quite reasonable 
evaluation of who her friends and enemies are, must inevitably violate a whole series of moral norms.  But if she is 
right, then their pursuit of the code is equally reprehensible.”  Segal 1966: 498 notes the political language used by 
Clytemnestra to describe Orestes’ “revolt” from her affections. 
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 Blundell 1989: 163 observes that Electra’s description of her quarrels with Clytemnestra is “far more 
vitriolic, at least on Clytemnestra’s part, than anything we actually observe.  Ironically, Electra shows no awareness 
that such terms may be equally applicable to her own abuse of her mother.”  In my opinion, it is a disregard to 
engage with this issue that vitiates much of Wright 2005b.  The situation in Aeschylus is similar, but since his 
Electra is less individualized, less rebellious, we are prevented from worrying much about latent bias in her words. 
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accomplish her personal goals.  I have argued that maschalismos should not be taken as a moral 
black mark against her so much as a manifestation of her constant concern with safety.
111
  Her 
pragmatic approach to religion is again evident in her prayer to Apollo Lyceius, which she offers 
in response to her ominous dream of the night before.  She has already responded to this dream 
by sending Chrysothemis with libations to the tomb of Agamemnon, indicating her suspicion that 
he is one possible source of the dream.  His appearance to her in a troubling dream makes her 
fear that the maschalismos has failed, and so she needs another means of diverting his spirit.  As 
her belief in chthonic powers was earlier enough to spur her to commit maschalismos, so now 
she makes a last-ditch effort to avert his wrath by appeasement with libations.  At the same time, 
she prays to Apollo that the dream may turn out well for her and ill for her enemies;
112
 this is an 
appropriate prayer to the “wolf-killing” god, who protects the flock by driving off predators and 
thus may be expected to defend the home and hearth from intruders.  If, as it seems, Apollo 
Lyceius is at least partly chthonic in his manner of worship,
113
 then he might be best approached 
with fear, as a god more inclined to send harm than good.  But here Clytemnestra is only 
concerned with her own well-being, and so she prays not only that the threat posed by the dream 
may not be fulfilled (a typical apotropaic prayer) but also that something good may come of it (a 
less common request of chthonic deities).  Her prayer also suggests that she views Apollo 
Lyceius as another possible source for the dream.  There is no way for her to know which is the 
true source of the dream, or even if both together might be, so she takes the appropriate measures 
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 Not all critics have found Sophocles’ Clytemnestra to be a completely abhorrent figure (e.g. Kells 1973); but 
my business in this chapter is not to offer a moral defense of her actions, but rather to consider how her religious 
attitude meshes with those of the other characters.  Nevertheless, in order to do this, we must approach her with a 
mind free of moralizing judgments. 
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 Blundell 1989: 151 points out that she may legitimately consider Orestes to have broken their bond of φιλία 
by choosing to side with Agamemnon, as Electra also has. 
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 See above, n. 67. 
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to propitiate both and thereby covers all her bases.
114
  We have already seen that she and Electra 
both believe the dream to have been sent by Agamemnon; now Clytemnestra’s religious system 
diverges sharply from Electra’s, becoming in some respects more inclusive – and this poses a 
difficulty for any spectators who might be interested in discovering the “true” nature of her 
dream. 
 If Clytemnestra’s primary concern is safety, her primary means of obtaining it is control.  
Maschalismos allows her (or so she hopes) to control Agamemnon and his Furies, if only in a 
negative sense.  Libations and prayer function similarly, by inducing divine powers to help her, 
or at least not to harm her.  Finally, it is significant that she seems to fear Orestes even more than 
the gods (who might seem scarier and infinitely more powerful) or Electra (who is more spiteful 
and immediate).  Orestes is in fact the cause of her greatest fear because he is the one element 
she feels unable to control; all she can do is hope that he stays away, a thing which no pious 
offerings or magical spells can accomplish.
115
  This explains her vast relief at the news of his 
death.  She has had cause to fear that at least one of her previous defensive measures has failed, 
and if so, then divine powers (not to mention Electra) might be conspiring with Orestes to aid his 
revenge.  The report that he is dead allows her to stop worrying about the prospect of a human 
avenger, and perhaps also lays to rest her fears of chthonic vengeance. 
 The arrival of the Paedagogus with his false messenger’s report is often seen as an ironic 
response to Clytemnestra’s prayer (637-59); but I would caution against attributing it directly to 
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 An anachronistic interpretation might consider her comprehensiveness a lack of faith in any one deity or 
method, but in the ancient world, the opposite was the case:  because she is willing to acknowledge the involvement 
of both Olympian and chthonic powers, she must pay heed to both. 
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 At least not in this play.  Sophocles chooses not to raise the possibility of defixiones.  I suggested that in Cho. 
the murder and mutilation of Agamemnon were also aimed directly at Orestes.  Nothing in El. makes a similar 
interpretation here impossible, but neither is there any statement quite so explicit as Cho. 441-2. 
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Apollo.
116
  I am more sympathetic to the position of Reinhardt, who draws a distinction between 
Oedipus Tyrannus 911ff. and this passage of Electra:  “this time the part played by fate and the 
gods is played by mere intrigue.  And this time illusion is no longer a symbol of the human 
condition, but simply a successful trick.”117  Further, while the Paedagogus is a part of the δόλος 
recommended by Apollo, Orestes is ultimately the author of this particular strategy, having given 
the Paedagogus very specific instructions as to what he must do (39-50). 
 The Paedagogus’ report shakes the foundations of Electra’s religious beliefs and 
ultimately leads her to abandon her strategy of lamentation in favor of a more humanistic 
approach.  Despite her earlier declaration that she would never cease lamenting (103-4), she 
actually does cease when she hears that Orestes has died.
118
  One might naturally expect this to 
be an additional cause for lamentation, not a reason to stop.  Her line of thinking seems to be that 
with Orestes dead there is no hope of rescue or revenge.  There is no longer any reason to keep 
Agamemnon’s spirit wakeful, since it has no human agent; if there is no hope from either of 
those quarters, then lamentation is useless, and Electra must look out for her own well-being.  
This is basically Chrysothemis’ reasoning, and Electra’s change of perspective becomes clearer 
in the second encounter between the two sisters, when Electra attempts to convince 
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 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 233 n. 55 understands it as a response by the chthonic gods to Clytemnestra’s 
prayer that they never give Electra rest.  Bowman 1997: 134 seems to connect the dream, the prayer to Apollo, and 
the arrival of the Paedagogus:  “As in the O.T., the messenger by implication comes in fulfilment of the prayer; in 
the Elektra, his arrival also sets in motion the fulfilment of the dream.  The implication that Apollo has sent the 
dream as in the O.T. he has given the oracle is unmistakable.”  A spectator watching the play would first learn of the 
dream, then witness Clytemnestra’s prayer, and finally hear the false messenger report.  It would be easy to connect 
these last two elements, and it is true that the Paedagogus’ activity aids fulfillment of the dream.  But it is less 
obvious that we should attribute the dream to Apollo because the Paedagogus appears after Clytemnestra’s prayer.  
The sequence of events is too jumbled for that to be a simple deduction for the audience. 
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 Reinhardt 1979: 151. 
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 At 796 Electra says πεπαύμεθ’ ἡμεῖς (either “we have ceased” or “we have been stopped”), probably with 
reference both to her hopes for revenge and to her lamentation (which is how Clytemnestra understands it at 798).  
The only time we truly see Electra lament is much later in the play, when Orestes approaches the palace with the 
urn. 
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Chrysothemis to join her in a plot to murder Aegisthus.  After telling her the news about Orestes, 
Electra gets right down to business (938-41): 
   Ηλ. οὕτως ἔχει σοι ταῦτ’· ἐὰν δ’ ἐμοὶ πίθῃ, 
    τῆς νῦν παρούσης πημονῆς λύσεις βάρος. 
   Χρ. ἦ τοὺς θανόντας ἐξαναστήσω ποτέ; 
   Ηλ. †οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὃ γ’† εἶπον· οὐ γὰρ ὧδ’ ἄφρων ἔφυν.
119
 
 
   El. That is how things stand; but if you will obey me, 
    you will lighten the weight of our present pain. 
   Ch. Shall I ever make the dead rise again? 
   El. That is not what I said!  I am not such a fool! 
She has a plan to release them both from their current problems – a common theme in this play, 
where several characters seek release from fear or suffering.  The striking thing is that salvation 
has not been among Electra’s biggest concerns up to this point.120  But it is now that her would-
be savior is dead. 
 Chrysothemis responds with a desultory question that might almost seem mocking.  In 
fact, she is reacting to what Electra said earlier about the efficacy of lamentation.  She deduces 
that Electra wants her to join in the lamentation, which between the two of them might be 
enough to raise two dead spirits – though Electra has diplomatically given Chrysothemis all the 
credit (note the singular verbs).  The sense of mockery that we might hear in these words is the 
result of Chrysothemis’ continuing disbelief and simplicity.  She still does not believe in the 
power of lamentation as Electra does, and one suspects that, like the chorus in the parodos, she 
cannot conceive of the process so subtly as Electra does.  Chrysothemis imagines ghosts 
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 As to the corruption in this line, Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1997 list a number of conjectures, none of which 
substantially alters the meaning. 
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 See Alexiou 2002: 61-2 on the connection among lamentation, salvation, and mystic cult – a connection 
which Electra fails to make.  See also Seaford 1994 for an interpretation of El. as echoing the mystic themes of 
darkness and light, death and resurrection.  He sees a correlation between Electra’s reaction to Orestes’ reappearance 
and the salvation granted after tribulation in mystic cult.  In keeping with my argument that her world becomes more 
human upon the supposed death of Orestes, I will only add that Electra subsequently attains “salvation” (in the 
passage discussed by Seaford) through the human agency of Orestes himself.  Seaford finds (288) that “the generally 
antithetical joys of vengeance and the mysteries are horrifically combined.”  Sophocles’ point, I think, is not so 
much to undermine either of these “joys” as to humanize the ritualistic framework. 
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wandering around trying to frighten or kill their murderers, and while this belief was not 
unknown among the ancient Greeks, Electra’s thought is more spiritual:  the dead may inspire 
strength, courage, and conviction in their living agents. 
 So Chrysothemis just misses the point once again.  But Electra does not answer as we 
might expect, with a reassertion of her beliefs and aims in ritual lamentation.  Instead, she scoffs 
at Chrysothemis’ words as if the whole idea were absurd.  Isn’t this the Electra who has earlier 
insisted that the dead heed the living, and aid their just revenge?  What has happened to that 
Electra?  She has lost her faith,
121
 it seems, though the reason is not clear.  Perhaps she no longer 
believes in the vitality of spirits, since they have failed to protect Orestes and bring his revenge 
to completion.  Perhaps she recognizes the practical helplessness of those spirits without a 
human agent.  It is intriguing, however, that her disavowal of the power of the dead comes at the 
very moment when she herself decides to become their agent, along with Chrysothemis (or so 
she hopes).
122
  This would be the appropriate time for both sisters to rouse their dead kin to 
support them, as Orestes and Electra did in Aeschylus’ Choephoroi.  But for whatever reason, 
Electra no longer acknowledges that system of beliefs, and her attitude suddenly becomes much 
more like Orestes’ in the prologue.  She will kill the usurpers or die trying (1043; cf. 1078-80, 
1319-21).  She has nothing left to lose, and she anticipates that success will bring her marriage, 
glory, wealth, and a return to her rightful position in the palace (959-85).
123
  She even fantasizes 
about the festivals that people will establish to celebrate her and Chrysothemis’ courage.  It has 
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 Cf. Foley 2001: 156 n. 56: “Notice that when Chrysothemis invokes the dead Agamemnon’s presence on her 
return from his tomb, Electra, who now thinks that Orestes is dead, loses her earlier faith in the power of the dead.” 
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 Foley 2001: 151-5 describes both ancient and modern Greek traditions of lamentation and revenge, stressing 
the female role of speech versus male action and violence; see Dué 2006: 9 n. 22 for further citations.  For Electra 
herself to take action is highly unusual and, I suggest, a signal that she is no longer operating within a system of 
lamentation and revenge. 
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 Cf. Electra’s very different sentiment at 361-2, part of her first conversation with Chrysothemis. 
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been suggested that the audience is meant to think of the famous Athenian tyrannicides, 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton,
124
 in which case the killing of Aegisthus becomes a political 
assassination more than vengeance for Agamemnon.  Here is a woman, at last, firmly resolved to 
lay a hand directly to the work that needs to be done, and for purely human motives.  She seeks 
from her dearly departed only a reputation for piety (εὐσέβεια, 968).  Now she looks to the future 
and the world of the living. 
 It is interesting to think about Electra’s fantasy festival in relation to the actual festival 
apparently held by Clytemnestra (277-84).  Electra describes the latter as an impious celebration 
of criminality, but the details may tell a slightly different story.  Clytemnestra holds dances 
(χοροί) – a standard ritual affair – and offers sacrifices θεοῖσιν τοῖς σωτηρίοις.125  Vickers 
suggests that the festival may be meant to expiate pollution incurred by the murder of 
Agamemnon, and it could also be interpreted along similar lines as a sacrifice of thanksgiving.
126
  
We know that Clytemnestra is deeply concerned with her own safety, conscious of both divine 
and human threats that surround her after her treacherous murder of Agamemnon.  This passage 
suggests that she recognizes a debt to the gods, whether Olympian or chthonic or both (it would 
be like Clytemnestra to cover all her bases), and pays that debt with monthly sacrifices.
127
  Her 
own personal safety is a matter of ongoing concern, and as such must be paid for regularly.  But 
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 Juffras 1991.  Cf. Electra’s very different sentiment at 361-2, part of her first conversation with 
Chrysothemis. 
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 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 233 n. 55 glosses this phrase as “to Olympian gods, especially perhaps to Zeus 
and Apollo,” though he gives no reasons for this interpretation and goes on to cite a tradition that Clytemnestra 
sacrificed to the Furies (Eum. 106 ff.) – which is what we would expect in a rite of expiation for murder. 
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 Vickers 1973: 573.  Clytemnestra’s festival also sounds like a perversion of hero cult (on which see Jones 
2010), which often featured sacrifices and contests of one kind or another – though these would of course be held in 
honor of the deceased, not σωτήριοι θεοί. 
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 It may also be significant that Agamemnon was killed at a feast (193, 204), rather than in his bath as in 
Aeschylus; cf. Hom. Od. 3.273-5. 
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σωτηρία in this context may also denote the salvation of her household (which was, after all, 
threatened from within by Agamemnon himself).  According to this argument, Clytemnestra 
does not necessarily intend her festival as a celebration of Agamemnon’s death so much as the 
liberation of her household, as well as her own continued protection from revenge.  It is hard to 
see how Electra’s festival would differ significantly from Clytemnestra’s.  If anything, Electra’s 
appears to emphasize masculine virtues (e.g. courage) far more than Clytemnestra’s and even 
puts the two sisters on a semi-divine level (σέβειν, 981).  Ultimately, it is a celebration of their 
character, their upbringing, their resolve, and their success – not, even in Electra’s imagination, a 
celebration of murder.  But an important difference lies in Electra’s attitude toward the gods 
within her fantasy:  there are no gods, only dead spirits who will be pleased at being avenged 
(without taking an active role in vengeance), and two sisters who are made to sound like gods.  
Where Clytemnestra acknowledges the support of divine powers, Electra attributes all to her own 
innate capacities.  Her world has become more human with the death of Orestes, and her fantasy 
makes it more human still, with the gods assuming increasingly less importance.  The 
implication, to which I shall return, is that revenge, including its incentives and its consequences, 
is a wholly human affair. 
 The second stasimon (1058-97) mostly consists of praise for Electra and commiseration 
for her wretched state of affairs.  Again, the chorus attempts a more comprehensive view than the 
characters, in some cases attributing to Electra motives that we can be quite sure she does not 
actually have.  The first strophe recognizes her devotion to Agamemnon (a brand of piety all too 
rare among mankind) and expresses the chorus’ desire to join her in sending a message to her 
dead kin in the underworld.  But Electra no longer subscribes to a chthonic strategy.  Her 
reaction to the death of Orestes, in contrast to the chorus, was to cease lamenting and rely instead 
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on her own powers.  Neither has she (or anyone else) ever thought of Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus as Furies, for according to Electra’s chthonic system, the Furies are agents, not 
opponents, of Agamemnon’s revenge.  Finally, the chorus ascribes to her a “reverence of Zeus” 
(τᾷ Ζηνὸς εὐσεβείᾳ), but from what Electra has actually said, her εὐσέβεια applies to her dead 
kin (968), and reverence for Zeus has not been been foremost in her thoughts at any point in the 
play.  Once again, the chorus echoes Electra, while at the same time diverging strikingly from 
her true attitude as it has been presented both in earlier scenes and in the one immediately 
preceding the ode. 
 Electra’s religious views shift again after the recognition scene.128  Orestes has arrived, 
thus relieving Electra of the burden of vengeance, and as her dramatic role becomes again that of 
an emotional support, so her religious attitude returns to a faith in chthonic powers.  It is only as 
actor that she sees vengeance in worldly, human terms. 
 Electra’s relationship with Orestes has been labeled “dysfunctional,”129 and it is plain 
throughout this scene that the two experience reunion in very different ways.  This is only 
reasonable, however, and not necessarily a sign of deeper weakness in their relationship.  Orestes 
is emotionally affected by Electra’s lament for him; if he seems less affected by her wretched 
appearance, that can be attributed to the fact that he has already gotten a hint of her 
circumstances (back in the prologue, when he did express sympathy for her and a desire to stay).  
His anxiety about all the noise she makes once she has recognized him is also understandable, as 
he is in the middle of a murder plot, and the Paedagogus’ warning that their voices could be 
heard inside the palace shows that his fears are well-founded.  But my purpose here is not a 
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 Burton 1980: 215 sees the return of Orestes as Agamemnon’s response to the χθονία φάμα of the chorus at 
1066 – though as with Clytemnestra’s prayer to Apollo, it is harder to attribute Orestes’ return to divine will when 
we have already seen human machinations at work in the prologue.  Cf. lines 1228-9. 
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 Wright 2005b: 186; see also the scholarship cited in n. 56 above. 
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defense of Orestes or of the different emotional levels of the siblings, for these are in part a 
function of their differing religious attitudes. 
 We have seen that Orestes is mostly concerned with human affairs:  politics, wealth, 
legitimate succession, and so forth.  He does make an occasional prayer or offering, but when he 
speaks of the gods, they are a generalizing plural (οἱ θεοί), and his only real contact with the 
divine is of a fairly concrete and formal nature (he consulted the Delphic oracle).  For these 
reasons, I am hesitant to associate him with any particular branch of the divine (e.g. chthonic or 
Olympian):  gods manifest themselves to him through established oracles or else meld together 
into one homogeneous group.  Then there is his generally to-the-point attitude.  For instance, 
after the recognition scene with Electra, he brusquely tells her (1289-91) μήτε μήτηρ ὡς κακὴ 
δίδασκέ με μήθ’ ὡς πατρῴαν κτῆσιν Αἴγισθος δόμων ἀντλεῖ, τὰ δ’ ἐκχεῖ, τὰ δὲ διασπέρει μάτην.  
Most of his attention in this passage goes to the squandering of his inheritance, and he brushes 
aside the whole affair as something that he is in any case well aware of.  No rousing speeches or 
emotional laments for him – just the business at hand. 
 Electra, on the other hand, is highly emotional and devotes herself to chthonic powers, 
especially the spirit of the dead Agamemnon, and her behavior might resemble that of a Fury.
130
  
Upon hearing of Orestes’ death, she briefly abandons those chthonic powers as ineffectual and 
focuses instead on the human world.  The reappearance of Orestes allows her to regain 
confidence in her earlier chthonic tactics; she was keeping Agamemnon’s spirit vital for just this 
moment, and Orestes’ arrival demonstrates that her long wait and lamentation were not in vain 
after all.  This dynamic may explain some of her more bizarre words in this scene, especially at 
1316-7 and 1361: 
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 By analogy, her practical ineffectiveness in avenging her father might raise questions about the Furies’ 
effectiveness. 
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 1)   ὥστ’ εἰ πατήρ μοι ζῶν ἵκοιτο, μηκέτ’ ἂν 
    τέρας νομίζειν αὐτό, πιστεύειν δ’ ὁρᾶν. 
 
    so that if my father were to return alive, I should not 
    now think it a miracle, but should believe I saw him. 
 
 2)   χαῖρ’, ὦ πάτερ· πατέρα γὰρ εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ 
 
    Hail, father – for I think I see a father 
The first is meant as something of an adynaton, similar to Chrysothemis’ question at 940, but 
like Chrysothemis’ question, it contains the kernel of a true belief.  All of Electra’s mourning has 
been intended to bring back her dead father – or at least, his strength, his support, his thirst for 
vengeance.  Most likely she would indeed be surprised to see him walk around the corner, but 
her words suggest that in some sense he has already done just that.  The adynaton is embedded in 
a natural result clause; that is, the natural result of Orestes’ return is the raising of Agamemnon.  
Thus the statement is an adynaton only insofar as Agamemnon is not expected physically to rise 
from the earth; he has already risen in a spiritual sense.  Electra’s delight at Orestes’ unexpected 
return is informed by her chthonic convictions. 
 The second statement is addressed to the Paedagogus, whom Electra finally recognizes as 
the man who helped her to spirit Orestes away from the palace so many years ago.  He has been 
something of a father-figure to Orestes, but Electra does not address him as father for that reason 
alone.  He was her partner in setting the revenge plot in motion in the first place, and they are 
both credited with raising Orestes to be an avenger (14, 951-3).  The Paedagogus’ return signals 
success in that venture, confirms Orestes’ identity (if confirmation is needed), and proves that 
Orestes’ reason for returning is revenge.  The Paedagogus represents the fulfillment of Electra’s 
initial plan and her laments since that day; this fulfillment may be attributed, in her view, to her 
lamentation and through it, to Agamemnon.  The Paedagogus symbolizes the working of 
Agamemnon’s spirit for all those years while Orestes was being brought up in exile, and Orestes 
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himself signifies the next step, vengeance itself.  Electra is not mad, as some have thought.  She 
is witnessing the substantiation of her religious beliefs and actions.
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 So when the avengers enter the palace, Electra has experienced some considerable shifts 
in belief, from reliance on chthonic powers to human self-sufficiency and back to chthonic 
powers, with a final nod to Apollo Lyceius.  According to Sheppard (1918: 87), “[i]t is … in the 
spirit caught from Orestes, that she makes her prayer to Apollo Lykeios.”  This may be true, but 
it requires qualification.  Orestes never prays to Apollo Lyceius, though it is possible that Electra 
takes his and Pylades’ proskynesis to the ἔδη θεῶν (Apollo’s among them) as her cue to pray 
(and line 1376 suggests as much).  But Orestes’ Apollo, insofar as Orestes even has a personal 
relationship with Apollo, is the prophetic god of Delphi, while Lyceius seems to be Apollo in his 
chthonic aspect, at least partially.  Electra’s prayer to the chthonic Apollo coincides with her 
reversion to her chthonic stance; if she is in fact influenced here by Orestes’ religious attitude, 
she still chooses to pray to the Apollo most closely related to her own chthonic worldview. 
 Further, the strands of religious belief begin to unravel here near the end of the play.  The 
echo of Clytemnestra in Electra’s prayer to Apollo invites comparison of the two passages and 
brings out the difference in their respective interpretations of the “wolf-god.”  For Clytemnestra, 
he is a protector of the home and its possessions, but for Electra, he is a punisher of the impious; 
since the impiety in this case is the murder of Agamemnon, Apollo Lyceius also becomes a god 
of vengeance who must kill the Aeschylean wolf and lioness.
132
  Apollo Lyceius was historically 
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 Or so she thinks.  Kitzinger 1991: 325: “Elektra’s willingness to entertain the illusion of her father’s 
presence creates an uncomfortable question about the frame of mind in which she now participates in the action and 
obscures rather than clarifies our understanding of that action.”  I would not go so far as to say, with Kitzinger, that 
Electra’s talk of her father is a “deliberate deception;” on one level it does in fact clarify our understanding of the 
action, for Electra’s words are an articulation of her religious views.  At the same time, those views are given no 
particular authority in this play, and so we are unable to rely upon them for a “true” understanding of the action.  
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worshiped together with more “typical” Olympians but with rites that seem quite chthonic.133  He 
is thus an ambivalent figure, ready to be defined in whatever way each character finds most 
helpful.  The same is true of certain gods mentioned in the following choral ode.  It first 
introduces Ares τὸ δυσέριστον αἷμα φυσῶν,134 who thus sounds rather like the Furies in 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides (53-4), and the Furies themselves are described in the next very sentence 
(especially 1388:  ἄφυκτοι κύνες).  In the antistrophe, Orestes becomes a “cunning helper of the 
dead” (1391-2:  ἐνέρων δολιόπους ἀρωγὸς), and then comes Hermes, here identified as the son 
of Maia, a master of trickery, who is using darkness (σκότῳ) to help someone who is himself 
described as a helper of the dead (ἐνέρων ἀρωγός).  Nominally, we have two Olympians (Ares 
and Hermes) and two chthonic forces (the Furies and the dead), all apparently swirling around 
the human avengers.  But as each of the Olympians is described in terms that may carry chthonic 
associations, the line, such as it is, between Olympians and chthonians is significantly blurred 
both in this ode and in Electra’s preceding prayer to Apollo Lyceius. 
 Moreover, opening the ode with the god of war may be a response to Electra’s invocation 
of Apollo Lyceius, who in Athens was closely associated with the army and warfare.  The chorus 
thus implies a third possible role for Apollo Lyceius as a god of war; while protection, 
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 See Dunn 2006: 191-2, 198.  Sheppard 1927: 8 notes the similarity between Clytemnestra’s and Electra’s 
(allegedly impious) prayers to Apollo and remarks that “from this moment Electra is lost.”  Similarly Blundell 1989: 
175:  “It is by no means obvious that the daughter’s prayer for the death of her mother is preferable to the mother’s 
for the death of her son.” 
 
 
133
 See above, n. 67. 
 
 
134
 It is especially difficult to know when Ares is being thought of as a god in his own right, rather than a 
metaphor for violent death.  Here, he is given no patronymic, as Hermes has, and perhaps no definite article (Lloyd-
Jones & Wilson read τὸ δυσέριστον κτλ., while Finglass 2007 prefers Blaydes’ ὁ).  Elsewhere in the play, he is 
associated with the battlefield at Troy (96), the threat posed by Clytemnestra to her offspring (1242), and the death 
of Clytemnestra (1423); in the first and last, his epithet of choice is φοίνιος.  All of these passages are consonant 
with the use of Ares as metaphor; Finglass 2007: 1385n. compares Aesch. Ag. 1389, where the dying Agamemnon 
breathes out blood just as Sophocles’ Ares does here.  In any event, his characterization in this passage resonates 
more with the other chthonic figures of the ode than with the Olympians. 
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vengeance, and warfare may all have been the province of the contemporary Athenian Apollo 
Lyceius, they are presented in this play as the views (or even the constructs) of individual people 
with their own (mutually exclusive) goals.  The same god would not, for instance, 
simultaneously preserve Clytemnestra’s well-being and punish her for impiety.  The chorus is 
attempting to provide a religious framework for the murder of Clytemnestra, not very different 
from the one articulated by Electra throughout most of the play, but it is hard to say just what 
Apollo Lyceius stands for, and therefore difficult to take any of these views as authoritative in 
Griffith’s sense. 
   As Electra returns to her chthonic attitude, the chorus also resumes its apparently 
comprehensive tone (in contrast to Electra’s narrow chthonicism).  Their religious views 
continue to differ with regard to Apollo Lyceius.  While the chorus’ ode is superficially 
comprehensive, it appears deeply chthonic; that the chorus has consistently been figured as the 
last remnant of Aeschylean unity makes their sudden emphasis of a chthonic system startling, 
and it resonates with Electra’s recent shifts in religious belief.  More significantly, the principal 
subject of these prayers and songs, Orestes, has given no indication that he thinks of himself as a 
Fury, a chthonic avenger, or an agent of Apollo.  If Sophocles meant to draw together the 
characters’ disparate religious attitudes into something like Aeschylean convergence, he would 
have done better to allow Electra to retain her religious credibility, rather than changing her 
opinions several times.  He would have done better to allow a single, coherent interpretation of 
Apollo Lyceius, rather than three different ones that all appear equally valid even as they cancel 
each other out.  But instead, he has driven a wedge into Aeschylus’ alliance of divine and human 
entities.  If there is an alliance of Olympian chthonic, and human powers, as in Choephoroi, none 
of the characters appears to be aware of it, least of all the avenger himself. 
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 The final scene of the play bears out the interpretation offered in this chapter.  Most of 
our interest in the gods fades amid the increased pace of the action as Electra immediately 
reemerges from the palace and cheers on the fatal blows to Clytemnestra, then Orestes rushes out 
to confirm that the deed is done and turns right around when Aegisthus is seen approaching.  The 
chorus’ occasional comments continue to evoke a comprehensive Aeschylean system (1417-23), 
mentioning the Furies, the dead, and Ares, as in the previous ode.  Orestes famously declares that 
“in the house all is well, if Apollo prophesied well” (1424-5); whether or not the conditional is 
meant to question the value of the prophecy, Orestes’ statement, combining reference to the 
Delphic oracle with concern for the household, reflects his general attitude about revenge 
throughout the play.  Aegisthus’ vague sense of divine involvement (1466-7) contributes little to 
his characterization;
135
 from what we hear of him in this play, he appears to be primarily a 
political, material figure, one who would in any case be unlikely to operate in accordance with a 
fully developed system of religious beliefs.  His notorious prediction of future evils for the house 
of Atreus (1497-8) is similarly tenuous:  Aegisthus has no authority as a seer, either in this play 
or in any other account, and his prediction is suitably vague.  The play concludes with the two 
characters most rooted in the human world:  Aegisthus attempts to exploit fear of divine 
punishment to save his own skin, while Orestes, who has successfully avenged his family’s 
honor and regained his inheritance, is able to ignore his threat.
136
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 Segal 1981: 270 points out that Aegisthus is caught in men’s nets, while the Aeschylean nets were those of 
the Furies or Justice (Ag. 1580, 1611). 
 
 
136
 The “dark” reading of Segal 1981 is developed on a different basis than the one I have offered here, but 
some of his concluding remarks are relevant (p. 290): “The triumphant choral song and ritual procession that end the 
Oresteia are here reduced to ambiguous discourse and reluctant, private movement toward a house whose contact 
with the divine order is clouded and uncertain.  Sophocles seems to have deliberately stripped away the rich mythic 
perspectives which Aeschylus had so elaborately woven into his version of the story.  The lyrics are sparse and for 
the most part restricted to discussions of the immediate situation.  The few myths that do occur are briefly told.  The 
divine perspective is the most reduced of any Sophoclean play.  The narrow spatial limits…correspond to the 
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“Matricide and Good Spirits”? 
 Throughout the play, the characters’ different religious stances and strategies are put in 
tension with one another, juxtaposed, problematized, and questioned.  In the opening scenes, we 
are confronted with Orestes and the Paedagogus, one planted firmly in the human world, with 
very human motives and little more than a token regard for the divine, the other with a sense of 
the absolute justice to be accomplished through the execution of his king’s murderers and relying 
on the support of both Olympian and chthonic beings.  Electra and the chorus soon appear, 
giving us yet another division of religious attitudes:  Electra focuses on her father’s shade almost 
to the exclusion of all else and asserts the vengeful efficacy of lamentation, which the chorus 
approves on general principle but fails to grasp entirely; their more comprehensive religious 
system is not thoroughly articulated and serves to highlight the narrowness and specificity of 
Electra’s.  And so it continues.  Electra sketches a system (or part of a system) that characterized 
the action of Choephoroi – the involvement of chthonic powers – and yet she willfully 
misunderstands Clytemnestra’s fearlessness and festival, which are based on the same type of 
system as her own.  She rehashes her argument about the efficacy of lamentation with 
Chrysothemis, and we begin to wonder whether to credit her system of belief when no one else 
seems to – and when she cannot understand Clytemnestra’s system, which is arguably the most 
similar to her own.  It is in the following sequence, in which Chrysothemis describes 
Clytemnestra’s dream (417-30), that Sophocles most clearly juxtaposes and contrasts several 
systems of belief and shows them all to be without any sure foundation. 
 We have already glanced at Electra’s judgment of Clytemnestra’s libations; she finds it 
ridiculous to think that Agamemnon could ever be appeased.  More significant, however, is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
shallowness of the mythic and divine planes.  The human figures are left to themselves, but in this highly 
concentrated and barren world they seem to have little scope for regeneration.” 
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implication that if Agamemnon cannot be appeased, then his vengeance is inevitable.  Or is it?  
At this point, it becomes a question of the power of the denizens of the underworld.  Perhaps the 
maschalismos did fail, perhaps Agamemnon did send the dream – now what?  Can he do 
anything more than send an ominous dream?  Can he aid Orestes if the latter does not accept a 
chthonic system of vengeance?  And if not, then does it really matter that he does not accept 
Clytemnestra’s offerings?137 
 This sequence falls right after Electra’s first debate with Chrysothemis over the purpose 
of lamentation.  Electra has asserted her reasons for continuing to mourn Agamemnon, which 
Chrysothemis failed to understand completely.  The subsequent account of Clytemnestra’s dream 
might almost seem like confirmation of Electra’s view, if we believe that it testifies to 
Agamemnon’s power in the world of the living.  But this scene also shows how Electra’s beliefs 
are guided by her own anger, grief, and fear.  She believes that lamentation does work, but that 
the maschalismos did not.  This is not problematic yet, since magical rituals in the ancient world 
must have failed with some frequency without any damage to their credence.  However, Electra’s 
attitude toward Clytemnestra’s offerings may be more telling.  On the one hand, she argues that 
under no circumstances would Agamemnon’s shade accept libations from his murderer; on the 
other hand, she is strangely insistent that Chrysothemis pour them out on the ground rather than 
offering them at Agamemnon’s tomb as instructed.  The implication is that he could be appeased, 
whatever Electra says, and so the safest move is not to offer them at all, just in case chthonic 
spirits turn out to be more fickle than anticipated.
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 Alexanderson 1966: 90:  “We can hardly doubt which of those two, Clytemnestra and Electra, has reason to 
count on divine help.”  We can doubt, I think, whether either one receives divine help. 
 
 
138
 In fact, she suggests that they will be waiting for Clytemnestra’s imminent arrival in the underworld, so 
Electra effectively turns a canceled offering into a threat.  Kitzinger 1991: 308 believes that “she prevents 
Chrysothemis from performing a ritual that would perpetuate the disorder that Clytaemnestra has created in their 
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 So when we hear about Clytemnestra’s dream, we suspect, along with the characters, that 
Agamemnon may be responsible for it.  When we hear that he was a victim of maschalismos, we 
may wonder whether he could have been responsible for it (if he was in fact successfully 
bound).
139
  When we hear Electra simultaneously asserting Agamemnon’s allegiance to her 
cause and implying that he might be influenced by Clytemnestra’s offerings, we begin to 
question the solidity of her beliefs.  Finally, when Clytemnestra herself comes on stage in the 
very next scene and prays to Apollo, we begin to wonder whether he sent the dream – or indeed, 
whether any external being is actually responsible for it, or it might even be a psychological 
manifestation of Clytemnestra’s worries about human avengers.  That Clytemnestra is willing to 
admit the possibility of two different sources is also problematic on an interpretative level.  She 
does not have to decide whether Agamemnon or Apollo sent the dream, but we would like to be 
able to do so – for this might help us determine how the matricide is to be understood – and the 
playwright gives no guidance in this matter.  It is worth noting that Aeschylus achieves the unity 
of powers in his version of the dream (Orestes is represented as a Fury in a dream sent by 
Agamemnon) without raising the issue of multiple sources.  Clytemnestra assumes that 
Agamemnon is the sender, and nobody doubts her conclusion.  All three agents of vengeance 
(Orestes, Agamemnon, Fury) are given a role to play, all three overlapping without conflict.  
Prayers to Apollo and other gods elsewhere in the play give the strong sense that they, too, are 
involved in the action, but without disturbing the balance or inviting the audience to wonder who 
is responsible for what. 
                                                                                                                                                             
world” – though I am reluctant to read order and disorder into the play quite so thoroughly as Kitzinger does, and I 
must disagree with her assertion (310) that “Elektra makes the ritual an act performed by the right people in the 
correct spirit and for straightforward reasons,” since beyond merely honoring the dead, she is also asking her father 
to help kill her mother. 
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 Electra’s years of lamentation, all with no visible effect, might also be a sign that Agamemnon was 
prevented from taking action. 
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 In fact, religious disjunction, not convergence, is a central theme of Electra, where 
characters often try to understand events and even each other through various frameworks, which 
the other characters do not share.  So when the chorus sees Orestes as a Fury, they are attempting 
to recreate the system Aeschylus used comprehensively in Choephoroi.  But that he does not see 
himself or his role in this way at all casts doubt on the ultimate legitimacy of that interpretation.  
We are given a glimpse into a variety of views, and sometimes those views seem tenable:  for 
example, that Agamemnon sent Clytemnestra’s dream and that he was able to do so because of 
the energy and attentiveness generated by Electra’s lamentation.  But then those views encounter 
resistance, doubt, or questioning (maybe Apollo sent the dream, and not Agamemnon; maybe 
lamentation is not enough to revive the dead) and the audience is given no clear signal as to 
which – if any – of these religious systems should be privileged in interpretation.  Should we 
understand the action from a chthonic point of view when the chief avenger, Orestes, does not?  
Should we understand that Apollo stands behind all this when the central figure, Electra, does 
not?
140
 
 This last question brings me to that eternal dilemma in interpretation of Electra:  is the 
matricide justified or not?  Or better yet:  are we to assume that Orestes will be pursued by Furies 
in the aftermath the dramatic action?
141
  Does Sophocles stage “matricide and good spirits”142 or 
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 MacLeod 2001: 17 addresses a very similar question with regard to ironic readings of the play: “the alleged 
grim irony by which Elektra and Orestes are reduced to the level of their enemies remains unresolved in that both 
are left unaware of it.  This would be a highly uncharacteristic use of irony by Sophokles whose heroes all come to 
recognize the tragic irony that informed their self-destructive actions.  Orestes and Elektra do not; and it seems 
unlikely that the audience is expected to see the situation in such a diametrically opposed way to the characters 
without some strong suggestion to this effect in the text.” 
 
 
141
 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 227: “What did happen after the play was over?  Critics are of course rash to ask 
such a question, but ask it they sometimes do. … But where does one stop asking such questions about matters 
which Aristotle might have described as ‘outside the drama’?  The sooner the better, it may be said (as in the 
notorious case of Lady Macbeth’s children).  But the subsequent fate of tragic personages can be a part of the drama, 
not least when it was a well-known part of the legend.” 
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a darker world of moral decay and corruption?  This chapter has tried to show that the answer to 
this question should not be formulated in terms of divine will, whether Apollo’s or the Furies’; 
we must look instead to the human characters’ morals, beliefs, and attempts at justification. 
 We are presented with an array of religious beliefs and approaches to ritual, none of them 
exclusive of the others, but none of them privileged over the others, either.  In the end, we are 
left with no particular moral or religious framework to use in interpreting the play because we 
have seen too many of them.  And we have seen that even the characters do not always believe in 
them as staunchly as they might.  Electra gives up on her strategy of lamentation altogether when 
she hears that Orestes is dead, and her faith in her own system is only restored by what she sees 
as proof:  Orestes’ “resurrection;” but this cannot be proof to us, since we know that he has been 
alive all along.  It is striking that she can change her course so suddenly, that she can stop 
believing in a system which she has been acting upon for so many years and which she has just 
defended before both the chorus and Chrysothemis.  It is striking, too, that her beliefs and 
motives can change so suddenly in response to what we know are actually non-events.  Orestes 
never did die, and so only Electra perceives his (re)appearance as resurrection.  We know better.  
And yet the effect, I think, is not to make us doubt Electra’s personal faith or resolution (that 
begins to sound anachronistic), but to make us doubt whether her beliefs were ever founded on 
any secure basis to begin with.
143
  And if we doubt that, then it becomes more difficult to 
interpret the play as a whole through her perspective. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
142
 Murray 1901: vi, paraphrasing Schlegel. 
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 Cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 103: “neither Sophocles’ nor Euripides’ play about the vengeance of Orestes 
accords the Erinyes anything like the importance that they enjoy in Aeschylus.  Sophocles, whose concern is with a 
terrible moment in time and not a chain of woes, gives us a particularly notable version, in that it offers no Erinyes 
at all.”  This merits qualification, since Sophocles’ Electra offers us several Furies – but Sophocles’ Electra offers 
none.  The religious beliefs of his central character go unconfirmed. 
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 Both siblings, when they come to the business of revenge, turn out to be motivated by 
very human, worldly concerns:  wealth, inheritance, legitimacy, glory, safety, well-being, 
marriage – the list could go on.  These are Orestes’ personal motives from the beginning, and 
revenge is treated as a means to his real end.  Electra adopts these motives suddenly when she 
decides that she must be the one to kill Aegisthus and Clytemnestra.  She then relapses into her 
previous system, yet in the final scene she is no longer the active avenger.  It is significant that 
when she perceives herself as actor, rather than motivator, she sees the world in a much more 
human way.  Significant, too, is the fact that the play ends not with Furies but with Aegisthus 
and Orestes, the two characters most detached from religious ritual and most concerned with the 
human and the political.
144
  And this, I suggest, is what Sophocles meant for the play as a whole:  
when you come right down to it, revenge is a human affair.  Humans will have their own reasons 
for undertaking it, and they will be able to justify it in one way or another – as the command of a 
god, as the wish of a dead man, as a means of winning glory and restoration.
145
  They may even 
be willing to change their moral stance and adopt new systems of belief to explain or justify 
themselves.  But in the end, their action must be evaluated on human terms alone, because that is 
all we have to go on.
146
  This does not meant that revenge is necessarily immoral, but that we 
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 For the importance of the polis in El., see Finglass 2005.  Bowman 1997: 143 takes “the transfer of political 
power” to be “the central theme of the play” which is reinforced by the ending.  Davidson 1988 sees the Homeric 
Odysseus as the major model for Orestes; the end thus brings the play back to the human/political level, even as the 
Odyssey ends not with the spirits of the dead but with their living relatives.  Electra’s final words (1483-90) imply 
that Aegisthus’ body should be cast out for the birds (but see Segal 1966: 521 n. 60) ὡς ἐμοὶ τόδ’ ἂν κακῶν μόνον 
γένοιτο τῶν πάλαι λυτήριον.  Winnington-Ingram 1980: 230 n. 45 expresses surprise that “he, the writer of Ajax and 
Antigone, meant to suggest what the scholiast thought he did,” while R.D. Griffith 1998: 232 deems exposure of the 
dead “a chronic Sophoclean obsession.”  There is some ambiguity in Sophocles’ expression, where κακῶν may be 
taken as partitive genitive or with τῶν πάλαι.  That “release” from evils can only be gotten from committing a like 
outrage against Aegisthus’ body (exposure to the birds in exchange for maschalismos) perhaps emphasizes that 
Electra is caught up in a world governed by vengeful, chthonic χάρις. 
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 Cairns 1993: 241-9, with particular attention to the agon, notes the opportunism of both Electra’s and 
Clytemnestra’s positions (p. 249): “Both justify conduct which is aischron in terms of dikē.” 
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simply cannot know whether the gods approve or not, or which gods might approve, or what they 
might do as a result, or whether they can do anything as a result, or whether they even exist.  We 
can only perceive them through the arguments and justifications of other, flawed humans.
147
 
 This religious agnosticism is not what many have come to expect from Sophoclean 
drama, which is supposed to shroud superhuman powers in mystery (rather than removing them 
altogether) and create heroes who are great, admirable, or even god-like.  A provocative religious 
stance and a critical eye for human conduct are features more often associated with Euripidean 
tragedy, especially that of the 410s,
148
 when Sophocles’ play was likely to have been produced.  
If Sophocles was drawing on a specific Euripidean source, rather than his general attitude of 
skepticism, a strong candidate is Euripides’ own Electra.  Neither Electra nor Orestes in this play 
has found many sympathetic readers, the former characteristically consumed by hate but with an 
added streak of spiteful pettiness, the latter upright and courageous at only the most superficial 
level.  Both are treacherous:  Electra baits Clytemnestra into the house with the promise of 
seeing her new grandchild, while Orestes murders Aegisthus by striking him in the back at a 
sacrifice.  The sudden remorse of both characters after the matricide, together with the 
unenviable fates predicted for each after the action of the play, leaves little doubt about how we 
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 Budelmann 2000: 181-2 remarks that “in the final scene of Electra neither divine command nor divine 
punishment is prominent.  Critics and spectators have to import both or either, and they are not told which.” 
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 Cf. Kitzinger 1991: 317 (on the agon): “the archaic justification of blood vengeance becomes inadequate if 
divorced from an examination of motive and character; the question of justice is removed from the sphere of a 
divinely sanctioned and unchallengeable system to a context limited by the capabilities of human thought, feeling, 
and language.”  Other critics, like Kitzinger, have argued that there is a sense of divine justice that nevertheless 
remains beyond the reach of the human characters.  My argument is slightly different in that I want to remove any 
certainty of “divine justice” altogether.  It is not that divine justice exists and we cannot grasp it; rather, it may or 
may not exist and we cannot know even that much.  If so, then a pessimistic reading of the play would most 
profitably begin not with divine will but with Electra’s self-destruction and degeneration into a Clytemnestra-like 
figure (e.g. Friis Johansen 1964, Segal 1966, Blundell 1989: 149-83). 
 
 
148
 Similarly to Soph. El., Ion more explicitly demonstrates the wrongheadedness of some human beliefs about 
the gods; cf. Meltzer 2006: 146-87. 
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are to understand this whole affair.  Clytemnestra and Aegisthus are not completely 
whitewashed, but their murders (especially Clytemnestra’s) are portrayed as unjustified and 
unnatural. 
 But if Electra and Orestes are to be condemned in Euripides’ play, Apollo does not come 
out much better.  He is blamed for the killing of Clytemnestra and his oracle called “unwise” 
(1302) by one who should know, the deified Castor.  A god himself, Castor speaks as an 
authoritative figure in this play, and his criticism of Apollo is to be taken seriously.  Sophocles’ 
Electra has no such authoritative figure, and that is what enables him to create an atmosphere of 
agnosticism even while the individual characters profess strong beliefs in one religious system or 
another.  The provocativeness of Sophocles’ position lies in the denial of divine influence in 
human affairs, which in turn strips his human characters of legitimate divine justification for 
their actions and exposes them to the audience’s criticism.  Euripides’ portrayal of the divine 
world also exposes his human characters to criticism, though in a different way:  his extremely 
negative characterization of Electra and Orestes before the murders and their overwhelming 
remorse afterward suggest the inherent immorality of the matricide, which is confirmed by 
Castor’s denunciation of Apollo.  In other words, Electra and Orestes should have known better 
than to put aside their own sense of morality in obedience to the “unwise” instructions of such an 
unreliable arbiter of justice as Apollo.  But Euripides’ approach, both here and in many of his 
other plays, is perhaps less provocative than Sophocles’ insofar as he never questions the gods’ 
existence.  Apollo may be foolish, Orestes may have been foolish to listen to him, but that oracle 
does stem from a real divine source, and it has a real effect in the world of men.  Castor validates 
to some extent a negative view of the gods, but his very presence on stage lends them a more 
substantial reality than they have in Sophocles’ Electra. 
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 If these brief conjectures are correct, then Sophocles’ treatment of men and gods in 
Electra is a product of “extreme dramatic interaction.”  The play is a thorough reworking of both 
Aeschylus’ divine system in Choephoroi and Euripides’ critical skepticism in Electra; both 
earlier plays are important parts of Sophocles’ immediate dramatic context, but in neither case 
does he straightforwardly imitate or contest the other poets’ ideas.  The Sophoclean Electra 
combines central ideas and themes of both plays to produce an original version of the myth and a 
dramatic experience that is both ambiguous and provocative. 
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Sophocles Ποιητής and the Art of Dramatic Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 The last chapter described a particular aspect of Sophocles’ dramatic strategy in Electra 
as a response to Aeschylus’ Choephoroi; the difficulties of dating (and limitations of space) kept 
us from a thorough study of the relationship between the Sophoclean and Euripidean Electras, 
but we were able to conclude broadly that both poets show a commonality of interest in their 
skepticism toward the gods and their pessimistic view of human justice.  In this chapter, we 
move on to Sophocles’ next play, Philoctetes, and his creative relationship with Euripides.  We 
will study Philoctetes as a reaction to, and a source of further inspiration for, Euripides’ dramatic 
experimentation near the end of the fifth century. 
 Where the last chapter sought to relate Electra to an old but influential play that treated 
the same myth, this chapter deals with a series of plays that were produced within the same time 
period – Helen (412 B.C.), Philoctetes (409), and Orestes (408) – and use similar dramatic 
techniques prominently and thematically.  This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive 
treatment of the relationship among these plays but merely examines one way in which 
Sophocles and Euripides engaged with one another in this period and within this range of ideas 
and dramatic strategies.  But it is meant to describe, in miniature, the kind of exchange that must 
have driven the evolution of Attic tragedy throughout the fifth century, with many playwrights 
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constantly reacting to each other and contributing their own ideas and innovations to the pool of 
available material. 
 Simply put, this chapter attempts to place Sophocles’ Philoctetes in its immediate 
dramatic context as a part of late-fifth-century tragedy (represented overwhelmingly by 
Euripides), and then to show how Euripides’ Orestes belongs to a context comprising both recent 
Euripidean tragedy and Philoctetes.  Since Philoctetes is securely dated to 409 B.C., it is 
unproblematic in general to group it with other plays of the late fifth century.  But in what sense 
does Sophocles’ play belong to this period and this context in terms of its themes and dramatic 
conception?  Philoctetes has often seemed exceptional among extant Sophoclean tragedies for 
various reasons (e.g. the deus ex machina and happy ending); but while it has been common to 
attribute such features generally to Euripidean influence, this is generally done in passing and 
without argument.
1
  I hope to fill that gap here by describing more specifically both the 
Euripidean context of Philoctetes and some particular ways in which Sophocles exploited it. 
 The Euripidean context consists primarily of his “romances,” by which I mean Ion, 
Iphigenia among the Taurians, and Helen.
2
  I use this particular term because it seems to me the 
best one for bringing out some of what is distinctive about this group of plays without being as 
loaded as labels like “melodrama” or “tragicomedy.”  Though these plays have a generally 
lighter tone and a spirit of fantasy and adventure that we do not really find elsewhere, my 
purpose here is not to discuss their genre but to note that, by virtue of their similarity of tone and 
other elements such as structure and theme, they represent a distinctive type of tragedy.  While 
                                                 
 
1
 E.g. Ferguson 1972: 209.  Craik 1979 represents a partial exception in that she describes Phil. as a 
“melodrama” of the type written chiefly by Euripides, but her central aim is not to relate Phil. closely to late 
Euripides, but to explain problematic features of the play (e.g. the prophecy of Helenus) as products of 
melodramatic rather than tragic intent. 
 
 
2
 There is no reason not to include Andromeda in this group, but it is a difficult play to use in studies like this 
one for the practical reason that so little of it survives beyond the opening scenes. 
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Wright’s term “escape-tragedy” is attractive for its generic neutrality, he applies it only to 
Iphigenia, Helen, and Andromeda, which he thinks were produced together as a trilogy.  But Ion 
is usually considered to be essentially the same type of play as the other three (whether or not 
any of them were produced together), and its structural innovations are clearly relevant to 
Philoctetes.
3
 
 As a type, Euripides’ romances are set in an Odyssean world of chance, benevolent gods, 
and happy endings.  They typically portray a Greek protagonist’s attempt to escape from a 
barbarian or otherwise marginal land back to her (the escapee is usually female) own people.  A 
rescuer, related to her either by blood or by marriage,
4
 duly arrives and a recognition scene 
ensues.  After the two have been reunited, they devise a plan of escape (usually termed a 
mechanema
5
) which requires the heroine to dupe the barbarian king so that the Greeks can get 
away.  Finally, a deus appears ex machina to prevent the barbarian king from pursuing the 
fleeing Greeks or harming those who remain behind, and the play ends happily.  This basic 
pattern is followed almost formulaically in Helen and Iphigenia among the Taurians, and the lost 
Andromeda probably looked similar.  The structure of Ion, as has been noted by Friedrich 
Solmsen,
6
 stands apart from the other three in its arrangement of these elements and so also in its 
overall effect.  Most importantly, the recognition in the first episode fails, and the mechanema, 
rather than being a conspiracy between reunited relatives to deceive an oppressor, is Creusa’s 
attempt to kill Ion.  Ion and Creusa must then be prevented from killing each other by various 
                                                 
 
3
 See esp. Levett 2004 on this topic. 
 
 
4
 In Andromeda, Perseus is not initially related to the escapee, though by all appearances Andromeda betroths 
herself to him in an early scene (see Gibert 1999/2000, CCG). 
 
 
5
 On the mechanema, see esp. Solmsen 1932. 
 
 
6
 Solmsen 1934. 
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Apolline interventions (a dove, the Pythia) until they finally recognize each other at the very end 
of the play and Athena appears ex machina to confirm Ion’s birthright and discourage him from 
asking embarrassing questions of the Delphic oracle.  Though the theme of escape may be found 
in Ion’s progression from anonymous slavery to Athenian nobility, this play seems more 
concerned with the relationships and impulsiveness of the human characters and their respective 
evaluations of Apollo’s behavior than in the themes of barbarism, isolation, deception, and 
escape that are so prominent in Helen, Iphigenia, and Andromeda. 
 A brief sketch of Philoctetes reveals a similar pattern, though in respect to some details, it 
almost appears to be an inversion of the Euripidean formula.  Philoctetes shares with Ion a 
delayed recognition and a mechanema deployed against one of the protagonists instead of a 
barbarian oppressor.  The title character must be rescued from a desert island and brought back 
to rejoin his own people; two Greeks (standing in an ersatz father-son relationship) conspire to 
deceive a barbaric and potentially dangerous third party in order to bring about that rescue.
7
  A 
deus appears at the end to reveal the divine plan, predict future events, and generally send the 
escapee on his way.  That the escapee turns out to be unwilling to leave and that he himself is the 
one who must be deceived are recognizable inversions of Euripidean technique and invest the 
play with its own unique dynamics.  Insofar as the action of Philoctetes is built from the same 
elements as the romances, its most distinctive feature in this context is a massive extension of the 
mechanema, which is usually limited to one half of the play or less in Euripides. 
 These similarities in structure suggest that Philoctetes was conceived as a Sophoclean 
variation on this Euripidean type of play.  But in order to situate Philoctetes in its immediate 
                                                 
 
7
 On the father-son theme in Phil., see Avery 1965, Fuqua 1976, Blundell 1988, Whitby 1996, Roisman 1997, 
Kosak 1999, Davidson 2001.  On the “savagery” of Philoctetes, see e.g. Phil. 9, 164-6, 226, 1321, Boulter 1962, 
Winnington-Ingram 1980: 290-7, Seale 1982: 26-32, Stephens 1995. 
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dramatic context, we must look at it from both angles, as an adaptation of recent material and as 
a source of further inspiration – but here we encounter another gap in the scholarship, which has 
linked this play to recent Euripidean work and to Orestes, but not to both at once.
8
  Orestes, too, 
is often grouped broadly with other late Euripidean plays considered to be “untragic,” though it 
is seldom related to the rest of late Euripides on the level of detailed interpretation.
9
  It is more 
often seen as a product of Sophoclean influence but usually as something like a parody of 
Philoctetes:
10
  thus Apollo’s epiphany at the end, for instance, becomes a deliberately absurd 
caricature of Heracles’ reversal of the action in the previous play.  While this reading is certainly 
compelling on one level, it is important to beware of oversimplifying Euripides’ use of 
Sophoclean material and to remember what kind of drama Euripides was writing before 
Philoctetes was produced.  This chapter attempts to show how both Euripidean and Sophoclean 
work prepares the way for Orestes, at least in terms of one nexus of themes and techniques. 
                                                 
 
8
 E.g. Dietrich 1891 (on the “sleep scenes”), Spira 1960 (including discussion of the deus in Phil. and Or.), 
Boulter 1962 (on the “savagery” of Orestes and Philoctetes), Parry 1969: 347 (on the isolation of Philoctetes and 
Orestes), Fuqua 1976 (on the use of myth and mythical paradigms in Phil. and Or.), Falkner 1983 (on the attitude 
toward nature and education in Phil. and Or.), Hoppin 1990: 151 (suggesting that the structure of the end of Phil. 
“varies Euripides’ practice in Electra and Helen but does Euripides one better”), Garner 1990: 149-51 (who surveys 
brief allusions to Phil. in Or.), Konstan 2000 (on pity and φιλία in Phil. and Or.), Levett 2004 (on dramatic 
technique in Ion and Phil.).  Shucard 1973 is interested only in late Sophocles (here El. and Phil.).  Greengard 1987: 
34-49 describes Phil. as a “romance,” but with reference to Hom. Od. rather than Euripides (though she does (pp. 
52-3) find similar “comic elements” in Phil. as in other late tragedies). 
 
 
9
 E.g. Porter 1994: 54-67 compares Or. to a series of Euripidean plays in terms of “the psychopathology of 
moral outrage,” Holzhausen 2003 compares Or. and Bacch. as plays of revenge, and Wright 2006 discusses Or. as a 
“sequel” to Hel. 
 
 
10
 E.g. Falkner 1983: 290-2, who also has a catalogue of similarities between the two plays; cf. Willink 1986: 
lvi n. 92 and Zeitlin 1980: 54-5.  Burnett 1998: 247-72 views Or. as a parody of tragic convention.  For ancient and 
modern criticism of Or., see Porter 1994: 1-44.  It is highly likely that Or. was influenced by Phil., since these two 
plays were produced in consecutive years and treat many of the same themes (e.g. savagery, illness, isolation and 
reintegration, education and coming of age); see n. 8 above.  Fuqua 1976: 66 (who constructs a thorough argument 
for Sophoclean influence on Euripides in terms of heroic paradigms), pointing to the dates of Phil. and Or., says, 
“Consequently, I believe that, if the plays can be shown to deal with some of the same specific isuses and employ 
similar dramatic techniques and patterns of action, the possibility of influence is so strong that the burden of proof 
rests upon those who would argue that Sophocles’ play did not influence Euripides.” 
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 So it seems safe to say that Philoctetes has close ties both to the romances and to Orestes; 
we will explore these plays sequentially with a view specifically to dramatic self-consciousness.  
In general, dramatic self-consciousness is widely discernible in the plays belonging to this 
period.
11
  The most famous example may be the recognition scene in Euripides’ Electra (487-
584), which is an explicit commentary not only on the parallel scene in Aeschylus’ Choephoroi 
but also on the recognition as a type of scene that different playwrights choose to fashion in 
different ways; the narratologists would say that this scene in Electra betrays the presence of an 
author who chooses among alternative methods of composition.
12
  Similar, if briefer, examples 
occur in Phoenissae (751-2, Eteocles’ comment that it would take too long to list all seven 
warriors) and Helen (1056, Menelaus’ remark that faking one’s own death in a tragedy is nothing 
new).  Perhaps the most versatile type of dramatic self-consciousness is the so-called “play 
within a play,” which makes the spectators aware that they are watching theater and prompts 
reflection on dramatic production and the people involved in it (poet, actors, and spectators) as 
well as the meaning and value of drama itself.
13
 
                                                 
 
11
 Throughout this chapter, I will use the term “metadrama” rather than “metatheater” because the latter tends to 
be used of explicit reference to theatricality (with the characters often displaying an awareness of being in a play), 
while what I have in mind here is more a matter of framing the action in such a way that an attentive spectator could 
appreciate its implications for a discourse on drama and performance; the characters themselves do not have to be 
conscious that they are enacting a performance.  Falkner 1998: 29-33 observes a distinction between different 
“modes” of audience experience (mimetic, synthetic, thematic), and though his terms are different, his discussion is 
very much in line with my own. 
 
 
12
 E.g. Roberts 1989: 162 sees it as characteristic of Euripides’ late plays that they “tend to suggest a set of 
competing stories, only one of which the poet has chosen to write.”  See also Marshall 1999/2000, Torrance 2011 
for the metadrama in this scene. 
 
 
13
 On metatheatricality and metapoetry in later Greek tragedy, see Goldhill 1986: 244-64, Segal 1982: 215-71, 
Bierl 1991: 177-218, Meltzer 1994 (on Hel.), Easterling 1997b:165-71 (including discussion of the false merchant 
scene in Soph. Phil.), Burian 1997: 193-8 (including brief discussion of Eur. Hel. and Soph. Phil.), Falkner 1998 (on 
Phil.), Ringer 1998, Lada-Richards 1999: 159-215, Marshall 1999/2000, Torrance 2011, Sansone 2009, Dunn 2012: 
359-75; cf. also Zeitlin 1981: 313-4, who discusses the metadramatic parody of Eur. Hel. in Ar. Thesm.  Recent 
scholarship has also shown much interest in ancient actors and performance, on which see e.g. the articles in 
Goldhill & Osborne 1999 and Easterling & Hall 2002. 
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 Throughout this chapter, I will be paying particular attention to the poets’ thoughts about 
actors and acting.  As the poets were probably responding in part to the increasing prominence 
and popularity of actors at the end of the fifth century, it is appropriate that we briefly consider 
some of the evidence for the development of the acting profession at the end of the century. 
 In the early fifth century, poets are said to have acted in their own plays and regularly 
employed the same actors,
14
 which suggests that there was little distinction in this period 
between the actors and the performance itself; actors were just another part of the poet’s toolkit.  
The beginning of a conceptual separation of poet and actor is marked by the poets’ complete 
withdrawal from acting sometime in the mid-fifth century.
15
  Around the same time, or perhaps a 
little later, official contests for the actors were established alongside the dramatic competitions at 
both the Lenaea and the Dionysia.
16
  The institution of histrionic competition reflected a growing 
popular interest in actors and their art, as well as motivating them to specialize and become more 
and more skilled.  The gap that had been opening between poets and actors was thus formalized 
as their accomplishments began to be celebrated separately.  However, on most occasions the 
winning actor and the winning poet must have come from the same dramatic team, so while poet 
and actor were growing farther apart conceptually, their practical experiences in competitive 
performances remained quite similar.  But the separation had become complete by 418 B.C., 
when the tragic actor Callipides won the histrionic competition even though his poet lost the 
                                                 
 
14
 Tragic poet-actors:  Arist. Rhet. 1403b23-4, Vit. Soph. 4, Athen. 1.20e.  Actors associated with specific poets:  
Vit. Aesch. 15, Σ Ar. Nub. 1266, Σ Ar. Ran. 791; cf. Vit. Soph. 6 and see in general Csapo & Slater 1994: 221-38.  In 
this and the following paragraph, I rely heavily on Slater 1990; see also Csapo 2010: 103-16. 
 
 
15
 Sophocles is said to have been the first to stop acting because of the weakness of his voice.  Vit.Soph. (4) 
describes his retirement from acting as one of his innovations, and the phrasing (πρῶτον μὲν καταλύσας τὴν 
ὑπόκρισιν τοῦ ποιητοῦ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν μικροφωνίαν (πάλαι γὰρ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ὑπεκρίνατο αὐτός)) also suggests that 
Sophocles’ personal choice not to act became the norm for poets generally. 
 
 
16
 The comic actors’ contest at the Dionysia is typically downdated to the late fourth century on the basis of 
inscriptional evidence. 
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dramatic competition;
17
 ten years later, an actor named Hegelochus single-handedly “ruined” 
Euripides’ “cleverest” play.18  Such events illustrate the professional independence of the actor, 
who did not need the poet as much as the poet needed him:  a good poet with a bad actor could 
not win, but a good actor with a bad poet could.  Though the poets and actors never competed 
against each other formally, the poets in the last decades of the fifth century were forced to 
recognize the actors’ contributions to a successful performance and the necessity of finding ways 
to work with them effectively. 
 In this same period, Old Comedy extended its mockery of tragedy to the actors as well as 
the plays,
19
 and, as we will see, late tragedy abounds in metadrama demonstrating the poets’ 
interest in the art of dramatic production as a whole and especially in the actor; while earlier 
tragedy (such as the opening of Sophocles’ Ajax) is occasionally metadramatic the emphasis is 
on the figures of playwright and spectator rather than the actor,
20
 who enters the conversation in 
a central way in the 410s.  Finally, a glance ahead at the fourth century shows the actors 
becoming decidedly more popular than the playwrights (many of whom reproduced old plays 
                                                 
 
17
 IG ii
2
 2319.  The establishment of the “three-actor rule” must have happened shortly thereafter.  On the 
number of actors in comedy and tragedy, see DFA 135-8.  Regulation of actors is usually seen as a means of 
achieving equity for contestants by giving the judges a way to compare apples to apples, so to speak (Csapo & Slater 
1994: 222) – though it would have a greater effect on the poets’ competition than the actors’, since only protagonists 
competed against each other; cf. Sifakis 1995. 
 
 
18
 Thus Strattis fr. 1 on Hegelochus’ mispronunciation of Eur. Or. 279; Strattis fr. 63, Ar. Ran. 302-4, and 
Sannyrion fr. 8 also capitalize on Hegelochus’ faux pas.  As Slater 1990: 391 remarks, “[i]f Aristophanes can have 
such fun at their expense, actors must now have something of the same public recognition and presence as the other 
public figures he attacks.” 
 
 
19
 A list of actors mocked in comedy can be found in Sommerstein 1996c: 349-50. 
 
 
20
 In the prologue of Soph. Aj., Athena stages a play for her internal spectator, Odysseus; Ajax is not treated as 
an actor so much as a puppet.  Easterling 1993: 81-3 gives a brief account of the metadrama in this scene.  Scenes of 
deception are also not usually cast in a dramatically self-conscious way in earlier tragedy.  For instance, the 
deception in Aesch. Cho. (Orestes’ entry into the palace) does not demand to be read as a play within a play, since 
there is no emphasis on who directs the plot, how the actor fills his role, or what is required to make his performance 
successful.  The most Aeschylus does in this respect is have Orestes declare that he will speak in a Phocian dialect 
(564), which of course real tragic actors did not do. 
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instead of writing their own) and even reaching “superstar” status.21  Though this phenomenon 
surely did not occur before the fourth century, most agree that its roots belong to the end of the 
fifth century. 
 While Philoctetes belongs broadly to the collection of self-conscious tragedies in this 
period, it is reasonable to study it most closely (at least in this context) with a Euripidean version 
of a play within a play; Helen and the romances provide the closest analogies. 
 Of the romances, Helen and Iphigenia among the Taurians have the best examples of a 
play within a play.  Since the mechanema of Ion is mean to kill rather than deceive, it is less 
suitable for such treatment.  Even in this play, however, Euripides makes a gesture that reminds 
his audience of his play’s dramatic status:  after delivering his prologue speech, Hermes ducks 
into the laurels so that he too can observe the action about to take place on stage (76-7).
22
  But 
little more attention is given to the role of poet, actors, or spectators.  Apollo, the putative author 
of the action, remains absent even when the play fails to conform to his intended script.
23
 
 In Iphigenia among the Taurians, Iphigenia, Orestes, and Pylades hatch a plot to deceive 
Thoas and escape from his barbarian land.  Iphigenia takes the lead in laying out a workable 
                                                 
 
21
 See e.g. Arist. Rhet. 1403b33.  The frequency of reperformances of old tragedy in the fourth century provided 
the audience with an opportunity to compare different actors’ renditions of the same characters and scenes, thus 
intensifying the competition among actors and allowing the audience to be more discerning in their judgments of 
histrionic talent; cf. Slater 1990. 
 
 
22
 Significantly, Hermes intends to learn τὸ κρανθέν; the aorist indicates something already accomplished – 
either Apollo’s prediction or the play itself (which has also been engineered by Apollo); I owe this point to John 
Gibert.  For other types of self-referentiality in Ion, see T. Cole 1997, S. Cole 2008. 
 
 
23
 Easterling 1993 asks what it contributes to a play actually to bring gods on stage (instead of allowing them to 
float in the background, as in Soph. OT) and suggests that a) they enable the audience to think about abstract ideas 
more concretely, and b) they draw attention to the play as a play insofar as their control over the action parallels the 
poet’s control over the plot.  I am generally sympathetic to the argument, though I question whether the audience 
would find metadramatic connotations in every prologue or epilogue epiphany.  Apollo in Eur. Alc. hardly seems in 
control of events, and I have suggested that Hermes in Eur. Ion is an internal spectator rather than a poet.  Even if 
we grant that these two are exceptions to the rule, I would argue that since the audience was familiar with the deus 
as a dramatic convention, they would be unlikely to link a god’s appearance with the concept of poetic composition 
without prompting. 
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script and assigning the proper roles to Orestes and Pylades (who, it turns out, are not to have 
any lines at all).  Iphigenia herself then exchanges the role of playwright for that of protagonist 
as she uses her office of priestess, the statue of Artemis, and a plausible story about purifying the 
matricides to convince Thoas to let them go down to the shore.  Iphigenia’s performance cleverly 
exploits her and her fellow actors’ preexisting situation (she is a sacrificial priestess; they are 
polluted matricides)
24
 as well as their props and costumes (the statue of Artemis, the prisoners’ 
chains
25).  Thoas in turn is cast as an internal spectator to Iphigenia’s performance, and it is 
noteworthy that he not only listens closely to what she tells him but also works to find meaning 
in it
26
 – as a spectator of tragedy is also expected to do.  His interpretation lends the necessary 
meaning to her performance, which therefore comes off successfully. 
 In Helen, the female lead again fills the part of playwright in devising a plot, arranging 
costumes, and instructing her actor (Menelaus) in the role he is to play.  Like Iphigenia, she then 
becomes her own protagonist, supported by Menelaus’ lesser histrionic talent.  This sequence 
focuses especially on the significance of different costumes and their importance to the success 
of a dramatic performance:  the actors perform better – and the internal spectators 
(Theoclymenus and the Egyptians) are more easily impressed – when they have costumes 
suitable to their standing and self-image.  The effect, in Helen as well as Iphigenia, of casting a 
deception as a dramatic performance catered to a spectator who interprets verbal and visual clues 
                                                 
 
24
 See Burnett 1971: 59-61 for Iphigenia’s manipulation of real circumstances for the sake of deception. 
 
 
25
 Though it must be noted that Iphigenia proposes adding chains Orestes’ and Pylades’ costumes during the 
deception (when the two men are still inside the temple). 
 
 
26
 E.g. IT 1168, 1170, 1176, 1182, 1184, 1186, 1200, 1210, 1213, 1216, 1218. 
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as he should is to raise the question of drama’s moral and epistemological status:  is all drama 
deceptive?  is it harmful or beneficial?
27
 
 Helen has the most explicit play within a play, the most straightforward in terms of 
identifying characters with poet, actor, and spectator, and our main discussion will therefore 
begin with a brief analysis of that play in order to establish a starting point for comparison with 
Philoctetes and eventually Orestes.  In using Helen, I do not mean to suggest that it was 
Sophocles’ sole source in composing Philoctetes, nor even that it was necessarily a source.  It 
seems more likely that Sophocles, having observed several of Euripides’ recent plays and found 
something of interest in them, decided to try his hand at writing the same type of play.
28
  To the 
extent that Sophocles drew on specific Euripidean tragedies in Philoctetes, he could have used 
any or all of the romances, or even other plays of this period, such as Electra and Phoenissae.  
Since space does not permit a complete treatment of how all of these plays may have influenced 
Philoctetes (though reference will be made to them where appropriate), we will start with Helen, 
which contains a well-developed play within a play with features that are both symptomatic of 
the drama of that period and analogous to what we will see in Philoctetes.  We will then proceed 
through Philoctetes and Orestes.
29
 
 As we examine each of our three tragedies in the rest of this chapter, we will be attuned 
to how each play portrays the roles of poet, actor, and spectator, how these key members of the 
                                                 
 
27
 Cf. Gorgias fr. 23 D-K on the benefits of being deceived by drama:  ὅ τ’ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ 
ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος.  Falkner 1998: 43-6 has good discussion of this 
passage and its relevance to Phil.  Segal 1982: 215-71 (reprinted in a shorter version in Segal 1985: 156-73) gives a 
reading of Bacch. that stresses drama’s ability to communicate truth through illusion or to reduce reality to an 
illusion. 
 
 
28
 This seems to be the assumption of Craik 1979, as well as Levett 2004. 
 
 
29
 Eur. IA and Bacch. also contain notable bits of metadrama.  Though the scope and aims of this chapter do not 
allow for full discussion of these plays, I will offer a few remarks in the conclusion. 
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theater are seen to interact with each other, and how all of this is communicated to the audience; 
we will be concerned with what the poets have to say about the demands of composing versus 
acting a play, as well as the relation between role-playing and the actor’s moral character.  We 
will also be sure to observe what elements are considered important for a successful dramatic 
performance and what overall attitude each play takes toward drama as an illusory art.  The late 
fifth century was a time of explicit experimentation, and comic poets like Aristophanes had long 
been questioning what makes for “good” tragedy, comedy, or melodrama.30  It is perhaps no 
accident that the three plays studied in this chapter present a remarkable variety of tone: the 
romances seem to be generally light-hearted and even amusing, while Philoctetes is more serious 
and Orestes simultaneously grim and absurd.  What (we might ask) does an atmosphere of 
fantasy, tragedy, or absurdity add to a metadramatic discussion of performance?  How does the 
tone of the play color its presentation and assessment of the value of drama – or vice versa? 
 
Helen: Costume, Deception, and the Dramatic Illusion 
 Helen presents us with a “play within a play” wherein each point of the triangle (poet, 
actor, spectator) is represented by one of the characters (Helen, Menelaus, and Theoclymenus, 
respectively).  As often, the miniature play is built around the mechanema – in this case, Helen’s 
and Menelaus’ plot to escape from Egypt and their execution of that plot, which caters 
specifically to the internal spectator and requires him to interpret his dramatic experience.  
Euripides’ metadramatic interest in these scenes is primarily in exploring what elements are 
necessary for a successful performance, such as originality, plausibility, proper costume, and 
obedience to the poet’s directions.  While this miniature play is a fairly straightforward discourse 
                                                 
 
30
 See Ar. Thesm. (esp. Agathon’s description of dramatic composition, 101-72) and the agon in Ran. 
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on dramatic performance and what is required for success, it does link provocatively with other 
central concerns of the play such as appearance versus reality and knowledge versus illusion: the 
audience is asked to consider the implications of a literal “dramatic illusion.” 
 When the Greeks set to planning their escape, Menelaus is the first to suggest several 
strategies (1035-48).  All are shown to be unworkable, so Helen takes over the task of devising a 
μηχανὴ σωτηρίας (1034) and instructs Menelaus in the part he is to play in the deception.  Her 
role as director of the scheme is evident not only in the dynamic of the conversation, where she 
continually tells Menelaus what to do and responds competently to his concerns (1049-86), but 
also in her brief assessment of what is at stake for her personally (1091-2): 
    ἢ γὰρ θανεῖν δεῖ μ’, ἢν ἁλῶ τεχνωμένη, 
    ἢ πατρίδα τ’ ἐλθεῖν καὶ σὸν ἐκσῶσαι δέμας. 
 
    Either I must die if my tricks are discovered, 
    or return to my fatherland and save your life. 
She is the one who devises the plot (τεχνωμένη), she is the one who will save Menelaus, and she 
is the one who will suffer the consequences of success or failure (escape or death).  Menelaus has 
no useful ideas of his own and must rely on Helen’s clear-sightedness, both in formulating the 
mechanema and in executing it.
31
 
 But of course both characters have a role to play in the deception, and it is fitting that 
Helen fills the function of lead actor as well as playwright/director.
32
  While she herself dons a 
new costume of black robes, cut hair, and torn cheeks, she makes good use of Menelaus’ current 
sorry state by inventing the story that he is a sailor who has lost his ship in a wreck (as he 
                                                 
 
31
 Like Helen, Iphigenia is the one to devise an original (καινόν, 1029) and workable plan after rejecting two or 
Orestes’ proposals.  As Helen does for Menelaus, Iphigenia continues to instruct Orestes with respect to the plot 
(1031-51) and to direct the other actors’ movements on stage (1079-80, 1204, 1206-10, 1217-8). 
 
 
32 We might compare Iphigenia, who conceives the plan and does all of the talking in Eur. IT. 
 
95 
 
actually is) and the only surviving follower of…himself.33  He agrees to the plan with what many 
have seen as a particularly overt bit of self-consciousness (1050-6), perhaps referring to Orestes’ 
rather similar plan to report his own death in the Sophoclean Electra or perhaps to the 
conventions of myth and tragedy more generally.
34
 
 The performance itself begins when Theoclymenus, the primary internal spectator,
35
 
returns to the palace at line 1165; Helen again takes the lead.  She delivers a prologue of sorts, 
introducing the ragged Greek “sailor” and reporting the news of Menelaus’ death.  She is 
responsible for setting the scene, as it were – narrating the necessary backstory, explaining her 
new costume, and even covering Menelaus’ first few lines.  She is also the one responsible for 
turning the spotlight over to Menelaus (1249); if it had been left up to him, he might not have 
gotten to deliver his lines! 
 The fourth episode is taken up with final preparations for the “funeral rites” of Menelaus.  
Helen’s feigned mourning continues to be effective – almost ruinously so, in fact, as 
Theoclymenus tries to prevent her from attend the funeral rites personally for fear that she might 
jump in the sea and drown herself (1395-8).  Theoclymenus, hearing only what he wants to hear 
– that Menelaus has died and Helen will marry him – completely swallows their performance, 
even donating a new ship and anything else they ask for.  Menelaus is now wearing another 
costume, one that finally equips him like a hero out of the Iliad and prepares him for his final 
                                                 
 
33
 Cf. IT 1033-4, where Iphigenia suggests using Orestes’ real status as a murderer from Argos in their 
deception and he replies χρῆσαι κακοῖσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς, εἰ κερδανεῖς. 
 
 
34
 See Allan 2008 ad loc. (esp. 1055-6n.) for the statement’s connection to Electra and to tragic plots in general.  
Burnett 1971: 92-3 sees this moment as a turning point for Menelaus, the moment when he starts to become a 
“credible” tragic figure. 
 
 
35
 The chorus might seem a more natural candidate for “internal spectator,” but in Hel. (as in IT, Phil., and Or.), 
they are on the same side as the plotters and are therefore not in a position to interpret what they say and wear.  
Indeed, the chorus of Phil. is more of a collective internal deuteragonist to Neoptolemus’ protagonist. 
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performance off stage on board the Egyptian ship.  When the messenger arrives to describe how 
the Greeks took over the ship and escaped, he emphasizes the Greeks’ histrionic talent:  Helen 
weeps convincingly for a man who is standing by her side (1527-9),
36
 Menelaus himself displays 
δόλιον οἶκτον (1542), and the Greek sailors follow suit by ἐκβαλόντες δάκρυα ποιητῷ τρόπῷ 
(1547). 
 The play is an extended meditation on the power of performance, disguise, and the 
illusory nature of drama.  The internal audience of this play within a play (Theoclymenus and the 
Egyptians) is literally deceived by the dramatic illusion, and the Greeks’ successful performance 
relies in large part on the quality of their costumes.  Though many other plays involve some sort 
of deception, it is less common for characters actually to change their costumes, as Helen does 
here.
37
  Moreover, she is concerned not only with her own dress and its effect on Theoclymenus 
but also Menelaus’ physical appearance.  In fact, costume turns out to be a significant factor in 
determining how well Menelaus plays his role.  I have already noted that Helen is generally the 
brains of the operation; this is manifest in her ability to devise a plan of escape, outfit herself in 
an appropriate costume and play a variety of roles as the situation warrants (whether it be 
mourning widow, eager bride-to-be, or even a sort of military leader on board the ship).  But 
Menelaus is not so quick-witted, and he seems to have trouble playing his assigned roles without 
the right costume.  In his initial appearance on stage, he tries to play the role of war hero and 
conqueror of Troy – but he looks like (and is) a shipwrecked sailor, and his role-playing fails to 
have the desired effect on either the old woman (who is unimpressed by his noble birth) or Helen 
                                                 
 
36
 These lines may be inspired by Electra’s lament over the empty urn as Orestes stands by (Soph. El. 1126-73); 
Allan 2008: 1528n. remarks that “the audience can appreciate H.’s skilled performance of the role of mourning 
wife.” 
 
 
37
 For Bacch., in which Pentheus not only changes his costume but takes the time to adjust it on stage under 
Dionysus’ direction, see below, pp. 152-5. 
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herself (who thinks that he is one of Theoclymenus’ henchmen).  He is more successful when he 
actually plays the part of a shipwrecked sailor and his own subordinate (while also playing 
second fiddle to Helen); and only when his rags have been replaced with regal finery does he 
effectively portray a war hero and lead his followers in a rout of the Egyptian sailors. 
 Though Theoclymenus’ role as internal spectator of Helen’s and Menelaus’ performance 
receives less attention than the performance itself, it is noteworthy that he, like any good 
spectator of tragedy, watches and listens to the performance closely and uses the clues he is 
given to draw conclusions about the action.
38
  When he first arrives (1165), he immediately 
notices Helen’s new costume of mourning garb and deduces that she has either had an ill-
omened dream or else received bad news from home (1184-92);
39
 without even hearing a word, 
he uses Helen’s outfit to prepare himself for the rest of her performance.  Of course, the whole 
point of Helen’s new costume is to catch Theoclymenus’ attention and make him suspect that 
something fateful has happened; but this is also essentially the purpose of all dramatic costumes:  
to help the audience identify the characters and their situations, even before any lines have been 
spoken.  So when Euripides has Helen and Menelaus enact a deceptive mechanema that is also 
cast as a dramatic performance and that succeeds in part because of the internal spectator’s 
willingness to accept the dramatic premise and interpret visual clues, he is questioning the 
fundamental epistemological status of all drama.  Scholars nowadays generally make a point of 
                                                 
 
38
 Thoas’ response to Iphigenia’s mechanema (1153-1233) is comparable, if much more thorough.  Most of the 
deceptive information actually comes from him rather than her, as he uses her status as sacrificial priestess to draw 
conclusions about her intentions.  It should be noted, of course, that real spectators of drama cannot influence or 
participate in the dramatic action as Thoas and Theoclymenus can, but the way the two barbarians kings respond to 
performances by interpreting what they see and hear is fundamentally similar to how dramatic audiences are 
expected to respond. 
 
 
39
 Euripides pointedly emphasizes the effectiveness of Helen’s and Menelaus’ disguises by the use of language 
with double meaning (e.g. 1201, 1205, 1288-9, with Allan 2008 ad locc.). 
 
98 
 
qualifying the term “dramatic illusion” or avoiding it altogether on the grounds that it is strictly 
inaccurate:
40
  everyone in the audience knew that he was watching a play, and no one was really 
deceived into thinking that what he saw was real.  But the nature of reality, the limits of human 
perception, and the power of illusion were important topics for the Greeks of the late fifth 
century and feature especially prominently in Euripides’ romances. 
 The importance of these themes to Helen is evident from the very beginning, in the 
bipartite prologue.
41
  First, Helen explains, in almost omniscient fashion,
42
 how the gods created 
a phantom look-alike of Helen herself and transported her to Egypt while the phantom went to 
Troy; now all of the Greek world is operating under a false impression of Helen’s character and 
behavior.  The point is then illustrated concretely when, in neat counterpoint to Helen’s opening 
speech about the phantom, which prepared the audience for a play of illusion and visual 
confusion, Teucer arrives and encounters Helen before the palace.  He immediately recognizes 
Helen but just as immediately dismisses that recognition as fallacious (72-7, 80-2).  He knows 
Helen by sight, but he also “knows” that she was dragged away from Troy by her hair (116) and 
therefore cannot be in Egypt.  His experiences at Troy interfere with his current visual 
experience so that he simultaneously recognizes Helen by her appearance and dissociates her 
from the Helen he thinks he knows.  This contradiction is highlighted not only in the action of 
the scene but also in the special emphasis laid on words for seeing and knowing, especially in 
lines 116-22: 
                                                 
 
40
 E.g. Sifakis 1971: 7-14, Bain 1977: 1-12, Taplin 1986: 164-5, Easterling 1993: 79-80; see also Taplin 1996, 
Easterling 1997b: 166 for the acceptance in recent decades of different degrees of self-referentiality in Greek 
tragedy. 
 
 
41
 This is a common format for Euripidean prologues.  On Euripidean beginnings, see Roberts 2005: 136-42.  
Burnett 1971: 77-8 notes the self-conscious quality of Helen’s song at 164-78 and suggests (p. 78) that the audience 
is “invited to think about the poet and the process of composition that lies behind the danced and costumed play.” 
 
 
42
 For Helen’s omniscience in this prologue, see Segal 1992: 89-90. 
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   Τε.  Μενέλαος αὐτὴν ἦγ’ ἐπισπάσας κόμης. 
   Ελ.  εἶδες σὺ τὴν δύστηνον, ἢ κλύων λέγεις; 
   Τε.  ὥσπερ σέ γ’, οὐδὲν ἧσσον, ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρῶ. 
   Ελ.  σκόπει δὲ μὴ δόκησιν εἴχετ’ ἐκ θεῶν. 
   Τε.  ἄλλου λόγου μέμνησο, μὴ κείνης ἔτι. 
   Ελ.  οὕτω δοκεῖτε τὴν δόκησιν ἀσφαλῆ; 
   Τε.  αὐτὸς γὰρ ὄσσοις εἰδόμην, καὶ νοῦς ὁρᾷ. 
 
   Teu.  Menelaus dragged her by the hair and led her off. 
   Hel.  Did you see the poor creature?  Or do you speak at second hand? 
   Teu.  I saw her with my eyes no less than I see you. 
   Hel.  Take care: you might have been under some divinely sent illusion. 
   Teu.  Speak of some other subject: no more of her. 
   Hel.  Are you so convinced that your impression is right? 
   Teu.  I saw her with my eyes.  And my mind also sees.
43
 
 
Teucer’s knowledge or ignorance here has little bearing on the progress of the plot; he exists to 
introduce in vivid fashion the theme of appearance versus reality,
44
 to report the rumor of 
Menelaus’ death, and to motivate Helen’s departure into the palace midway through the first 
episode, all of which is accomplished whether he knows to whom he is speaking or not. 
 This prologue also establishes the audience’s position relative to the dramatic action.  As 
often in Greek tragedy, that position is one of superior knowledge.
45
  Helen’s prologue speech 
puts them in possession of information they will need to interpret and appreciate the rest of the 
play; that Helen almost immediately forgets some of the most important details (such as Hermes’ 
guarantee that she and Menelaus will return safely to Sparta (56-8)) only emphasizes her human 
short-sightedness and creates a sense of distance between audience and characters.  From their 
privileged epistemological position the spectators can witness Helen’s unhappiness without 
                                                 
 
43
 See Dale 1967 and Allan 2008 ad loc. for arguments for and against deletion of lines 121-2. 
 
 
44
 On this basic theme in Hel. (with further references), see Allan 2008: 46-9. 
 
 
45
 This is not to say that spectators of Greek tragedy always anticipated everything that would happen in a play, 
but they usually had enough of an advantage over the characters to appreciate dramatic irony and to grasp the wider 
religious or mythical implications of the action. 
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despairing themselves,
46
 and the fact that they already know about the phantom allows them to 
appreciate Teucer’s and Menelaus’ difficulty identifying the real Helen when they encounter her.  
The audience knows that Teucer did not see the real Helen at Troy, and they can appreciate the 
irony of a man who relies so heavily on his senses, as Teucer seems to, nevertheless ignoring 
what his eyes tell him here.  Through this distance Euripides is able to demonstrate 
straightforwardly the limits of human comprehension and human inferiority to divine whim.  The 
characters are trapped in a world where nothing is as it seems, while the audience observes the 
ironies from a safe distance and a position of superior knowledge. 
 Against a scholarly tradition that has viewed much of late Euripides as melodramatic or 
even comic, Matthew Wright argues that Helen (together with Iphigenia among the Taurians and 
Andromeda) should be read as “true” tragedies, dark in tone and dire in implication.47  Much of 
Wright’s argument rests on the problematization of knowledge and ignorance, appearance and 
reality in these plays, and the suggestion that humans are pitiful, helpless creatures at the mercy 
of a whimsical world that may not always prove friendly.  An important part of this 
interpretation is the treatment of myth in these plays.  Wright observes a number of instances in 
both Helen and Iphigenia among the Taurians in which characters question some aspect of their 
own myths.  For instance, Helen tells the story of Zeus’ seduction of Leda in the form of a swan, 
and then wonders aloud about its veracity (17-21).  Again, was Helen really born from an egg, as 
the story goes (257-9)?
48
  Have Castor and Pollux died or not (138)?  Wright terms this 
                                                 
 
46
 The audience probably expected a happy ending anyway from their external knowledge of the myth (on 
which see Gantz 1993: 662-4, who relies heavily on Hom. Od. and Eur. Hel.):  in every known version, Menelaus 
and Helen both survive to return to Sparta. 
 
 
47
 Wright 2005a. 
 
 
48
 Diggle and most other editors brackets these lines, but see Allan 2008 ad loc. 
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phenomenon “metamythology,”49 and he argues that the “audience is made to question what they 
know now about the mythical past.”50  Though Wright makes a strong argument for the tragic 
tenor of Helen and Iphigenia among the Taurians, his reading verges too close to total nihilism 
for both the characters and the audience.  Part of being a spectator of tragedy is being aware of 
different versions of a given myth and their inherent contradictions.  While a sense of distance 
between audience and characters is not incompatible with a “dark” reading of the play, such as 
Wright advocates, I would argue that the audience is brought to understand intellectually the 
limitations of the human condition but is probably not drawn emotionally into the action or 
involved personally in the confusion – at least, not to a significant degree.  As far as 
metamythology is concerned, it seems more likely that Euripides is having a little fun in a play 
that does, after all, present a story alternative to the more usual version.  In any case, I would 
argue that the questioning of these mythical details does not really affect our experience of the 
play:  we can observe how little the characters know even about themselves, but our sympathy 
for Helen does not depend on the manner of her birth. 
 So Helen is a study of appearances, illusions, and perceptions.  These themes manifest 
themselves in part in the development and execution of the mechanema, which not only 
demonstrates the power of deception and deceptive appearances but does so in dramatic terms.  
This raises the question of whether all drama is in fact a type of illusion, and whether dramatic 
illusion is substantially different from other kinds.  The audience, however, may consider these 
and other questions from a position of relative epistemological security.  Even where 
                                                 
 
49
 Wright 2005a: 133-57. 
 
 
50
 Wright 2005a: 156.  Cf. Meltzer 1994, who argues that Hel. uses the backstory of “Helen’s” abduction to 
explore its own appropriation of Helen within the mythical tradition. 
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metamythology is concerned, the audience enjoys privileged knowledge and is able to observe 
from a distance the characters’ attempts to grapple with the slippery world around them. 
 
Philoctetes: The Ethics of Role-Playing 
 The play within Sophocles’ Philoctetes is easily recognizable:  Odysseus (and later 
Heracles) represents the playwright, Neoptolemus the chief actor, and Philoctetes the internal 
audience;
51
 as in Helen, the play within a play begins with the devising of a mechanema.  This 
miniature play shows rather more interest in the challenges facing the actor and spectator than in 
the poet (whose representatives appear principally in the prologue and exodos).  While the actor 
does not physically disguise himself (as in Helen), Philoctetes exploits and builds on the themes 
of role-playing and deception that we saw in the romances.  Rather than exploring the 
importance of matching costume to role and other such performative possibilities, Philoctetes 
suggests that a successful dramatic performance depends not only on effective costume but also 
on achieving a coherent match between the actor’s role and his moral character.  Moreover, the 
tension between the actor’s nature and the part he is required to play raises important ethical 
implications.  What happens when an actor (especially an inexperienced actor) is asked to play a 
part incommensurate with his own nature?  Does he adapt the part to suit his nature, or does he 
adapt his nature to suit the part?  And what does this mean for the success of his performance?  
Neoptolemus’ dissatisfaction with his assigned role eventually leads him to abandon his script 
and improvise against the wishes of his internal playwright (Odysseus); the tension between 
these characters perhaps reflects the tension between playwrights and actors in the late fifth 
century as the latter began to enjoy greater publicity.  But in Philoctetes only the true poet 
                                                 
 
51
 For the metadrama in Phil., see Greengard 1987: 25 n. 16, Falkner 1998 (who focuses especially on Odysseus 
as internal  playwright) and Lada-Richards 2009: 50 (whose main interest is in Neoptolemus as internal actor). 
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(represented by Heracles) is able to provide a complete and satisfying conclusion to the play, and 
in this way Sophocles reasserts the primacy of the poet over the actor. 
 Who plays the role of the spectator?  Philoctetes’ experience as the victim of a deception 
that is accomplished in part because of his own appreciation for Neoptolemus’ performance is 
fundamentally similar to that of Theoclymenus and Thoas (though much extended).  However, 
Sophocles creates an original twist in his play within a play by drawing the audience into the 
deception alongside Philoctetes.  Though the audience begins the play in a position of superior 
knowledge to Philoctetes after witnessing Odysseus’ instructions to Neoptolemus in the 
prologue, in the rest of the play, those two characters seem to know more than they say about the 
mythical background.  Since Neoptolemus is engaged in deception for much of the play, it is not 
always clear (to Philoctetes or to the audience) when he is telling the truth.
52
  David Seale 
describes well this aspect of Philoctetes:
53
 
 “Much of the dramatic technique of the play relies not on the audience’s knowledge but on its 
 ignorance or, more correctly, its uncertainty. … The audience is caught up in the complexity; 
 not only do they not view the action from their traditional vantage of superior knowledge, but 
 there is actually a reversal of standpoint: remarkably, two characters on-stage, Odysseus and 
 Neoptolemus, know more than the audience and they appear reluctant to tell what they know, 
 for example, about the oracle, or, especially in the case of Neoptolemus, what they feel.” 
 
In addition to the unreliability of these characters, the audience’s acquaintance with the mythical 
tradition (including past tragedies) interferes with their ability to distinguish falsehoods from 
truth, since sometimes Neoptolemus tells a “lie” that is paralleled in other accounts of the myth 
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 Cf. Greengard 1987: 5 n. 3: “What is unique to Philoctetes is that the truth is never sorted out from the 
fiction; there is no onstage voice of truth to pronounce which of the many secondhand and fabricated pieces of 
information are in the end correct.” 
 
 
53
 Seale 1982: 48; my reading of Phil. has much in common with that of Seale 1972 and 1982: 26-55 and 
Roberts 1989; see also Taplin 1987: 69-70 and Falkner 1998: 36-9, who concludes that “[o]ur confusion about the 
meaning of what is being said on stage and about what the characters are seeking to accomplish heightens our 
consciousness of ourselves as audience.”  Avery 2002: 14 considers the possbility that Sophocles intentionally left it 
vague how many ships Odysseus and Neoptolemus brought to Lemnos, which also contributes to the play’s general 
atmosphere of epistemological instability, and Hoppin 1990: 165-71 for the importance of perception in this play 
(especially with regard to the “double ending”). 
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and therefore seems to be true.  Thus, where Helen raises the possibility of a drama that is all 
illusion, Philoctetes actually creates an illusory performance for both Philoctetes and the external 
audience:  both (though for different reasons) are unable to distinguish dramatic reality from 
dramatic illusion.  Further, though the problematization of myth (Wright’s “metamythology”) is 
less explicit than in Helen, it has more of an impact on how we understand the characters or the 
action (e.g. whether or not we sympathize with Neoptolemus). 
 We turn first to the prologue, which lays out the characters’ various roles in a play within 
a play and begins to draw the audience into the action to participate as quasi-internal spectators 
alongside Philoctetes.  Even before Philoctetes appears, the audience is plunged into a 
conversation between Neoptolemus and Odysseus and thereby made to work to understand the 
dramatic situation.  This type of prologue is common in Sophocles, and indeed, Felix Budelmann 
has argued that Sophoclean tragedy is charateristically demanding of its audience at all levels.
54
  
In this case, Sophocles’ penchant for challenging drama contributes to his metadramatic 
commentary on what it means to be a spectator of tragedy by requiring the audience to exercise 
its own interpretative powers right from the start to reconstruct the dramatic situation on the 
basis of information provided casually in conversation. 
 Though this play within a play is not marked as such by a character’s change of costume 
(as in Helen), the prologue of Philoctetes has clear dramatic overtones as Odysseus, filling the 
role of playwright and director, instructs Neoptolemus in how to play his role, even down to the 
tone he should use and specific lines he should deliver (56-66).
55
  Like every competing 
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 Budelmann 2000; see esp. p. 19: “Sophoclean language can engage many different spectators by giving them 
a degree of information but no complete knowledge, prompting them to use what they know for struggling with 
what they do not know.” 
 
 
55
 Fuqua 1976: 32-6 shows that Sophocles’ choice to characterize Neoptolemus as a would-be son of Odysseus 
may be an extension of a Homeric tradition that associated the two characters and goes on to explore the similarities 
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playwright, what Odysseus wants most is victory (νίκη).56  Neoptolemus is the young actor 
making his debut appearance, and even at the outset, he is not entirely satisfied with the role he 
has been given; he is in a similar position to Menelaus, insofar as both would prefer to play the 
part of the dominant warrior when the situation demands instead that they pretend to be passive 
sufferers of misfortune or injustice.  Neoptolemus also objects to the very idea of acting (here, 
δόλος57), because it is itself at odds with his preferred type of role-playing:  it is uncharacteristic 
of a dominant warrior to pretend to be anything else.  In addition to the promise of glory, 
Neoptolemus ultimately agrees to Odysseus’ plan because he is convinced that there is no other 
way (101-7).
58
 
 With these attitudes Neoptolemus and the audience enter the first episode.  Thus far, the 
prologue has prepared us to view the deception in dramatic terms:  we have seen Neoptolemus’ 
aversion to his assigned role and wonder how he will fill it.  Will he lie to Philoctetes or not?  Is 
he still reluctant, or has he put aside his moral qualms?  Can someone with a supposedly 
Achillean nature pull off a deception on this scale? 
 Neoptolemus is in a peculiar position when he first meets Philoctetes.  He is a young 
warrior possessing (we are led to assume) a noble, aggressive nature like Achilles, but he has 
                                                                                                                                                             
between the Sophoclean Neoptolemus and the Homeric Telemachus (pp. 49-63), who then becomes a paradigm for 
Orestes in Eur. Or. (pp. 67-8). 
 
 
56
 E.g. 81, 134, 1052; Odysseus’ famous lines at 1049-51 illustrate his consummate histrionic talent: οὗ γὰρ 
τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτός εἰμ’ ἐγώ· | χὤπου δικαίων κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίσις, | οὐκ ἂν λάβοις μου μᾶλλον οὐδέν’ 
εὐσεβῆ.  For discussion of Odysseus’ values, see Blundell 1987, 1989: 184-93.  Stephens 1995 attempts to 
rehabilitate Odysseus by suggesting that the audience would have sympathized with the view that Philoctetes’ 
presence was intolerable because of his loathsome wound. 
 
 
57
 For δόλος as a metaphor for dramatic production, see Goward 2004: 39-41. 
 
 
58
 For the moral dimensions of Odysseus’ persuasion of Neoptolemus, see Blundell 1989: 184-93, Cairns 1993: 
250-3, and cf. Gibert 1995: 67:  “in Philoctetes, Odysseus skillfully overcomes Neoptolemus’ reluctance to deceive 
Philoctetes in two stages:  first he confuses him as to the meaning of key moral terms (γενναῖος, σοφός, δίκαιος), 
and then he clinches the case with an appeal to profit (κέρδος, 111-2).”  Scodel 2012: 14-7 suggests that both 
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes are easily deceived because their native innocence has not been exposed to Odyssean 
corruption at Troy. 
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agreed to deceive a fellow Greek into doing something he does not want to do (which seems to 
run contrary to his Achillean nature); but in order to effect this deception, he must pretend to 
have an Achillean nature.
59
  In other words, he must pretend to be himself without actually being 
himself – though we cannot know whether his Achillean nature has been realized yet; perhaps he 
must pretend to be the person he is meant to become without actually becoming that person.
60
  
This is a rather more complicated scenario than the one faced by Helen and Menelaus.  In both 
plays, the characters take advantage of what is already available (Menelaus’ ragged clothing, 
Neoptolemus’ lineage) as a means of deception, but the challenge in Helen is to match the role 
with its appropriate costume; the performance is most successful when it is effectively 
communicated on the visual level.  Neoptolemus’ dilemma is primarily ethical rather than visual 
or physical (no disguise is necessary since he and Philoctetes have never met before), and his 
discomfort with his role arises from his performative preferences, rather than dissatisfaction with 
his costume. 
 So both Helen and Philoctetes are concerned with the deceptive nature of drama, but 
where the former devotes more space to the visual aspect of performance and the compatibility 
of costume with role, the latter explores the connection between role-playing, self-perception, 
and ethics. 
                                                 
 
59
 On illusion and reality in Phil., see Seale 1982: 26-55, who reads the play as a “basic movement from 
appearance to reality” (p. 46).  For complication of Neoptolemus’ association with Achilles, see Blundell 1988, 
Gibert 1995: 143-58, Belfiore 2000: 73-80. 
 
 
60
 See esp. Knox 1966: 123 on Neoptolemus’ performance as a “spurious Achilles;” Hamilton 1975 argues 
rather that Neoptolemus’ story provides the framework for the action of the play – though that does not necessariy 
negate the Achillean parallels.  Similarly, Hamilton (132 n.4) is correct to point out Neoptolemus’ parallels with 
Ajax, but there is no reason that Neoptolemus has to be modeled on only one Homeric hero.  Lada-Richards 1998: 
80-4 suggests that Neoptolemus’ performance ultimately fails because he does not complete the transition from his 
Achillean self to his Odyssean role but instead attempted to play a part that fused the two together; alternatively, 
Lada-Richards 2002: 406-7 suggests that it is because he misunderstands an Odyssean part as Achillean. 
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 After Neoptolemus’ reluctance to accept Odysseus’ scheme in the prologue and until his 
cry of anguish at line 895, it is difficult to tell what is going through his mind, what he thinks of 
his role, and how eagerly he performs it – and that is exactly the point.  We, the quasi-
internalized audience, know broadly the dilemma he faces as an unwilling and inexperienced 
actor of an Odyssean part, but for nearly two-thirds of the play we cannot tell how he handles 
this dilemma.  Philoctetes, who is unaware of Neoptolemus’ dilemma, can be deceived because 
of his ignorance about what has been going on in the outside world for the past ten years and his 
preconceptions about Odysseus and the Atreidae.  All he can do is listen to what Neoptolemus 
says and evaluate it on the basis of his own prior experience.  That is essentially all the external 
audience can do as well; but instead of ignorance it is their familiarity with the myth that 
prevents them from being able to distinguish truth from falsehood in Neoptolemus’ words.61 
 Since they know how Neoptolemus is supposed to carry out his mission, the audience 
anticipates a scene of deception, and more specifically, they probably expect Neoptolemus to 
feed Philoctetes a false story that will convince him to leave the island.  But in fact the exchange 
between these two characters focuses to a surprising extent on true information and actual past 
events.  Questionable information is mixed in with secure, perhaps leading the audience to 
conclude, along with Philoctetes, that it is all secure and usable.  This epistemological instability 
is reminiscent of the uncertainty surrounding Helen’s identity in the early scenes of Euripides’ 
play, but Sophocles extends the experience of interpretation and confusion beyond the characters 
to involve the audience as well. 
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 Budelmann 2000: 97-8 sees this effect already in Odysseus’ prologue description of Lemnos as abandoned 
(line 2) even though it was not deserted according to any known myth or history.  Falkner 1998: 34 notes that the 
description of Philoctetes’ cave as having two entrances metadramatically makes the audience aware of the back 
side of the skene and raises the question of whether Philoctetes will make his first entrance from the skene or an 
eisodos. 
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 Neoptolemus first identifies himself as the son of Achilles from Scyros and says that he is 
on his way home (239-41).  Philoctetes then questions him further, sparing him the need to 
invent a deceptive speech.  When Philoctetes asks where he is coming from and why he is on 
Lemnos, Neoptolemus answers only the first question, apparently quite honestly (245, ἐξ Ἰλίου 
τοι δὴ τανῦν γε ναυστολῶ); he is saved from answering the second when the subject of Ilium 
diverts the conversation.  Neoptolemus continues to avoid falsehood when, instead of saying that 
he has never heard of Philoctetes, he asks instead πῶς γὰρ κάτοιδ’ ὅν γ’ εἶδον οὐδεπώποτε; (250) 
– though when Philoctetes presses the point, he states more directly, ὡς μηδὲν εἰδότ’ ἴσθι μ’ ὧν 
ἀνιστορεῖς (253).  By this point, the only other demonstrably false thing Neoptolemus has said is 
that he is going home, and Philoctetes has not shown any interest in this information.
62
  For the 
next eighty lines, all Neoptolemus has to do to keep the “deception” going is listen to 
Philoctetes’ tale (254-316).  So far, the deception is operating more through the human 
relationship developing between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes than outright dishonesty. 
 Like Theoclymenus, Philoctetes is the unwitting audience of Neoptolemus’ debut 
performance.  Like Theoclymenus, Philoctetes to some extent sees what he wants to see:  when 
he learns who Neoptolemus is, he thinks he also understands what kind of a person Neoptolemus 
must be as the son of Achilles.  Neoptolemus starts out strongly, and as long as he keeps to the 
script Odysseus has given him, he continues to hold his audience of one; following Odysseus’ 
instructions, Neoptolemus paints a picture of himself as a true son of Achilles (a picture whose 
essence is accurate, as we will discover), all the while moving further and further away from that 
image of himself in his actual behavior.  As a result, the internal audience, Philoctetes, both does 
and does not fall under the dramatic illusion:  he understands, or at least presumes, Neoptolemus’ 
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 Adams 1957: 143 parses Neoptolemus’ words too finely when he claims that lines 240 and 383 mean “going 
towards home” rather than “going home.” 
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true nature perhaps better than Neoptolemus himself, but he is deceived as to the young man’s 
true purpose and method. 
 Neoptolemus’ performance is also designed, at least ostensibly, to give both characters 
and audience enough information to understand what people are like and why they act the way 
they do.
63
  I say “ostensibly” because in fact it is often unclear how the events narrated by 
Neoptolemus really transpired:  what happened to Neoptolemus at Troy and how did he really 
respond?  Or has he even been to Troy?
64
  What is his true attitude toward the Atreidae?  Which 
warriors have really died and which survived – and what does that tell us about the justice of the 
gods in this play?  The answers to these questions would clarify the present action, but they 
remain elusive. 
 Neoptolemus’ account of his visit to Troy (329-90) is a case in point.  He states that 
Achilles was killed by Apollo, that he himself was summoned to Troy by Odysseus and Phoenix, 
that he was deprived of his father’s arms by Odysseus and the Atreidae, and that he left Troy as a 
result.  There is nothing patently false here, except (once again) Neoptolemus’ angry departure 
for Scyros.  Achilles’ death at the hands of Paris, with the help of Apollo, is in accordance with 
the standard myth.  It is likely that Neoptolemus was summoned by Odysseus and Phoenix;
65
 that 
it is his task to take Troy (now that Achilles had fallen) has already been suggested in the 
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 On past, present, and future in Phil., see Roberts 1989: 175.  Kosak 1999 discusses the tension between 
Philoctetes’ past self (a respected warrior) and his present circumstances (potentially diminished social status due to 
illness). 
 
 
64
 Calder 1971: 155-8. 
 
 
65
 According to Hom. Od. 11.508-9, Odysseus was sent to bring Neoptolemus from Scyros, though the Little 
Iliad has Neoptolemus being fetched after Philoctetes; see Proclus’ summary at Allen 1912: 106, Gantz 1993: 636-
7, who notes that “the drama is as much a study of Neoptolemos’ character under pressure and temptation as it is of 
Philoktetes, and Sophokles is likely to have invented a good many of the details of his plot to serve that purpose.  
We should note, though, that other playwrights of the fifth century (e.g., Achaios, Philokles) also wrote dramas 
entitled Philoktetes, and we cannot say what they may have added to the tradition.”  Fuqua 1976: 44 suggests that 
this passage 343-7 “may summarize the action of [Sophocles’] Scyrians;” if so, and if Scyrians was produced before 
Phil., then Phoenix’ role in fetching Neoptolemus was already established. 
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prologue (114) and is also paralleled in the epic cycle.
66
  We do not know just how Neoptolemus 
reacted to the Judgment of the Arms; he may well have been disappointed to find that they had 
been awarded to someone else and angry at the Atreidae.
67
  He may even have lashed out at 
Odysseus in the way he describes, though his anger has obviously cooled, and even here he 
admits that the Atreidae are more to blame than Odysseus (385).  Neoptolemus’ speech is not 
clearly honest or deceptive; the combination of dubious items and reliable is such as to make 
them all seem reliable – or all dubious.68 
 The topic of conversation turns to the Greeks who have died at Troy (410-52).
69
  Homeric 
parallels validate most of Neoptolemus’ answers here, but Thersites is said to be still alive, while 
the Aethiopis has him dead by Achilles’ hand.70  There may also be a slighter change regarding 
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 Any potential dishonesty on this point is in any case attributed to Odysseus and Phoenix (345):  εἴτ’ ἀληθὲς 
εἴτ’ ἄρ’ οὖν μάτην. 
 
 
67
 According to the Little Iliad (see Allen 1912: 106), Odysseus gave the arms to Neoptolemus, but the 
Sophoclean Neoptolemus makes it plain that he does not have them (380-1, 383), and Odysseus (who is obviously 
unreliable) suggests that he use this story as part of his deception (58-64).  Calder 1971: 159 thinks that 
Neoptolemus does not have the arms because he has not yet been to Troy; Adams 1957: 137 and Belfiore 2000: 75-6 
think that Odysseus kept the arms for himself.  Following Schlesinger 1968, O’Higgins 1991: 42 (with n. 20) points 
out that Neoptolemus’ supposed rage at losing the arms of Achilles at least seems true because of its similarity to 
Ajax’  rage over the same thing (and of course we may compare Achilles’ wrath and consequent withdrawal from 
the fighting).  Again we may ask:  is Sophocles following a different version (or innovating) or is Neoptolemus 
falsifying his account? 
 
 
68
 See Seale 1982: 33, Budelmann 2000: 100-6 for the mixture of truth and falsehood in this passage.  Adams 
1957: 140 rather paradoxically notes the ambiguities while also stating that “Neoptolemus, with sincere intention to 
deceive, is yet saved from actual untruth with admirable dramatic skill;” while Sophocles is indeed careful how to 
phrase Neoptolemus’ words, it is inaccurate to claim (p. 142) that “Neoptolemus…has not yet uttered anything that 
is not really true.”  Easterling 1977: 126-7 sees the ambiguity of Neoptolemus’ words in this passage as an example 
of one of Sophocles’ primary methods of character-drawing. 
 
 
69 For this motif in Phil., IT, and Hel., see Davidson 2006, who remarks (p. 11), “It would be rash indeed to 
claim that this Sophoclean passage was directly indebted to the Euripidean passages.  It nevertheless displays many 
similarities with them and this suggests at the very least an on-going interaction involving the two dramatists, and 
probably other dramatists as well, in the handling of a type of scene whose origins are likely to be located in 
Homer.” 
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 Thus Proclus (Allen 1912: 105).  On Thersites, see Huxley 1967 and O’Higgins 1991: 41  (who speaks of the 
characters as “reconstructing” the past).  Scodel 2012: 5-6 notes that Achilles was purified by Odysseus after he 
killed Thersites; removing the murder of Thersites would thus remove an important (positive) connection between 
Odysseus and Achilles. 
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Antilochus, who now seems to have been Nestor’s only remaining son, in contrast to the 
Homeric tradition.
71
  In both cases (Thersites and Antilochus) a dubious member is included 
among others backed by Homeric precedent (Odysseus and Diomedes, Ajax and Patroclus), and 
there is no way to know whether Neoptolemus is lying selectively or Sophocles simply following 
a different version of the myth.
72
 
 The answer to this question matters, of course, because whether Neoptolemus leaps 
enthusiastically into the deception or avoids outright lies as much as possible says something 
about his character and his handling of his assigned role, the degree of sympathy to be accorded 
to him, and the ethical implications of role-playing.
73
  It also matters because we would like to 
know what kind of world these characters inhabit – and more specifically whether the gods are 
wicked or just, whether they preserve the bad and neglect the good or vice versa (447-52).
74
  As 
a result, critics have diligently attempted to determine how much of what Neoptolemus says in 
the first episode is true.  Davidson, for instance, thinks that Sophocles is adapting the myth and 
that Neoptolemus’ reports about what went on at Troy are therefore true;75 Calder, on the other 
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 On Sophocles’ changes to the tradition (if changes they are) and support for the MSS reading ὅσπερ ἦν γόνος 
in 425, see Davidson 2006: 13-5;  
 
 
72
 Roberts 1989: 169-70 points out that Philoctetes asks about different people “in the wrong order,” that is, in 
contrast to the sequence of events known to the audience; the result for the audience, Roberts notes, is a sort of 
“dislocation” from their sure knowledge of the epic cycle.”  Scodel 2012 has a careful analysis of the positive and 
negative implications of Neoptolemus’ account, which, she argues, simultaneously idealizes the past and 
problematizes any straightforward idealization. 
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 On Neoptolemus’ moral character, see esp. Blundell 1988, and for Sophocles’ interest in the moral attitudes 
of his characters, see Nussbaum 1976.  Blundell 1989: 197 sees in Neoptolemus’ reaction to Philoctetes’ pessimism 
an inability to decide on the value of key moral terms. 
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 Cf. Levett 2004.  By contrast, in Eur. Hel. we have a fairly clear idea why Hera and Aphrodite are plotting 
about Helen and Menelaus even before the epiphany, and the difference between divine and human morality is plain 
(cf. Conacher 1967a: 295-7, though I cannot agree that Theonoe necessarily represents Euripides’ own views). 
 
 
75
 Davidson 2006: 11-5.  Many readers have a basically favorable opinion of Neoptolemus and prefer to see him 
as a reluctant liar at worst (in spite of his bloodthirsty reputation in the mythical tradition); contra Calder 1971, Kott 
1973: 177-80, and (more reasonably) Belfiore 2000: 73-80.  We might compare a common critical attitude toward 
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hand, is convinced that Neoptolemus’ whole speech is false on the grounds that “in production it 
is impractical to hope that an audience could discern ‘the truths’ from ‘the lies’.”76  But that is 
exactly my point.  Sophocles keeps us uncertain of how to evaluate the characters and their 
world and thus makes us uncomfortably aware of our vulnerability as spectators. 
 Another element critical to our reading of the play – indeed, critical to most readings of 
this play – is Helenus’ prophecy.  Much ink has been spilled in debates about what Helenus 
“really” said or what his prophecy really means and whether Odysseus and Neoptolemus 
understand it correctly; there has also been extensive discussion about just how much 
Neoptolemus knows about the prophecy, when, and how.  It seems to me that the ambiguity 
surrounding the prophecy is deliberate, and so all the attempts to elucidate it are misdirected.  
Throughout the first episode, Sophocles has made the audience aware of what it means to be a 
spectator of Greek tragedy:  that they must rely on the characters’ (potentially unreliable) words, 
that they naturally and necessarily – but sometimes mistakenly – interpret the action with 
reference to other versions of the myth.  The prophecy is another element that keeps the audience 
guessing about the backstory of the play, the characters’ motives, and the role of the gods. 
 Helenus’ prophecy is first mentioned by the false merchant (604-13), but since it is 
continually reinterpreted as the characters either manipulate it deceitfully or achieve a fuller 
understanding of it, the audience is likely to keep considering and reconsidering its significance 
retrospectively at various points in the play.
77
  Thus, for example, when we first hear Odysseus’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ajax’ so-called “deception speech” (Aj. 646-92):  some have felt that the speech cannot be purely deceptive in part 
because deception simply runs counter to Ajax’ character. 
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 Calder 1971: 158-9.  In fact, Odysseus in the prologue (54-65) advises Neoptolemus to use a mixture of truth 
and falsehood. 
 
 
77
 On this scene, see Linforth 1956: 114-8, Easterling 1997b: 165-71, Lada-Richards 2002: 397-8, Goward 
2004: 96-101, and esp. Budelmann 2000: 113-23, who discusses different scholarly views of the prophecy of 
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plan in the prologue, it seems quite reasonable:  since Philoctetes cannot be persuaded or forced 
to rejoin the Greek army, he must be tricked.  But when we learn of Helenus’ prophecy (if in fact 
we trust the false merchant
78
), we must revise our opinion of Odysseus and his plan, since, as 
Buxton and others have noticed, using first δόλος and then βία only reduces the likelihood of 
winning Philoctetes by πειθώ,79 and the prophecy has stated that Philoctetes must go to Troy 
willingly.  Odysseus’ decision to use trickery made good sense on human terms, but now it 
appears that he has either misunderstood or disregarded the prophecy.
80
  The audience, 
meanwhile, is left to wonder whether δόλος and a voluntary departure to Troy are reconcilable or 
whether the prophecy’s stipulations have been dangerously disobeyed. 
 The situation is complicated further when Neoptolemus comes into possession of the 
bow, but refuses to depart without Philoctetes (who lies asleep on the ground) and asserts in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Helenus and gives a justification for paying close attention to it, especially in the false merchant scene.  Important 
studies of the prophecy include Linforth 1956 and Hinds 1967 (arguing that Odysseus and Neoptolemus are aware 
that Philoctetes must come to Troy), Robinson 1969: 46-51 (arguing that Philoctetes’ abandonment without his bow 
is a real possibility), Gill 1980 (arguing that Odysseus fails to grasp the spirit of the oracle). 
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 Most have felt that the false merchant’s account of the prophecy is basically reliable, and some have even 
thought that the purpose of this scene is to inform Neoptolemus of its contents (e.g. Minadeo 1994: 140), though this 
fails to account for Neoptolemus’ own versions of the prophecy at 839-42 and 1329-47.  For a reasonable 
assessment of Neoptolemus’ knowledge of the prophecy, see Knox 1964: 187-90 n. 21.  Goward 2004: 101 correctly 
notes that “[g]iving such an important narrative so absolutely unauthoritative a position in the play is vey much part 
of Sophocles’ subtle narrative strategy” (which, for her, is characteriized by the deliberate creationof a multiplicity 
of ambiguous parallel narratives); cf. also Roberts 1989: 171. 
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 As seen by Blundell 1989: 203 and others, Philoctetes’ reaction to the false merchant’s report (628-32) shows 
that Odysseus was right:  persuasion would not have worked anyway.  Taousiani 2011 disputes this reading in the 
course of an argument that persuasion is a viable option from the start of the play; in the end, I cannot accept this 
interpretation since it seems to me that Philoctetes is too jaded to listen seriously to anyone he knew to be connected 
with Odysseus and the Atreidae (and if Neoptolemus concealed these associations, then he would be engaging in 
deception). 
 
 
80
 According to Nussbaum 1976: 34-6, Odysseus’ moral outlook prevents him from recognizing the importance 
of Philoctetes’ subjectivity and thus collapses persuasion and force into one.  Hoppin 1981, arguing that deceit and 
persuasion need not be exclusive alternatives, suggests that Odysseus plans to trick Philoctetes out of his bow in 
order to gain the chance to use persuasion safely; see also Budelmann 2000: 123-30 emphasizes the difficulty 
characters (and the audience) have in coming to a correct understanding of the prophecy and sees this pervasive 
uncertainty as typical of Sophoclean drama. 
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dactylic hexameters that the man himself is also needed to take Troy (839-42).
81
  Since we have 
not heard such a thing prior to this, we might suspect that Neoptolemus is beginning to think of 
Philoctetes as a friend and therefore simply reinterprets Helenus’ prophecy for his sake.  We may 
think that Neoptolemus, confronted with a direct conflict between the image of himself he has 
been creating for Philoctetes and the performance demanded of him by Odysseus, is beginning to 
push back against his internal playwright’s instructions:  his “script” (as indicated by the chorus) 
requires him to take the bow and run, while his heretofore dormant Achillean nature is loath to 
abandon a friend who has placed his trust in him.  As Goward says, “The experience of acting 
friendship for Philoctetes has produced real feelings of friendship.”82  Neoptolemus’ reason for 
hesitating may be practical, ethical, or emotional; we in the audience cannot tell whether his 
invocation of divinely inspired prophecy is accurate or merely meant to lend rhetorical weight to 
his decision to remain with Philoctetes.
83
 
 Again, when Odysseus himself captures Philoctetes, he suddenly releases him on exactly 
the opposite grounds that the bow alone is sufficient:  either he or Teucer can fire it as well as 
Philoctetes (1053-62).  But since Neoptolemus thinks that Philoctetes is also needed, we might 
suspect that Odysseus is manipulating Philoctetes rather than expressing his true opinion.  The 
prospect of being abandoned again, this time without a weapon, combined with the thought of 
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 These hexameters are usually associated with oracular language, but Winnington-Ingram 1969b: 48-50 
believes that Neoptolemus now conceives of Philoctetes as an agonistic prize, and thus the hexameters are heroic 
rather than oracular.  Belfiore 2000: 63-80 describes the bow as a guest-gift extending an offer of xenia to 
Neopotolemus, whose decision to return it or not thus becomes a choice between violating and affirming xenia. 
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 Goward 2004: 100. 
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 Easterling 1978 emphasizes the ambiguity of the characters’ motives throughout the play and comments (p. 
30) that “[t]here is nothing an audience finds more baffling than motiveless behaviour, but if what the characters do 
is susceptible of explanation, even of multiple explanation, then we accept it because this is what we are used to in 
real life.”  While she is right to point out that the various ambiguities and contradictions in Phil. do not confuse or 
distract the audience, I would argue that they are also not typical of ancient tragedy and are therefore meant to be 
noticed. 
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Odysseus wielding his bow, might be enough to provoke Philoctetes to accompany the Greeks to 
Troy just to prevent these things from happening.  Both Neoptolemus and Odysseus could be 
using the prophecy for their own ends.  Or one could be telling the truth and the other lying; it 
may even be possible that both are telling the truth, as they see it, but that they have not correctly 
understood the prophecy.  Sophocles does not give us enough information to answer these 
questions, but that does not mean the audience will not ask them; we want to know what kind of 
people and what kind of situation we are dealing with.  So does Philoctetes, and perhaps it is not 
surprising that, after hearing a couple versions of what the Greeks intend (from Odysseus at 
1053-62 and Neoptolemus at 1314-47) he is still unconvinced that going to Troy is really in his 
best interest.  Neoptolemus’ account of Helenus’ prophecy and what is destined to happen at 
Troy appears to be complete, and given that he has just returned the bow as a sign of repentance 
and good will, it seems unlikely that he is lying,
84
 but the fact remains that he is still trying to 
convince Philoctetes to do something he expressly does not want to do; Neoptolemus’ chief 
rhetorical tool, the one most likely to persuade, is an optimistic interpretation of prophecy.  By 
this point, we have heard several different versions of the prophecy and are not in a strong 
position to know whether the latest one is correct. 
 So we do not know what Odysseus “really” thinks about the prophecy, except perhaps 
what he says in the prologue (before the prophecy itself has been mentioned), nor do we know 
Neoptolemus’ true opinion, since both characters have ulterior motives for saying what they do 
about it.  This ambiguity is symptomatic of the way Sophocles manages the audience’s 
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 Calder 1971: 163-6 argues, rather implausibly, that this entire scene is still part of the attempt to deceive 
Philoctetes, that Neoptolemus remains false to the very end, and that the deception would have been signaled to the 
audience through comic acting style and techniques; curiously, Calder does not address  Neoptolemus’ confession at 
915-6.  For response to this negative view of Neoptolemus, see Fuqua 1976. 
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epistemological position in this play.
85
  In spite of the fact that they have witnessed the prologue 
and already know the basics of Odysseus’ plan, as well as the eventual outcome of the myth, the 
Sophoclean audience is consistently placed in the same position as the internal spectator, 
Philoctetes – a position of relative ignorance and dependence on Neoptolemus and Odysseus for 
information about recent events.  In Helen, the audience’s foreknowledge of the characters’ 
identities, background, or plans allows them to observe the action from a distance and appreciate 
moments of deep irony; the audience of Helen is truly external.  But Sophocles’ audience is 
“internalized” into the play within a play and thus obliged to interpret what the characters say 
and do alongside Philoctetes.  Euripides lets us observe the characters’ epistemological struggles 
and the process of interpreting dramatic performance; Sophocles makes us experience these 
things. 
 The false merchant scene (542-627) almost seems designed to illustrate this point.  As 
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes are about to leave for the harbor, the chorus spots one of Odysseus’ 
men approaching in the guise of a merchant and advises the other two to wait a moment until 
they learn what he has to say.  The “merchant” greets Neoptolemus immediately and indicates 
that he has news for him specifically.  He is concerned not to incur the ire of the Atreidae and 
leads Neoptolemus on for several lines before finally giving the important information:  Phoenix 
and the sons of Theseus have left Troy to find Neoptolemus and bring him back.  Neoptolemus 
goes on to ask for additional details (by what means will they bring him back?  why isn’t 
Odysseus coming?) and after answering a few of these questions, the “merchant” eventually 
refuses to speak further until he learns who Philoctetes is.  Neoptolemus tells him, prompting the 
“merchant” to urge their swift departure.  This is all very well; between them, Neoptolemus and 
                                                 
 
85
 It is also reminiscent of the cynical agnosticism of Soph. El., which demonstrated how malleable religious 
beliefs can be when they are used to justify various human actions; see ch. 2 above. 
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the “merchant” have put up a credible front, each maintaining his side of the story and asking 
questions or providing responses that help the other to know where he is going while also 
conveying a realistic sense of urgency.  But at 578-9, Philoctetes interjects τί φησιν, ὦ παῖ; τί δὲ 
κατὰ σκότον ποτὲ | διεμπολᾷ λόγοισι πρός σ’ ὁ ναυβάτης;  It seems that he has not actually heard 
any of the exchange!  He has been waiting politely on the sidelines for Neoptolemus to finish his 
conversation with an old acquaintance; only when he hears his name (575) does he begin to take 
a personal interest in what is being said.
86
 
 So what was the purpose of the last thirty-five lines?  Why have Neoptolemus and the 
“merchant” gone to such effort to construct their false story, ask each other the right questions, 
make their concern and agitation seem real if Philoctetes was not even paying any attention?  
The answer:  for the audience.  The audience has known all along what the “merchant’s” ploy is.  
They saw Odysseus in the prologue promise to send one of his men if Neoptolemus seemed to be 
taking too long.  They can recognize that much of what the “merchant” says is false, as well as 
noticing the way he twists true information so as to encourage a particular course of action; they 
can finally enjoy an actual deception, complete with false characters and false information,
87
 that 
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 Pace Seale 1982: 35.  Bain 1977: 84 remarks significantly that “[t]he obvious dramatic function of the scene 
is not so much to deceive Philoctetes as to put him in possession of the facts, to let him know that his presence or 
perhaps the presence of his bow at Troy is essential if Troy is ever to be taken and that an attempt will be made to 
remove him from Lemnus, an attempt involving his deadly enemy, Odysseus.  In other words it is the ‘true’ part of 
the merchant’s story that matters.”  The significance of this passage depends heavily on how it is played on stage.  
The chorus announces the arrival of the false merchant with instructions to both Neoptolemus and Philoctetes (in the 
dual) to depart only after hearing what he has to say (539-41); obviously the chorus, who is in on the plot, wants 
Philoctetes to listen to the forthcoming deceptive exchange.  But since the false merchant’s first words are Ἀχιλλέως 
παῖ and he does not even acknowledge Philoctetes’ presence for another thirty lines, Philoctetes might reasonably 
deduce that the conversation is none of his business and stay out of it; there is no sign that Philoctetes is listening 
until 578.  Bain believes that 573-4 and 576-7 are spoken aside; Webster 1970 ad loc. is correct that the merchant’s 
quieter voice “is designed to arouse Philoctetes’ suspicion,” and Neoptolemus’ response (including Philoctetes’ 
name) is probably spoken aloud (as Bain implies) in order to catch his attention.  These devices suggest that 
Philoctetes has not been listening to the conversation, since they would not be necessary if he were.  Simply put, the 
false merchant cannot carry out his mission to hasten Philoctetes’ departure if Philoctetes does not notice anything 
he has to say. 
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they have been led to expect in this play.  But while they are focusing on all these details, they 
fail to realize that none of it is relevant.  Only when Philoctetes finally speaks up do they 
recognize that they have been deceived themselves into thinking that what they saw and heard 
was meaningful.
88
  Their experience of this scene is similar to Philoctetes’ throughout the play, 
as he weighs information and tries to evaluate people who end up being quite irrelevant to his 
decision to go to Troy. 
 Once Philoctetes joins the conversation, the exchange of information resumes its prior 
course.  Neoptolemus reasserts his hatred of the Atreidae – the one falsehood critical to his 
deception, if falsehood it is
89
 – and the “merchant” explains why Odysseus and Diomedes are 
searching for Philoctetes, including an account of Helenus’ prophecy and its reception in the 
Greek camp.
90
  The only explicit falsehood here is the inclusion of Diomedes in Neoptolemus’ 
place, and even this is not inconsistent with the audience’s knowledge of the myth:  Euripides’ 
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 For instance, as Budelmann 2000: 98 points out, no known account has Phoenix and the sons of Theseus sent 
after Neoptolemus (though Phoenix’ involvement is not inherently implausible). 
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 Many have commented on this scene’s metadramatic connotations (e.g. Kittmer 1995, Easterling 1997b: 169-
70, Ringer 1998: 101-25, Lada-Richards 1997, 1998, 2009).  Goward 2004: 97 draws attention to the importance of 
both acting and spectating in this scene: “A major underlying purpose of this loop seems to be nothing less than to 
force the audience to focus on acting, and bear witness to the effect both of participating in it, and of observing it. … 
Neoptolemus is acting.  He is also acting with, and observing the acting of, the False Merchant.  He is observing the 
effect of the joint acting on Philoctetes.  Meanwhile the audience is observing all of this.  At this point, how can they 
assess Neoptolemus’ real frame of mind?  As Neoptolemus’ and the False Merchant’s words have no simple truth-
value, only the audience’s emotional responses can guide them to Neoptolemus’ concealed feelings and help them 
assess whether any speech of his is ‘true’ or not.  There is no escape from subjectivity here.”  But while the audience 
is trying to decide what is going through Neoptolemus’ head, they fail to notice the trick being played on them by 
the poet. 
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 Adams 1957: 134-59 sees Neoptolemus’ supposed rage at the Atreidae as a central premise of the play. 
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 Minadeo 1994: 140 thinks that the false merchant is to be understood as implicitly instructing Neoptolemus 
when he describes Odysseus’ determination to use force or persuasion to bring Philoctetes to Troy, but this stands in 
direct contradiction to what Odysseus said in the prologue, and it is surely deliberate that the true strategy 
(deception) is not mentioned (Buxton 1982: 121). 
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Philoctetes (431 B.C.) featured just that pair.
91
  We are entitled to ask once again whether the 
false merchant is feeding Philoctetes a false story or deceiving him with the simple truth.
92
 
 Neoptolemus, relying on the script given to him by Odysseus, has delivered an effective 
performance so far.  Even when he must improvise, as in the false merchant scene, he still acts 
under Odysseus’ direction, since the “merchant” is another actor-figure sent by Odysseus (and 
even played by the same actor, as is frequently noted) whose main purpose is to supplement 
Neoptolemus’ performance for the sake of both the internal and the external audience.  We are 
given no insight into the false merchant’s moral character; like the chorus, he is a blank slate, 
both willing and able to fill whatever role is assigned to him.  He initiates the conversation with 
Neoptolemus and cues him on his lines (much as Helen turns the dialogue over to Menelaus at 
Hel. 1249); he sets the stage anew, as it were, by delivering a prologue-like speech at 603-21 and 
clearing the way for his fellow actor, Neoptolemus, to improvise a new plot on that basis.  But 
the false merchant’s performance is meant for Philoctetes at least as much as Neoptolemus.93  
The false merchant takes some of the burden of improvisation off Neoptolemus, who merely has 
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 Cf. Fuqua 1976: 66 on Phil. 591-7, 603-19, Or. 1654-7:  “The use of such references seems to have been 
‘double-edged’; on the one hand they give the action a greater verisimilitude than it might otherwise have possessed, 
and on the other they point out the extent to which the action on stage differs from the customary account.”  
Budelmann 2000: 98-100 suggests that the “force of myth” itself is responsible for the fact that the false merchant 
does not invent a completely mendacious speech. 
 
 
92
 The ambiguity extends even to the weather:  when Philoctetes insists upon leaving immediately, Neoptolemus 
replies that the winds are contrary.  It is possible that the adverse winds are also Neoptolemus’ invention, but 
Philoctetes does not know that – and neither does the audience.  Any audience of ancient drama must rely on the 
characters for information about things like the weather, but the reliability of those characters is not usually so 
severely compromised (Ussher 1990 ad loc.). 
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 This is true even if (as I argue above) Philoctetes does not actually listen to the false merchant’s opening 
speech. 
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to go along with Philoctetes’ predictable reaction to the false merchant’s news.  In other words, 
even when he is technically not “on script,” Neoptolemus is still following his director’s lead.94 
 Eventually, Neoptolemus becomes so uncomfortable with the role he is playing that he 
casts it aside and removes his Achillean mask, as it were, for Philoctetes.
95
  But it is difficult to 
know just when Neoptolemus begins to separate himself from the plot.  After Philoctetes’ attack 
of pain, Neoptolemus begins to show signs of discomfort or even remorse.  Philoctetes is made 
nervous at first by Neoptolemus’ unresponsiveness (804-5), and the latter offers a vague 
explanation:  ἀλγῶ πάλαι δὴ τἀπὶ σοὶ στένων κακά (806).  After reassuring him that his illness 
comes and goes quickly (on the assumption that that is what he meant by κακά), Philoctetes 
secures Neoptolemus’ promise to stay with him.  The moment passes.  With hindsight, we can 
suspect that Neoptolemus’ conscience is beginning to bother him, but that is not made explicit 
yet; the audience, like Philoctetes, is free to interpret his silence however they choose.  But after 
Philoctetes has recovered from his seizure, Neoptolemus becomes agitated again (895-922).  He 
cries out in apparent anguish, causing Philoctetes to think that he has changed his mind about 
rescuing him from the island.  The tension is drawn out while Neoptolemus remains indecisive 
about his course of action, and finally he reveals the whole situation to Philoctetes.
96
 
 Much of the play to this point has repeatedly challenged the audience’s ability to achieve 
an accurate interpretation of the characters and events.  The external spectators, like the internal 
spectator, have been made aware of what it is like to be manipulated by a poet’s (and his actors’) 
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 Errandonea 1955-6 argues that the “merchant” is actually Odysseus in disguise.  I disagree, but if anything, 
that would only make Odysseus’ control of the action at this point more obvious. 
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 Levett 2004: 262 sees Neoptolemus’ confession as “something of a meta-theatrical moment, in that a 
character, in the midst of a mêchanêma, rejects the use of deception, one of its most common characteristics.”  It is 
certainly unusual for a character to foil his own deception, but I don’t quite see how that simple fact makes this 
passage metatheatrical. 
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 For the dramatic technique in this scene of revelation, see Dubischar 2007: 203-4. 
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clever use of their own knowledge and expectations.  As a result, the audience has been 
continuously kept uncertain of how to evaluate Neoptolemus’ moral character; we have been 
able to say less about his attitude toward his assigned role because his attitude, like his moral 
character, has not been clearly revealed.  Once he comes clean, however, even if not everything 
he says is certainly reliable (such as his final account of the prophecy), we are better able to 
consider the effects his role-playing has had on himself and his internal audience.  Philoctetes 
does not understand how someone could take on a role so opposed to his own nature.  Actually, 
Philoctetes’ outrage seems to be directed at Neoptolemus’ moral choice to go along with the 
deception rather than his success at role-playing.  Philoctetes accuses Odysseus of teaching 
Neoptolemus “to be clever at evil” (εὖ προὐδίδαξεν ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι σοφόν), thus implying 
Neoptolemus has allowed his inherently good nature to be corrupted to suit a wicked role.  This 
is of course part of Plato’s ethical criticism of drama:  bad behavior imitated too often eventually 
becomes habit and destroys the actor’s moral character.97  Philoctetes sees that process at work in 
Neoptolemus, and evidently the young man does as well, for he casts aside the wicked role 
before it can destroy him entirely. 
 Nevertheless, it is ironic that very little of what Neoptolemus has done while playing his 
Odyssean role is straightforwardly deceptive or un-Achillean.  Except for a few particulars (as 
discussed in the first section of this chapter) he has not lied to Philoctetes, instead merely voicing 
agreement with Philoctetes’ views and painting a picture of himself that he would like to live up 
to someday.  The deception relies rather on Neoptolemus’ pretense of an Achillean nature that he 
possesses but has not yet realized.  And perhaps this explains his success at deception, which is 
supposed (in this play) to be so un-Achillean.  Odysseus has not given Neoptolemus a role that 
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 Plato Resp. 394d-397b. 
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runs completely counter to his nature but one that, paradoxically, allows him to exploit it for 
deceptive purposes.  For an actor in the theater, this is a recipe for success; we might think of 
Polus, who is said to have delivered Electra’s lament for Orestes especially memorably because 
he used an urn containing his own son’s ashes.98  Insofar as acting is inherently “deceptive,” an 
actor is likely to be most successful when he can exploit his own natural inclinations to that end. 
 But Neoptolemus feels that his behavior has been disgraceful, and he finally abandons 
Odysseus’ script when the implications of his role bring him to a moral impasse.99  It takes him 
some time to find a way out of this dilemma, not least because Odysseus, the internal playwright 
himself, appears on stage to take matters into his own hands.  A recalcitrant actor may get away 
from his script or improvise a little too much, but he must yield when the playwright becomes 
personally involved. 
 Or must he?  When Odysseus first intervenes, Neoptolemus silently submits,
100
 but when 
they return to the stage a little later (1222), Neoptolemus usurps the role of playwright and 
attempts to contrive his own resolution to the plot.  The internal poet’s drama has failed because 
his protagonist was not up to the part.  Interestingly, it seems that Neoptolemus objects not so 
much to the role-playing itself as to its ultimate implications:  the theft of the bow and the re-
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 Recounted by Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att. 6.5 (= Soph. T 46). 
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 On the tension between Neoptolemus’ duties to Philoctetes versus Odysseus and the rest of the Greeks, see 
Blundell 1989: 211-4, Belfiore 2000: 63-80. 
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 Goldhill 2009: 35-48 discusses characters who act as internal spectators, thereby both inviting the real 
audience to construct their own reactions to what they witness and providing a model for “critical observation.”  
Among other passages, Goldhill examines the third episode of Soph. Phil., making Neoptolemus the representative 
of the “audience on stage” as he observes the quarrel between Odysseus and Philoctetes; Neoptolemus is silent 
throughout, inviting the audience to construct his moral and emotional reactions to the quarrel.  However, this has 
been the case with Neoptolemus throughout the play, both when he was actively participating in Odysseus’ plot and 
when he remained silent in response to Philoctetes’ pleas.  The spectators are at any rate made aware of their own 
position as spectators when they are forced to imagine what is going through Neoptolemus’ head, and I see no 
reason to think of Neoptolemus as anything other than an actor-figure throughout.  But cf. Easterling 1993: 81-3, 
who suggests (p. 82) that Odysseus in the prologue of Soph. Aj. “illustrates the function of theatre to create models 
for us to try out.” 
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abandonment of Philoctetes, with whom he has come to feel a certain kinship.  Ironically, when 
Neoptolemus first landed on Lemnos, he was quite willing to capture Philoctetes by force (90-2).  
But his role-playing has been so successful that he has drawn his internal audience into his 
performance and forged a friendship with him on that basis; and now force is no longer a viable 
option.  In fact, neither is deception.  It might be valid to deceive an enemy (and Philoctetes was 
certainly hostile to the Greek army), but once he becomes a friend, he must not be deceived any 
longer – even if that friendship is based on deception.  So Neoptolemus puts aside all role-
playing, both the Achillean role of violence and glory (as he imagines it) and the pseudo-
Achillean role required by Odysseus.  Neoptolemus gives the bow back to Philoctetes and 
returns the play almost to where it began.
101
  He attempts to start all over by using persuasion to 
get Philoctetes to come with him to Troy.  But the internal spectator is no longer receptive.  
When Philoctetes demands that Neoptolemus take him home as promised (1398-9), even though 
Neoptolemus made that promise when he was still playing a role that he has since put aside, 
Philoctetes is in essence asking for evidence that their friendship is based on more than an 
illusion.  And Neoptolemus’ agreement confirms that it is.  The two start toward the eisodos, 
signaling an ending that is only partially satisfying:  the main characters are reconciled and 
behaving in accordance with their principles, but the myth has not been fulfilled.
102
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 According to Hamilton 1975: 133-4, Philoctetes’ reference to the arms of Achilles is meant to link this 
passage to Neoptolemus’ false story in the first episode, thus marking this ending as insufficient (because it is based 
on a lie). 
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 Hoppin 1990: 142-9 describes thoroughly the elements of closure surrounding the first ending, showing that 
the audience would have been ready to accept it on dramatic terms, if not mythical ones (an effect Hoppin associates 
broadly with Euripides); this false ending is thus a red herring akin to the false merchant scene.  Hamilton 1975: 134 
argues that this first ending is “wrong not only because that is not the way the myth goes … but also because it is 
based on an insufficient model for action,” i.e. Neoptolemus’ false tale in the first episode.  See also Seale 1982: 42-
5 on this passage and the near-departure immediately preceding the epiphany. 
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 Ismene Lada-Richards has explored Sophocles’ play within a play with a particular view 
to the changing dynamics within the theater at the end of the fifth century.
103
  In this period, 
power and prestige were beginning to shift away from the playwrights to the actors, who were 
becoming increasingly popular in their own right; the playwrights had to find a way to work 
effectively with them and use their talents to create a powerful piece of drama.  For Lada-
Richards, Neoptolemus represents the recalcitrant actor who deviates from his script and 
improvises to suit his own preferences (and to please his audience), thus frustrating the 
performance intended by the playwright (Odysseus).  In this case, the actor’s improvisation also 
fails to effect the necessary resolution, as he ignores the requirements of plot in favor of 
satisfying his internal audience; since neither internal playwright nor internal actor can devise an 
appropriate ending, that must be handled by the real playwright (Sophocles) with a deus ex 
machina.
104
  On this level, the abruptness of Heracles’ appearance105 and Philoctetes’ reversal 
are apt:  as the sorcerer corrects his apprentice, Sophocles steps in with an efficient solution to 
the problem created by his wayward characters, both of whom have failed to fill the roles given 
to them.
106
  Unlike Neoptolemus’ ending, in which Philoctetes is denied his destined glory at 
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 Lada-Richards 2009. 
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 Some have argued that Heracles is really only Odysseus in disguise (Errandonea 1955-6, Lattimore 1964: 
44-5, with n. 35, Roisman 2001; for similar suggestions relating to other plays, see DeForest 1989).  I do not 
subscribe to this reading myself – it is a matter of dramatic convention to have an actor play multiple parts, and 
Sophocles would have to give some positive indication that he wanted this epiphany to be understood as a deception 
– but if we take it so, then the tragedy ends with the internal playwright (Odysseus) rather than the external 
(Sophocles) reclaiming control of his play. 
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 Hoppin 1990: 150-1 notes that among extant epiphanies it is highly unusual for the deus to interrupt trochees 
(which indicate closure) with “a competing meter of closure” (here, anapaests); in this case, the shifting meters 
allow the play to “back up” and try again.  The effect, she argues, is to “jolt” the audience and the characters, both of 
whom now expect the play to end with a departure for Malis, back onto the correct mythological track.  Thus, even 
at the end, the audience’s experience parallels that of Philoctetes, both having their expectations foiled by the deus, 
who also finally provides (some) secure knowledge. 
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 The primary argument in favor of reading Heracles’ epiphany as an Odyssean trick is the fact that otherwise 
Odysseus seems to run out of ideas, whereas in the mythical tradition, he is never at a loss for a clever solution.  But 
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Troy, and unlike Odysseus’ ending, in which a victim of injustice is again manipulated into 
going where he least wants to go, Sophocles’ ending is satisfying on all levels.  Philoctetes and 
Neoptolemus preserve their new friendship, Philoctetes will be healed by Asclepius himself, and 
both Neoptolemus and Philoctetes will win glory for conquering Troy – and Philoctetes has not 
had to surrender his principles.
107
 
 But the audience is reminded not to place too much confidence in what they have learned 
from this dramatic performance.  Neoptolemus’ apparent intention to live up to his Achillean 
nature does not resolve our doubts about him, since Heracles warns Philoctetes and Neoptolemus 
to observe εὐσέβεια during the sack of Troy (1441), which we know (again, relying on our 
external knowledge of the myth) that Neoptolemus will fail to do.  The play ends on a note of 
aporia:
108
  has Neoptolemus really developed into a decent individual, as we thought, or is he a 
                                                                                                                                                             
it was not impossible to outwit Odysseus (cf. Palamedes’ ruse on Ithaca, to which lines 73 and 1024-5 may refer), 
and Taousiani 2011 points out that Odysseus forte was (honest or deceptive) rhetorical persuasion rather than simply 
trickery; at any rate there is no reason that Sophocles’ Odysseus must be as infallible as Homer’s, especially if we 
also accept (as most critics do) that Sophocles has altered Neoptolemus’ normally bloodthirsty character for the sake 
of this play. 
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 For the ending of Phil. and how it satisfies the audience, see esp. Easterling 1978: 36-9; for Heracles as a 
representative of the true playwright (as opposed to Odysseus), see Falkner 1998: 47-8.  Hamilton 1975: 135 n. 17 
reviews earlier scholarship that was less satisfied with the epiphany; for Hamilton, Heracles’ story finally provides a 
proper model of action, displacing the fallacious model of Neoptolemus’ story in the first episode.  Ussher 1990: 11 
takes a darker view on the grounds that Philoctetes’ enemies win out – but this is in no way emphasized in the text; 
cf. Nussbaum 1976: 49: “Though justice has achieved a victory and we have come to see how merit and fairness 
may be related, we are asked now to recognize the dependence of the moral scene as a whole upon caprice and 
chance, the stormy moods of nature and the carelessness of the gods.”  See O’Higgins 1991: 47-8 for the argument 
that, regardless of what will happen at Troy, Philoctetes has already won glory from his time on Lemnos.  Levett 
2004: 263-5 describes the epiphany of Phil. as a type of recognition that caps a mechanema à la Euripides’ 
romances. 
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 A common feature of Sophoclean endings, on which see Roberts 1987, 1988, and 2005: 145, Goward 2004: 
50-2; Hoppin 1990: 161 (with nn. 44-6) has a synopsis of views on the ending of Phil.  Roberts states (1988: 191-2), 
“Sophocles, then, seems both to point to a future beyond the play and to point to its being always in the future.  
Easterling suggests a further effect of Sophocles’ glimpses of later events when she comments that this device 
‘draws attention to the play as a play’ and is thus ‘in some respects analogous’ to Euripides’ use of the deus ex 
machina.  The analogy, it seems, lies in the fact that both poets appear to use references to the larger myth in a way 
that comments on the ending of a particular play and asserts that it is just that: the ending of a particular play.” 
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sacrilegious criminal?
109
  How does our experience of the play match up with our external 
knowledge of the myth? 
 Sophocles has added an ethical twist to his play within a play.  Neoptolemus’ 
performance ultimately fails not because of inappropriate costuming but because the role does 
not suit the actor.  The quality of Neoptolemus’ moral character is a central focus of Philoctetes, 
and Sophocles approaches it from two angles:  that of the actor, Neoptolemus himself, and that 
of the audience.  In the prologue, Neoptolemus notes his discomfort with role-playing and thus 
invites us to wonder, as Plato did, whether acting has an effect on one’s inborn nature and ethic.  
It is not easy for us to answer that question, however, since Neoptolemus’ attitude toward his 
role is opaque for much of the play.  The audience’s angle, which is characterized by 
epistemological instability, does not grant them secure knowledge of Neoptolemus’ character 
and behavior prior to the action of the play, so they cannot see whether he changes as a result of 
his role-playing.  Even if they did know his backstory, it is difficult to tell when Neoptolemus is 
lying, how well he plays his part, or even how he feels about it.  The potentially negative effects 
of role-playing finally become a little clearer when Neoptolemus renounces his performance and 
Philoctetes condemns the internal playwright as a teacher of evil; Heracles’ warning to observe 
piety also seems to suggest a downward turn for Neoptolemus’ morality, though it is not clear 
whether that turn results directly from anything we have seen in the play. 
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 In her study of narrative in Phil., Roberts 1989:175 observes that “[t]he story of Neoptolemus’ past is partly 
invented and partly true, partly his own and partly Odysseus’; he seems to be deciding whether or not to accept it as 
his past.  His future is similarly indeterminate, with hints of dangerous possibility.”  Neoptolemus’ sacrilegious acts 
(on which the negative reading of Calder 1971 relies heavily) were well known from a variety of sources:  the death 
of Priam (Iliou Persis), the murder of Asyanax (Little Iliad), the sacrifice of Polyxena (Ibycus fr. 26 (Page), Eur. 
Hec. 523-68); see Gantz 1993: 650-9.  Neoptolemus’ claim at Phil. 334-5 that Achilles died at the hands of Phoebus 
looks ahead to the tradition that Neoptolemus was also slain by Apollo as punishment for killing Priam (Gantz 1993: 
690-4 records the different versions).  Eur. Or. 1554-5 puts a decidedly negative spin on the “twin lions” theme 
introduced in Heracles’ speech (1435). 
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 Though the poet receives proportionally less attention in Sophocles’ play within a play 
than the actor and audience, this figure returns powerfully at the end of the play to establish the 
creative ability of the tragic playwright and his preeminence over up-and-coming actors who 
would think that they could do better. 
 
Orestes: The Chaos of Performance 
 Euripides’ Orestes is clearly a step away from his earlier romances, not least in its 
decreased interest in disguise and deception.
110
  In Helen, for instance, the Greeks (led by the 
captive heroine) must trick the barbarian ruler so they can escape back to Greece; but Orestes is 
attempting to escape from condemnation and death (rather than a foreign land),
111
 and his 
primary means of escape are persuasion and violence.  Deliberate deception is only a factor in 
the attempted murder of Helen, when Orestes and Pylades pretend to supplicate her for their lives 
before pulling out their swords.  Likewise, costume and disguise are not especially relevant, 
since everybody in the play already knows everybody else and a simple change of costume is 
unlikely to fool anyone.  So Euripides, under the influence of Sophocles’ treatment of ethics and 
role-playing in Philoctetes (or so I will argue), has moved from one set of metadramatic interests 
in Helen to another in Orestes. 
 Philoctetes, though it is much akin to the romances in many respects, also discards 
previous Euripidean interests in costume and disguise, replacing them with a discourse on the 
ethics of imitation and role-playing and the effect such activities might have on the actor’s moral 
character.  Further, it examines the role of the actor as such:  a creative individual with his own 
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 On the theme of σωτηρία (rather than physical escape) in Or., see Parry 1969. 
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talents and preferences who performs a critical function in the creation of a successful drama.  
Orestes expands both of these ideas (role-playing and histrionic independence) and carries them 
to extreme conclusions. 
 The external audience is again “internalized” and made aware of the weakness of their 
position as spectators and interpreters of dramatic performance.  Once again, the ambiguity of 
the mythical background is the primary means of problematizing the audience’s experience of 
the play.  As in Philoctetes, it is not always clear which version or treatment of a myth Euripides 
subscribes to – for instance, whether Clytemnestra was a frightening and tyrannical figure (as in 
the Oresteia) or a somewhat regretful mother intent upon reconciliation (as in Euripides’ 
Electra).  Indeed, the play itself amounts to a large-scale reinterpretation of the myth of Orestes, 
and the audience’s uncertainty about its mythical background makes it difficult for them to 
comprehend fully the context of the action and the characters’ motives.  The audience’s position 
is further destabilized by the nature of the plot:  Euripides has inserted his own, almost wholly 
invented story between two well-established mythical traditions, the murder of Clytemnestra and 
Orestes’ subsequent trial and acquittal in Athens.  Since the part of the myth represented by 
Orestes did not exist before 408 B.C., the only sure events are the past (Clytemnestra’s death) 
and the future (Orestes in Athens), and certain details about these are left uncertain; everything in 
between is wholly unknown.  Finally, Euripides makes several gestures toward both the 
“traditional” myth of Orestes and the “traditional” format of tragedy but then indicates that 
Orestes does not fit into either of these paradigms; the audience cannot use their external 
129 
 
knowledge of the myth or notions of what tragedy usually looks like to anticipate or evaluate the 
action of the play.
112
 
 Like several other tragedies, Orestes has a play within a play that centers around the 
planning and execution of the mechanema beginning at line 1098.
113
  But there is another play 
within this play, one that, paradoxically, spans almost the entirety of Orestes.  Prior to the action 
of the play, we are told, the playwright-figure (Apollo) has given directions that his actors have 
duly carried out (the matricide).  Now, however, the playwright is absent and the actors 
restive;
114
 like Neoptolemus, they begin to improvise solutions to the plot.  But these actors, 
especially Orestes, are more ambitious than capable, and they are unsuited for the roles they 
attempt to fill; those roles in turn are unsuitable for the action to which they are applied.  In the 
end, as in Philoctetes, the playwright-figure must step in to provide a real solution.  The poet 
again reasserts his primacy over the actors, though the specific message is almost opposite that of 
Philoctetes:  instead of being the only one who can provide a satisfying ending, the poet is the 
only one who can get away with a completely absurd ending, one that actors and audience alike 
have no choice but to accept even as it contradicts the action of the play.  There is no clear 
internal spectator (except for Menelaus and Orestes at the very end), but, as in Philoctetes, the 
external audience is drawn into that position.  Euripides establishes a dramatic world in which 
the usual “rules” of myth and tragedy do not apply only to double-cross his audience at the end 
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 Burnett 1998: 247-72 (followed by Porter 1994: 89-93) similarly reads Or. as an inversion of tragic form that 
continually foils the audience’s expectations of tragic characters and tragic story patterns. 
 
 
113
 Burnett 1971: 188, though not thinking in terms of metadrama, finds that line 960 (the kommos after the 
messenger report and before the mechanema) marks the end of the suppliant/rescue action and essentially begins a 
new play. 
 
 
114
 Zeitlin 1980: 52 notes that the absence of Apollo, “the myth-sustaining god,” is what makes room for the 
play’s extensive mythical inventiveness and exploration of alternative solutions for the usual story of Orestes.  It is 
worth remembering that the playwright-figures in Phil. (Odysseus, Heracles) are also absent for most of the play, 
which enables the actor to go his own way.  The main difference between Phil. and Or. is that Euripides omits the 
prologue scene where the playwright instructs his actor and only mentions this event retrospectively. 
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by reaffirming the world of traditional myth and tragedy.  This audience, like that of Philoctetes, 
cannot distinguish between illusion and reality. 
 In the prologue and parodos, Euripides establishes a tone of tragic depth founded on the 
traditional myths of the house of Tantalus only to undermine this tone repeatedly.
115
  The effect 
is to caution the audience against expecting a “normal” treatment of the story – that is, heroic 
characters punished, persecuted, or rewarded by deities who take a personal interest in them.  
This is the kind of world adumbrated in Electra’s opening words (1-3):116 
    οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ὧδ’ εἰπεῖν ἔπος 
    οὐδὲ πάθος οὐδὲ ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος, 
    ἧς οὐκ ἂν ἄραιτ’ ἄχθος ἀνθρώπου φύσις. 
 
    There is virtually nothing horrific, 
    no suffering, no god-sent affliction, 
    whose burden man, being what he is, might not shoulder. 
Though this ringing statement portends the suffering and misery that will attend the protagonists 
through most of the play, the sense of the steadfast endurance, strength, and nobility of mankind 
will be belied almost immediately by Orestes’ pathetic appearance and his weakness in the face 
of Menelaus, Tyndareus, and the Argive assembly (not to mention his desperate violence in the 
final scenes of the play). 
 The world of traditional tragedy continues to be implicit in Electra’s account of her own 
ancestry.  She tells of the privileges and crimes of Tantalus and his descendants with cautionary 
language about how far that information can be trusted (ὡς λέγουσι(ν) in lines 5 and 8, εἰ δὴ 
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 Cf. Wolff 1968 on the disjunction of myth and plot in this play.  Burnett 1971: 183-204 argues that Or. is 
built around a series of plot failures that continually foil the audience’s expectations of “normal” tragic action; as 
she puts it (183): “No situation is allowed to resolve itself in the ordinary tragic way, no character behaves 
throughout quite as we feel he should, and meanwhile the dramatist seems to stand aside, refusing all aid.” 
 
 
116
 Fuqua 1976: 82 sees these lines as programmatic for the play’s treatment of φύσις and its connection to the 
same theme in Phil.  For the interplay of traditional myth and modernity in this opening sententia (dependent on the 
polyvalence of δεινός), see Willink 1986 ad loc., who also comments “[t]he sentiment is traditionally ‘tragic’ in 
focusing attention on the δεινόν character of human πάθη …; at the same time the reflective hyperbole warns us, in a 
manner consistent with irony, to expect the presentation of an extravagantly δεινόν myth.” 
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κλεινός in line 17).117  She describes her family, including current generations, as living in a 
world in which gods and men still mingle, where divine wrath can sentence a mortal to eternal 
punishment and criminal behavior can resonate for generations.  She is more reticent about her 
own parents, characterizing Clytemnestra as ἀνοσιωτάτη (24) but avoiding any details about her 
motives (26-7).
118
  Such avoidance will be Euripides’ strategy throughout the play; we know 
what Electra believes but not why she believes it, and when the audience does not know clearly 
the mythical details assumed in the backstory of the play, they are also unable to know what sort 
of characters they are dealing with and where to place their sympathies. 
 Apollo’s effective absence from the plot at this point, while eventually allowing the 
actors to take control of the script, also stands in contrast to other well-known accounts of the 
myth that the audience might like to rely on in interpretation (e.g. the Oresteia of Stesichorus or 
Aeschylus).  That Apollo is said to have commanded the matricide is no surprise – indeed, it is a 
regular part of the myth – but Electra’s and Orestes’ extremely negative attitude toward him is 
unexpected.  Electra speaks of ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος (2), denounces Apollo as the ultimate cause of 
Clytemnestra’s death (28-31), and even accuses him of sacrificing her and Orestes (191-3);119 
throughout the first half of the play, the two continually blame him for their crime and for 
abandoning them to the fallout of the matricide (28-30, 161-5, 285-7, 416-20, 590-6).  But 
nobody else is impressed by this line of defense, and when even Orestes gives up on it, that 
might be taken as confirmation of Apollo’s disinterest and irrelevance.  This assumption will of 
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 Wright 2006: 40: “there is no reason to doubt Tantalus’ parentage or the reason for his punishment.  In other 
words, it is the attitude towards myth, rather than the details of the myth itself, that strikes one as unusual.”  As with 
Hel., he sees this application of “metamythology” as intended to question the concept of myth itself, whereas I 
would relate it to the audience’s evaluation of the action of this particular play. 
 
 
118
 Willink 1986 ad loc. thinks that Electra must have in mind Clytemnestra’s affair with Aegisthus. 
 
 
119
 See Gibert 2003 for the significance of this statement. 
132 
 
course turn out to be unfounded at the end of the play, but until then it contradicts what we know 
from other versions and suggests that Orestes does not after all operate in accordance with the 
“traditional” tragic myth.  Electra’s and Orestes’ upcoming trial before the people of Argos, 
seemingly in place of the trial at Athens conducted by the gods, further removes the situation 
from the best-known (Aeschylean) version of the myth.
120
 
 So Electra’s prologue speech sketches a typical “tragic” world of gods and heroes while 
simultaneously hinting that none of that is applicable here.  Further, as Wright notes, “Electra is 
refusing to deliver a straightforwardly expository prologue-speech of the usual kind;”121 the lack 
of secure information in a speech that would normally be almost omniscient suggests a 
disjunction from traditional tragedy on a formal level as well.  The same is true of the unusual 
parodos:  the vast majority of the parodos is performed by Electra, rather than the chorus,
122
 who 
is instead scolded for singing and dancing.  But this traditional tragic world is undermined most 
starkly by the preceding scene, in which Helen’s frivolity accentuates the dissonance within 
Electra’s speech and helps to mark the action and characters of Orestes as somehow alien to 
“normal” tragedy. 
 Helen seems to have a very shallow understanding of her family’s situation, almost 
parodically so; her offerings to Clytemnestra are paltry and her prayer singularly inappropriate, 
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 Cf. Euben 1986b: 230: “In the opening seventy lines Electra distances herself from the history of her house 
that she is recounting in detail:  Tantalus was born of Zeus ‘or so they say’; the story of his fall from grace is a 
legend about which she does ‘not really know’; and of her father’s fame she says, ‘if what he had was fame.’  These 
doubts (which appear in other plays of Euripides), here deprive her and us of any sense of secure interpretative 
context, and break the continuity of past and present.  Since the story of the house includes the gods, her uncertainty 
extends to them and the deed Orestes has done at their behest.” 
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 Wright 2006: 40. 
 
 
122
 Burnett 1971: 196-7 briefly discusses the unconventional features of the parodos.  The chorus is given 58 
words out of a total 270 (= 21.48%); their part comes out to be 27% the size of Electra’s.  See also Dunn 1989: 240-
2 (reprinted in Dunn 1996: 163-5) for the unusual quality of these opening scenes as produced by an interplay of 
speech and silence. 
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and she blithely declares Electra and Orestes undefiled on the questionable grounds that Apollo 
is the one truly responsible for Clytemnestra’s death.123  That she lives closely and 
unconcernedly with the matricides while mourning for her sister and that she even attempts to 
send Electra of all people to Clytemnestra’s grave with offerings characterize her as thoughtless 
and absurd,
124
 qualities which are brought out even more sharply by Electra’s acerbic responses.  
This pathetic, petty family hardly seems the stuff of myth; the implication is that we should not 
expect the usual myth.
125
  And if they cannot look to the usual myth as an aid to interpreting 
Orestes, then they cannot use their outside knowledge of the story to evaluate the characters or 
anticipate what will happen next.  Moreover, they should beware of trusting any of the characters 
(such as Electra) when they attempt to cast the action in terms of traditional myth.  In this 
respect, the spectators of Orestes are more at the mercy of the playwright than the spectators of 
Helen, more dependent on their own capacities to reason and interpret, more prone to being 
surprised or misled – in short, more like the audience of Philoctetes. 
 After Helen has gone and the chorus arrived, Orestes experiences a bout of madness 
(253-79).
126
  His eyes grow wild and he leaps about as he sees Furies coming for him.  Electra 
herself, clinging to Orestes and trying to soothe him, appears to him to be another Fury, and he 
pushes her away in panic.  He imagines that he draws a bow given to him by Apollo and fires on 
the Furies, who eventually fall away from his shafts and leave him alone. 
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 For Helen’s statement and how it reflects on her character, see Parker 1983: 104-43, 309-11 (for whom (p. 
311) Helen’s statement “is simply an expression of her glib moral laxity”) and Gibert 2003: 188 (with n. 91). 
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 See Willink 1986 ad loc. for Helen’s ἀβουλία. 
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 Cf. the discussion of Fuqua 1978, which, while demonstrating the relevance of myth and mythical paradigms 
to Or., constantly points out the ways in which the play undermines its apparent endorsement of traditional myth. 
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 For a level-headed assessment of the theme of madness in Or., see Porter 1994: 298-313. 
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 What to make of this scene?  The audience sees Orestes jumping around the stage, 
brandishing an invisible bow at invisible Furies and misidentifying Electra as one of them.
127
  At 
first appearance, it seems clear that Orestes’ mad vision is just that:  a hallucination, a 
psychological manifestation of his guilty conscience (as he himself suggests later at 396).
128
  On 
the other hand, we know that the Orestes of myth is supposed to be pursued by Furies who need 
not be visible (as at the end of Choephoroi).  Electra is surely not a Fury, but she often displays 
an unquenchable, Fury-like thirst for vengeance.  We see no bow, but there was a tradition that 
Apollo gave Orestes a bow with which to defend himself,
129
 and the invisible bow even appears 
to work in this scene; as Orestes threatens the Furies and fires his bow, he imagines that he 
defeats them and in due course his madness subsides.
130
  But we are not able to say 
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 Cropp 1982 argues that lines 268-70 are interpolations (with further literature on the scene cited in n. 5), but 
see Kovacs 2002 for response.  Kovacs, however, thinks that Orestes must brandish a physical bow in this scene (p. 
280): “(1) There would be little point in having Orestes deludedly imagine such a gift and such instructions.  Such a 
procedure would be mystifying, but the mystery would never be dispelled.  The lines speak of a particular bow, with 
particular characterstics, given by Apollo to Orestes on a particular occasion with instructions to use it against the 
goddesses if they should attack him.  This suggests a real, not an imaginary, object.  (2) The most obvious 
interpretation of the scene is that Orestes’ words and gesticulations are effective in frightening off the Erinyes.  (The 
alternative is to suppose that the end of Orestes’ distress just happens to coincide with the threat.)  But an imaginary 
bow would not have that effect.  (3) The lines embody an allusion to Stesichorus, for whom the bow was a real gift 
from Apollo.  That allusion would only contribute puzzlement if in Euripides the bow is imaginary.”  In my view, 
the point of including such a detail in this scene would be precisely to suggest the reality of Orestes’ experience 
even while the audience cannot visually verify it.  Mystification, in other words, is exactly the desired effect of this 
passage.  That the bow was real in Stesichorus does not require Euripides to make it real here, and in fact the 
Stesichorean allusion might suggest to the audience that the play operates within multiple layers of reality; if the 
Furies can be both imaginary and real, why not the bow? (cf. Willink 1986: 268-74n.:  “[t]he Stesichorean ‘bow-
giving’ had always, in a sense, been a metaphor for the protection promised by Apollo; its ‘reality’ is of the same 
mythic order as that of the Furies themselves” (his italics)).  Kovacs accepts the reality of Orestes’ vision, claiming 
instead that Electra’s experience is the faulty one and that the bow is proof of this; I would prefer to remove the bow 
and thus leave both options equally open.  Burnett 1971: 201-3 (cf. 205-22) thinks that the bow is real and remains 
on the stage throughout the play as a visible reminder of Orestes’ lack of faith in Apollo, but some have found this 
reading to be something of a Judeo-Christian anachronism. 
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 On the force of σύνεσις in this play, see e.g. Smith 1967, Rodgers 1969, Willink 1986: 396n., Assaël 1996. 
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 Stesichorus fr. 217 Page.  See Willink 1986: 268-74n. for other tragic archery scenes and for the 
(non)existence of a real bow in this scene.  Dunn 1996: 177 describes this scene as “pitting Stesichorus against 
Aeschylus, pitting the bow of the lyric poet against the Furies of the tragedian.”  Both bow and Furies are given at 
least figurative substance by their presence in previous treatments of the myth. 
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straightforwardly whether Orestes’ vision is a product of his fevered imagination or a real 
experience of the divine world.
131
  Our own visual experience of the scene is brought into 
competition with our prior knowledge of the story, and Euripides does not tell us which should 
be the primary basis for interpreting the play.  This is exactly the dynamic operative in Helen, 
where Teucer and Menelaus encounter a conflict between what they know about Helen from past 
experience and what they see in front of them now – except that this conflict now engages the 
audience as well.  It is thus also fundamentally similar to the first episode of Philoctetes, where 
the audience is “internalized” and rendered unable to determine the reliability of Neoptolemus’ 
story by their own prior knowledge of the myth.  If my argument for the dissociation of Orestes 
from traditional myth in the prologue and parodos is convincing, then we may also prefer to 
divorce Orestes’ madness from its mythical precedents and understand it in more modern, human 
terms. 
 The same argument can be made about the dialogue between Tyndareus and Orestes 
(491-631).  Without denying Clytemnestra’s guilt, Tyndareus contends that she should have been 
expelled rather than murdered (492-502); she deserved to die, but not by Orestes’ hand (538-9).  
Many critics have found fault with Tyndareus’ argument, since fifth-century legal processes 
were  not supposed to exist in mythical Argos.
132
  But the prologue introduced several mythical 
details in order to demonstrate that they are irrelevant in this particular dramatic world, and I 
would suggest that the same thing is happening here.  Euripides’ Argos is not Aeschylus’ Argos:  
it is essentially democratic and already has an established legal system; it is not a primitive 
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 As soon as sanity returns, Orestes goes back to blaming Apollo for his predicament, which is ironic if we 
think that the god really did help stave off the Furies. 
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 Willink 1986 ad loc. describes this passage as a “fusion of reason, emotion and unreason.” 
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 Cf. Willink 1986: 496-596n.  Holzhausen 2003: 47-67 has a thorough discussion of Tyndareus and his 
attitude toward law. 
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society of blood vendettas, and the very fact that Orestes and Electra have been put on trial 
perhaps shows that something similar could indeed have been done to Clytemnestra.  Further, 
when Tyndareus imagines an Aeschylean context in which Clytemnestra bared her breast to 
Orestes as she begged for her life (526-8), it is significant that he invokes a passage that makes 
Clytemnestra out to be a victim of impious violence; there is no mention of the “man-
counseling” Clytemnestra who dominates the action of Agamemnon.  Euripides is citing 
Aeschylus very selectively.  Reference to one part of the Oresteia should make us aware of the 
parts that are missing and wonder how much of Aeschylus’ treatment should be transferred to 
Orestes. 
 Orestes responds to Tyndareus with arguments borrowed from the Aeschylean Apollo 
that he is the son of his father rather than his mother and that by killing Clytemnestra he set an 
example for other would-be adulterous and murderous wives, thus protecting all the men of 
Greece.  But the very fact that it is Orestes, not Apollo, making this argument points up Apollo’s 
already conspicuous absence from the play.  Moreover, Orestes’ audience here (Tyndareus and 
Menelaus) is rather less amenable to these arguments than the Aeschylean Athena was.  This 
defense won acquittal for Orestes in Eumenides, but here it fails even to budge Tyndareus or win 
Menelaus’ support, and it fails again in the trial (931-42).133  Characters like Menelaus and 
Tyndareus are not interested in a defense based on divine justification; they are more concerned 
with the laws and politics in Argos and Sparta, and their disregard for what Apollo did or did not 
do suggests to the audience that the gods are simply irrelevant in this play.
134
  The trial itself 
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 Willink 1986 ad loc. prefers to delete 932-43 as an interpolation.  But given the nature of this play and its 
sometimes ambivalent characterization of Orestes, sarcasm and flawed logic seem insufficient justification for 
deleting these lines; see also Porter 1994: 74 n. 102 for defense. 
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appears to be a replacement for the Aeschylean trial at Athens,
135
 but without any gods and 
apparently without much concern for justice.  It is not meant to end a cycle of vengeance, as in 
Aeschylus, and if the Argives and their various leaders were really interested in finding a just 
solution, they would probably side with Diomedes, who proposes exile rather than execution.
136
  
Instead, the Argives are swayed by Tyndareus and the friends of Aegisthus, who simply want 
vengeance, and the likes of Talthybius, who sides with whoever is in power.  We are indeed 
meant to think of the Oresteia in these passages – but only to notice the differences between it 
and Orestes.
137
 
 After the messenger has described the trial and its decision, Electra and the chorus sing a 
lament (960-1012).
138
  Electra sticks to the version of her family history which she outlined in 
the prologue:  her fate is simply the worst and most recent in a chain of disasters reaching back 
to Tantalus.  We have already been cautioned by the prologue against taking uses of the 
traditional myth at face value; the world of the play does not appear to be the same as that which 
was supposedly inhabited by Tantalus and the rest, nor does it appear to be a world in which 
gods and men still interact meaningfully, whether for good or for ill.  Moreover, the chorus 
offers an alternative explanation according to which the fall of the house of Tantalus is due to a 
more vague φθόνος θεόθεν, which suggests that the successful family has reached the end of its 
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 Cf. Gibert 2003: 195, commenting that “[i]t is a commonplace of criticism that the characters of Orestes are 
represented as distant from the gods, and also that Euripides encourages us to measure this distance by constantly 
recalling specific passages of the Oresteia.” 
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 At the end, Apollo explains that Orestes will still have to go to Athens and stand trial before a panel of gods 
there (1648-52) – but the audience does not know that until Apollo’s appearance. 
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 For Diomedes’ proposal as moderate and unbiased, see Willink 1986: 898-902n. 
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 This is the argument of Porter 1994: 93-7 (against Greenberg 1962). 
 
 
138
 In my discussion, I follow Diggle’s text; see Willink 1986 for an alternative distribution of lines.  Damen 
1990 suggests that the whole thing was originally choral, and Electra’s part was only recast later. 
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good luck, and “fate,” which seems to comprise little more than the vicissitudes of fortune that 
attend all human affairs.  Electra’s attempt to connect her suffering with a family history that is 
important and renowned (if not always admirable) rings hollow in the modernized context of 
Argive democracy and in the absence of the sort of divine activity usually associated with the 
house of Tantalus (and with Orestes in particular).  The malleability of the mythical past reaches 
beyond the characters, each of whom thinks he or she has figured out how the world works, to 
affect the audience, who is constantly reminded that the characters’ knowledge is not reliable and 
is thus deprived of any real guidance in interpretation.
139
 
 The hatching of the mechanema signals the start of the smaller-scale play within a play, 
but in fact Orestes has already been trying out many different roles throughout the tragedy.  As 
Froma Zeitlin has shown in her definitive article on role-playing in Orestes, Orestes is trapped 
within his own myth,
140
 and role-playing seems to be his primary means of escaping from it and 
finding some control over his own destiny.
141
  During his fit of madness, he assumes the 
Stesichorean version of himself, an Orestes who still has divine support and can fight off the 
bloodthirsty Furies.
142
  When he goes off to the assembly supported by Pylades, he becomes a 
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 Cf. Euben 1986b: 247: “Removing the spectator’s omniscience unites him with the principals in their baffled 
groping for meaning, puissance, and stature.”  Euripides’ tactic in this scene is fundamentally similar to the one used 
in Soph. El. (studied in the previous chapter), in which the audience is presented with contradictory views of the 
divine world with no way to choose between them. 
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 Cf. Dunn 1989, who argues that Orestes employs various types of comic license to escape from his tragic 
situation; his argument for the collapse of generic boundaries at the end of the play broadly supports my contention 
that Or. deliberately defies the audience’s expectations of “typical” tragedy. 
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 Zeitlin 1980; though she discusses role-playing with reference to mythical characters (rather than actors), it 
is an easy step from a character who plays a role to a character who therefore conceptually represents an actor, and 
indeed, Zeitlin’s “closet of masks” analogy invites such an extension.  Cf. Fuqua 1976 (from which Fuqua 1978 
borrows heavily), who discusses the “mythical paradigms” used by Sophocles to create Neoptolemus (and, to a 
lesser extent, by Euripides to create Orestes); the concept is fundamentally similar to that of role-playing, as 
Neoptolemus and Orestes each in turn attempt to follow the example of Telemachus. 
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double of Heracles supported by Theseus.  His mocking comment about the Gorgon identifies 
him with Medusa but also (indirectly) with his own mother.  When he appears on the roof of the 
stage-building at the end with his knife at a girl’s throat, he tries to assume the role of the 
victorious Medea, who kills her sons, avenges herself on Jason, and escapes with impunity. 
 But even as he ransacks the “closet of masks” in a search for the role that will free him 
from his mythical constraints, he keeps returning to the same patterns of Atreid violence.  In 
attacking Helen, he repeats the murder of Clytemnestra; in threatening Hermione, he nearly 
repeats the sacrifice of Iphigenia.  He plays the roles of both of his parents against each other and 
his own family, making as if to continue the cycle of violence along exactly the same lines as the 
previous generation – all in an attempt to get away from that cycle.  The paradox is that the 
plotline gets so out of control (to the point where Orestes orders the burning of the palace at 
Argos) while still being a closed system of Atreid violence; no matter how far Orestes strays 
from his script, he ends up right back where he started. 
 So when Orestes and his friends devise the mechanema, they are making more explicit a 
pattern of salvific role-playing that has pervaded the tragedy up to this point.  Like Neoptolemus, 
who agrees to deception once force and persuasion have been ruled out, Orestes turns to the 
mechanema when all other options have failed him, when Apollo, Menelaus, Tyndareus, and the 
Argive assembly all seem to have turned against him.
143
  Orestes, Pylades, and Electra plot to 
deceive and kill Helen, kidnap Hermione, and coerce Menelaus into helping them escape.  
Pylades continues to give the lie to the audience’s tragic expectations by assuming a role that 
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 Alternatively (or additionally), he takes the role of “the sick and isolated Philoctetes whom society has also 
rejected.  Each received the bow as a gift from a divine or semi-divine figure whose unwelcome command they 
obeyed” (Zeitlin 1980: 55). 
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 A point made also by Kovacs 2002. 
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perverts his more usual tragic self.  As often, he is the one responsible for offering advice in a 
critical situation, but in this case that means proposing the murder of Helen (1105).  In an ironic 
reversal of his advice to Orestes in Choephoroi (902, “hold all men your enemies, rather than the 
gods!”), he urges a course of action that could draw the enmity of both men and gods.  His usual 
willingness to take risks and even die with Orestes (cf. IT 674-86) becomes to a willingness to 
help murder Helen and kidnap Hermione.
144
  The perversity of the whole situation is underscored 
by Orestes’ effusive praise for his friends’ “noble” suggestions (1155-61, 1204-8). 
 In fact, if we are looking for a playwright-figure in this scene, Electra is the best 
candidate.  Though Pylades is the first to suggest something other than immediate suicide, 
Electra is the one to change the plot fundamentally from one of revenge (and then suicide) to one 
of escape and salvation (1177-8).  She describes for Orestes two alternative scenarios, one in 
which Menelaus yields and one in which he does not (1195-9), and predicts which course the 
action will take (1200-2).  While Orestes and Pylades enter the palace to carry out the plot, she 
remains outside and directs the chorus to keep watch (1246-95).  When Hermione appears, 
Electra hurriedly explains the plan to the chorus again, telling them how they and she should 
behave in order to deceive Hermione (1317-20): they must school their facial expressions, which 
were of course represented by masks, so that they look the way they always do – the chorus calm 
and expressionless, Electra σκυθρωπός.  In the end, Electra even traps Hermione by giving her a 
role to play in her miniature drama as a suppliant of Helen (1337-9, though Orestes and Pylades 
have already made an attempt on Helen’s life).  Even after Hermione has gone into the palace, 
Electra continues to call directions to her allies (1345-6, 1349-52).  Urging on Orestes from 
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outside is also her role in the Sophoclean Electra (1415) and in both of her eponymous plays she 
is a keen advocate of vengeance, so her eagerness here to kidnap the innocent Hermione is a 
perversion of the tragic tradition along the same lines as Pylades’ advice to Orestes to kill Helen.  
But Electra is also a playwright-figure like the heroines of the romances, who take the initiative 
to devise and direct a plot.
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 Orestes and Pylades attempt to cast themselves in a heroic role by imitating Odysseus 
when they enter the palace to supplicate Helen (cf. Odysseus’ supplication of Arete) and when 
they lock up the servants in different rooms to keep them out of the way (cf. Odysseus’ return to 
Ithaca).  In both cases, Orestes is attempting to appropriate a heroic paradigm for his rather 
unheroic actions;
146
 that is, he plays the part of the epic hero even though his situation and his 
moral character do not fit the part.  Sophocles’ Neoptolemus attempted something very similar in 
creating an image of himself as heroic even though he did not yet have any real claim to heroism.  
Neoptolemus’ role-playing, however, is arguably more appropriate to his character, since he does 
possess the Achillean legacy to which he is pretending; Orestes’ appropriation of the heroic 
paradigm is specious, and one might even argue that while Neoptolemus risks destroying his 
good character by playing a wicked role, Orestes is concealing a wicked character beneath a 
good role.  The clash between his heroic assumptions and his bullying behavior is evident in the 
pseudo-epic description of his slaughter of Helen’s slaves (1402-6, 1458-89) and his interview 
with the terrified Phrygian, who is clearly not up to playing the role of epic opponent. 
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 The Phrygian’s extraordinary performance (1369-1524) provides another good example 
of how this play constantly foils the audience’s tragic or mythic expectations.147  It is standard 
tragic practice to have a messenger emerge from the palace after one or more characters have 
entered with the intention of committing a murder.  But instead of the usual faceless messenger 
who gives an impossibly detailed narration of what went on in the house,
148
 we have a panicked 
Phrygian slave who either bursts out of the palace or even vaults down from the roof and sings a 
nearly incoherent description of Orestes’ failed attack on Helen.  After more than a hundred lines 
of this, it is still not entirely clear whether Helen has died or what has happened to her 
(information that a normal messenger would have announced up front); in fact, the Phrygian is 
intent only on telling Orestes whatever he wants to hear, and Orestes’ own bullying attitude turns 
what could have been a staid and mournful messenger scene into an absurd stichomythia.  When 
the Phrygian asserts that Helen died justly (ἐνδικώτατα), Orestes accuses him of merely saying 
what he wants to hear, then turns around and threatens to kill the Phrygian if he does not say 
what Orestes wants to hear (1514-6): 
  Ορ. δειλίᾳ γλώσςῃ χαρίζῃ, τἄνδον οὐχ οὕτω φρονῶν. 
  Φρ. οὐ γάρ, ἥτις Ἑλλάδ’ αὐτοῖς Φρυξὶ διελυμήνατο; 
  Ορ. ὄμοσον (εἰ δὲ μή, κτενῶ σε) μὴ λέγειν ἐμὴν χάριν. 
 
  Or. You’re a coward, trying to curry favor with your tongue: 
   this is not what you really think. 
  Phr. No?  When she has ruined Greece – and the Phrygians too? 
  Or. Swear an oath (or I’ll kill you) that you’re not just saying so to please me. 
This messenger is not only incoherent with fear, he is ready to adapt his message in order to save 
his own skin.  As a soft, cowardly Phrygian, he is the antithesis of the typical tragic Trojan and 
instead reflects fifth-century Athens’ jingoistic attitude toward easterners (especially the Persian 
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148
 For the conventional omniscience of tragic messengers, see Barrett 2002 (esp. pp. 23-6). 
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Empire).
149
  The Phrygian undermines the audience’s expectations of both tragic messengers and 
tragic Trojans.
150
 
 By this point in the play, confusion reigns.  Even those who were actually inside the 
house when Helen disappeared are not sure what really happened, and the Phrygian only seemed 
sure about her death when he was threatened by Orestes.  When Menelaus arrives, he rejects the 
report of her disappearance as a product either of the messenger’s fear or of Orestes’ trickery 
(1556-60).  He remains convinced that Helen has been murdered, though Orestes’ response that 
he would have killed her if he could have indicates that she is not dead (1579-85).
151
 
 The question is finally resolved by the appearance of Apollo ex machina (1625), possibly 
with Helen in tow.
152
  His speech is intensely mythological, as if to counter the unreliability of 
myth as a criterion throughout the play up to now and emphasize the characters’ inability to 
appreciate divine involvement in their affairs, most recently in the disappearance of Helen.  The 
prologue and numerous significant scenes throughout the play have suggested that the world of 
myth, a world in which gods personally protect and reward their favorite mortals and punish their 
enemies, was no more than a distant memory with no real pertinence to the action on stage.  
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Apollo’s epiphany not only reverses the near-disastrous climax of the play but also reasserts that 
mythical world:  not only do the gods still take an active interest in human affairs, we are even 
told that Aeschylus’ divine trial on the Areopagus (or something like it) will still take place.  It 
turns out that Electra’s mythical paradigm was accurate all along, though we would never have 
known it from the action of the play. 
 So Euripides creates a dynamic similar to that of Sophocles’ false merchant scene but on 
a much larger scale and reveals that the entire tragedy has been a red herring.
153
  Apollo’s 
willingness to step in and help Orestes (in spite of his hostility) and his ability to reverse 
everything in the human world suggest that the characters (and the audience) have been 
attempting to sort out the mythical background and determine the legitimacy of the matricide to 
no purpose.
154
  The audience has been constantly comparing the world of Orestes with that of 
Aeschylean myth only to discover that there is in fact no meaningful difference. 
 Apollo’s appearance also represents the playwright’s return to reclaim his script from 
recalcitrant actors.  Like Neoptolemus, Orestes has taken the play into his own hands and 
improvised in ways that run counter both to the traditional myth and to Apollo’s plans as he 
describes them in this play.  Neoptolemus is almost literally given a script by Odysseus, which 
he eventually abandons to go his own way.  Orestes is not being closely directed by any such 
figure of authority, but that is the very problem.  Apollo, who should have been his playwright, 
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has deserted him, forcing him to become his own playwright and invent his own script.  Thus, 
though Euripides does not set up his play within a play as clearly as Sophocles does, he creates 
an authorial void for Orestes to step into early in the drama; once we have been told that the 
sorcerer is away, we know that the apprentice is free to experiment.  As a result of these rogue 
actors’ experiments, both plays nearly end with mythically impossible events (Neoptolemus 
taking Philoctetes home instead of to Troy, Orestes killing Hermione and burning down the 
palace at Argos), and in both cases, the impossible conclusion is forestalled by the appearance of 
a deus ex machina who represents the authoritative intervention of the true playwright, the only 
one who can effect a proper ending.
155
 
 But are the endings of Philoctetes and Orestes “proper”?  Both Heracles and Apollo 
essentially reverse the natural conclusion toward which events have been building, and thus both 
endings contain a hint of improbability, if not outright absurdity.  At the same time, Heracles is 
fairly well integrated into the major themes of the play,
156
 and he has been mentioned before as a 
model of heroic endurance; Philoctetes’ quick change of mind seems less far-fetched when we 
consider his relationship to Heracles, the thematic importance of friendship in this play, and its 
exploration of the meaning of heroism.  Apollo, on the other hand, after being blamed and 
criticized throughout the first half of the play for giving an impious command and failing to 
support the people who carried it out, drops from sight entirely until his appearance on the crane 
at line 1625.  Though he is present in a fashion throughout the play, his intervention is not 
thematically prepared for, as Heracles’ is, and his speech seems designed to highlight the 
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completeness and absurdity of the reversal:
157
  Orestes will marry the woman he is threatening to 
kill, Menelaus blesses his daughter’s marriage to the man who has just tried to blackmail him, 
Orestes will rule as king in a city that has just condemned him to death….  What is Euripides up 
to?  Why would he deliberately mark the god’s intervention – the playwright’s correction of his 
actor’s chaotic experimentation – as an absurdity? 
 Perhaps absurdity and arbitrariness are exactly the point.  Orestes, the would-be actor-
playwright, has abandoned his script and attempted to invent a new version of the myth; his 
version is both disastrous for all involved and, paradoxically, not very original, since it rehashes 
various aspects of Atreid myth as well as most of Euripides’ previous work.  When Orestes 
appears atop the stage-building, he is attempting to play the role of authoritative deus only to be 
literally upstaged by the real thing (as many critics have noted).  But Orestes is also a recalcitrant 
actor trying to do the playwright’s job and impose some sort of conclusion on the play; on this 
level too he is supplanted by the real playwright, who is able to send a real deus to effect a real 
conclusion.  The harshness and absurdity of the conclusion are the playwright’s reassertion of his 
dominance in the actor-poet relationship:  the poet can write whatever sort of conclusion he likes 
– even an illogical one – and the audience has little choice but to accept it.  Only the playwright, 
not the actor, can get away with this degree of dramatic absurdity.
158
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 So Orestes vastly expands the themes we have been studying in this chapter.  There are 
actually two plays within this play, the one represented by the mechanema, the other 
incorporating Orestes’ nearly continuous role-playing and his attempts to escape from the script 
set for him by Apollo and the mythical tradition.  His attempts fail because he lacks either the 
histrionic competence or the heroic character necessary to fill these roles, and in the end, these 
shortcomings lead to a nearly catastrophic conclusion which only the true playwright has the 
skill and authority to correct.  Euripides reestablishes the superiority of the playwright by using 
the same device as Sophocles but with opposite implications.  The absurdity of the conclusion, 
which runs counter to the “rules” of the play as the audience has come to understand them and 
reveals that the entire play was a red herring also establishes the poet’s control over his 
spectators.  It is the poet, and the poet alone, who decides what sort of dramatic experience the 
audience will have; their role, if they can manage it, is to find the meaning in the poet’s carefully 
crafted absurdity. 
 
Conclusion: Tragedy and Absurdity 
 This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the close interaction between Sophocles and 
Euripides in one phase of their careers by comparing sequential uses of similar dramatic 
strategies.  Given the close chronology, it is not unlikely that Helen and the other romances 
influenced Philoctetes, which in turn influenced Orestes, and that has been my working 
assumption throughout this chapter.  But whether or not that assumption is correct, the 
commonality of interests and similarity of techniques among these plays indicates that they are 
all drawing on the same ever-evolving pool of dramatic material.  In this case, a key element, the 
growing self-consciousness of tragedies in the late fifth century, should be attributed in part to an 
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external phenomenon, the rise of star actors, who were becoming increasingly prominent and 
perhaps even beginning to rival the poets for the audience’s interest and approval.  Creating a 
play within a play was not something the poets just did; it was a response to the changing 
dynamics of theatrical production and was accompanied by a great deal of dramaturgical 
experimentation and self-reflection.  The poets made tragedy itself a medium for discussing 
dramaturgy and performance.  Their interest lay not only in innovating and toying with 
traditional elements of dramaturgy but in being seen to do so by the audience.
159
  All three plays 
we have examined in this section put a creative new twist on a well-known story, and Sophocles 
and Euripides both use these occasions not only to advertise the novelty of their plots but also to 
discuss the current state of tragic production – the role of the poet, the role of the actors, and the 
relationship between the two, as well as the importance of the spectator in creating dramatic 
meaning. 
 Helen shows a relatively superficial interest in dramaturgy, focusing on such matters as 
costume and plausibility of plot, and the inventiveness of the poet-figure receives more attention 
than the roles of either actor or spectator; it does, however, raise the question of drama’s status 
along a spectrum of illusion and reality.  Philoctetes is more concerned with both actor and 
spectator and expands on the theme of drama as illusion.  In response to the rising status of 
actors in the late fifth century, this play examines more closely the challenges that face an actor 
asked to play a difficult or unappealing part and reasserts the primacy of the poet over the actor, 
as only the former is able to create a fully satisfying conclusion.  Sophocles also brings the 
external spectator into the play so that he, like Philoctetes, is unable to tell dramatic appearance 
from dramatic reality (especially with reference to the mythical background).  Orestes builds on 
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these ideas further.  The external spectator is again drawn into the action and made uncertain of 
how he is to apply his mythical knowledge in interpreting the play.  The actor-figure again 
improvises a script, drawing on numerous mythical paradigms that fail to suit his particular plot; 
the poet again confirms his dominance in that relationship by imposing an ending that would 
have been impossible for the actor alone and that the audience has little choice but to accept, 
absurd though it is. 
 In each play, a similar combination of elements creates a different overall tone.  Helen is 
generally light-hearted.  Not all have found it so, and certainly the characters take risks and 
nearly bring themselves to disaster; certainly the action has serious implications for the human 
condition.  But the audience, observing from an epistemologically secure distance, can 
appreciate these implications without actually becoming caught up in them.  Spectators of Helen 
do not fear for the happy ending as the characters do, nor as spectators of Philoctetes do.  
Sophocles’ play, on the other hand, is quite serious throughout:  Philoctetes’ pitiable state 
(including an onstage seizure), his unrelenting hatred for his enemies, Neoptolemus’ pangs of 
conscience, the contradictory burdens of duty and morality, his sacrifice of his own worldly well-
being for the sake of a promise – these are serious issues, and they are treated with a serious 
tone.  The irony in this play is not amusing or absurd, as it often is in Helen.  But Euripides’ way 
of dealing with ideas of deception and illusion is through absurdity.  His ideas are serious too, 
but he uses the close juxtaposition of human knowledge and ignorant behavior to drive home the 
point in an almost academic fashion.  Orestes is a curious combination of tragedy and absurdity.  
The dramatic action is detached from its mythical surroundings, making the epiphany at the end 
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unexpected
160
 and (one suspects) deliberately difficult to reconcile with the rest of the play.  The 
epiphany itself reverses the action so drastically – and the characters change their attitudes so 
drastically – as to suggest a certain hollowness to the conclusion, which the characters doubt 
even as they accept it.
161
  The poets’ inventive engagement with each other has given us three 
plays with numerous thematic and structural similarities and yet a remarkable variety of tone and 
content. 
 This chapter’s main purpose has been to situate Philoctetes within its immediate dramatic 
context, which means relating it to plays on both sides, earlier and later.  In general, this 
approach brings Sophocles and Euripides closer together, since we can witness them treating the 
same ideas and using the same techniques in a series of plays.  Indeed,  if we look at only half of 
the equation (Philoctetes and the romances, or Philoctetes and Orestes), we risk oversimplifying 
the relationship among these plays. 
 For instance, Euripides’ Helen explores relatively simple aspects of performance such as 
costuming, delivery, and plausibility of plot, while Philoctetes dwells more on a single actor-
figure and invests his role-playing with an ethical importance.  It would be easy to conclude that 
these two plays demonstrate a fundamental difference between the poets:  Euripides is interested 
in spectacle, Sophocles in character; or perhaps Euripides sees drama primarily in terms of 
entertainment, while Sophocles uses it as a vehicle for moral thought and teaching.  Once we add 
Orestes to the mix, however, we find that these conclusions cannot stand.  Orestes redeploys 
several Sophoclean themes and techniques.  Its hero is a perverted version of the Sophoclean 
Neoptolemus – a malleable young man whose moral character becomes corrupted in spite of the 
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many heroic roles he assumes; and in fact, Sophocles’ discussion of the ethics of role-playing 
probably has its roots in Helen in Menelaus’ struggle to find a role that suits his natural talents. 
 Again, the spectator is treated differently in Euripides’ romances and Sophocles’ 
Philoctetes.  Helen is more concerned with the figures of poet and actor and the challenges of 
performance than with the spectator’s experience:  while the internal audience of Helen grapples 
with the principals’ deceptive performance, the external audience sits high and dry, as it were, 
and observes from a safe distance.  By contrast, Philoctetes depicts the spectator as a potentially 
vulnerable interpreter of performance; instead of placing his spectators in a position of superior 
knowledge, Sophocles involves them in the characters’ confusion by putting much of the 
mythical background in the mouth of a deceptive character.  But we should beware of suspecting 
that Euripides prefers to keep his audience distant from the action or that Sophocles is uniquely 
interested in ambiguity.  Rather, Sophocles is extending to the external audience an effect that 
Euripides had already applied to the internal audience, and in Orestes Euripides does the same 
thing.  In an extension of the false merchant scene in Philoctetes, where the audience is tricked 
into thinking that an exchange is meaningful when it is not, the audience of Orestes is made to 
think that they are watching a modernized tragedy only to discover that all the usual rules of 
myth and tragedy still apply.
162
  In both plays, the audience’s own outside knowledge of the 
myth proves to be an impediment to straightforward interpretation of the action.  So also 
Apollo’s epiphany in Orestes is not merely a rejection or parody of the epiphany in Philoctetes 
but is meant rather to make the same point about the primacy of the poet:  both plays not only 
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drive home the precariousness of the audience’s epistemological position but also emphasize the 
poet’s unique ability to create a conclusion for his play. 
 Even the three-play discussion we have pursued here is a great deal simpler than the 
reality must have been.  An exhaustive account of the extant evidence for the poets’ ongoing 
dialogue about acting and performance at the end of the fifth century would have to include, 
minimally, the historical context of acting and dramatic competition, contemporary sophistic and 
philosophical attitudes toward role-playing, Euripides’ other romances (Ion, Iphigenia among the 
Taurians, and even Andromeda), and comedies like Thesmophoriazusae.  This chapter only 
touches the tip of the iceberg. 
 Of course, dramatic self-consciousness did not die out after Orestes.  Euripides’ 
Iphigenia at Aulis and Bacchae both contain notable bits of metadrama.  Iphigenia, though 
lacking a full-blown play within a play, also opens with a bit of dramatic self-consciousness:
163
  
as Agamemnon attempts to rescind his earlier command to have Iphigenia brought to Aulis, he is 
also trying to rewrite (μεταγράφω, 108) the plot of the play at the last minute.  Bacchae is even 
more conspicuously self-conscious, and it would be natural to include it in a discussion of 
tragedy and metadrama in the late fifth century; it has been omitted here simply because our 
focus is on Sophocles’ Philoctetes and how it relates to the plays on either side of it.  It is more 
than likely, however, that Bacchae could and should be read as another step in this same 
sequence, and I shall conclude this chapter with a few thoughts on how Bacchae relates to this 
discussion of metadrama. 
 Like Helen, Bacchae focuses on the use of costume in performance and the question of 
the illusory status of drama.  Like Orestes, Bacchae contains two plays within it, one of which 
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spans most of the dramatic action.
164
  Dionysus devises the plot of the play in the prologue and 
then disguises himself in order to carry out a large-scale deception of the people of Thebes.  As 
the creator of the main outline of the action, Dionysus represents the external poet, Euripides, but 
he also becomes an internal playwright when he helps Pentheus disguise himself as a maenad.  It 
is Dionysus who suggests spying on the maenads in the first place and directs Pentheus’ 
costuming and subsequent journey to the mountains – even though Pentheus thinks that he is the 
one in control.  Pentheus himself collapses the roles of actor and spectator:  he dons a new 
costume, but (as is often noted) with the intention of playing the part of spectator (θεατής, 829) 
to the maenads; but the maenads’ own Dionysiac delusion causes his costume to fail, and they 
draw him unwillingly into their “performance,” eventually reducing him to a prop.165  Though 
we have seen internal and external playwrights in the plays discussed in this chapter, it is an 
original move on Euripides’ part to collapsed the two into one character in Bacchae.  Like Helen, 
Dionysus is to some extent his own protagonist, but for the most part he lets Pentheus play the 
dominant role while he himself remains ostensibly passive; for instance, when he disguises 
Pentheus and sends him into the mountains, Dionysus orchestrates his movements and the 
maenads’ reactions while participating relatively little in the action himself.  But for all his 
passivity, this poet never loses control over his actors. 
 At first glance, the audience’s epistemological position is the steadiest since Helen and 
the other romances, as the prologue informs spectators of Dionysus’ plan and prepares them for 
his disguise.  At the same time, they witness Pentheus as spectator being pulled into the dramatic 
action, and the Dionysiac quality of the play creates an atmosphere of unreality that causes the 
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external audience to experience Dionysus’ power in some of the same ways as the characters.  
This is most notable in the “palace miracle” scene, where it seems that Euripides has his chorus 
describe the total collapse of the palace (602-3) without representing it visually, thus creating a 
disconnect between the audience’s two main sources of dramatic knowledge (what they see on 
stage and what they hear from the characters).
166
  Dionysus’ smiling mask, together with the 
notorious “comic elements” (including Pentheus’ costuming and the aged Cadmus’ and 
Teiresias’ attempt at ecstatic dance),167 may serve the similar purpose of disorienting the 
audience and suggesting to them a tragic world turned upside-down.  And Charles Segal has 
suggested that when Agave slowly returns to her senses at the end of the play, we may be meant 
to observe that this is the same sort of process the spectator undergoes when he leaves behind the 
“dramatic illusion” and “attempts to integrate the fiction now ending into the reality of his own 
experience and self-understanding.”168 
 The absurdity of Bacchae is different from that of Orestes, as it derives entirely from the 
god’s mystifying power that alters the way the characters see the world around them.  Dramatic 
performance becomes a religious experience brought about by direct contact with the god of the 
theater.  That it is Dionysus who represents both the internal and the external playwright, and 
who creates for both internal and external spectators a dramatic experience that is simultaneously 
                                                 
 
166
 On the staging of the earthquake and collapse of the palace, see e.g. Segal 1982: 219-22, Goldhill 1986: 276-
82; Taplin 1978: 119-20 does not think that these events were staged at all, but his discussion is more concerned 
with the contrast between the chorus’ excitement and Dionysus’ calm.  Segal especially has a good discussion of the 
language of “seeing” and “appearance” that lends subjectivity to the audience’s experience of the collapse.  If the 
collapse is rendered only (or almost only) through the words of the characters and chorus, then it becomes a focal 
point for Euripides’ discussion of the “dramatic illusion:”  what the audience sees does not line up with what they 
hear from the characters, and so they must decide on their own whether or not the collapse “really happened.” 
 
 
167
 These elements, together with some that seem satyric, suggest that Bacch. may also be a discourse on genre.  
On comedy and satyr play in Bacch., see esp. Seidensticker 1978, Sansone 1978 (the latter urging caution in 
identification and interpretation of satyric elements in tragedy). 
 
 
168
 Segal 1982: 265. 
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illusory and illuminating raises questions about the meaning of the “dramatic illusion” 
particularly insistently.
169
 
 
 
                                                 
 
169
 Goldhill 1986: 265-86 discusses some of the ways the audience is brought into the action of Eur. Bacch., 
emphasizing (against Taplin) the inherent subjectivity even of the original performance (p. 283): “Each actor reads 
his lines as an interpretation – with the overseeing of a director or even the author, who may also offer an instructive 
reading, an interpretation for the actor.  The actor’s interrelations on stage are subject to the constructive 
interpretation of the audience.”  The experience of any tragedy is thus constructed jointly by the audience and the 
actors; plays like Bacch. make the audience aware of this fact.  On self-referentiality in Bacch., see also Lada-
Richards 1999: 159-215. 
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Sophocles Ἠθοποιός and Euripides’ Theban Plays 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the last chapter, we examined an ongoing dialogue between Sophocles and Euripides 
about the nature of their art, the demands upon the poet and the actor to give a good 
performance, and the challenge to the spectator of achieving a satisfactory interpretation of the 
performance.  Metadrama of this sort occurs more frequently and more openly in tragedy of the 
late fifth century than it does earlier and thus is more usually associated with Euripides than 
Sophocles.  In this chapter, we turn to what is supposed to be a more “Sophoclean” sphere:  the 
characters and conception of his last play, Oedipus at Colonus.
1
  Like previous chapters, this one 
attempts to describe the playwright at work at a particular moment late in his career:  what was 
fresh and topical in the world of Greek drama when Sophocles sat down to write Oedipus at 
Colonus?  What tidbits did he gather from others’ recent dramatic accomplishments, and how did 
he manipulate or combine them effectively in his latest extant play? 
 Interpreters of Oedipus at Colonus have often viewed it as an extension or reworking of 
the ideas treated in Sophocles’ earlier Oedipus Tyrannus.  Since so much of Sophocles’ modern 
reputation derives from his “three Theban plays,” it is natural to think of one in the context of the 
                                                 
 
1
 Vit. Soph. (21) gives what is probably the best known description of Sophocles’ skill at characterization; this 
chapter, however, will be more concerned with Sophocles’ overall conceptualization of certain characters rather than 
his techniques of characterization. 
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other two, and since so little of Sophocles’ corpus survives, it is reasonable to analyze three 
complete treatments of the same mythical family all together to formulate conclusions about 
Sophocles’ dramatic style and preferences.  This tendency is reinforced by the fact that 
Sophocles himself clearly links the action of Oedipus at Colonus to both Antigone and Oedipus 
Tyrannus.
2
  On the other hand, it is a bit of a stretch to claim that Oedipus is the same character 
in both of his namesake plays or that both are ultimately based on some essentially consistent 
conception of Oedipus’ story.  But the fragments of Sophocles’ lost work indicate that the 
Theban myths were of less interest to him than his surviving plays would suggest,
3
 and though 
Oedipus Tyrannus was highly esteemed even in antiquity,
4
 there is no particular reason to think 
that Sophocles saw Oedipus at Colonus as the restoration of his paradigmatic tragic hero or 
worried about portraying Oedipus (and others) consistently in plays written some twenty years 
apart. Most scholars nowadays shy away from such an extreme account of the relationship 
between Sophocles’ Theban plays. 
 Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone thus constitute one particular dramatic context of 
Oedipus at Colonus (what we might call the “authorial context”), but the immediate dramatic 
context of Oedipus at Colonus is still largely overlooked.  It is more than likely that recent 
productions also influenced the composition of that play.  So what other tragedies were produced 
                                                 
 
2
 E.g. Oedipus’ defenses of his past actions at (OC 510-48, 960-99), the curse on Creon (OC 864-70) and 
references to the burial of Polyneices (OC 1410).  On the intertextuality of OC with Ant. and OT, see esp. 
Markantonatos 2007: 195-230.  There is no doubt that OC refers to Ant. and OT, but using these allusions to create 
an extradramatic story line on which to base a reading of OC (as e.g. Rosenmeyer 1952 does) is wrongheaded.  
Zeitlin 1986: 134-7 notes several connections between OC and OT and Ant., as well as Eum. and Sept.  Calder 1985 
surveys a number of possible literary sources for OC, but his approach is brief and lacks nuance. 
 
 
3
 Sophocles seems to have been particularly interested in Troy, and especially Achilles and Neoptolemus 
(Fuqua 1976: 43-4, Sommerstein 2003b: 355 n. 2). 
 
 
4
 Hyp. II Soph. OT (= Soph. T 39), Aelius Aristides Or. 46.256.11 (= Soph. T 40), Arist. Poet. 1452a.22-6, 
1452a.32-3, 1453b.29-31, 1453b. 6-8, 1455a.16-8, 1460a.27-30; it is noteworthy that Aristotle often does not bother 
to specify which Oedipus he means when he refers to the Tyrannus. 
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in the years leading up to the composition of Oedipus at Colonus in 407 or 406 B.C.?
5
  Of 
particular relevance to Oedipus at Colonus is a group of Theban plays written by Euripides in 
411 or later:  the fragmentary Oedipus, Hypsipyle, Antigone, and the extant Phoenissae.  Metrical 
criteria place Oedipus at the end of Euripides’ career,6 and the other three may be placed more 
precisely by a scholion to line 53 of Aristophanes’ Frogs; the Aristophanic Dionysus claims to 
have been reading Euripides’ Andromeda, and the scholion expresses confusion as to the comic 
poet’s choice of tragedy: 
 διὰ τί δὲ μὴ ἄλλο τι τῶν πρὸ ὀλίγου διδαχθέντων καὶ καλῶν, Ὑψιπύλης, Φοινισσῶν, 
 Ἀντιγόνης; ἡ δὲ Ἀνδρομέδα ὀγδόῳ ἔτει προεισῆλθεν. 
 
 Why not another of the good plays produced a little earlier – Hypsipyle, Phoenissae, Antigone?  
 But Andromeda was produced eight years before.
7
 
 
Since the complaint here is specifically one of chronology, we have good reason to believe not 
only that Hypsipyle, Phoenissae, and Antigone came later than Andromeda (which was produced 
with Helen in 412) but also that they came at least a couple of years after Andromeda.
8
  The 
range can be narrowed further if we believe that Euripides left Athens for good in 408, in which 
case these three plays must have been produced before he left.
9
  In any case, Euripides produced 
                                                 
 
5
 I am assuming that OC was written in the last year(s) of Sophocles’ life, and not significantly earlier, as some 
have thought.  Since he never produced it himself (as we might reasonably expect him to have done if he had the 
chance), we may assume that he did not have the chance, i.e. that he died before it could be presented at the next 
festival (thus e.g. Stoessl 1966: 6). 
 
 
6
 CCG: 112. 
 
 
7
 The translation is mine.  Many scholars emend Antiope to Antigone, as I have done here; see esp. TrGF V (s.v. 
Antigone T I, Antiope T ii), CCG: 269 (with further bibliography).  Both plays are of course Theban, but Antiope 
seems to belong to an earlier period on metrical grounds, while Antigone fits nicely with the other Labdacid plays of 
this later period; for all dates, see esp. Cropp & Fick 1985.  As Kannicht (TrGF) shows, the confusion of names is 
not uncommon.  The question of whether Hyps., Phoen., and Ant. belong to a true trilogy has no bearing on my 
argument. 
 
 
8
 So Craik 1988: 40, Mastronarde 1994: 11-4; Amiech 2004: 14 places it between 410 and 408. 
 
 
9
 Sources for Euripides’ Macedonian exile are collected in TrGF V as Eur. testimonia 112-20, and its historicity 
is widely accepted.  I am skeptical myself; see Scullion 2003. 
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this trio no more than three or four years before Sophocles wrote his Oedipus at Colonus and 
significantly later than the production of Oedipus Tyrannus (usually placed in the early 420s).  It 
is hard to imagine that Sophocles’ decision to return to Oedipus was not at all influenced by 
Euripides’ sudden spate of Theban tragedies. 
 Broadly speaking, then, it is legitimate to consider Euripides’ Hypsipyle, Phoenissae, 
Oedipus, and Antigone potentially significant antecedents to Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus on 
the grounds of both content and chronology.
10
  A brief survey of a few specific similarities 
between the Euripidean and Sophoclean material will strengthen this connection.  Most obvious 
is of course a basic mythical similarity:  four of the five plays portray Thebes and its ruling 
family (the Labdacids) and feature several of the same characters (Oedipus, Creon, Antigone, 
and Polyneices); four of the five draw on the story of the expedition of the Seven against Thebes.  
Phoenissae tackles this story directly, though expansively and with an additional interest in 
stories subordinate to the fratricidal war (e.g. the sacrifice of Menoeceus); the action of Antigone 
seems to have been based on the aftermath of the war, including the burial of Polyneices; 
Hypsipyle approaches the war from the point of view of the Seven, rather than Eteocles and 
Thebes, while focusing on a story (the reunion of Hypsipyle and her sons) which had never 
before been related to the war.
11
  The story dramatized in Oedipus at Colonus is also tangential 
                                                 
 
10
 Additionally, Eur. Phoen. was parodied by Strattis in his Phoenissae (see frr. 46-8 and testimonia), which 
suggests the immediate impact of Euripides’ play among other dramatists.  The probable connection between OC 
and Euripides’ Theban plays is surprisingly under-researched.  An introductory discussion of sources in Kamerbeek 
1984: 1-3 mentions Phoen. only in connection with Jocasta’s role in the Lille Papyrus and Oedipus’ death at 
Colonus (which he thinks originated with Sophocles).  In a chapter on mythical sources of OC, Markantonatos 2007 
devotes only three pages (57-60) to Euripides and focuses only on the figure of Oedipus and his association with 
Athens; the section on “intertextual reversal” in Markantonatos 2002 (pp. 161-5) comments only on Ant. and OC.  
Segal 1981 devotes 46 pages to OC (including numerous links to Ant. and OT) without a word about Euripides.  
Imhof 1970 compares OC with Ion, but the latter was probably less recent and less immediately relevant than 
Phoen. 
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to the war, from the viewpoint of characters outside of Thebes (and with one scene reserved 
specially for Polyneices instead of Eteocles).  And all five tragedies depict reunions of family 
members who have been estranged, separated, or unrecognized – though the reunions do not 
always fall out happily.
12
 
 Phoenissae and Oedipus at Colonus both make some basic mythical assumptions that 
differ from those of Oedipus Tyrannus, Antigone, and Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes.13  Thus 
Oedipus is made to survive until the time of his sons’ war; thus Creon, who has been regent since 
Oedipus’ fall, becomes an advisor or henchman of Eteocles when the latter seizes power and 
casts out his brother.  Similarly, Creon, who may have figured as the villain of Euripides’ 
Oedipus and Antigone,
14
 reappears in similar guise in Oedipus at Colonus.  In the backstory to 
both Phoenissae and Oedipus at Colonus, both brothers have made a deliberate attempt to avoid 
the family curse (by agreeing either to share the kingship or to give it up altogether).  Antigone 
accompanies her father into exile at the end of Phoenissae and throughout Oedipus at Colonus (a 
role unmentioned in Sophocles’ earlier plays).  The idea of some special affection between 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11
 The connection between the Seven and the foundation of the Nemean Games had been made at least as early 
as Aeschylus (probably in his Nemea; see fr. 149a), but it was Euripides’ innovation to import Hypsipyle and her 
sons into this context. 
 
 
12
 Estranged: Polyneices and Eteocles (Phoen.), Polyneices and Oedipus (OC); separated: Polyneices and 
Jocasta (Phoen.), Polyneices and Antigone (OC), Hypsipyle and her sons (Hyps.); unrecognized: Oedipus and 
Jocasta (Oedipus).  Antigone may have featured a sort of recognition scene between Creon and Antigone (who was 
thought dead) or Creon and the son of Antigone and Haemon. 
 
 
13
 For Euripides’ mythical innovations in Phoen., see Conacher 1967a: 229, Craik 1988: 36-9.  For discussion 
of Sept. and Phoen. together, see Foley 1985: 112-32. 
 
 
14
 See e.g. Eur. frr. 551, 554a; see CCG: 105-32 (with further bibliography) for the possibility that Creon’s 
jealousy was a significant theme in Oedipus.  The plot of Antigone is much disputed, but Creon again seems to be 
the one responsible for the deaths of Haemon and Antigone; see TrGF V ad loc. 
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Polyneices and Antigone is not developed until Phoenissae and Oedipus at Colonus.
15
  And this 
list could no doubt be extended. 
 The first point to be made in a study like this is the simple fact of poetic interaction 
within the immediate dramatic context of Oedipus at Colonus.  I hope that this admittedly short 
and rough overview of the Theban plays written in the last years of the fifth century 
demonstrates that Euripides’ influence on Sophocles in this case is more than merely plausible 
on the basis of chronology and content.  The next step, to which the rest of this chapter will be 
devoted, is to examine just how Sophocles manipulated the Euripidean material.  Rather than (in 
the manner of a commentary) proceeding sequentially through Oedipus at Colonus and 
indicating specific points of contact with Euripides’ plays, I examine three individual characters 
who appear in both plays and the themes developed around them.  This method affords the 
opportunity to move beyond simple comparison of mythical features and to appreciate some of 
the ways Sophocles engages closely with the ideas and problems raised by Euripides’ work.  
First we will examine the two poets’ depiction of Antigone as a parthenos and budding heroine.  
Then we will study the two scenes in which Polyneices appears (Phoen. 261-637, OC 1249-
1446) with particular attention to his experience of exile, his reception by his family members, 
and his doom-laden departure.  Finally, we will consider Oedipus himself, the meaning of his 
pollution, and his importance to the theme of power.  Since it is difficult to undertake a thorough 
study of characterization in fragmentary plays, Phoenissae naturally furnishes the bulk of 
comparative material.  Though this approach inevitably results in some repetition of material 
                                                 
 
15
 In Soph. Ant., the heroine insists upon burying Polyneices qua brother; she does not advocate for him 
personally but the rights of the dead and her duty to her family.  Eteocles, who has already been granted burial, 
receives almost no attention at all in the play. 
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from one section to another, it is to be hoped that points of overlap are more meaningful than 
tedious. 
 
The Heroism of Antigone 
 The character of Antigone in Phoenissae has been interpreted as undergoing a sort of 
transition or transformation over the course of the play;
16
 I shall argue here that she exchanges 
the role of impressionable maiden for that of defiant hero – though the transition is not entirely 
successful.  These ideas carry over into Oedipus at Colonus, where Antigone evinces a more 
coherent combination of maidenly and heroic traits.
17
 
 At the beginning of Phoenissae, she is an innocent girl under the protection of an old 
servant, eager to catch a glimpse of the Argive army; more importantly for our purposes, she is a 
proper parthenos with a due concern for keeping to her appointed place within her family and 
society.  She has asked her mother’s permission to view the army (89-91), and she duly 
cooperates with the servant’s careful strategizing to keep her out of the sight of anyone who does 
not belong to her own household (92-5, 193-201).  In fact, she never leaves the building itself, 
                                                 
 
16
 E.g. Foley 1985: 139-43, Lamari 2007: 21-2; cf. Mastronarde 1994: 89n.:  “Ant.’s maidenhood and the 
seclusion it requires according to conventional etiquette become a leitmotif which articulates her action in the play, 
illustrating her emergence from a protected innocence into the harsh realities of adult life.”  Similarly Amiech 2004: 
512:  “En quelque sorte, Jocaste la projette dans le monde des hommes et des adultes où règne la violence; elle la 
fait sortir définitivement du monde clos et feutré du gynécée.  Elle n’y retournera plus puisqu’elle va prendre la 
route de l’exil avec son père à la suite des événements qui vont se précipiter.”  Müller-Goldingen 1985: 249-50 
locates Antigone’s transition more specifically in the exodos, when she decides to accompany Oedipus into exile. 
 
 
17
 There have been many studies in recent decades of the depiction of women in Greek tragedy, how it is 
influenced by contemporary social values, and how male authors and audiences use it to think about themselves; 
important studies in this vein include Foley 1981a (with 1981b), 1985, and 2001, Zeitlin 1996: 341-74, McClure 
1999.  The current discussion will be less concerned with these issues than with how Euripides’ characterization of 
Antigone (and, to a lesser extent, Jocasta) influenced Soph. OC.  I thus rely on basic knowledge about what was or 
was not expected of women in the ancient world when I describe Antigone as submissive and silent versus 
outspoken and defiant; but I do not attempt to draw conclusions about the audience’s reactions to Antigone, nor 
about the use of women in tragedy more broadly.  Indeed, the figures discussed in this chapter generally transgress 
social boundaries less boldly (or less successfully) than many other women in tragedy and therefore receive less 
attention in the scholarship mentioned here. 
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being content to look out at the army from an elevated position in the house and to accept the 
servant’s descriptions.18  His very presence reinforces our impression of Antigone as an 
essentially normal girl who must not be out in public, even so far as she is, without male 
supervision, and who is expected to follow his instructions without argument.
19
 
 When Jocasta calls her out of the palace at line 1264 and begins to lead her off to the 
battlefield in an attempt to stop the fratricidal single combat,
20
 Antigone initially demurs (1270-
1, 1275-6):
21
  a battlefield, surrounded by strangers and watched by countless male eyes, is 
hardly an appropriate place for any woman and especially an unmarried girl like Antigone.  But 
Jocasta will brook no excuses or delay when her sons’ lives are at stake.  This is a key point in 
Antigone’s transition, the first time she willingly disobeys society’s rules about when and where 
women should be seen,
22
 and the advice Jocasta gives her may be emblematic of this change:  
οὐκ ἐν αἰσχύνῃ τὰ σά (Phoen. 1276).  For Jocasta, the impending familial catastrophe outweighs 
any concerns about social propriety, and her urgency soon infects Antigone as well.  The 
                                                 
 
18
 On the authenticity of this scene, see Mastronarde 1994: 168-73.  On the staging, which probably places 
Antigone on the roof of the skene, see Mastronarde 1990: 255-7, 1994: 88ff.n., Amiech 2004: 262-3. 
 
 
19
 Cf. Amiech 2004: 264:  “Dans le discours du vieux serviteur, Antigone apparaît comme une jeune fille plutôt 
docile – différente en tous les cas de celle de Sophocle que le spectateur ne peut qu’avoir à l’esprit et aussi de 
l’Antigone qui réapparaîtra plus loin dans notre pièce, disant elle-meme que, sous la pression des événements, elle 
abandonne la pudeur, la rougeur qui sied aux jeunes filles.” 
 
 
20
 On the authenticity of this scene, see Mastronarde 1994: 1264-83n. 
 
 
21
 For the phrase τῶνδε δωμάτων πάρος, see Mastronarde 1994:1270-1n.   
 
 
22
 Antigone’s words in 1275 (ποῖ, παρθενῶνας ἐκλιποῦσ’) are probably meant to underscore the significance of 
this moment for her by echoing the servants words at 89-90 (ἐπεί σε μήτηρ παρθενῶνας ἐκλιπεῖν μεθῆκε…); see 
Mastronarde 1994 ad loc., Amiech 2004: 264.  Cf. Craik 1988: 1270n.:  “The successive reactions of Antigone – 
anxious interrogation, horror at the information that the duel is imminent, incredulilty at the suggestion of 
intervention – are entirely realistic, and heightened through implicit contrast with her earlier situation, when she 
needed her mother’s permission even to look out on the army, 88-91; and where the slave shielded her from contact 
with strangers and from any hint of scandal, 92-5, 193-7.  Repetition of key words … and reiteration of key ideas … 
is telling.  The way is paved too for Antigone’s final appearance, where the same words and ideas recur (esp. 1486, 
1489).  Antigone’s character does not change in the course of the play; merely her circumstances.” 
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transition to a more outspoken, defiant Antigone is eased by the fact that it is initially motivated 
by respectful obedience to her mother and an active worry for her brothers. 
 Antigone reappears on stage for the last time in the exodos.  This entire scene has fallen 
under heavy suspicion of interpolation and even large-scale revision under the influence of 
reperformances of Sophocles’ Antigone.23  Thus, the most disputed elements are the references to 
Haemon and the burial of Polyneices; if we think that the exodos could have been revised with a 
view to Oedipus at Colonus as well, then we may also doubt the exile of Oedipus and 
Antigone.
24
 
 Let us assume for a moment that everything after line 1624 is spurious
25
 and imagine 
what Euripides might have written.  Both Antigone and Oedipus have already been brought on 
stage in 1480-1581; this passage is generally accepted even by skeptical editors,
26
 and anyway 
Antigone and Oedipus must appear at the end of the play, the former because she alone survives 
of those who have gone off to the battlefield and must now play the part of the one who mourns 
                                                 
 
23
 “Old” tragedies began to be reperformed regularly at the Dionysia in 386 B.C.; see IG ii2 2318.  For fourth-
century performance of Ant., see esp. Dem. 19.247.  Mastronarde 1994: 39-49 gives a good overview of the problem 
of interpolation in Phoen., though in his view (against Fraenkel 1963, Willink 1990, and others), the manuscript 
traditions preserved by actors and poets versus book-sellers generally remained separate. 
 
 
24
 I am not sure how popular or influential Soph. OC was in the fourth century; the strongest indication of 
interpolation on that basis is lines 1703-7, on which see Mastronarde 1994 ad loc.  I agree in principle with Craik 
1988: 1703-7n. that “[i]t is unreasonable to suspect these lines, simply because they refer to the situation which 
underlies the plot of S.OC.”  I would still delete 1706-7, which do not naturally follow 1705 (why ask “where in 
Attica?” after Oedipus has said “in Athens”?); see also Reeve 1972: 468, Müller-Goldingen 1985: 255-6.  If 
Euripides is inventing the tradition of Oedipus’ burial at Colonus, his motivation is not obvious and he does not 
develop the idea; he could of course be alluding to a preexisting local tradition, but again the point of the allusion is 
not obvious. 
 
 
25
 Diggle (followed by Kovacs) brackets everything from 1582 to the end of the play; Willink 1990 is similarly 
skeptical.  Much more conservative approaches to the text are represented by Craik 1988, Mastronarde 1994, and 
Amiech 2004, who helpfully summarizes (567) the most common criticisms of the surviving text; Foley 1985: 131 
n. 45 also has further bibliography.  As lines 1595-9 were imitated by Aristophanes (noted by Craik and 
Mastronarde, discussed by Sommerstein 2012b: 11-6), it seems likely that the substance of the text is sound at least 
as far as 1624 (the end of Oedipus’ speech). 
 
 
26
 See Mastronarde 1994 ad loc.  Amiech 2004: 567 opens her commentary on 1582-1682 with the statement 
that “[a]vec le v. 1582 commence le débat sur l’authenticité de la fin des Phéniciennes.” 
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over the bodies of her kin (and Creon would not be suitable for this), the latter because he has 
been made to survive, lurking in the palace, beyond his usual mythical expiry.
27
  Given that 
Oedipus so manifestly represents the family curse and destructive pollution (as I will discuss 
later), his exile is not an unlikely way to conclude the tragedy:  the danger of his presence, now 
confirmed by the tragic deaths of his wife, sons, and nephew, would be motivation enough for 
Creon to expel him before he can bring further disaster upon Thebes; furthermore, the departure 
of Oedipus under his daughter’s guidance nicely balances the arrival of Teiresias, also guided by 
his daughter.
28
  The question of burying Polyneices would also be a natural – if not inevitable – 
one, since his body is displayed on stage with the others.  It is hard to see how the play could 
have ended without at least one of these topics.  Would Creon, Antigone, and Oedipus (a volatile 
group in any tragedy
29
) simply lament the dead and then return to the palace together?  Would 
that not be an anticlimactic way to use Oedipus, whom Euripides has been holding in reserve for 
the entire play?  At any rate, it seems likely that the exodos featured some sort of controversy 
(whether over exile or burial), and either one would give Antigone a chance to behave in 
defiance of societal norms – and she has already pointedly divorced herself from maidenly 
                                                 
 
27
 So Amiech 2004: 255. 
 
 
28
 Frequently noted by commentators (e.g. Foley 1985: 143, Goff 1988: 140, Mastronarde, 1994: 7, Dunn 1996: 
195-6, Lamari 2007: 19 and 2010: 86); both scenes are also reversals of the prologue, where a girl is guided by an 
old man (Antigone and the servant). 
 
 
29
 In addition to the conflict between Antigone and Creon in Soph. Ant. and the brief altercation between 
Oedipus and Creon in OT (512-678), Antigone has some sort of run-in with Creon in Euripides’ Antigone, and 
Oedipus and Creon seem to be at odds again in his Oedipus (for both plays, see above, n. 14).  Antigone and 
Oedipus will of course quarrel with Creon again in OC. 
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behavior at 1485-92.  If the text is in fact sound as far as 1624, then both themes have been 
raised already in Creon’s speech at 1584-94 – unless, of course, we excise key lines.30 
 Upon the deaths of her mother and brothers, Antigone is deprived of almost all her family 
at once, severed from her previous life and left without a female role model (such as Jocasta had 
been); her only remaining κύριος is now Creon, who makes intolerable decrees about the other 
members of her family.  In these circumstances, she completes the transition begun in the fourth 
episode, leaving behind her life as a parthenos and becoming something like the willful and 
defiant heroine of Sophocles’ play.  She either defies Creon to his face regarding the burial of 
Polyneices or she pledges to leave behind the comforts of home and tend Oedipus in exile (or 
both, as in the text we have).  Either of these acts is a far cry from her behavior in the prologue, 
where she was obedient to her male supervisor and careful to avoid the gaze of strangers.  The 
argument can be taken at least this far, whatever we think about the state of the text from 1624 
on.  In the following pages, I will assume for the sake of argument that the exodos as it stands is 
basically genuine.
31
  In that case, Euripides shows Antigone trying to become her earlier 
Sophoclean counterpart without quite succeeding. 
 After the lyrics of Antigone and Oedipus, Creon immediately announces that Oedipus 
shall be banished (1589, reiterated at 1626 after Oedipus’ protest) and that Polyneices’ body is to 
remain unburied (1628-34).  Antigone contests both of these decrees in reverse order.  Her 
arguments against abusing the dead are reminiscent of the Sophoclean Antigone,
32
 but Creon’s 
                                                 
 
30
 For fuller treatment of the ideas in this paragraph, see Conacher 1967b, with whom I am in complete 
agreement.  For an account of the inconsistencies at the end of Phoen. that takes into consideration its dramatic 
inversion of several other tragedies, see Dunn 1996: 180-202. 
 
 
31
 On the state of the text, see Mastronarde 1994: 39-49 (generally), 591-4; in his notes, he defends the 
substance of all of the passages cited here.  Hose 1990 has a good overview of scholarly attempts to elucidate the 
exodos of Phoen. 
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responses are less impassioned.  In Sophocles, he had something at stake in his arguments with 
Antigone:  prevailing over her meant proving his masculinity; furthermore, he was very 
conscious of his role as new ruler and determined that his first decisions as king should be seen 
as sound ones.  But in Euripides, he is an advisor and aide to Eteocles, and after the latter has 
died, Creon merely claims to be carrying out the former king’s wishes.  Creon has nothing in 
particular at stake, and for the most part he does not even engage Antigone in argument.  As she 
offers reasons not to abuse the dead, he shrugs them off and asserts that the decision has already 
been made and will be enforced.  When she declares that she will bury Polyneices herself, Creon 
responds just as directly that she will bury herself with him (1657-8).  His tone is not so much 
crude or aggressive (as in Sophocles) as matter-of-fact.  Antigone, by contrast, becomes 
increasingly emotional as the situation slips out of her control.  When Creon grows tired of the 
argument and orders her to be taken inside, she throws herself on Polyneices’ body and refuses 
to budge (1660-1); she pleads in Jocasta’s name (1665).  Creon remains unmoved, so she 
actually lowers her request:  just let her wash Polyneices’ body and bind his wounds (1667-9).  
Again she is denied.  Antigone’s advocacy for Polyneices proceeds from verbal defiance and 
moral argumentation to simple pleading to physical resistance (as she clings to the body) to 
bargaining for a lesser favor.  Most of this behavior is unimaginable for the Sophoclean 
Antigone; that is not because Euripides’ heroine is any less noble in nature, but because he puts 
her in a situation where her efforts at heroism are unrecognized and unappreciated.  All her 
attempts to resist Creon are ineffectual; as he remains indifferent, refusing to fight back or show 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
32
 E.g. her description of Creon as μῶρος (1647); cf. Soph. Ant. 469-70.  There are several more or less 
significant echoes of Ant. throughout this passage; see Craik 1988 ad locc. 
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any real concern for her resistance, she backs down and eventually abandons the argument 
altogether.
33
 
 But there is still a chance for her to realize her new, stubbornly defiant self.  By 
threatening to murder Haemon on their wedding night, she gains an opening to declare that she 
will go into exile with Oedipus.
34
  She emphasizes her willingness to share his suffering with 
words compounded with συν- (1679-81), which makes her sound rather like the Sophoclean 
Ismene begging to be allowed a share of heroism.
35
  Creon seems rather puzzled by all this (he 
turns her talk of μωρία back on her at 1680), but he is satisfied to let her go into exile;36 once 
again, he cares little for her motives and is only glad that his remaining son will be safe.  Even 
Oedipus, who immediately praises her filial loyalty (1683), attempts to refuse her offer,
37
 not 
wanting her to sacrifice her own comfort on his behalf (1685) or incur disgrace by wandering in 
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 At 1672 Creon mentions (in connection with her mourning) Antigone’s upcoming marriage to Haemon and 
thus diverts the conversation; Antigone never expressly disavows her intention to bury Polyneices, but neither does 
she resume her argument – except at 1743-6, which is certainly spurious as it now contradicts the decision she has 
just made to go into exile with Oedipus (see Foley 1985: 130 n. 44).  My interpretation of Antigone’s gradual 
acquiescence regarding Polyneices matches that of Conacher 1967b and Mastronarde 1994 ad locc.  Craik 1988: 
1630n. describes the only way to salvage 1743-6:  “It is possible to argue that Antigone intends to perform burial of 
Polyneikes, but not within Theban territory, and that she could readily achieve this on her way with Oidipous to 
Athens (so Pearson 1917); this solves some of the problems of the exodos, but at the cost of admitting that Euripides 
left his intention unclear.” 
 
 
34
 Mastronarde 1994: 30:  “Her decision to accompany her father … seems to be part of a reinterpretation of her 
heroism in which burial of her brother has been effectively blocked (an innovation if Antigone’s main role in earlier 
myth was to bury her brother).  Thus Antigone’s exile is presumably a Euripidean innovation, followed by 
Sophocles in OC.” 
 
 
35
 Cf. Soph. Ant. 536-7, 540-1, as well as 41 (Antigone’s invitation to Ismene).  But Antigone’s use of 
ξυνθανοῦμαι at Phoen. 1681 parallels Jocasta’s words at 1283 (noted by Mastronarde 1994: 1681n.) and perhaps 
shows Antigone laying claim to the same brand of heroism as her mother. 
 
 
36
 Pace Mastronarde 1994: 1682n., who comments that Creon has been pressing for Antigone’s marriage to 
Haemon but backs off because of her threat, Creon does not seem to be especially concerned with Antigone’s 
attitude toward the marriage (until she issues her threat).  As Antigone’s king and κύριος, he does not need to 
persuade her to marry Haemon but can simply compel the marriage. 
 
 
37
 Cf. Craik 1988: 1307-766n. (p. 246):  “to her decision to repudiate the match [with Haemon] Kreon reacts 
with bafflement (1674, 1678) and Oidipous with remonstrance (1683, 1685, 1691).”  Mastronarde 1994 ad loc. notes 
that Oedipus’ αἰνῶ μέν in 1683 could be equivalent to “no, thanks.” 
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exile (1691).
38
  He does not understand that Antigone has come to realize (in accordance with 
Jocasta’s advice at 1276) that sometimes one must put aside shame in pursuit of a greater service 
to one’s φίλοι.  In failing really to take her seriously, Oedipus and Creon both treat her like the 
naïve parthenos she was in the first episode and thus keep her from becoming the Sophoclean 
Antigone.
39
  Unlike that Antigone, she is unable to bury Polyneices or even defy Creon 
effectively,
40
 and though she is allowed to fulfill her duty to Oedipus in the end, it is not on a 
resounding note of heroism and only after he has tried to stop her.
41
  As Helene Foley puts it, 
“When Euripides’ Antigone tries to act on a heroic model, the result is forceful but rather 
grotesque.”42 
 Euripides’ debt to Sophocles’ Antigone is obvious in two ways.  First is the way he has 
elaborated and refined the male/female dichotomy.  In Sophocles, Antigone had a basically 
masculine disposition; Ismene warned her to heed her status as a woman, naturally inferior to 
men (61-4), while Creon even felt his masculinity threatened by her open defiance of him (484-
5).
43
  Antigone does not undergo any transition from feminine to masculine; her boldness and 
independence are simply manifestations of her inherently fierce nature (471).  But in Phoenissae, 
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 The use of στέργω in 1685 is perhaps echoed by OC 7-8; cf. also the sentiment of OT 1413-5. 
 
 
39
 Mastronarde 1994 ad loc. notes that “Oed.’s concern recalls the theme of Ant. as sheltered maiden, but she 
has gone beyond that condition; and her appeal to nobility matches Oed.’s in 1623.” 
 
 
40
 Cf. Foley 1985: 141:  “Ironically, Antigone’s attempt to follow tradition seems to result in the only action of 
the play that fails to achieve the expected outcome, her burial of Polyneices.  This naïve and sheltered girl lacks the 
disposition requisite to fulfill her Sophoclean (and perhaps Aeschylean) role.” 
 
 
41
 Cf. Foley 1985: 143:  “Although Oedipus finally accepts Antigone’s company in exile, he seems to contest 
her choice to the end.” 
 
 
42
 Foley 1985: 142; cf. her assessment (on the same page) of the play’s closing lyrical exchange:  “Antigone and 
Oedipus sing past each other, and at cross purposes.  The babbling old man has no interest in his daughter’s attempts 
at heroics.” 
 
 
43
 Cf. Lane & Lane 1986 (esp. 162-8) who argue that, though Antigone herself does not think in terms of 
masculine versus feminine, everyone else sees her attitude as masculine. 
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the dichotomy is more complex, since Antigone is characterized not only as a female but 
specifically as a parthenos – a young, unmarried girl, innocent, naïve, dependent on and obedient 
to others (especially her natal family).  Her behavior in the exodos directly contradicts her initial 
characterization, and that is exactly the point:  the extent of her family’s crisis and disaster has 
caused her to mature and even to cast off her youthful and socially conventional ways in order to 
become the kind of figure who can defy authority, face threats of death and respond in kind, and 
put her (natal) family first in all things.  In Phoenissae, the parthenos and the hero are mutually 
exclusive ideas, and over the course of the play, Antigone changes (or tries to change) from one 
to the other. 
 Euripides’ second debt to Sophocles is in developing Antigone as a noble and heroic 
figure determined to do what is right regardless of the consequences.  What Euripides has done 
differently is first to cast Antigone as a parthenos with a strong sense of shame and propriety and 
then, when she tries to move beyond that attitude, to hinder her in various ways – through the 
particular arrangement of events, through blocking figures like Creon and Oedipus – from 
actually becoming the heroic Sophoclean figure.  It is noteworthy that Euripides’ treatment of 
Antigone is similar to his handling of Eteocles, who in the second episode continually tries to fill 
the role of confident general (as he had in Aeschylus) only to be shot down by Creon’s relentless 
practicality.
44
  In this way, Eteocles, too, is deprived of his dramatic weight.  The same may even 
be said of Oedipus, who embodies the family curse, pollution, and devastation throughout the 
play – until the end, when this horrifying figure is revealed to be only a wretched old man whose 
strength and glory are gone (1688-9), a wraith shut away in the dark palace (1539-45
45
), now 
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 Cf. Lamari 2010: 78-9. 
 
 
45
 For the difficulties in line 1543 (esp. surrounding ἀφανές), see Mastronarde 1994 ad loc. 
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mourning for his dead wife and sons, now imagining himself wandering alone in exile and dying 
wherever he happens to fall (1687).  He hardly seems the type of figure others have made him 
out to be, and despite choral claims that he is an integral part of the force that motivates the 
destruction of his house, he hardly seems capable of motivating any action at all.
46
 
 As in Phoenissae, the Antigone of Oedipus at Colonus is also characterized in terms of 
masculinity and femininity; as in Phoenissae, masculinity equates with boldness, labor, 
independence, and so on, while femininity is defined more specifically as maidenliness.
47
  But 
where Euripides sees these concepts as opposites, with Antigone moving out of the feminine 
sphere and into the masculine over the course of the play, Sophocles brings them both together at 
once.  His new Antigone does not have to cease to be a proper parthenos in order to perform 
unmaidenly duties (like accompanying Oedipus in exile).  At the same time, Sophocles allows 
her to be concerned with maidenly conduct while also restoring her effective heroism to her.  As 
a character, she combines modesty and humility with a degree of confidence and self-assertion 
unknown to the girlish Antigone who appears at the beginning of Phoenissae.  Her relative 
independence in thought and action enables her to care for herself and Oedipus, to stand up to the 
chorus of old men who want to evict them from their land, and to mediate between her quarreling 
father and brother.  But in none of these activities does she become abrasive and intractable (as 
in Antigone) or desperate and helpless (as in Phoenissae) – except when Creon’s goons seize her, 
a circumstance in which no amount of feminine heroism could be expected to avail her.  She 
maintains a sense of decorum in an eminently unmaidenly context (squalor, poverty, exile) and 
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 Cf. Mastronarde 1994: 1540n. (citing Edmunds 1981 on Oedipus as a revenant):  “there is an intended 
discrepancy between this intimation of demonic power and the realistic portrayal of Oed.’s feebleness with the 
evocation of his ordinary familial attachment to Jocasta, Antigone, and even his sons.” 
 
 
47
 See esp. 342-5, 1367-8. 
172 
 
acquits herself with grace, intelligence, and strength.  Against all odds she manages to be a 
socially acceptable heroine. 
 We are encouraged to see Antigone as a parthenos throughout by the fact that she is 
constantly in the company of her father, tending him instead of a husband and children (749-
52).
48
  On the other hand, nurture is a role more commonly associated with mothers than with 
parthenoi, and nurture of Oedipus in exile is even associated specifically with his (and 
Antigone’s) mother in Phoenissae (1617).49  Antigone is thus paradoxically something of a 
maidenly mother to her own father – maidenly in her manner, motherly in her tasks, but 
masculine in her circumstances. 
 As a character, then, Sophocles’ Antigone combines both sides of Euripides’ Antigone, 
her maidenliness and her heroic attitude.  But her dramatic function is to be a failed reconciler.  
Her chief role as a reconciler is to get both sides (Oedipus and the chorus, Oedipus and 
Polyneices) to talk to each other, though she cannot force them to come to terms and her attempts 
at reconciliation ultimately fail.  Antigone shares her role as both a motherly figure and a failed 
reconciler with the Euripidean Jocasta, who, in addition to being the matriarch of the ruling 
family, also serves the dramatic purpose of creating space for discussion between her two sons 
who would rather not discuss anything with each other.
50
  It is noteworthy that Antigone’s role is 
more difficult and less successful when the parties to be reconciled both belong to her own 
family.  It is appropriate that bringing the Labdacids together should result in familial destruction 
                                                 
 
48
 In what is both a reflection and a reversal of Phoen., the first time we see Antigone, she is accompanied by 
and taking instructions from an old man, but this time she is the one describing what she sees to the old man. 
 
 
49
 And also, it appears, in Euripides’ Oedipus (fr. 545a.11-2). 
 
 
50
 Noted briefly by Zeitlin 1986: 137 n. 45.  See Michelini 2009: 172-3 for Jocasta as maternal figure.  If 
Scharffenberger 1995 is correct in arguing that the “reconciliation scene” of Ar. Lys. stands behind the agon of 
Phoen., then Jocasta’s failure is also underscored by contrast with her comic exemplar. 
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rather than reconciliation;
51
 it is also appropriate that Antigone collapses the generations by 
filling her mother’s role as reconciler of quarreling family members and nurturer of Oedipus. 
 Oedipus’ utter dependence on Antigone for guidance and support is made abundantly 
clear in the opening scenes of the play, but despite his blindness and physical weakness, he 
retains his sense of authority.  Antigone shows him due respect, obeys his commands without 
question, and holds her peace when Oedipus wishes to speak with someone else (such as the 
Ξένος or Theseus);52 but the simple fact of Oedipus’ blindness also requires her to possess some 
authority and independence of her own.  She must describe and interpret the world for him, 
choose the paths along which to guide him, and find stones for him to sit on.  When the two of 
them arrive in the grove of the Eumenides, she does not wait for his command but immediately 
volunteers to reconnoiter and find out what district they have stopped in (26).  She is willing, in 
her service to her father, not only to sacrifice her physical comfort and reputation
53
 but even to 
risk her own safety by traveling without protection; instead, it is her task to protect Oedipus by 
hiding him from potential enemies or by standing up to them herself.
54
  In short, Antigone has 
freely chosen to perform a physically and mentally exhausting duty that requires “masculine” 
                                                 
 
51
 Cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 123 (with reference to Sophocles’ Polyneices scene):  “This, it could seem, is how 
familial interactions between male Labdacids proceed: in this house, when a son is not killing his father (as Oedipus 
killed Laius), then a son who has urgent need of his father’s good offices receives not a benison but a curse.  In a 
sense, the pervasive dysfunction that has brought the family to this point cannot but be capped by such an 
interaction.” 
 
 
52
 Cf. Seale 1982: 117:  “It is particularly noticeable that she informs Oedipus of the stranger’s departure as well 
as his arrival, but is excluded from the dialogue of the meeting which she has ‘arranged’.”  Antigone’s sensitivity to 
propriety is perhaps most evident in the scene in which Theseus, after rescuing the two sisters from Creon’s men, 
returns them to their father.  Oedipus asks for an account of the battle and rescue, only to have Antigone defer to 
Theseus (1117-8):  it is not her place to make a long speech about another person’s brave deeds.  It is noteworthy 
that while Antigone is on stage for nearly the entire play (1419 lines, or 79.8%), she speaks only 164 lines (9.2%). 
 
 
53
 OC 345-52, 747-54; cf. Phoen. 1684-5, 1690-2.  These are all, perhaps, “significant details” (Easterling 1977) 
that lend depth to Antigone as a character and suggest an interplay of masculinity and maidenliness. 
 
 
54
 OC 113-4, 236-53.  The vulnerability of both is vividly illustrated in the scene with Creon, who orders his 
henchmen to seize Antigone and makes for Oedipus himself.  Both father and daughter are powerless to resist, even 
in the company of the chorus, until Theseus arrives. 
174 
 
courage and strength and is not obviously compatible with the behavior normally expected of 
young women.  What I will try to show in the rest of this section is how Sophocles maintains a 
balance between these apparently opposite ends of the behavioral spectrum and achieves in 
Antigone a reconciliation of masculine heroism and feminine propriety. 
 In the first episode, after the chorus has learned Oedipus’ identity and demanded that he 
leave their country, Antigone steps in to plead on his behalf (237-53): 
    ὦ ξένοι αἰδόφρονες, 
    ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γεραὸν πατέρα 
    τόνδ’ ἐμὸν οὐκ ἀνέτλατ’ ἔργων 
    ἀκόντων ἀίοντες αὐδάν,     240 
    ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ τὰν μελέαν, ἱκετεύομεν, 
    ὦ ξένοι, οἰκτίραθ’, ἃ 
    πατρὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ τλάμονος ἄντομαι, 
    ἄντομαι οὐκ ἀλαοῖς προσορωμένα 
    ὄμμα σὸν ὄμμασιν, ὥς τις ἀφ’ αἵματος 
    ὑμετέρου προφανεῖσα, τὸν ἄθλιον 
    αἰδοῦς κῦρσαι· ἐν ὑμῖν ὡς θεῷ 
    κείμεθα τλάμονες· ἀλλ’ ἴτε, νεύσατε 
    τὰν ἀδόκητον χάριν, 
    πρός σ’ ὅ τι σοι φίλον οἴκοθεν ἄντομαι,   250 
    ἢ τέκνον, ἢ λέχος, ἢ χρέος, ἢ θεός. 
    οὐ γὰρ ἴδοις ἂν ἀθρῶν βροτὸν ὅστις ἄν, 
    εἰ θεὸς ἄγοι, 
    ἐκφυγεῖν δύναιτο. 
 
    Strangers of respectful mind, 
    since you have not borne 
    with my aged father here, 
    having heard of the things he did unwittingly,   240 
    yet pity my unhappy self, 
    I beseech you, strangers, 
    when I appeal to you on behalf of my poor father. 
    I appeal to you, looking upon your eyes 
    with eyes that are not blind, appearing as though 
    I came from your own blood, that the miserable man 
    may meet with respect!  We are in your hands, 
    as though you were a god.  Come, grant 
    the unhoped-for favour, 
    I beseech you by whatever you hold dear,   250 
    be it a child or a wife or a possession or a god!  
    For however hard you look, you will not discern a mortal who, 
    when a god drives him, 
    can escape! 
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Antigone acts as Oedipus’ protector by coming to his defense immediately after the chorus has 
ordered him out of the country.  But she also does not steal Oedipus’ thunder; she appeals to the 
chorus’ pity and sense of shame and leaves the more polemical and controversial argumentation 
to Oedipus so that her speech turns out to be more of a prelude to his.  Without being prompted, 
Antigone is willing to put herself forward and defend her father, but she also observes her proper 
place by yielding the spotlight to her male kin and letting him make the rational (iambic) 
argument to match her emotional (lyric) plea.
55
 
 In making her plea, Antigone rather openly takes on the role of damsel in distress.  She 
appeals humbly to the chorus (using words like ἱκετεύομεν, ἄντομαι, νεύσατε) and as if in a law 
court casts herself in the role of the defendant’s innocent and pitiable daughter (241-2), 
reminiscent of the chorus’ own families at home (245-6, 250-1).56  She begins by flattering the 
choristers as αἰδόφρονες (237),57 which anticipates the substance of her petition:  she asks only 
for pity and αἰδώς (247), but even this minimal request is more than she can expect to be granted 
(249).
58
  She puts the focus on herself (who is more clearly an innocent sufferer) in order to win 
the chorus’ goodwill and thus makes effective use of her unfortunate situation. 
 Despite the humble tone and emphasis on her helplessness, Antigone’s speech is an 
intelligent and spirited piece of rhetoric.  Though she figures herself as the defendant’s pitiable 
                                                 
 
55
 Cf. Σ 237 (cited approvingly by Jebb ad loc.): τὸ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης πρόσωπον ὅλον καὶ τοῦ χοροῦ τὸ 
τετράστιχον ἀθετοῦνται· κρεῖττον γάρ φασιν εὐθέως τῷ δικαιολογικῷ χρήσασθαι τὸν Οἰδίπουν πρὸς αὐτούς· ἀλλὰ 
τὰ πράγματα αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἐν δυσπραγίᾳ ὥστε ἐπαφρόδιτον εἶναι αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐλεεινολογίαν καὶ 
τοῦτο τὸ πρόσωπον ἡ Ἀντιγόνη πληροῖ…. 
 
 
56
 Her appeal to a hypothetical blood relation as a compelling motivation for moral action also links her to 
Sophocles’ earlier Antigone.  Cf. OC 1189-91 and n. 62 below. 
 
 
57
 She flatters them further at 246-7 by indicating her and Oedipus’ total dependence on them.  For αἰδώς as a 
sort of mercy, see Jebb ad loc. (citing Dem. 37.59). 
 
 
58
 Cf. Jebb ad loc.: “τὰν ἀδόκ. χ., the unlooked for grace, i.e. for which, after your stern words (226), we can 
scarcely dare to hope, – but which for that very reason, will be the more gracious.” 
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child, she actually plays the role of Oedipus’ advocate and makes it clear that her requests are 
made on his behalf rather than her own (243, 246-7).  Antigone herself does not enter the 
passage until line 241 with ἀλλ’ ἐμὲ τὰν μελέαν, whose language and phrasing parallel that of 
ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γεραὸν πατέρα three lines above, so that Antigone seems to step right into Oedipus’ 
place as advocate.  Similarly, her words in 244-5 do more than point out Oedipus’ obvious 
pathetic blindness; they describe Antigone herself as sighted and willing to confront the 
choristers face to face.
59
  If Oedipus’ blindness makes him incapable of engaging in direct 
argument, Antigone is able to make up for this deficiency by standing in for him and looking the 
chorus in the eye herself.
60
 
 Antigone’s behavior is very different in this passage than at the end of Phoenissae, where 
she pleads on behalf of Polyneices. There, she begs Creon, clings to the body, and even seems as 
though she will have to be dragged away from it.  Here, she remains upright and faces the 
chorus; rather than begging for one thing at a time in stichomythia, she makes a complete, 
forceful appeal, and though she uses the language of supplication, it seems plain that she is not 
physically humbling herself in any way.  Her reference in 248 to τὴν ἀδόκητον χάριν plays to the 
chorus’ imagined graciousness but also suggests her resignation:  if the chorus insists on their 
immediate departure, it would just mean a return to wandering as usual.  Antigone’s situation is 
less desperate than it is in Phoenissae, and so her speech, while moving and passionate, is also 
less desperate.  And what is more, the chorus takes her seriously, which Euripides’ Creon 
generally did not; though they do not change their minds about expelling Oedipus, they admit to 
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 Allan 2006: 113-4 suggests that the middle form of ὁράω here carries an extra “emotional overtone.” 
 
 
60
 Antigone is thus asking the chorus to display a certain respect for social norms even as she herself violates 
maidenly protocol by looking them “shamelessly” in the eye (a point I owe to John Gibert). 
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feeling pity for both father and daughter, which is an improvement on their curt rejection at 228-
36 (and pity is, after all, the only thing Antigone actually asked for). 
 As we have seen, Antigone makes her first major utterance in this play before the chorus 
in defense of Oedipus’ suppliant rights; the second is made before Oedipus himself in defense of 
Polyneices’ suppliant rights (1181-1203).  Antigone again assumes the role of protector by 
reassuring Oedipus that he will not be harmed by Polyneices (1185-8); indeed, line 1185 (οὐ γάρ 
σε, θάρσει, πρὸς βίαν παρασπάσει) sounds like a pledge to defend Oedipus against violent 
assault, such as Creon attempted in the previous episode,
61
 until γνώμης in the next line makes it 
clear that she is talking about persuasion, not physical force. 
 In this speech, Antigone sets herself up as a moral authority to Oedipus, lecturing him on 
his duty to his kin rather than asserting Polyneices’ innocence.  From her point of view, it does 
not matter whether Polyneices is good or bad, whether his actions have been honest or wicked; it 
also does not particularly matter what Polyneices has to say to Oedipus.  What matters is that 
Oedipus has a duty to Polynecies as his son and suppliant to hear him out and not to do him any 
harm;
62
 he must also honor her and Theseus’ services to him by honoring their request to hear 
Polyneices (1202-3).
63
  Antigone asks Oedipus to remember that he is responsible for 
Polyneices’ nature (1189), and to keep a hold of his temper (1195-1200).64  In this scene, it is 
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 And Oedipus is afraid of being kidnapped by Polyneices as well (1207).  Jebb ad loc. calls 1186 “a tribute, 
marked by feminine tact, to her father’s judgment.” 
 
 
62
 In her insistence on the importance of blood relation over deeds or morality, she is a reflection of the heroine 
of Soph. Ant.  On the other hand, Oedipus has stressed his blood relation to his sons throughout the play as a reason 
to condemn them for failing to take care of him; cf. Markantonatos 2002: 59-63. 
 
 
63
 The good services Oedipus has received could be either Theseus’ acceptance of Oedipus or Antigone’s care-
tending.  Antigone’s words appear to echo Amphiaraus’ in Hyps. (fr. 757.872-3); for more on the use of this 
Euripidean play in the fourth episode of OC, see pp. 194-8 below. 
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Antigone who behaves as the parental figure by rebuking her charge for headstrong behavior and 
an excessively rigid morality,
65
 and her initial apology for giving such advice when she is merely 
a young girl (νέα, 1181) seems more and more appropriate as her stern lecture continues.66 
 It is perhaps significant that, while Antigone does not succeed in softening Oedipus’ 
nature, he does not take offense at her presumptuousness but yields to her (1204-5) and changes 
his mind about an issue he had seemed to be set on – quite unexpected in a character with a 
“heroic temper.”67  After pressing him to heed his responsibilities, she reasserts her moral high 
ground with a claim to justice that also shows once again her concern not to speak any more than 
is expected of her (1201-2).  In this passage, Antigone seems to have stepped further out of her 
role as parthenos than in any previous scene (tellingly, her long speech comes right after her 
maidenly deferral to Theseus at 1115-8),
68
 and yet she refrains from discussing specifically 
Polyneices’ crimes (1189-90) or Oedipus’ past (1196), topics which may be thought unfit for 
ladies’ tongues.69  She asks no more than that Oedipus make the minimum gesture toward what 
is right by listening to his suppliant.  Even while she censures Oedipus’ harsh nature, she avoids 
making demands or insisting on anything; she reasons with him, encourages him, and pleads 
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 If we read αἰδοῦ νιν in line 1192 (suggested by Jebb ad loc. and adopted by Lloyd-Jones & Wilson), 
Antigone repeats the substance of her plea to the chorus (236, 246).  As Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990 point out, this 
conjecture “yields a far weightier utterance than ‘let him alone’.” 
 
 
65
 Cf. Jocasta’s rebuke of her sons’ haste (Phoen. 452) and of Eteocles’ narrow morality and intransigence 
(Phoen. 528-68), and her advice that ὅταν φίλος τις ἀνδρὶ θυμωθεὶς φίλῳ ἐς ἓν συνελθὼν ὄμματ’ ὄμμασιν διδῷ, ἐφ’ 
οἷσιν ἥκει, ταῦτα χρὴ μόνον σκοπεῖν, κακῶν δέ τῶν πρὶν μηδενὸς μνείαν ἔχειν (461-4). 
 
 
66
 Cf. Linforth 1951: 155: “She is plainly shocked and resentful, and, though her feelings are essentially 
womanly, she speaks without the restraint expected of a woman, still more of a daughter speaking to her father.” 
 
 
67
 See Knox 1964 (esp. 143-62 on OC), 1966; his method is criticized by Gibert 1995: 255-62, who remarks 
(258-9), “Oedipus in Oedipus at Colonus is more than just stubborn; those moments in which he is are not, to my 
mind, the most important ones in the play.” 
 
 
68
 Noted by Winnington-Ingram 1980: 259 n.33. 
 
 
69
 Cf. Euripides’ Electra (Or. 26-7), who is reluctant to speak plainly about Clytemnestra’s adultery. 
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with him, so that despite her sternness she never becomes disrespectful or abrasive.  Both here 
and in the first episode she is persuasive as she could not be in Phoenissae, and agreeable in 
personality as she could not be in Antigone. 
 In the dialogue between Polyneices and Antigone that closes the scene,
70
 it is quite clear 
that both understand the power of Oedipus’ curse:  if Polyneices marches on Thebes, he will die.  
So Antigone makes another attempt at persuasion and begs Polyneices to turn back.  He refuses, 
as we know he must, and in some ways this dialogue tells us more about him as a character than 
about her (and I will return to this passage in the next section).  But despite their obviously close 
relationship, there is a bit of a disconnect between Polyneices and Antigone.  The latter points 
out a number of practical reasons to turn back to Argos:  there is no profit in sacking Thebes 
(1420-1), his soldiers might not follow him (1427-8), he will die (1424-5).  She does not 
understand that Polyneices must confront Eteocles as a matter of pride and honor; and given her 
attitude in Sophocles’ Antigone, it is rather surprising that she does not understand the concept of 
taking a stand on basic principle.  In her inability to comprehend the male ego or appreciate the 
motivating power of honor and glory (which Polyneices offers to her at 1411-3), we perhaps 
catch a glimpse of the relatively simple Antigone of the prologue of Phoenissae.
71
 
 Though Antigone successfully maintains a balance between parthenos and hero, she is to 
some extent characterized by failure.  All of her major actions are attempts at persuasion, which 
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 After Polyneices’ initial speech, Oedipus remains stubbornly silent, and it looks as though he (like the chorus 
earlier) intends to grant Antigone only the bare minimum of what she requested:  he will let Polyneices speak to him 
but will not respond or do him harm.  The curse (which we are surely meant to see as effective) does not come until 
after Polyneices has renewed his plea in a second speech – at the urging of Antigone, who hopes that Oedipus will 
thus be prompted to speak.  Oedipus fulfills this hope but not her request that he do no harm. 
 
 
71
 Alan Sommerstein (in private communication) has compared her also to Lysistrata (another practical female 
opposed to hawkish men); this comparison is all the more appropriate if Lysistrata was the original model for 
Euripides’ Jocasta (as Scharffenberger 1995 argues) and therefore an indirect model for Sophocles’ own failed 
reconciler as well. 
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regularly yield no more than the bare minimum of what she has asked for:  the chorus grants her 
pity but not permission to remain at Colonus, while Oedipus agrees to see Polyneices only to 
curse him.
72
  How can this be, if she is a successful blend of heroism and maidenliness, as I have 
been arguing?  In Phoenissae, Antigone fails either to become a coherent character or to achieve 
any control over events, so there is no conflict between her character and her dramatic function.  
But in Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone’s character is separate from her dramatic function:  her 
character consists of a resolution of the Euripidean Antigone’s conflicting maidenly and heroic 
tendencies, while in terms of function, she is more akin to the Euripidean Jocasta.  Antigone’s 
failure is not that of the heroic maiden but of the mother-figure who works in vain to bring her 
self-destructive family together.
73
 
 Antigone makes one final attempt to halt disaster in this play – or rather, she announces 
that she will.  After Oedipus’ passing, she and Ismene decide to return to Thebes and try to stop 
the conflict between their brothers (1769-72).  This conclusion is reminiscent of Phoenissae 
1264-83, when Jocasta summons Antigone to the battlefield, and the latter first begins to move 
away from her innocent, maidenly life and become a more involved and assertive figure.  If we 
take our reading of Oedipus at Colonus a step farther, we might see in the exodos the seeds of a 
similar crisis for Antigone.  She has just lost her father, and she is about to lose both her 
brothers; her first attempt to stop Polyneices’ expedition has already failed.  Again she sets out to 
save her brothers, this time without Jocasta to lead her, and again her efforts will be in vain.  
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 Buxton 1982: 143-4 says of πειθώ in OC that “it is a human quality, depending for its effectiveness on the 
moral authority and credibility of the human agents who do the persuading” (his emphasis), but Antigone’s 
persuasions are at best only minimally effective; that is, she convinces both sides to talk to each other but not to 
resolve their differences. 
 
 
73
 Winnington-Ingram 1980: 274 may have the right reading of Antigone’s heroism in OC:  “If Antigone 
represents the power of persuasion, she fails: fails with the Chorus in the Parodos, fails with her father, fails with 
Polynices, fails (as we know) in the task she sets herself at the end of the play.  She fails to prevent terrible events, 
but by her love and pity mitigates the gross evil of them.” 
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Perhaps we are meant to imagine that Antigone, who has maintained her maidenly qualities – 
and even some of her innocence – while fulfilling a long and arduous duty to her father, will 
emerge from this crisis changed, as she did in Phoenissae.  It remains an open question, 
however, whether she will emerge as the distressed, ineffective Antigone of Euripides or the 
harsh, adamantine Antigone of Sophocles’ earlier work.74 
 
The Return of Polyneices 
 Rather surprisingly, Polyneices is an uncommon character on the Attic stage.  Together 
with the rest of the Seven, he is an important part of the off-stage action in Aeschylus’ Seven 
against Thebes, but he only appears on stage as a corpse at the end of the play.  His burial is of 
course the central issue of Sophocles’ Antigone, but little is said about what kind of a person he 
was in life and it is questionable whether that even matters (Creon thinks he was impious for 
attacking his own city, and Antigone does not dispute the point).  From a dramatist’s point of 
view, the most obvious way to treat the story of the Seven and their war against Thebes is to set 
the play in Thebes and to focus on the figure of Eteocles; this is exactly what Aeschylus does, 
and if Euripides’ Phoenissae ranges much farther, it has a similar strategy.  But it is probably 
Euripides’ innovation not only to bring Polyneices into Thebes75 – an unexpected move, since he 
must die in combat (i.e. outside of Thebes) – but even to bring him on stage in the first place.  
That Polyneices’ only other known appearance in Greek tragedy occurs in Sophocles’ Oedipus at 
Colonus is likely to be significant.  The main object of this section is to demonstrate that 
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 The fact that she never responds directly to Polyneices’ requests for burial (1409-10, 1435-6) allows the 
question to remain open.  See Jebb ad loc. for a defense of 1435-6 (with transposition of τελεῖτε and θανόντι).  
Markantonatos 2002: 163-5 notes that Antigone’s lament at the end recalls Soph. Ant., where her mourning become 
a threat to civic order; but here Antigone yields to Theseus’ civic authority. 
 
 
75
 Euripides marks his innovation in Jocasta’s words at 310-1 (McDermott 1991: 30).  On possible poetic 
models for this scene, see Mastronarde 1994: 26. 
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Sophocles modeled both the character of Polyneices and the scene in which he features after 
their counterparts in Phoenissae.  However, the end of Sophocles’ scene, with the stichomythic 
exchange between Antigone and Polyneices betrays the influence of Euripides’ Hypsipyle, a 
matter to which we will turn at the end of this section. 
 Let us first sketch in broad outline the similarities between the two Polyneices scenes 
(Phoen. 261-637, OC 1249-1446).  In both plays, Polyneices enters by an eisodos into potentially 
hostile territory; in both plays, he has received a guarantee of safe passage and his approach is 
made possible by the prior advocacy of a female relative (Jocasta, Antigone).
76
  He comes for the 
purpose of reconciliation with a male member of his family (a brother!), and he has an offer to 
make to that end:  in Phoenissae, he is prepared to disband his army and resume the alternating 
schedule of kingship he and Eteocles had previously agreed to, while in Oedipus at Colonus, he 
offers to bring his father home to Thebes and install him in the palace; he also offers vengeance 
on Eteocles, who has wronged them both.  His entrance is prepared for by a scene featuring 
Antigone:  in Euripides, she views the army from the walls and anticipates Polyneices’ arrival in 
Thebes (170-1);
77
 in Sophocles, she persuades Oedipus to receive him as a suppliant.  At the end 
of the scene, he exits to his death, either after agreeing to meet Eteocles on the battlefield or after 
being cursed by Oedipus. 
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 In Phoen., Jocasta is always credited with bringing the two together ὑπόσπονδον πρὶν ψαῦσαι δορός (81-2; cf. 
273, 364-6), though it is never made plain that Eteocles has granted his brother safe passage (600 comes close), and 
Polyneices remains apprehensive throughout his visit. 
 
 
77
 The servant tells her that Polyneices will come ὥστε σ’ ἐμπλῆσαι χαρᾶς.  Craik 1988 comments ad loc. that 
“Euripides arouses expectations to be fulfilled in part (that Polyneikes will come to the palace) but unfulfilled in 
essence:  there is no joy; Eteokles vetoes a meeting (616-7); brother and sister are reunited only on the battlefield, as 
later reported (see esp. 1447); they are seen on stage together only after Polyneikes is dead;” it is only at 1671 that 
Antigone’s “wish to embrace Polyneikes is ironically fulfilled” (Craik 1988: 165n.).  The irony may have been 
apparent to the audience even this early, since, as Lamari 2010: 37-8 points out, a vain wish to embrace an absent 
loved one was a traditional motif. 
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 The Polyneices scene in Phoenissae develops into a fairly standard agon, with the two 
brothers each giving a speech in defense of his own point of view and Jocasta moderating.  In 
these speeches the brothers are clearly contrasted and it becomes obvious that justice stands on 
the side of Polyneices.  As is usual in Euripidean agones, though the contestants intend to use the 
debate as a vehicle for reconciliation, it ends up polarizing them even more than before and 
provides an opportunity for the audience to learn more fully the positions and motivations of 
each side.
78
  Also as usual, after the speeches, the scene dissolves into angry stichomythia as the 
brothers threaten each other and eventually agree to find each other on the battlefield.  This 
appears to set up the mutual fratricide, though neither brother knows what the outcome of their 
fight will be, and in fact they do not meet in the first battle and must eventually establish a single 
combat to settle the issue.  Polyneices thus departs from the first episode to a doom that we know 
is certain, though he does not.
79
 
 The Polyneices scene in Oedipus at Colonus is most immediately a suppliant scene:  
Polyneices takes refuge at the altar of Poseidon until he can secure a guarantee of safe passage, 
and Theseus and Antigone manage to convince Oedipus to see him by appealing to the respect 
due to a suppliant.  However, the scene also contains elements of the agon, as Polyneices and 
Oedipus both offer speeches containing logical arguments and proofs to demonstrate the validity 
of their respective positions.  Where suppliancy in tragedy usually results sooner or later in the 
acceptance of the suppliant’s plea for help, the outcome of Oedipus’ and Polyneices’ 
confrontation is again a polarization that demonstrates the impossibility of reconciliation.  But 
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 On the agon as a formal element, see, in addition to Mastronarde 1994: 443-637n., Strohm 1957: 3-49 (pp. 
37-9 on Phoen.), Duchemin 1968, Collard 1975, Lloyd 1992 (pp. 83-93 on Phoen.), Dubischar 2001; for discussion 
of Sophocles in particular, see Long 1968: 155-60, Webster 1969: 148-55, Holt 1981. 
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 Oedipus has cursed his sons (66-8), but they have shut him away in the palace deliberately to forget about his 
curse and the family doom that he represents (64-5 – but see Kerkhecker 1996, Amiech 2004: 253-4). 
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Sophocles adds a twist by having Oedipus initially refuse to respond to Polyneices at all.  We 
could thus read Polyneices’ first speech as a failed supplication scene:  he makes his more 
emotion-based plea to Oedipus here, attempting to convey remorse for his past crimes and to 
rouse sympathy for his own similar plight; but instead of making a speech in response, Oedipus 
remains silent, and the supplication structure fizzles and dies.  Moreover, when Polyneices turns 
to Antigone for help, she does not remonstrate with Oedipus (as for example, Euripides’ Aethra 
remonstrates with Theseus) but instead encourages Polyneices to continue speaking.  At this 
point, he offers a more straightforward account of his recent activity, Eteocles’ injustices, and his 
mission to take back Thebes for himself, and now Oedipus answers with his own speech; though 
he is angry and hateful, his purpose is to refute Polyneices’ account through logical 
argumentation and an alternate description of the past.  The scene has shifted from a supplication 
to an agon such as we found in the Polyneices scene of Phoenissae.  The agon as a formal 
dramatic element is usually studied in context of Euripidean tragedy, but it seems that Sophocles 
constructed his formal debates scenes according to a similar model.
80
  At any rate, since (as I 
argue) this particular agon in Oedipus at Colonus draws on a specific Euripidean agon in 
Phoenissae, and the two scenes share a superficially similar agon structure (matching speeches 
followed by stichomythia), it is reasonable to think that certain similarities and differences are 
intentional and significant.  In the case of Oedipus at Colonus, the stichomythia is not an 
escalation of anger (as it is in Phoenissae) but a pathetic exchange between one of the 
contestants and a third party (Antigone).  Thus, Sophocles’ milder stichomythia should not be 
taken simply as evidence of the distinctiveness of Sophoclean agones, but as a deliberate reversal 
of Euripides’ method in Phoenissae. 
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 See Holt 1981, who argues that the agon had become formalized by the mid-fifth century (when we see 
variations in Aesch. Ag. and Soph. Aj.). 
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 Polyneices is similarly characterized in both plays.  That Phoenissae and Oedipus at 
Colonus 1) bring him on stage as a living character, 2) develop his side of the story, from his 
perspective, and 3) give him a generally or partially sympathetic treatment
81
 are all important 
innovations.  Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes raises the basic problems surrounding Polyneices 
without exploring them thoroughly.  We are told, for instance, that the Seven have sworn an oath 
to destroy the city or die trying (46-8), but Polyneices hopes not only to avenge himself on 
Eteocles but to rule in Thebes (647-8).  Again, we are told that Polyneices’ shield depicts Justice 
bringing home the exile (642-8), but the just man par excellence, Amphiaraus, disapproves of 
violence against one’s native city (576-86).  It is not entirely clear which side, if either, is in the 
right, and in any case, Aeschylus’ main focus is on Eteocles; since Polyneices remains largely 
undeveloped as a character, our attention and sympathy are devoted instead to Eteocles.  
Sophocles’ earlier Antigone never questions Creon’s assertion that Polyneices was impious for 
attacking his own city but merely advocates the rights of the dead and the gods of the 
underworld.  We never get Polyneices’ side of the story. 
 Euripides’ treatment of Polyneices, then, is a considerable step away from the traditional 
approach, and Sophocles follows his lead.  Both poets bring Polyneices on stage and give him 
the opportunity to tell his own story.  What is more, they characterize him similarly on various 
points of detail.  For example, both the Euripidean and the Sophoclean Polyneices are 
straightforward in their manner of argumentation, though both are in some sense superficial.  
Euripides’ Polyneices seems not to have considered fully what it means to attack a city that he 
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 See Mastronarde 1994: 27-8:  “the lengths to which Eur. goes to win sympathy for Polynices are not matched 
in any other source that we know of.”  Amiech 2004 includes a section (pp. 38-41) titled “Un parti pris favorable à 
Polynice” in her account of Euripides’ mythical innovations in Phoen.; she nevertheless sees Polyneices as a 
problematic figure – as indeed he must be in any version. 
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supposedly still loves,
82
 and Sophocles’ Polyneices speaks the right words and perhaps even 
feels due shame and guilt over his contribution to Oedipus’ sorry circumstances, but he has a 
fairly simplistic idea of what Oedipus has gone through and what it will take to appease him.
83
  
Again, though Polyneices’ relative age differs in the two plays (in Euripides, he is the younger 
brother,
84
 in Sophocles, the elder), in both cases his age serves to win the audience’s sympathy:  
as the younger brother, he has abided by the agreement he made with Eteocles, voluntarily gone 
into exile, and returned to find the deal broken; as the elder, he might be considered the natural 
heir to Oedipus’ throne, and to be driven out by his younger brother is both unjust and shameful. 
 As a mythical figure guilty of neglecting his father, marching on his homeland, and 
committing fratricide for the sake of political power, Polyneices is not obviously sympathetic, 
and any portrayal of him will inevitably contain some complexity.  Given these circumstances, 
one especially effective way to cast Polyneices in a favorable light is to contrast him with other, 
more disagreeable characters, a method employed by both Euripides and Sophocles.  Euripides 
juxtaposes him with Eteocles, a man who adheres to an extreme brand of moral relativism in his 
shameless love of power, while Sophocles sets him against both Creon and Oedipus.  Creon’s 
attempt to get Oedipus back to Thebes involves bald-faced deception and even physical assault; 
Polyneices, who comes alone and uses only frank persuasion, cannot help looking decent by 
comparison.  Oedipus is a trickier case, since our sympathy for him has been built up over the 
first 1250 lines of the play.  Nevertheless, his reception of Polyneices has seemed to many 
(starting with Antigone, line 1189-91) to be excessively harsh, and Polyneices’ resigned 
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 Polyneices’ love for Thebes: 358-9, 406-7; Jocasta confronts him with the consequences of Argive victory: 
570-77 (cf. Eteocles’ retorts at 604-17). 
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 See e.g. Easterling 1967: 6, Seale 1982: 134-5. 
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 Apparently an innovation (Sommerstein 2010b). 
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acceptance of his father’s curse and his concern with preserving his honor before his Argive 
allies perhaps cast him in the role of doomed but admirable tragic hero (an argument to which I 
shall return). 
 All of this, from similarities in staging to conception to characterization, suggest that 
Sophocles deliberately modeled his scene and his Polyneices after their Euripidean counterparts.  
But differences between the two plays are of course equally important, and it appears that 
Sophocles has pointedly reversed some key elements in Euripides’ scene; these reversals may 
alter the way we understand the Sophoclean Polyneices by contrasting ironically with what he 
(and we) expect to get out of the scene or by lending him depth and tragic pathos. 
 The Polyneices scene in Oedipus at Colonus is actually set up in the fourth episode with 
Theseus’ announcement that an unidentified suppliant has taken up a position on the altar to 
Poseidon and requested an audience with Oedipus (1156-62).  Oedipus remains puzzled as to the 
stranger’s identity for some time, until finally Theseus mentions that he appears to be an Argive 
(1167).  This play with Polyneices’ identity is reminiscent of Euripides’ rather bolder game in 
the opening of the first episode of Phoenissae, where Polyneices appears as a character (possibly 
for the first time in Attic tragedy) and Euripides plays the initial moments of his entrance to full 
effect.  Though we have been told of the parley (81-2), we may not expect Polyneices to come 
into enemy territory alone, without his allies or bodyguards; and we may not expect the grand 
figure described in the prologue (167-9) to creep furtively through the city with his sword drawn, 
peering around for possible ambushes (265-6) and keeping an eye out for altars where he can 
take refuge if necessary (274-5).  A full twelve lines after his entrance, Polyneices obliquely 
identifies himself by referring to his mother’s persuasion (272-3, looking back to 81-2), and 
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formally identifies himself only at line 288.
85
  Euripides toys with an audience who may have 
been doubtful that Polyneices’ would appear on stage at all,86 and who might be even more 
doubtful as to his identity when the manner of his arrival runs counter to the description of him 
in the prologue.  Though Sophocles’ audience could probably guess the identity of the suppliant 
as soon as they heard him called a “relative of Oedipus, but not from Thebes” (1156-7), his 
purely verbal play with Polyneices’ identity – indeed, with the very idea of bringing him on stage 
in a tragedy – is perhaps a hat-tip to Euripides’ own innovation in that regard.  Euripides’ 
Polyneices scene, falling as it does in the first episode, is only one of many innovations and 
surprises; by contrast, Sophocles’ Polyneices scene is in some sense climactic, coming late in a 
very long tragedy – when, perhaps, we have even less reason to expect to see Polyneices at all.  
In this respect, Sophocles’ tribute to Euripidean innovation packs more punch by virtue of being 
something of a surprise in its own right.
87
 
 In Oedipus at Colonus, Antigone’s speech on her brother’s behalf (1181-1203) puts her 
in a position similar to Jocasta’s in Phoenissae and prepares us for a reunion between siblings 
such as is hinted at in Euripides’ “teichoskopia” and such as his Polyneices actually receives 
from his mother.  In the latter passage, Jocasta expresses sorrow over Polyneices’ long absence 
and joy for his return; though fearing to dredge up bad memories, she asks what exile is like and 
finds further cause for sorrow in his report.  Such a reunion is forestalled in Oedipus at Colonus, 
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 Ironically, the chorus has just been singing about Polyneices in the parodos (esp. 258-60), though without 
specific reference to the figure who enters by an eisodos.  Sommerstein 2010b argues that earlier representations of 
Polyneices identify him as the elder by giving him a beard; if Euripides’ Polyneices, being the younger brother, 
wears a beardless mask this would also make it difficult for the audience to identify him at first (though 63 suggests 
that both brothers are at least old enough to grow a beard). 
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 At least one event foreshadowed in the prologue (the reunion of Antigone and Polyneices, suggested at 165-6, 
170-1) does not actually transpire in the first episode.  See n. 77 above. 
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 Linforth 1951: 154 describes the unexpectedness of Polyneices’ arrival within the larger context of the play. 
189 
 
however, and instead of being reunited immediately with his advocate, Antigone (as we may 
have expected after her speech), Polyneices addresses his first speech to Oedipus, only turning to 
his sister when their father maintains a stubborn silence.  Again, Sophocles’ game is similar to 
Euripides’:  his intimation that the siblings will be reunited turns out to be a red herring, even 
though this time both siblings are on stage at the same time. 
 Instead of a delighted mother and an arrogant brother, the Sophoclean Polyneices is met 
with a resentful father and sympathetic sisters – a neat reversal which brings out the variance 
between what Polyneices hopes to accomplish and the actual result of his suppliancy. 
 When Polyneices first appears in Oedipus at Colonus, he is weeping both for Oedipus’ 
lot and for his own (1249-50, 1254-6).
88
  He opens his plea with a distressed commentary on 
Oedipus’ wretched fate in exile, and an acknowledgement of his own responsibility for it.  He 
claims to have been unaware of how terrible exile really is until he experienced it himself.  This 
attitude is reminiscent of the Euripidean Polyneices’, who has voluntarily gone into exile as a 
part of his deal with Eteocles to share the kingship but returns to Thebes with a very poor 
opinion of exile
89
 and resolves not to give up his claims to his inheritance; he has discovered that 
any risk is worth running to avoid a lifetime in exile, and this is a sort of shortsightedness he 
shares with his Sophoclean counterpart.  Neither realized what exile really meant; in Euripides, 
the realization motivates Polyneices’ march on Thebes, while in Sophocles, it constitutes 
Polyneices’ attempt at justification for failing to recall Oedipus to Thebes earlier:  he simply did 
not know how bad Oedipus’ life had become and so did not feel any urgency in providing help.  
But Oedipus throws this argument back in his face by calling him, in effect, a hypocrite who 
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 Cf. Phoen. 366-70, where Polyneices weeps over his own exile.  In Sophocles, the simple fact of his tears 
(1255; noted also by Antigone, 1250-1) goes a long way toward establishing the sincerity of  his pity for Oedipus. 
 
 
89
 In both plays, moreover, Polyneices complains about how the exile must live in subservience to others 
(Phoen. 388-407, OC 1336). 
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only wants to help someone who can return the favor.  The Euripidean Polyneices’ incomplete 
understanding and newly discovered hatred of exile mitigate somewhat his apparent materialism 
and make him sympathetic by explaining his behavior; but in Sophocles, Oedipus uses these 
same things to expose Polyneices’ unfilial attitude and hypocrisy. 
 But his expectation of forgiveness is not completely unreasonable, as we may see from a 
comparison with Phoenissae.  The Euripidean Polyneices comes to the parley with a remarkable 
offer:  if only Eteocles is willing to resume their alternating rule of Thebes, he will send away his 
army and dismiss any claims to additional compensation (and we know that he has the right to 
make such claims).  In other words, he is willing to forgive the past and start afresh.  But since 
Eteocles will accept nothing less than total capitulation, the generous offer is made in vain.  The 
Sophoclean Polyneices seems to share a similar outlook but finds himself in a weaker position.  
He acknowledges that he has been unjust, but he must hope that Oedipus will overlook his 
crimes, decline to seek further punishment, and exhibit αἰδώς instead.90  In other words, he 
expects that Oedipus will behave like the Euripidean Polyneices.  But Oedipus subscribes to a 
philosophy of δίκη rather than αἰδώς (1267-9, 1381-2); for him, forgiveness is not possible and 
all he has to offer is a curse for his sons’ neglect.  Oedipus’ harshness in this is pointed up not 
only by Antigone’s earlier admonishment about a parent’s responsibility to his children (1189-
91) but also by the contrast between Oedipus and the Euripidean Polyneices – both in similar 
situations, but only one willing to give up his chance at revenge and let bygones be bygones.
91
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 Antigone also requested αἰδώς from the chorus on behalf of Oedipus (246), and perhaps (if we follow Jebb) 
from Oedipus on behalf of Polyneices (1192). 
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 Of course, it is crucial to Oedipus’ characterization that he has been exiled from Thebes for many years, and 
the length of time has made him more extreme in several respects.  Zeitlin 1986: 134 notes that Polyneices’ strategy 
of finding similarity in his and Oedipus’ experiences is no longer appropriate since now Oedipus’ “task is to make 
distinctions rather than efface them.”  Mastrangelo 2000 argues that Polyneices and Oedipus are both defined by 
their bonds to friends and family members but that Oedipus alone is able to sever his old bonds and establish new 
191 
 
 The dialogue between Antigone and Polyneices fulfills an expectation of their reunion 
that Euripides had toyed with (but not realized) in Phoenissae and that Sophocles himself seems 
to have raised and foiled already in Oedipus at Colonus.  Euripides, no doubt taking his cue from 
Sophocles’ Antigone (which allowed, if it did not necessitate, a special relationship between 
Antigone and Polyneices), develops that relationship on both sides, allowing Antigone to 
anticipate Polyneices’ arrival eagerly and Polyneices to ask to see his sisters before he leaves 
Thebes (616-7) – but his request is denied and we never actually see how Polyneices and his 
sisters interact with each other.
92
  Sophocles takes this a step further:  he finally brings both 
siblings on stage together, but at first it seems that they will not get the opportunity to speak with 
one another, as Polyneices engages with Oedipus immediately upon entering.  But the 
stichomythic dialogue after the agon, normally reserved for an angry escalation between 
contestants, instead becomes an occasion to explore the relationship between Antigone and 
Polyneices in a way that it probably never had been before.  In place of the threats hurled by the 
brothers in Euripides, we have expressions of mutual affection between Polyneices and Antigone 
and sorrow at the prospect of Polyneices’ death. 
 The Sophoclean Polyneices continues to be a difficult figure to interpret.  Some find him 
insincere in his reaction to Oedipus’ condition or hypocritical in expecting Oedipus to forgive 
where he himself will not.  Others draw attention to Polyneices’ tears and his affectionate 
relationship with his sisters, pointing out also that we have been given no reason to mistrust 
him.
93
  His decision not to tell his men about Oedipus’ curse is an especially polarizing point for 
                                                                                                                                                             
ones; Oedipus’ curse is designed to cut all of Polyneices’ bonds, and at this moment we know that Polyneices is 
doomed. 
 
 
92
 The messenger report narrates a meeting of sorts between the siblings on the battlefield, but no interaction 
between them is described. 
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modern critics:  is it a mark of selfishness and disregard for his men’s lives or an indication that 
he is a responsible leader concerned with the morale of his troops? 
 It seems to me that in his characterization of Polyneices, Sophocles is deliberately 
problematizing an inherently problematic figure.  As Euripides does in Phoenissae, Sophocles 
makes Polyneices sympathetic by contrasting him with more negative characters (like Creon) 
and by emphasizing or changing important details (like his age) – but these sympathetic elements 
only highlight the more questionable aspects of his attitude and behavior. 
 A good example is Polyneices’ description of his allies.  By this point in the tragic 
tradition, a catalogue of his allies is probably almost requisite in any treatment of the Seven; 
certain details of characterization, like the bloodthirstiness of Capaneus and the piety of 
Amphiaraus, are also traditional.  The catalogue here (1313-23) is no longer than it has to be 
(even omitting any description of the heroes’ shields), and the order in which the Seven are 
listed, especially Amphiaraus and Capaneus, is significant.  The former comes first, where his 
piety can make a good initial impression on Polyneices’ audience and suggest the justice of the 
expedition as a whole.  Capaneus, on the other hand, is relegated to fifth, late enough in the 
catalogue that his attitude will not be taken as representative but one removed from Polyneices 
himself, who must come last in order to bring the catalogue back into his larger plea for Oedipus’ 
assistance.  Though Capaneus cannot but be a problematic ally for anyone with a claim to justice, 
his presence is diminished in importance as much as possible in favor of the more 
straightforwardly honorable Amphiaraus.  But where the catalogues of the Seven in Aeschylus 
and Euripides are put in the mouths of messengers, Sophocles’ version belongs to Polyneices’ 
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 Sensible treatments of the sympathy accorded to both Oedipus and Polyneices may be found in Easterling 
1967 and Winnington-Ingram 1980: 275-6. 
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speech to his father, and we are entitled to wonder whether the elevation of the pious man and 
the diminishment of the impious is true or merely the result of Polyneices’ rhetorical purpose. 
 While the Euripidean Polyneices’ willingness to send his army away is a mark of his 
generosity, the Sophoclean Polyneices’ unwillingness to do the same (even before he has reached 
Thebes) casts Polyneices as an intransigent figure, but one who goes to meet his fate with heroic 
acceptance.  It underscores his strong sense of honor and shame before his army, while also 
raising questions about how his personal morality and ambition influence his view of his 
responsibilities as a general.  However we interpret his decision to march on Thebes, it lends him 
a depth unavailable to the Euripidean Polyneices, who does not seem to have thought much 
beyond his personal feud with his brother.
94
 
 So the most important thing for our discussion is the sheer complexity of the Sophoclean 
Polyneices as a character; it would be easy to make Polyneices a straightforwardly villainous 
figure, and we have seen Euripides’ attempt to do the opposite.  Sophocles follows Euripides’ 
lead in giving him certain traits or experiences that render him sympathetic, but he avoids 
whitewashing Polyneices completely.  Instead, the combination of positive and negative features 
creates a figure who is both admirable and repellent, honorable and hypocritical.  Even while 
Polyneices’ personal morality makes us uneasy, his acceptance of the curse is tragic and his 
departure to certain doom is poignant.
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 C.f. Easterling 1967: 11:  “Sophocles’ intention in this scene is to show why Polynices in spite of the curse 
did persevere: because he was that kind of man.  Another motive, too, must be Sophocles’ desire to arouse further 
sympathy for Polynices, to show the dreadfulness of Oedipus’ decision, and perhaps to touch us most deeply by this 
emphasis on the fact that the issues of life are rarely clear-cut.”  Seale 1982: 136 notes the effect of the staging:  
“Both [sisters] leave the side of Oedipus and cling to their brother (1437).  The father is alone, brother and sisters are 
together.  The disruption of the earlier grouping shows the vindictiveness of Oedipus and the harshness of the 
retribution he is dispensing.” 
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 For Polyneices’ knowledge of his fate:  OC 1399-1401, 1432-8 (cf. Phoen. 621-2, 633-5); for turning the 
army back:  OC 1414-9 (cf. Phoen. 484-91).  Jebb 1414-1446n. remarks,  “The version of the paternal curse adopted 
by Sophocles tended to suggest this question to the spectator: – Why should Polyneices persevere in the war, when 
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 At this point, Sophocles’ conceptualization of the scene is also informed by a second 
Euripidean tragedy, Hypsipyle.  Like Oedipus at Colonus, Hypsipyle dramatizes a story related 
but strictly external to the war of the Seven against Thebes.  Like Oedipus at Colonus, Hypsipyle 
only brings one of the Seven on stage and portrays him sympathetically; this is of course not 
unusual for Amphiaraus, the only one of the Seven regularly treated with admiration and respect, 
but it does fit into the trend in the late fifth century of reevaluting the Seven as interesting and 
potentially justifiable characters.  In other words, just as it would make sense for Sophocles to 
look to the Euripidean Polyneices as a model for developing his own Polyneices, so he might 
also reasonably look to the Euripidean Amphiaraus, a doomed member of the Seven carrying a 
burden of knowledge. 
 The central action of Hypsipyle revolves around the slaying of the infant Opheltes by a 
snake.  While his nurse, Hypsipyle, leads Amphiaraus to a spring so that he can make a sacrifice, 
Opheltes is left unattended and is ultimately seized by the snake guarding the spring.  Opheltes’ 
mother, Eurydice, is understandably upset when she learns of his death and apparently accuses 
Hypsipyle of acting with malice aforethought.  The dispute is settled by Amphiaraus, who not 
only confirms Hypsipyle’s story but also – and more importantly – eases Eurydice’s anger and 
grief by explaining the significance of Opheltes’ death.  He interprets this tragic event as an 
omen bearing on the expedition of the Seven, who will all be killed at Thebes just as Opheltes 
was killed by the serpent.
96
  In commemoration of the fatal expedition, Opheltes is renamed 
                                                                                                                                                             
his defeat and death had been definitely foretold to him?  For he plainly believes the prediction (cp. 1407, 1435), 
though he affects to think that there is a chance of escape (1444).  The answer is furnished by the traits in his 
character which this dialogue brings out.  They give the ἠθικὴ πίστις for a course which might otherwise have 
seemed improbable.”  Segal 1981: 389 (who generally views Polyneices negatively) grants that “[h]e answers with 
the tragic hero’s acceptance of his daimon, the god’s will ….  His last words have the noble calm of the doomed 
man who has turned his face to death but looks back in compassionate sorrow to those whom his death will hurt.” 
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 The serpent is a very apt analogue for Thebes, a city founded by men grown from a serpent’s teeth. 
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Archemoros and funeral games are instituted in his honor.  It seems that the Seven then compete 
at these funeral games, as do the sons of Hypsipyle, whose reunion with her is somehow brought 
about in connection with the games. 
 While Amphiaraus plays an important role in Hypsipyle, he does not seem to hold the 
main interest, which lies rather with the title character, her life of slavery, her liability for the 
death of the infant Opheltes, and her reunion with her sons.  Amphiaraus acts as something of a 
plot device in all of this by motivating the actions of Hypsipyle and other characters.  This is 
why the play ends not with Amphiaraus’ departure to Thebes but with the reunion of Hypsipyle 
and her sons.
97
  Amphiaraus is important and interesting, but he is not the subject of the play. 
 This explains why Euripides appears to have left some potentially powerful dramatic 
material unexploited – which Sophocles then explores more fully through the figure of 
Polyneices.  The circumstances of Polyneices in Oedipus at Colonus and Amphiaraus in 
Hypsipyle are similar in several respects, though, as far as we can tell, Euripides does not fully 
develop some of the ideas raised in his play.  Amphiaraus and the Sophoclean Polyneices both 
have foreknowledge of their own demise, but Sophocles gives the point greater prominence by 
focusing on how Polyneices comes by his knowledge and what he does with it.  Amphiaraus 
already knows before the play begins that he will die if he marches on Thebes with the rest of the 
Seven;
98
 that he does so anyway is due more to his wife’s treachery than to his tragic heroism.  If 
his attitude toward his own destiny was explored more deeply (probably in the first episode, 
where he describes the bribery of Eriphyle to Hypsipyle), we can no longer see the details.  At 
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 Dionysus also appeared ex machina and must have said something about the Seven and his native Thebes, but 
given that Amphiaraus had aleady departed at this point, Dionysus probably gave more space to arranging 
Hypsipyle’s return to Lemnos (perhaps) and Euneus’ future in Athens. 
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 Amphiaraus narrates his past in fr. 752K, which, according to the generally accepted reconstruction of Cockle 
1987 (see e.g. TrGF V, CCG), belongs to the first episode. 
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the same time, though he resents being forced to leave home with the expedition (fr. 752h.15-
20), his attitude is not one of hopelessness, and he is still concerned to maintain good relations 
with the gods (esp. fr. 752k.20-1) and to requite those who have helped him (fr. 757.868-73).  
When he takes his leave of his newfound φίλοι (Hypsipyle and her sons) at the end of the play, 
we are surely meant to remember that despite the happy outcome for some of the play’s 
characters, Amphiaraus is departing to certain death at Thebes.
99
  But Euripides apparently does 
not develop this angle, since he has chosen to focus instead on Hypsipyle’s reunion with her 
sons. 
 It is not clear whether Euripides explains how the rest of the Seven learned of 
Amphiaraus’ interpretation of Opheltes’ death.  If we stop and think about it, we can infer that 
they must have found out at some point; could they really compete in the funeral games without 
knowing whose death was being honored and why?  Euripides may have passed over the point 
entirely as something too obvious to bother explaining or as an unnecessary detail that stood 
outside his main theme; or he may have mentioned it in passing without making it into a moral 
dilemma for Amphiaraus.
100
  Euripides’ story, after all, is really about how Hypsipyle, her sons, 
and Eurydice respond to the death of Opheltes.  Amphiaraus’ interpretation, while significant for 
the larger scope of mythical events, is more immediately a means of appeasing Eurydice and 
saving Hypsipyle, just as the funeral games are meant to facilitate the reunion of Hypsipyle and 
her sons.  Euripides has little reason to bring the rest of the Seven on stage, and may not care to 
explain how they learned of the omen or how they reacted to it (courageous resolve or hubristic 
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 Hypsipyle and Euneus wish him well with unintentional irony (fr. 759a.1590-2). 
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 A more extensive scene in which Amphiaraus describes the omen to his allies (for which we have no 
evidence) would seem dramatically superfluous, since the omen has already been interpreted for Eurydice. 
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defiance or something else).
101
  When Amphiaraus departs to rejoin the expedition, we know that 
their mission will be fatal, but we do not know if they know it; no tragic point is made out of the 
matter one way or another. 
 But Sophocles noticed these ideas and developed them further through the figure of 
Polyneices.  The theme of an unexpected prophecy of doom coupled with the question of how 
one bears the burden of knowledge that affects many other people as well is not at all evident in 
Phoenissae, where Polyneices and Eteocles have done their best to forget about Oedipus and the 
family curse; each departs merely hoping to kill the other, not expecting to die himself,
102
 and 
neither seems especially troubled at the prospect of large-scale casualties among their followers.  
Amphiaraus provides a much better model for the Sophoclean Polyneices, though Euripides 
broaches the tragic issues without exploring them.
103
 
 The Sophoclean Polyneices is brought on stage for his own scene and as a character of 
psychological and emotional interest for his own sake, and not merely as a mover of the action.  
In contrast to Amphiaraus, Polyneices learns of his fate during the play when he receives 
Oedipus’ curse instead of his blessing, and we in the audience can witness his immediate 
reaction; additionally, Polyneices must decide whether to share the bad news with the rest of the 
Seven or keep it to himself.  The dialogue with Antigone that closes his scene fleshes him out as 
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 Of course, we do not have all of this play, but since Euripides is centrally concerned  with Hypsipyle and her 
sons (not the Seven, who never appear on stage, except for Amphiaraus), it is possible that he did not find it 
necessary even to mention how or whether the rest of the army learned about the omen. 
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 Indeed, the curse in Phoen. seems to be that the brothers will divide their inheritance with the sword (68), 
which does not necessarily equate with mutual fratricide. 
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 The Aeschylean Eteocles also knows that he will kill his brother and be killed by him.  But Oedipus’ curse 
does not become an issue in Aeschylus’ play until the moment when Eteocles suddenly realizes its full meaning and 
goes off to face Polyneices anyway; that is, we are not prompted to wonder whether he has told anyone else about 
the curse or whether he has a moral duty to do so.  Unlike Polyneices and Amphiaraus, Eteocles has no reason to 
believe that his death will have any negative effect on the Theban war effort.  The fate of the other six Theban 
champions does not rest on him, and in any case, he knows that he himself will successfully defend the seventh gate 
(even if he dies in the process). 
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a character by exploring various Euripidean questions.  How does one deal with the sudden 
knowledge of one’s own death?  How does one deal with the knowledge of a much grander 
failure that will affect many other people as well?  How does one balance fate with honor?  
When we see how Polyneices answers these questions – that he will face his fate willingly, that 
he will bear the burden of knowledge by himself, and that he will sacrifice himself and his cause 
to honor – he becomes a deeper figure.  While much of Sophocles’ scene is modeled on the first 
episode of Phoenissae and much of Polyneices’ characterization in Oedipus at Colonus is either 
deliberate imitation or deliberate reversal of the Euripidean figure, the Sophoclean Polyneices 
remains distinct and interesting primarily because of his final dialogue with Antigone.  Elements 
drawn from Phoenissae make him sympathetic, flawed, and human; hints of Amphiaraus from 
Hypsipyle make him tragic and heroic. 
 The degree of sympathy to be accorded to Polyneices has long been a matter of debate; it 
is remarkable that, while the Euripidean Polyneices displays some of the same faults (short-
sightedness, selfishness), he has not provoked nearly as much controversy as his Sophoclean 
counterpart.
104
  This is of course because in Phoenissae the contrast with Eteocles makes the 
issue seem completely black and white; there is no doubt which of the two brothers is more right 
and thus more sympathetic.  The Sophoclean Polyneices is contrasted with Creon in a similar 
way, but since those two characters do not appear in the same scene, the effect of the contrast is 
weaker.  We appreciate Polyneices’ honesty after Creon’s duplicity, but a more immediate effect 
is created by the confrontation of Polyneices and Oedipus.  There is a contrast here as well 
(between Polyneices’ hope for forgiveness and Oedipus’ insistence on justice), but there is also a 
great deal of similarity, both in their circumstances and in their attitudes toward those who have 
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 For a balanced assessment of the Euripidean Polyneices, see Lloyd 1992: 84-7, Mastronarde 1994: 225-6. 
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done them wrong.  This prevents the spectator of Sophocles’ agon scene from making an easy 
choice between contestants.  Both are simultaneously sympathetic and repellent, and often for 
the same reasons.  Thus, Polyneices remains a deeply problematic figure throughout the agon, as 
Sophocles explores the ethical questions raised by his plight, and the audience’s sympathy for 
him is won – insofar as it is won – chiefly by the manner of his entrance and departure.  But in 
the end, this is what we expect of Sophocles and Euripides:  their respective treatments of the 
myth are similar in many respects, but Euripides’ is more explicit in its impact and the ideas 
more bluntly juxtaposed. 
 
Oedipus, Power, and Pollution 
 Two other well-known themes in Oedipus at Colonus spring from Euripidean roots.  On 
the one hand, the theme of control, especially the control of Oedipus by one of his sons and his 
determination to remain autonomous, is widely recognized.
105
  On the other hand, his great 
speeches in defense of his own past seem to inform the play in an essential way and have 
prompted scholars to study the play as a reflection on the revelation of Oedipus’ crimes in 
Sophocles’ earlier Oedipus Tyrannus.  But it is not usual to connect these two themes with each 
other, nor to derive their inspiration ultimately from Euripides’ Phoenissae, rather than Oedipus 
Tyrannus.  In brief, I will argue that the theme of control (κράτος) of Oedipus is an extension of 
a different theme – the quest for political power – which runs through both tragedies.106  The 
theme of controlling Oedipus is naturally attended by the question of his guilt and the nature of 
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 E.g. Segal 1981: 386, Buxton 1982: 135, Zeitlin 1986: 132, Wilson 1997: 73-6, Hutchinson 1999: 61-2. 
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 κράτος and its cognates are important terms in OT as well, but more diffuse in meaning and application than 
in Phoen. or OC.  The most pertinent passages are probably OT 237 and 1522-3, which respectively identify 
Oedipus as a ruler and an ex-ruler, thus exemplifying the magnitude of his fall.  See Zeitlin 1986: 122 n. 20 for 
κράτος and ἀρχή as quintessential Theban themes. 
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his pollution, which is a central theme in Phoenissae and then carefully recast and reversed in 
Oedipus at Colonus.  Winnington-Ingram (1980: 261) speaks for many when he says that “one 
wonders at first why Sophocles should have handled the topic in this way and at such length, 
especially since the acceptance of Oedipus by Theseus is not conditioned by any argument as to 
his guilt or innocence;” indeed, Oedipus’ speeches are not directed at Theseus but at those who 
attack or doubt him on the basis of assumptions about him that have been developed in 
Phoenissae. 
 The question of who will control Oedipus (both alive and dead) is of course the central 
issue of Sophocles’ play and is thematized most noticeably in the use of the word κράτος and its 
cognates.  This language is most concentrated in a passage from the first episode,
107
 when 
Ismene arrives from Thebes bringing a report of a new oracle and the Thebans’ plans to recover 
Oedipus from exile (396-408): 
   Ισ. καὶ μὴν Κρέοντά γ’ ἴσθι σοι τούτων χάριν 
    ἥξοντα βαιοῦ κοὐχὶ μυρίου χρόνου. 
   Οι. ὅπως τί δράσῃ, θύγατερ; ἑρμήνευέ μοι. 
   Ισ. ὥς σ’ ἄγχι γῆς στήσωσι Καδμείας, ὅπως 
    κρατῶσι μὲν σοῦ, γῆς δὲ μὴ ’μβαίνῃς ὅρων.       400 
   Οι. ἡ δ’ ὠφέλησις τίς θύρασι κειμένου; 
   Ισ. κείνοις ὁ τύμβος δυστυχῶν ὁ σὸς βαρύς. 
   Οι. κἄνευ θεοῦ τις τοῦτό γ’ ἂν γνώμῃ μάθοι. 
   Ισ. τούτου χάριν τοίνυν σε προσθέσθαι πέλας 
    χώρας θέλουσι, μηδ’ ἵν’ ἂν σαυτοῦ κρατοῖς. 
   Οι. ἦ καὶ κατασκιῶσι Θηβαίᾳ κόνει; 
   Ισ. ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐᾷ τοὔμφυλον αἷμά γ’, ὦ πάτερ. 
   Οι. οὐκ ἆρ’ ἐμοῦ γε μὴ κρατήσωσίν ποτε. 
 
   Ism. Yet know that because of this Creon 
    will come to you not after a long time, but soon. 
   Oed. To do what, my daughter?  Explain to me! 
   Ism. So that they can establish you near the Cadmean land,    
    where they can control you without your entering its bounds.      400 
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 Winnington-Ingram 1954 (substantially reprinted in Winnington-Ingram 1980): 16 n. 7 compares the 
repetition of κράτος and κρατεῖν to the repetition of τροφ- words in the same episode and comments that “[t]his 
could … be shown to be a characteristic Sophoclean use of words.”  For this type of repetition, see esp. Easterling 
1973. 
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   Oed. But what help do they get from my being outside their country? 
   Ism. If things go wrong with it, your tomb will cause them trouble. 
   Oed. Even without a god to tell one, one might know that by guessing. 
   Ism. Then that is why they wish to place you near them, 
    and not where you would be your own master. 
   Oed. Will they even shroud my body in Theban soil? 
   Ism. But the shedding of kindred blood does not allow it, father! 
   Oed. Then they shall never gain power over me! 
 
This brief passage illustrates both the Thebans’ determination to gain possession of Oedipus (and 
why: 402) and Oedipus’ even greater determination not to let them get their hands on him.  The 
only thing Oedipus really wants, other than proper burial, is protection from those who would 
take away his freedom.
108
 
 What is perhaps less frequently observed is the distinct use of the same vocabulary even a 
few lines preceding the passage cited above.  When Ismene reports that her brothers have broken 
their previous agreement in favor of contending for the Theban throne, she says that they both 
wish ἀρχῆς λαβέσθαι καὶ κράτους τυραννικοῦ (373).  Again, when she explains why they would 
need Oedipus for their safety (εὔσοια, 390), she says ἐν σοὶ τὰ κείνων φασὶ γίγνεσθαι κράτη 
(392).  In the same passage she mingles two meanings of κράτος:  control of Oedipus, but also 
control of the Theban throne, i.e. political power,
109
 and Polyneices also uses the same language 
of his mission (1332).  Both meanings are collapsed at 1381-6 (the last time κράτος and its 
cognates occur in the play), when Oedipus rejects Polyneices’ suppliancy, declares that κράτος 
belongs to his curses, and condemns Polyneices μήτε γῆς ἐμφυλίου δόρει κρατῆσαι.110  Oedipus 
simultaneously refuses to put himself in another’s control and dooms Polyneices’ quest for 
political power. 
                                                 
 
108
 Similar uses of κράτος/κρατέω also at 646 (Oedipus’ resolve to turn the tables and gain κράτος over his 
enemies), 1207 (Oedipus afraid that Polyneices might seize him). 
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 For κράτος as political power, see also 68 (of Theseus) and Jebb 392n. 
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 Or, with Reiske’s conjecture (adopted by Dawe 1996): μήτε γῆς ἐμφυλίῳ δόρει κρατῆσαι. 
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 Throughout the tragedy, then, control of Oedipus is tantamount to control of Thebes, both 
being described in terms of κράτος.  That this is not accidental may be demonstrated by a glance 
at the use of an apparent synonym.  In this play, νίκη and its cognates are never used of the war 
of the Seven against Thebes.
111
  Rather, they occur when somebody wins an argument or when 
one person gets his own way instead of another.  νίκη is an expression of straightforward victory, 
of the fact that somebody has won and somebody has lost; but it does not imply anything about 
what is to be gained from that victory (such as political power).  In short, in Oedipus at Colonus, 
νίκη is the neutral word for victory, κράτος the word for power, control, dominion – all the 
things which Polyneices and Eteocles want to get for themselves and which will be guaranteed if 
they can only get control of Oedipus. 
 The idea of control or power, also represented by the word κράτος, is also found in 
Phoenissae; if anything, it is more fundamental to Euripides’ play, which is after all centrally 
concerned with the war itself.  Throughout, κράτος is consistently used of the brothers’ personal 
quarrel and the power that each hopes to win.  That is, Eteocles and Polyneices seem to view the 
war as a manifestation of their own struggle for the throne; they do not seem to realize or care 
that others are also involved, and that victory for either side will have serious consequences for 
the Theban citizenry and the Argive soldiers.  This is the lesson Jocasta tries to impress upon her 
sons in the first episode (especially Polyneices, who repeatedly labels Thebes φίλος but seems 
not to have thought about what victory by conquest must entail).  As the argument between the 
brothers in the first episode escalates, both reassert their claim to political power and material 
wealth, and both pledge to make good their claims by killing each other on the battlefield.  What 
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 In fact, the only time it is used of military victory in general is 1088 (with reference to Theseus’ rescue of 
Antigone and Ismene). 
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they both aim at is κράτος, the combination of victory and power, but they give little thought to 
the countless other people who must fight and die and suffer along the way.
112
 
 Given that the war and victory are of primary importance in Phoenissae, it is reasonable 
to conclude that Sophocles derived his usage of κράτος from that play.  Oedipus at Colonus 
continues to use κράτος of the brothers’ struggle for power in Thebes, but the concept of νίκη is 
watered down by being consistently applied to non-military victories.  The consequent isolation 
of κράτος as the primary term for victory in the war (and the power it brings) allows Sophocles 
to extend its range and introduce a new theme (control of Oedipus).  Sophocles thus balances the 
Euripidean concept of κράτος (the power that attends victory) with κράτος over Oedipus. 
 However, once Sophocles has introduced the idea that Oedipus’ presence is an essential 
component of victory, he must deal with an additional problem.  As a man guilty of committing 
the most horrific crimes against members of his own family, Oedipus is polluted, perhaps an 
object of divine wrath, and possibly even dangerous to be near.
113
  This is exactly the attitude 
toward him in Phoenissae.  Though he only appears on stage at the very end of the play, the 
figure of Oedipus is fundamental to the conception of human and divine causality in Phoenissae.  
In this respect Phoenissae is akin both to epic, which is perhaps best known for employing 
“double determination,”114 and to the Aeschylean trilogy, which constructs a family curse or 
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 In Phoen., the language of νίκη, used especially by those outside the brothers’ feud (including Jocasta, 
Creon, and Antigone), seems to describe the war as such – that is, a deadly contest between opposing armies with 
the fate of a city and its inhabitants at stake – and to reveal a concern not for who wins the throne but for who wins 
the war and which side suffers the consequences of defeat. 
 
 
113
 On pollution (including an illustrative discussion of OC), see Parker 1983: 317-21.  Cf. Segal 1981: 390:  
“[Oedipus’] foul garments have associations with Oedipus’ miasma as the visible mark of the curses on his house.  
They are a reminder of his power to continue those curses through his deadly impreceations upon his sons.”  For 
Segal, one of the play’s most important themes is Oedipus’ separating himself from his past pollution and suffering 
in order to become a hero. 
 
 
114
 Michelini 1999/2000 (on generic interaction in late Euripides) has brief remarks on Phoen. on p. 43; see also 
Michelini 2009. 
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history of divine wrath in the background of the play and traces different stages of the curse’s 
development through the family’s history.  In Aeschylus’ own trilogy about the house of 
Oedipus, for instance, the three plays portrayed the death of Laius (resulting from his 
disobedience of an oracle), the revelation of Oedipus’ crimes, and of course the war of the Seven 
against Thebes.
115
  In each generation, the family curse
116
 plays itself out to disastrous effect.  
Though Phoenissae seems not to have belonged to a “true” trilogy like Aeschylus’,117 it similarly 
adumbrates the calamity that perpetually surrounds the Labdacids so that we feel the crimes of 
the past pressing down on the present generation.  This dramatic strategy is perhaps best 
exemplified in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, which devotes a significant amount of space to 
reconstructing the crimes of the past as they relate to the story being dramatized.  Choral odes 
and Cassandra’s prophetic insight are the playwright’s chief tools for sketching a history of 
divine wrath and human corruption that motivates the action on stage. 
 Perhaps even more so than an Aeschylean trilogy, Phoenissae illustrates the concept of 
multiple causality, continually accumulating human and divine explanations for the events 
playing themselves out without any attempt to reconcile or distinguish one from another.
118
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 Hutchinson 1985: xvii-xl has a good discussion of Aesch. Sept. and its tetralogy. 
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 I use the term “curse” loosely to refer equally to an actual curse, divine wrath, or a familial tendency to 
destruction; on the distinctions, see esp. West 1999, Sewell-Rutter 2007:49-77.  Cf. Sewell-Rutter 2007: 40:  
“Oedipus is both the dangerous and powerful presence that Creon takes him to be and the very present and concrete 
link in the chain of familial misfortune from Laius to Eteocles and Polyneices.” 
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 Many have thought, following Σ Αr. Ran. 53, that Phoen. was produced together with one or more of the 
plays named there (Antigone and Hypsipyle); Oedipus is another possible companion play.  In these cases, the 
trilogy would be thematically coherent, but would not portray a single version of the myth (as in Aeschylus), since 
the other plays make different mythical assumptions from Phoen. (e.g. Antigone does marry Haemon; Oedipus goes 
into exile with Jocasta). 
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 Conacher 1967a: 233-48, Mastronarde 1994: 8-9, 350-3n.; Craik 1988 43-4:  “throughout the play divine 
motivation expressed in terms of daimonion, tyche, or ate intersects with human or naturalistic motivation expressed 
in terms of miasma or alastor arising from Oidipous’ parricide, and ara the curse he set on his sons … Eris ‘strife’ 
and Erinys ‘curse’ which may be abstract nouns or personified as minor goddesses lie between divine and human 
will … Justice is involved in divine influence, but not central to it.”  Various characters and the chorus offer the 
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Oedipus represents a nexus of these forces:  the family curse, the crimes antecedent (and 
presumably preparatory) to the mutual fratricide, and the pollution that infects all of his 
incestuous family.  Eteocles and Polyneices have shut him up in the palace in an attempt to 
forget all that he signifies about themselves and their future (64-5), but throughout the play we 
are reminded that he still lurks in the darkness of the palace, muttering curses against his sons 
(e.g. 66-8, 327-36).
119
  Simply not thinking about the family curse does not make it go away. 
 Euripides’ Oedipus is imagined to bring ruin in two basic ways.  First, he destroys his 
sons by being their father, corrupting the family line, continuing a tradition of intrafamilial 
crime, and cursing them.  Second, he brings sorrow to the city of Thebes simply by being in it.  
When Creon exiles him at the end of the play, he cites a prophecy given by Teiresias to the effect 
that Thebes can never flourish while Oedipus resides there (1590-1).
120
  His curse and his role as 
a link in the Aeschylean chain of inherited disaster motivate his sons’ fratricide, while the 
pollution he bears as a result of his crimes brings divine anger down upon the city as a whole in a 
war that destroys many citizens and most of the ruling family.  I have pointed out already how 
the man himself, when we finally meet him in the exodos, seems grossly incommensurate with 
the image painted of him throughout the play, and this is a typically Euripidean disjunction of 
appearance and reality.  Oedipus is a blind, pathetic old man who mourns for his cursed sons and 
his faithful mother-wife, who is dismayed at being cast out from his homeland, and who 
                                                                                                                                                             
following possible causes/agents of Labdacid ruin:  Oedipus’ curses (66-8, 1051-4, 1355, 1425-6), Furies (253-5, 
1306-7, 1503-7, 1593-4), the gods (257-8, 1612-4), iron (350), Eris (351, 798-800, 811-3, 1495), Oedipus and his 
crimes (351, 1504-7), τὸ δαιμόνιον (352), incest (379-81, 814-7), pollution (1050), the family curse (1611). 
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 See Lamari 2010: 54-5 for Oedipus’ continual presence (even while physically absent) throughout the play. 
 
 
120
 As many have noted, Teiresias has not said anything quite like this in the play itself; this would be quite a 
serious distortion of 886-8, so it may be that Creon is be referring instead to a prophecy delivered before the 
dramatic action. 
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anticipates an early, even immediate death alone in exile.  But he is who he is, and by his very 
nature he brings destruction to those closest to him. 
 According to Euripides’ conception, then, there is no meaningful distinction between 
Oedipus as sufferer versus criminal, as one who bears pollution versus one who curses his own 
sons.  Oedipus is the physical manifestation of everything that destroys his family.  Where 
Euripides makes the idea of Oedipus central to his play, Sophocles brings the character into the 
spotlight and explores his different roles.  He allows Oedipus to defend himself and his past on 
multiple occasions, but reaffirms the potency of his curses.  In Sophocles, Oedipus is only 
destructive in his role as avenger of the wrongs committed against him, and this role is most 
clearly manifested in his curses on Creon and on Polyneices and Eteocles. 
 Oedipus defends himself at length three times in the play, twice before the chorus (258-
91, 522-48) and once before Creon (960-1013).
121
  The first of these concentrates on Oedipus’ 
rights as a suppliant and Athens’ duty to respect those rights, but also introduces all of the major 
arguments about Oedipus’ past:  he is not wicked (270); it is unreasonable to fear his dreadful 
appearance and reputation (265-6, 285-6); his “crimes” were mostly passive, and at any rate he 
was ignorant of the identity of his “victims” (266-7, 273-4); he acted as any normal person 
would have if placed in a similar situation (271-2).  In this case, the defense is prompted by the 
chorus’ sudden command that he leave their country, evidently because they, like Euripides’ 
Creon, fear that his pollution might bring divine wrath down upon the people who shelter him 
(234-6, 256-7).  Sophocles’ Oedipus must demonstrate to the chorus that he is not so terrible as 
his reputation would have them believe, and he successfully responds to their fears by drawing 
attention to the logical fallacy of equating appearance with reality and by casting his crimes as 
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passive sufferings rather than premeditated cruelty.  Since his past cannot prove him to be guilty, 
wicked, or destructive (since he is not the one responsible for his crimes), a refusal to accept him 
would make a mockery of Athens’ own reputation for piety.122 
 The second passage is a lyric exchange with the chorus, who simply want to satisfy their 
curiosity about Oedipus’ past.  In the scene immediately preceding this one, they have advised 
Oedipus on how to propitiate the Eumenides, and he has sent Ismene off to take care of it (461-
509).  Even though we may feel that propitiation is superfluous in light of Oedipus’ evident 
affinity for the Eumenides and the prayer he offered immediately upon arriving in the grove (84-
110), he still pays careful attention to the chorus’ detailed instructions; his willingness to perform 
the ritual anyway demonstrates his moral purity (despite his ritual pollution) and settles the 
chorus’ anxieties on that count.123  Instead, since Oedipus’ previous speech drew attention to his 
terrible reputation, they now want to know how true his reputation is.  Since the question is one 
of facts, Oedipus cannot avoid admitting what he has done, but he can and does continue to 
emphasize the role played by his own ignorance (522-6, 537-41) as well as the idea of justifiable 
self-defense (545-8).  The juxtaposition of these scenes – the propitiation of the Eumenides and 
Oedipus’ legalistic argument – not only shows the chorus’ fears about Oedipus being laid to rest 
one by one but also underscores the disjunction between Oedipus’ past acts and his personal 
ethic and religiosity.  In Phoenissae, these facets of Oedipus’ characterization are all different 
ways of saying the same thing, and Sophocles’ chorus is initially inclined to share that view; but 
Oedipus methodically disassembles all the elements that combine to make him who he is, 
showing that each one can be defended and that none affords any reason for fear. 
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 For Oedipus’ terribleness (with a particular focus on his similarity to the Eumenides), see Mills 1997: 166-8. 
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 For Oedipus and the Eumenides, see esp. Henrichs 1983.  One need not be morally pure to propitiate a deity 
(witness Clytemnestra), but since Oedipus belongs in the sacred grove, he has done nothing that requires 
propitiation; his offering is a gesture of goodwill to the goddesses (cf. 498-9) for the sake of the chorus. 
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 In both of these passages, Oedipus argues that he is legally innocent of his crimes and 
therefore not morally repugnant; similarly, his use of hypothetical arguments helps to normalize 
him as a person and bring him back to the level of his interlocutor(s).  Though others charge him 
with pollution – which he does not deny (see esp. 1132-6) – Oedipus distinguishes the social 
stigma of pollution from his personal moral integrity, which can be defended by rational and 
legally based argumentation.  The idea that pollution itself is destructive is effectively refuted by 
the oracle that Oedipus’ presence will bring victory and his pledge to benefit Athens. 
 Creon’s accusation of Oedipus before Theseus recalls the chorus’ first reaction to him.  
Creon claims that Oedipus is unworthy of a god-fearing state like Athens, and that he is actually 
doing the Athenians a favor by removing a potential source of divine disfavor and restricting his 
pollution to his own household.  Oedipus in turn accuses Creon of deceit and shamelessness, and 
while Creon’s arguments may have some force (especially since they parallel the chorus’ 
concerns in the parodos), the juxtaposition of the clearly villainous Creon and the sympathetic 
Oedipus gives the latter the moral high ground.  We come upon this scene ready to view Oedipus 
as righteous, and indeed, he gives more weight to his claims of virtue in this speech (966-8, 988-
90) than in previous ones.  At the same time, he makes the fullest case yet for his legal innocence 
(963-5, 969-73, 983-4, 986, 997-9), deploying as well a hypothetical argument designed to 
demystify and normalize his actions (992-6). 
 Though these three speeches use and reuse particular arguments, they have different 
functions within the overall dramatic structure.  To put it roughly, Oedipus’ first speech 
persuades the chorus that his reputation, appearance, and religious pollution are not sufficient 
grounds for fearing him (while his readiness to propitiate the Eumenides gives them a positive 
reason to trust in his piety), the second argues that he is not legally guilty for the specific crimes 
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he has committed, and the third shows him to be morally upright, or at least not κακός, like 
Creon.
124
  The helplessness of Oedipus and his daughters against physical assault illustrates more 
vividly his passivity in suffering and his inability to do harm to others.  He is not dangerous or 
despicable for any of the specific reasons alleged against him; and it is my contention that his 
repeated arguments were inspired by the cumulative characterization of Oedipus in Phoenissae, 
where such distinctions are meaningless and Oedipus is always understood as a source of ill 
fortune. 
 Oedipus’ chief reason for defending himself at all is his desire to stay in Colonus; if 
Theseus and the chorus believe that he is wicked or dangerous, they will not allow him to stay 
there or anywhere in their territory.  The Thebans apparently think of him in the same way as the 
characters in Phoenissae, and they attempt to resolve the apparent paradox between an Oedipus 
whose presence is dangerous and an Oedipus whose presence will bring victory by deciding to 
plant him at their border, far enough away that his pollution cannot infect them but near enough 
for them to exercise control over him and his tomb.  But Oedipus himself demonstrates that there 
is no paradox, and the Athenians accept his arguments.  His presence is straightforwardly 
beneficial, and those factors that make him seem dangerous are imaginary or without 
substance.
125
 
 Indeed, the only means of defense Oedipus has in this play is his words, especially curses 
(cf. 873).  As these curses are directed only at specific individuals who have done him wrong 
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 This last point is particularly apt, if the popular attribution of Eur. fr. 554a (from Oedipus) to Creon is 
correct:  Creon treats Oedipus precisely as a wicked person who therefore deserves to be treated wickedly, even as a 
suppliant.  Cf. Burian 1974: 414:   “Pollution remains, of course, making a whole range of normal human contacts 
inaccessible to Oedipus (cf. 1130-1135), but pollution cannot void his claim of justice for his deeds, nor excuse 
injustice against him.” 
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 The idea of Oedipus as simultaneously dangerous (because of his terrible wrath) and beneficial is of course 
also in line with his death and transformation into a hero; for hero cult in OC, see esp. Burian 1974, Edmunds 1981. 
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(Creon, his sons), it seems that Oedipus can actually be dangerous only to those who harm him, 
which simply means he has a right to requital, like all men. The tragedy of Oedipus lies in the 
fact that his curses spread in their effect beyond their intended targets.  Thus Creon’s old age will 
indeed be characterized by suffering (if we think of Antigone), but only through the deaths of 
Antigone, Haemon, and Eurydice, and even Megareus and Menoeceus (if we think of Antigone 
1303-5 and Phoenissae).  Likewise, his curse on Eteocles and Polyneices seals their doom but 
also leads ultimately to the death of Antigone.  Perhaps it is to be expected that the curses of a 
soon-to-be hero might get out of control.  But on Euripides’ terms, Oedipus stands absolved of 
destroying his family and former city through wickedness and pollution. 
 
Distorted Reflections 
 Sophocles views the figure of Antigone, I have argued, through a Euripidean lens of 
maidenliness and heroism.  However, what were conceived as opposites in Euripides are 
reconciled in Oedipus at Colonus, and Antigone is able to be both parthenos and hero 
simultaneously.  At the same time, her function in the Sophoclean play is analogous to that of the 
Euripidean Jocasta.  Though Antigone as a character manages to find a balance between heroism 
and maidenliness, she is not obviously more successful than either the Euripidean Antigone or 
Jocasta at influencing events or reconciling her quarreling family members.  A tension remains 
between Antigone as a coherent maiden-hero and a failed Labdacid peace-maker.  Sophocles’ 
character combines a number of Euripidean ideas and functions in one, resolving some conflicts 
while producing others. 
 The agon between Polyneices and Oedipus appears to reflect quite closely the first 
episode of Phoenissae – first in its progression as an agon rather than a supplication scene, and 
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then in its redeployment of visual details and mythical elements.  The mirroring of the first 
episode of Phoenissae constitutes acknowledgement of Euripides’ innovations, as well as 
preparing the audience for another reassessment of Polyneices’ character and motivations.  
Though Sophocles’ Polyneices is more clearly problematic in his appeal to Oedipus than 
Euripides’ is in his argument with Eteocles, Sophocles takes care to give his figure a sympathetic 
arrival and departure, the latter being also a development of Amphiaraus’ circumstances in 
Hypsipyle.  In the figure of Polyneices, then, there is straightforward imitation and recognition of 
Euripides’ approach in Phoenissae, but also a tendency to problematize the ethical situation and 
create tragic depth through exploration of tragic and moral ideas raised but unexploited in 
Euripides’ Hypsipyle. 
 In the figure of Oedipus, we see the most extensive expansion and reworking of 
Euripidean material.  Sophocles adopts the theme of κράτος as political power (specifically that 
which falls to the victor in the fraternal feud) but combines it with a variant of this theme, κράτος 
as control of Oedipus.  This extension of the Euripidean theme encapsulates the central problem 
of the play but also brings Sophocles into contact with another, seemingly unrelated Euripidean 
motif, the pollution of Oedipus.  Sophocles gives his hero a chance to defend himself against the 
charges raised in Phoenissae, thus allowing “control of Oedipus” to be a beneficial thing and 
creating a figure of surprising strength and authority over against the unexpectedly frail Oedipus 
who appears in the exodos of Phoenissae.  Here especially we may observe the creative potential 
inherent in Sophocles’ exploitation of others’ dramatic material:  his Oedipus is not only a 
response to Euripides’ (on his own terms) but also a vehicle for developing old themes and 
producing new ones. 
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 This chapter has attempted only a partial survey of this material and what can be gained 
from studying it closely.  I have chosen to focus my main discussion on particular characters and 
on the ideas developed through them primarily in Phoenissae and Oedipus at Colonus.  This 
approach, an obvious way to relate plays which feature a number of the same characters, also 
provides an element of stability in comparison of different scenes or themes and seemed to me to 
offer the best chance for fruitful analysis of large portions of Sophocles’ play.  My purpose has 
not been to describe exhaustively how Oedipus at Colonus engages with Phoenissae but to open 
up the topic by surveying a few important points of contact.  By the same token, I have not 
intended to discredit Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone as providing one useful 
dramatic context for study of Oedipus at Colonus but only to draw attention to the previously 
neglected context of Euripides’ recent Theban plays. 
 It seems to me that these two contexts furnish us with the means of studying Oedipus at 
Colonus from two rather different angles.  Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone contribute to 
character development primarily by serving as reference points for past and future mythical 
events; that is, knowing what Oedipus used to be and what Antigone will become colors our 
understanding of what they are now.  Why has Oedipus changed since his revelation and fall?  
How will Antigone become the heroine of her namesake play?  Even if Oedipus and Antigone 
are still recognizable under the terms of the earlier plays, they are different in significant ways, 
and those differences between then and now are often the whole point.  Sophocles uses his 
earlier plays to explore how time and events affect both characters. 
 If Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone adumbrate the past and future, Phoenissae is more of 
a mirror to current events, providing a distorted reflection of the actual themes and situations in 
213 
 
Oedipus at Colonus.
126
  The particular circumstances in each play are obviously very different 
(one is set in Thebes, the other at Colonus; in one Oedipus resides in the palace, in the other he is 
in exile; and so on), but both plays put their characters in situations that require them to behave 
in similar ways and make the same types of decisions.   In both plays, Antigone is a proper 
parthenos called upon to perform unmaidenly duties; how will she handle the situation?  What 
happens when Labdacids try to reconcile their differences?  What is Polyneices’ personal 
morality, and what is his motivation for doing what he is doing?  What is the meaning of 
Oedipus’ crimes and sufferings to himself and to those around him – regardless of whether he is 
shut away out of sight or standing at center stage?  Euripides’ answers to these and other 
questions are not the same as Sophocles’, and these differences lend irony or pathos to the 
dramatic situation.  The distorted reflection in Phoenissae allows a glimpse into an alternate 
universe, suggesting how things could have gone differently. 
 That scholars have been eager to relate Sophocles’ last play to his earlier treatments of 
the same myth is not surprising or inappropriate.  Nor is it surprising that Oedipus at Colonus has 
so often been viewed as Sophocles’ redemption of his most famous hero, as the poet’s last advice 
to his audience and polis, as a meditation on old age or the end of empire, as a dedication to the 
poet’s hometown, or as a profound religious testament.  These are all, to varying degrees, 
legitimate contexts in which to study the play, and general scholarly interest in exploring these 
contexts makes it all the more strange that Oedipus at Colonus is so infrequently read in the 
context of Euripides’ Theban plays, especially his fully extant Phoenissae.  The primary purpose 
of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the immediate (Euripidean) dramatic context is every 
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 Chronologically, OC is a reflection of Phoen., but as we read OC in light of Phoen., we can use the earlier 
play as an interpretative mirror for the later. 
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bit as critical for our understanding of Oedipus at Colonus as the other, more popular contexts 
and to explore some of the interpretative possibilities of reading Sophocles’ last play in this light. 
 Phoenissae and Oedipus at Colonus together provide an excellent example of what I have 
been calling extreme dramatic interaction.  Phoenissae, like its near cousin Orestes, is intensely 
intertextual, drawing perhaps most significantly on older works such as Aeschylus’ Seven 
against Thebes and Sophocles’ Antigone; but it is also a part of Euripides’ recent collection of 
Theban plays and finds inspiration for one of its most famous scenes (the attempted 
reconciliation in the first episode) in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata.  All of these plays also stand, 
directly or indirectly, behind Oedipus at Colonus.  Poets of the late fifth century found reason to 
be interested in their own work and that of others, earlier plays and more recent ones, tragedies 
as well as comedies – and these interests intertwined and built on each other as the poets 
continued to develop new themes, new questions, and new ideas. 
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Sophocles Κωμῳδούμενος 
 
 
 
 
 
 Previous chapters have focused on how Sophocles made use of what he found in the 
“pool” of available dramatic material, though we have also had something to say about how 
other playwrights responded to his work (especially in our discussion of Euripides’ Orestes), and 
this is the topic which we will address in the present chapter.  We are also leaving behind purely 
tragic intertextuality to study fifth- and fourth-century comic poets’ use of Sophoclean drama.  In 
other words, this chapter attempts to show what sort of context Sophocles provided for comic 
playwrights, how they interpreted and reacted to his work, and how all of this squares with what 
we already know about Aristophanes’ treatment of Euripides.  In addition to describing how 
Sophocles was perceived by his comic contemporaries, then, this chapter continues to explore 
seldom-recognized similarities between Sophocles and Euripides.  That such a study has not 
been undertaken before speaks volumes about the way we understand both Sophocles and 
Euripides, for a sustained relationship with comedy is perceived to be one of the things that most 
distinguishes these two poets from each other.  Euripides is generally seen as bold and 
provocative, and thus an easy and appropriate target for comic parody, while Sophocles is 
traditional and conservative, the very paragon of good tragedy; surely comedy could have 
nothing to say about him.  Indeed, the absence of any extant comedies that are centrally 
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concerned with Sophocles, as Thesmophoriazusae is with Euripides, seems to support this 
conclusion. 
 Very little work has been done on ancient parody of Sophoclean drama, and for reasons 
that are easy to find.  Aristophanes’ most conspicuous parodies offer sufficient material for those 
interested in comic treatments of Euripides while also providing a useful body of evidence for 
scholars working in various other areas:
1
  in theories of parody or generic interaction, in 
Aristophanes’ attitude toward comedy versus tragedy, or even in Aeschylus’ comic reception.2  
In other words, we already have enough material to discuss most of the major questions about 
paratragedy on the scholarly agenda.  But comic exploitations of Sophoclean drama have 
generally been overlooked except for a handful of recent articles focusing on specific points of 
contact
3
 and the commentaries, which rarely do more than note that there is a reference to 
Sophocles.  My primary purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate that Sophocles’ work did in 
fact stand in a meaningful relationship with the comic genre, one fundamentally comparable to 
the relationship between Euripides and Aristophanes. 
                                                 
 
1
 Recent studies of ancient comedy, tragedy, and paratragedy include Rau 1967, Dover 1972: 72-77 and 183-9, 
Handley 1985: 355-425, Taplin 1986 and 1993, Goldhill 1991: 167-222, Silk 1993 and 2000b, Platter 2007.  Bowie 
2000: 322-4 and Silk 2000a survey instances of paratragedy (and other parody) in fifth-century comic poets other 
than Aristophanes.  
 
 
2
 Pieters 1976 focuses on the exploitation of Aesch. Eum. in Cratinus’ Ploutoi; Bakola 2010: 118-79 expands on 
Cratinus’ interest in (usually Aeschylean) tragedy.  Others have discussed Euripides’ and Aeschylus’ use of comedy 
or comic elements (Knox 1970 (reprinted in Knox 1979: 250-74), Seidensticker 1982, E. Segal 1995, Gregory 
1999/2000; Sommerstein 2002).  The closest such study we have for Sophocles is a chapter in Seidensticker 1982 
(pp. 76-88) and Meltzer 1991/2 on the guard in Antigone. 
 
 
3
 Rau 1967 deals with Aristophanic parody of all types, including select Sophoclean passages, and his 
appendices provide more complete collections of material; my debt to Rau will be evident throughout this chapter.  
Articles on comic treatment of Sophocles include Dobrov 1993 (reprinted in Dobrov 2001), Castellani 2010, 
Compton-Engle (in preparation).  Weissenberger 2008 is more interested in the original conception of Frogs than 
what it has to say about Sophocles specifically.  Lefèvre 2001: 279-88 connects Sophocles to Menander on the basis 
of the τύχη theme and happy endings.  Griffith 2006 also links Sophoclean satyr play to New Comedy thematically, 
but dissociates it from Old Comedy linguistically; Zagagi 1999 finds comic themes in Ichneutai, though this is taken 
as a generic similarity between comedy and satyr play.  Lada-Richards 1997 discusses the degree of identification 
between actor and character in tragedy versus comedy using Soph. Phil. as the tragic standard.  Cairns 2005 
considers – and rejects – Pollux’ statement that Euripides and Sophocles experimented with parabases. 
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 Quotations, references, and reminiscences of Sophoclean drama are scattered throughout 
the comic poets of the fifth and fourth centuries, including both fragmentary and extant plays of 
Aristophanes.  I draw on comedy of this period (i.e. Old and Middle Comedy) because the poets 
writing then were close enough in time to Sophocles still to consider him as a fellow dramatist, 
rather than a canonized classic.  Furthermore, the tendency of Old and Middle Comedy to treat 
contemporary figures and mythical subjects means those comic poets may have been more ready 
to engage with a tragedian, while the romanticized, domestic, and apolitical plots of New 
Comedy had less reason to be interested in classical tragedy. 
 Some of the examples I examine in this chapter are humorous, others serious; some make 
fun of Sophocles or tragedy as a genre, others do not; some draw on Sophoclean satyr play rather 
than tragedy.  Such a range of material and dynamics may seem to pose a challenge with regard 
to terminology.  Bakola’s approach to the same problem provides a helpful starting point:4 
 “in his discussions of comedy’s use of tragedy, Silk distinguishes between ‘paratragedy’ and 
 ‘parody (of tragedy)’, suggesting that ‘paratragedy is the cover term for all of comedy’s 
 intertextual dependence on tragedy, some of which is parodic but some is not’, whereas parody, 
 as ‘any kind of distorting representation of an original’, ‘is essentially negative: it works by 
 recalling a more or less specific original and subverting it’.  In Silk’s essays, parody has 
 connotations of ‘criticism’ or even ‘polemic’.  Whereas Silk’s distinction is valuable as a 
 concept, we should take into account that modern literary theory has recognized parody as a 
 flexible and inclusive term, whose semantics have changed constantly through the ages.  
 Although the phenomenon can be on occasion ‘negative’ and ‘subversive’ (in Silk’s terms, 
 critical or polemical), it is not necessarily or consistently so.  Because parodies are often written 
 in admiration, affection, or even in a playful spirit, taking ‘subversion’ as an essential principle 
 of parody would be misleading, unless we read ‘subversive’ as something more than ‘critical’ 
 or ‘polemical’.  On the other hand, distortion is a fundamental feature of parody and is achieved 
 by exaggeration, displacement, or transformation of either manner, matter, or both.  In our 
 discussion, the term ‘parody’ will have a wider and more inclusive application.  Thus 
 ‘paratragedy’ and ‘parody (of tragedy)’ are used as largely interchangeable terms, meaning the 
 distortive representation of a tragic original with a humorous or playful effect without any 
 preconception as to the intention underlying this representation.” 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Bakola 2010: 120-1.  My project is also to some extent counterpart to that of Bakola, who means to expand 
our understanding of comic paratragedy on the comic side by moving beyond Aristophanes. 
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Bakola makes an important point regarding the tone of parody, which need not be critical or 
subversive – or even humorous, especially if the comic poet is using tragedy to lend weight or 
authority to his own work.  Like Bakola’s, this study is concerned with particular comic and 
tragic passages rather than a theory of parody, so there is less to be gained from a careful 
differentiation between terms.  However, not every comic passage I will be discussing has a 
specific tragic model; that is, the comic poet may be composing freely in what he imagines to be 
Sophocles’ tragic style or imitating a Sophoclean type of song without drawing on any specific 
example.  It is reasonable, therefore, to speak of both parody and paratragedy – where 
“paratragedy” is an all-encompassing term for comedy’s exploitation of tragedy and “parody” 
refers to an exploitation of a specific tragic model
5
 – in some discussions of individual passages. 
 Except for the final section, which also describes thematic and structural patterns, the 
evidence treated in this chapter consists almost entirely of verbal correspondences between 
comedy and Sophoclean drama (whether tragedy or satyr play).  This is of course what we 
normally look for in studies of intertextuality, but in this particular case we are also dependent on 
the ancient citers (primarily scholia, lexicographers, and Athenaeus) to inform us about specific 
connections between plays.  In many cases, both the Sophoclean play and the comedy are lost 
except for fragments where (we are told) the comic poet meant to evoke Sophocles; sometimes 
the tragedy is extant but not the comedy or vice versa.  Where we must rely on fragmentary 
evidence, the argument is necessarily limited, for a citation of Sophoclean drama may have 
resonated much more widely than can now be seen.  By the same token, we risk falling prey to 
the citers’ mistakes and vagaries, which cannot be checked against other evidence.  But that is 
                                                 
 
5
 These are the definitions used by Silk 1993; cf. Robson 2009: 103-19. 
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the nature of the topic, and even with these dangers we can usually be confident in asserting a 
direct relationship between texts on the basis of direct quotation. 
 I organize my case-studies into three broadly defined sections, each representing a range 
along a conceptual spectrum and therefore also overlapping to some extent with its fellow(s) to 
either side; these levels are not meant to be exclusive or rigid, only to lend some structure and 
coherence to a large body of disparate evidence.  Roughly put, these levels address the 
intertextuality between Sophocles and comedy in terms of 1) collision of high and low registers, 
2) appropriation and manipulation of ideas, and 3) integration into the larger comic passage or 
scene; more thorough descriptions of these levels will be provided as we come to each section.  
Discussion in the text will center on those cases which I consider most secure and illustrative, 
especially those that involve direct quotation (as opposed to loose allusion).  My argument is a 
cumulative one; I hope that my main points about Sophocles’ relationship with comedy will still 
stand even if some individual examples are found to be less convincing than others. 
 At the most basic level, direct quotation demonstrates that the comic poet had Sophocles 
in mind when he wrote.  The quotation may be completely unconscious on his part, though then 
we can still argue that nothing in the poet’s mind distinguished Sophoclean drama from any 
other source.  Some quotations are little more than banal representations of tragic language, 
while others tend toward the gnomic; I have omitted such passages from my discussion when 
they appear to be incidental rather than conscious references to Sophoclean drama.  With these 
set aside, I may take most quotations discussed here as the product of the comic poet’s purpose. 
 In addition to the question of authorial intent, it is important to consider whether the 
audience would have recognized a Sophoclean quotation as such, and if so, whether they would 
have grasped its full implications.  Some help on this point is provided by Martin Revermann’s 
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article on the competence of theater audiences.
6
  Undoubtedly different spectators comprehended 
comic jokes and intertexuality in varying degrees, and it is unlikely that everyone interpreted 
each passage as thoroughly as I am about to do.  However, I think that higher levels of meaning 
were often available to those able to find them, and that some spectators were indeed able to do 
so.  In a sense, then, the levels which I use to describe comedy’s interaction with Sophocles may 
be understood in two ways:  they sketch, in increasing complexity, the comic poets’ use of 
Sophoclean drama in their plays; but they also correspond roughly to the level of competence 
required of spectators in order to recognize tragic references and understand their implications.  
Thus, most spectators would be expected to perceive level 1, which represents a fairly simple 
engagement with Sophocles, while fewer and fewer would perceive all of the dynamics at work 
in levels 2 and 3.  For simplicity, I will refer broadly throughout this chapter to “the audience’s” 
reactions, but it should be understood that composition of “the audience” constantly changes, 
depending on the degree of dramatic complexity involved in each example. 
 
Level 1: Collision of Registers 
 The most fundamental way for a comic poet to capitalize on tragic quotation is through a 
collision of high and low registers.  Even without a clear marker to indicate the source tragedian 
or tragedy, most tragic quotations are identifiable as such because of their relatively higher 
language and diction.  Tragic markers may include tone, word choice, phrasing, style (e.g. 
omission of the definite article), and metrical features (e.g. “heavy” iambic trimeter), and it is not 
unlikely that actors sometimes struck a tragic pose when delivering such lines.
7
  Collision occurs 
                                                 
 
6
 Revermann 2006.  Kaimio 2000: 55-7 makes a similar argument (with further bibliography in n. 12). 
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when elements like these appear in a comic context or are closely juxtaposed with clearly comic 
language.  Linguistic collision at its most basic is designed to produce humor through 
juxtaposition without necessarily lending any deeper meaning to the passage in question or even 
requiring that the audience recognize the tragic quotation specifically.  Sometimes the comic 
poet simply inserts a tragic fragment into a comic passage; at other times, he manipulates the 
tragic fragment just a little, replacing a word or phrase with something blatantly comic to 
increase the sense of collision and perhaps create a paraprosdokian joke.  These two categories, 
which ultimately describe the same phenomenon with the same effect, may be summarized as 
“collision between a tragic fragment and the comic context” and “collision within a tragic 
fragment” – and of course the two are not mutually exclusive. 
 On a slightly higher level are citations for which a familiarity with the tragic model is 
required, at least for them to have their full effect.  (It should be stressed again that even where 
the audience does not understand every level of humor operating in a given instance of 
intertextuality, the basic level of collision through juxtaposition nearly always remains.)  Such 
citations may involve a collision of ideas or images drawn from a tragic (or satyric) model – 
often a sort of “visual collision” rather than strictly linguistic.  Then there is the effect achieved 
through transfer of words originally spoken by a particular tragic character in a particular tragic 
context to a new, comic character and context.  While the transfer of the tragic to the comic lies 
at the heart of any collision of generic registers, a tragic quotation may be appropriate or 
inappropriate within a specific comic plot in varying degrees, and the result either way is usually 
humorous.  With collision of tragic and comic registers (whether linguistic collision, visual 
collision, or transfer of tragic language), the ultimate goal is generally simple absurdity or 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 For gestures and other questions of performance style, see e.g. Taplin 1977 and 1978, Green 2002, and 
Valakas 2002 (with discussion of previous scholarship). 
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perhaps bathetic deflation of the tragic expression or situation; the point of the quotation lies in 
the juxtaposition itself and not in any commentary on the tragedy per se. 
 Antiphanes fr. 1 (= Soph. fr. 754, cited by Athenaeus) offers an example of collision 
between tragedy and comedy, though the specific points of contrast are lost.  Speaker A claims to 
quote four and a half lines of Sophoclean tragedy; the title of the Sophoclean play is unknown.
8
  
Even if the lines were freely composed by Antiphanes himself in what he imagined to be 
Sophoclean style, the effect is still one of generic collision:
9
 
     (Α.) καὶ πρῶτα μὲν 
   αἴρω ποθεινὴν μᾶζαν, ἣν φερέσβιος 
   Δηὼ βροτοῖσι χάρμα δωρεῖται φίλον· 
   ἔπειτα πνικτὰ τακερὰ μηκάδων μέλη, 
   χλόην καταμπέχοντα σάρκα νεογενῆ. 
   (Β.) τί λέγεις;  (Α.) τραγῳδίαν περαίνω Σοφοκλέους. 
 
     (A.)  And first I lift 
   the much-longed-for loaf, the gift to mortals of Deo, 
   bringer of our livelihood, a well-loved delight; 
   and then the baked tender limbs of bleaters, 
   embracing green vegetables, the meat of young ones. 
   (B.) What are you saying? (A.) I’m reciting a tragedy of Sophocles! 
 The language is consistently elevated or at least unobjectionable in tragic diction,
10
 
except for the fourth line; πνικτά is never found in tragedy and τακερά only once,11 which makes 
                                                 
 
8
 Pearson 1917 suggests Triptolemus, presumably because of the reference to Deo, but there is no reason to 
think that the story of Triptolemus was concerned with full meals (including meat), as opposed to grain. 
 
 
9
 It is also possible to think, with Kock, that the tragic quotation belongs to the younger Sophocles, though 
given the fame of the elder poet, it seems more likely that his name would be used without a modifier than his 
grandson’s (Sophocles III, according to Sutton 1987: 15-6); see also Nesselrath 1990: 246 n. 15.  Antiphanes’ 
willingness to exploit the work of the elder Sophocles is demonstrated by Antiphanes fr. 228 (discussed below, pp. 
247-9). 
 
 
10
 Elevated vocabulary includes φερέσβιος, Δηώ (three others in comedy), χάρμα, βροτός (not solely, but 
overwhelmingly tragic), μηκάς (one other in Antiphanes).  καταμπέχω occurs only twice through the fourth century 
– the one cited here, and another in Antiphanes (fr. 174, from Omphale).  According to Gomperz, only ἣν – φίλον is 
certainly Sophoclean.  Pearson 1917 (who follows Gomperz in giving Sophocles φερέσβιος – φίλον) states ad loc. 
that “the tragic vocabulary seems to have been placed in a ludicrous setting…. In this connexion it is material to 
observe that, while the writers of the Middle Comedy were especially prone to direct parody…they also followed 
with zest the practice of describing homely objects in the grandiloquent style of poetry.”  The allusion to El. 1173 at 
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it unlikely that this particular line derives entirely from Sophocles.  Rather, Antiphanes himself 
has inserted at least one blatantly comic word in order to create collision within the fragment as 
well as around it.  Though he gives no details, speaker B seems puzzled or surprised at his 
companion’s words, which then have to be explained by being labeled Sophoclean, and the 
combination of tragic language with the internal collision in the fourth line makes this 
explanation both believable and absurd.  Thus, even though we have nothing of the surrounding 
context (and the title of the play, Ἄγροικος, tells us little12), it is safe to suppose a collision of 
registers both within and between the tragic quotation and whatever came before it.  Presumably 
there was something humorous in seeing one comic character strike a tragic pose only to be met 
with his companion’s total unfamiliarity with the tragic source.13 
 In the case of Antiphanes, we can be fairly sure that a collision of the tragic and comic 
genres is intended, even if we can no longer perceive all the details.  Passages of Alexis and of 
Aristophanes’ Lysistrata activate a similar collision, incorporating as well a move from tragic 
generality to comic specificity.
14
  Each of these passages exploits one particular example of a 
more widely represented tragic idiom: a gnomic generalization about a certain πᾶν γένος 
(whether an ethnic group or some other), usually in the form of a negative stereotype.  Antigone 
1055 and Soph. fr. 587 (from Tereus) are two examples, though such statements are not limited 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ar. fr. 468 may hinge on a similar collision of registers (Aristophanes’ λῆρος is foreign to tragedy), though in a play 
called Polyidus the sentiment may have had serious potential as well. 
 
 
11
 Though τακερός is used occasionally by the lyric poets, it occurs elsewhere in tragedy only in Eur. fr. 65.38 
in Austin 1968 (= Eur. fr. 370.38 TrGF): τακερὰ μέλεα; but τακερά here is conjectured by analogy with Antiphanes 
fr. 1, and TrGF prints .ακ..α μέλεα. 
 
 
12
 Nesselrath 1990: 246 thinks that Speaker B is the titular ἄγροικος and compares Antiphanes’ use of 
Sophocles to Axionicus’ use of Euripides in his Φιλευριπίδης. 
 
 
13
 Cf. the interplay in Thesm. between the parodic Euripides and his Kinsman on the one hand and the over-
literal, unliterary Critylla on the other. 
 
 
14
 Cf. Eupolis fr. 234: Soph. Ant. 388. 
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to Sophocles.
15
  In comedy, this tragic idiom is picked up by Alexis fr. 67, which possibly draws 
on Soph. fr. 587 above all: 
  Soph. fr. 587: φιλάργυρον μὲν πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον γένος 
 
    For the whole race of barbarians loves money 
 
  Alexis fr. 67: ἀεὶ φιλόμυρον πᾶν τὸ Σάρδεων γένος 
 
    The whole race of Sardians is always fond of unguents
16
 
The phrasing of these two passages is very similar and perhaps features a deliberate play on 
φιλάργυρον / φιλόμυρον.  Alexis retains the basic word-order of fr. 587, replacing φιλάργυρον 
and identifying the particular type of barbarians (Sardians).  At the same time as he makes his 
statement more specific, Alexis emphasizes the universality inherent in all stereotypes by 
including ἀεί as well as πᾶν; the statement is simultaneously broadened and narrowed to the 
whole of the Sardian race all the time.  φιλόμυρον also plays into a stereotype arguably less 
severe than that of the Sophoclean fragment.  We do not know in what sense the Thracians of 
Tereus were φιλάργυρον, but in Antigone, Creon accuses Teiresias of accepting bribes in 
exchange for negative prophetic answers – a fairly serious charge between two important men.  
Alexis’ φιλόμυρον is likely to denote luxury rather than political bribery, and seems to have been 
associated with the Sardians in particular.
17
  This is a fairly simple conversion, then, from the 
graver and more generalizing tragic sententia to the more specific and perhaps slighter criticism 
of Sardis; though Sophocles fr. 587 appears to be Alexis’ most immediate model, the audience 
                                                 
 
15
 E.g. Eur. Andr. 173, Phoen. 356, IA 520 (though the second does not appear to be a negative stereotype). 
 
 
16
 The translation is mine.  Soph. fr. 587 is cited by Stobaeus, Alexis fr. 67 by Athenaeus (from a play called 
Ἐκπωματοποιός). 
 
 
17
 See PCG II ad loc.; Ant. 1037-8 associates Sardis specifically with electrum, for which Jebb 1073f.n. also 
cites Hdt. 1.50. 
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need only recognize a tragic habit rather than a specific passage in order to appreciate the 
conversion. 
 An early passage of Lysistrata uses another variation of this tragic idiom that recalls 
Sophocles fr. 945 (which unfortunately cannot be placed in any play).  As Lysistrata struggles to 
win the other women over to her plan for a sex-strike, she eventually throws up her hands in 
frustration over the lasciviousness of womankind (137-9):
18
 
  Soph. fr. 945:  ὦ θνητὸν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ταλαίπωρον γένος, 
     ὡς οὐδέν ἐσμεν πλὴν σκιαῖς ἐοικότες, 
     βάρος περισσὸν γῆς ἀναστρωφώμενοι 
 
     O mortal and miserable race of men, 
     since we are nothing but creatures like shadows, 
     walking about as a superfluous burden upon the earth! 
 
  Ar. Lys. 137-9:  ὢ παγκατάπυγον θἠμέτερον ἅπαν γένος. 
     οὐκ ἐτὸς ἀφ’ ἡμῶν εἰσιν αἱ τραγῳδίαι. 
     οὐδὲν γάρ ἐσμεν πλὴν Ποσειδῶν καὶ σκάφη. 
 
     Oh what a low and horny race are we! 
     No wonder tragedies get written about us: 
     we’re nothing but Poseidon and a tub. 
Instead of the more usual third-person statement about another race, the speaker in each of these 
passages apostrophizes
19
 his or her own race and explains the reason for the pessimistic 
exclamation using the phrase οὐδέν ἐσμεν πλήν.  That these features are absent from the other 
examples in Sophocles and Alexis, as well as Euripides, allows us to connect Lysistrata 137-9 
with Soph. fr. 945. 
                                                 
 
18
 The fragment is preserved by Stobaeus; scholia to Lys. 138 and 139 detect a reference to Tyro, and on this 
basis, Nauck (followed by Pearson 1917) suspects that the Sophoclean fragment is also from Tyro.  See TrGF IV ad 
loc. for other possible reminiscences of the fragment outside of drama. 
 
 
19
 We are told that two other apostrophes, El. 86 and 289, were parodied by Pherecrates (fr. 141) and 
Aristophanes (fr. 175), though the parodies themselves do not survive. 
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 An internal collision of registers is achieved immediately by the insertion of 
παγκατάπυγον.20  In the middle line, instead of continuing the pathetic exclamation, Lysistrata 
speculates further about the results of feminine lust; the mention of tragedy prepares for the joke 
on Ποσειδῶν καὶ σκάφη in the final clause.  Line 138 both flags the surrounding lines as tragic 
and provides a link between Lysistrata’s assessment of the female race and Sophocles’ treatment 
of Tyro, which is collapsed into two keywords, Ποσειδῶν καὶ σκάφη, the implication being that 
that play exemplified female behavior such as is currently being demonstrated on the 
Aristophanic stage.
21
  As in the previous example, Aristophanes’ manipulation of the tragic 
apostrophe is accompanied by a move from general to specific; θἠμέτερον ἅπαν γένος pokes fun 
at the generality of tragic sententiae by simultaneously broadening and narrowing the subject of 
discussion to the whole of the female race.  What began as a tragic lament about the human 
condition has become a comic cliché describing women’s promiscuity, with specific jabs at 
Sophocles’ Tyro and his habit of dramatically stereotyping a πᾶν γένος of one kind or another.22 
 This passage from Aristophanes’ Lysistrata achieves a simple collision of registers by 
concentrating on a particular mannerism of Sophoclean and tragic drama; it also relies in part on 
a visual theme of the Tyro plays (the exposure of the twins in a boat and perhaps their later 
                                                 
 
20
 For similar jokes based on a change of registers in the middle of a quotation, cf. Cratinus Minor fr. 4 on Soph. 
fr. 934, Eriphus fr. 1 on Soph. Trach. 1, and both Eupolis fr. 41 and Ar. fr. 427 on Soph. fr. 890 (which Rau 1967: 
208 describes as “Ausrufe tragischer Klage, komische Antworten”). 
 
 
21
 That Tyro was raped has no bearing on Aristophanes’ comic program; as the scholion explains, Poseidon and 
the skiff are taken jointly to represent a woman’s wantonness (here, sleeping with someone other than her husband) 
and guile in escaping responsibility (by exposing her illegitimate children).  Cf. Sommerstein 1990 ad loc.: “To the 
disillusioned Lysistrata all women now seem to resemble Tyro in their lustfulness (“Poseidon”) and their 
irresponsibility (“a tub”…).” 
 
 
22
 A version of the πᾶν γένος idiom is also incorporated into Ar. Av. 1240, which plays with another Sophoclean 
expression (the mattock of Zeus, also found in Aeschylus, but attributed by the scholion here to Sophocles’ Chryses 
fr. 727). 
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recognition through that token
23).  Aristophanes creates a similar “imagistic” collision with what 
must have been a memorable scene in Sophocles’ Inachus, probably a satyr play, which serves as 
the subtext for a passing joke at Ecclesiazusae 79-81.
24
  One of the women has come to the 
meeting armed with a staff belonging to a man named (or nicknamed) Lamius.
25
  The man’s 
name and staff together easily identify him with the female bogey Lamia.
26
  Praxagora carries the 
monster imagery a step further by comparing the man to Argus, who was an actual character in 
Sophocles’ play: 
    νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρ’, ἐπιτήδειός γ’ ἂν ἦν 
    τὴν τοῦ πανόπτου διφθέραν ἐνημμένος 
    εἴπερ τις ἄλλος βουκολεῖν τὸν δήμιον. 
 
    By Zeus the Savior, if he wore 
    old All-Eyes’ leather jacket he’d be the very man 
    to provide fodder for the public executioner. 
The thought is rather obscure, but Praxagora seems to imagine Lamius wearing the same leather 
garment as Argus; this particular mode of dress, combined with his stick and his suggestive 
name, would somehow make him an appropriate person to attend the executioner, whatever that 
means.
27
  A simple collision of registers resides in the word βουκολεῖν, which properly refers to 
                                                 
 
23
 See Arist. Poet. 1454b25 for the recognition by means of the σκάφη. 
 
 
24
 This passage is listed in TrGF IV as Soph. fr. 281.  Scholia to Eccl. 80 and 81 note the allusion to Inachus; 
Nauck relates this to 281a (which describes Argus’ appearance on stage). 
 
 
25
 For Lamius see Sommerstein 1998: 77n. 
 
 
26
 Sommerstein 1998: 78n.  Other features that identify Lamius with Argus are the farting mentioned in line 79 
and the fact that he was caught napping by the woman who took his staff.  Ar. Ach. 390 (cf. Soph. fr. 269c.19-20) 
and Cratinus fr. 161 (significantly, from his Panoptai) may also be visual reminiscences of Inachus; if so, they 
would push back the terminus ante quem of Sophocles’ play considerably.  For other possible echoes of Sophoclean 
scenes, cf. Nub. 256-7: Soph. Athamas, Antiphanes fr. 189.8-12, 23: Soph. Epigonoi.  Nub. 555-6 suggests that 
Phrynichus parodied a scene from an Andromeda, possibly Sophocles’ (so Webster).  Lys. 563-4 draws on a recent 
depiction of Tereus armed like a Thracian, probably Sophocles’, since he seems to have been the first to make 
Tereus a Thracian (see below, pp. 273-5); by contrast, Ar. fr. 936 speaks of the “Daulian nightingale,” apparently 
not alluding to the Sophoclean version. 
 
 
27
 Sommerstein 1998: 81n.  thinks that τὸν δήμιον denotes one suitable to be executed, but the scholion suggests 
that either Lamius or Argus is to be imagined as a prison guard (αἰνίττεται δὲ ὡς ὄντος αὐτοῦ δεσμοφύλακος).  On 
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cowherding; it could have been used literally in Inachus, where Io was turned into a cow and 
subsequently entrusted to Argus, who thereby became a cowherd and possibly a δήμιος.  Since 
Praxagora is not talking about actual cowherding, the word must now be taken metaphorically 
and probably jars with the modern, civic context of the comedy; δήμιος, too, if it was used in 
Inachus with a meaning other than “executioner,” must now be taken as a fifth-century civic 
term.  Thus, two ideas that may have fit together well enough in Sophocles (βουκολεῖν, δήμιος) 
are made to collide with one another, with βουκολεῖν still firmly attached to its mythical and 
satyric context and δήμιος suddenly importing contemporary Athens. 
 This example is intriguing insofar as it deals with Sophoclean drama in a manner almost 
exactly opposite to comedy’s usual method:  where tragic imagery is often literalized and 
concretized, here a satyric character is relegated to the imagination and literal language taken 
metaphorically.  Argus was an actual character in Sophocles’ play, literally πανόπτης with his 
hundred eyes,
28
 and we are told that he appeared on stage singing (fr. 281a), which 
simultaneously gives good reason to believe that this play was satyric rather than tragic and 
explains why Argus was memorable enough for Aristophanes to use him in a comedy.  As there 
was certainly something humorous about his first appearance on the Sophoclean stage, so 
Aristophanes’ appropriation of this figure cannot operate straightforwardly in terms of 
juxtaposition and deflation.  He does not bring Argus back on stage, for instance, partly because 
there is no place for that in his comedy but also because it has already been done; Argus cannot 
                                                                                                                                                             
τὸν δήμιον vs. τὸ δήμιον, see Sommerstein 1998 ad loc. (though his objection that τὸ δήμιον in this sense does not 
appear in comedy is invalid since we are dealing with paratragedy, and this usage is paralleled in tragedy by Aesch. 
Supp. 370, 699; on the other hand, a parodist could certainly adapt tragic τὸ δήμιον to τὸν δήμιον for the purposes of 
his comedy). 
 
 
28
 Cf. Aesch. Supp. 303-5.  Ar. Ach. 435 applies the epithet punningly to Zeus. 
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be concretized or even trivialized because Sophocles (and perhaps Cratinus
29
) seems to have 
done just those things to him.  What Aristophanes can do instead is use his audience’s visual 
recollection of that memorable scene to create a passing joke about a contemporary Athenian.  
The mental images of Lamius on the one hand and Argus on the other are conjured up side-by-
side and the audience invited to compare the two – and to find them remarkably similar.  Thus 
Lamius is made (though only in our imagination) to look as silly as Sophocles’ Argus 
undoubtedly did.  Rather than being the target of deflation, Sophocles’ character is deployed 
constructively (albeit on the premise that he was silly to begin with) to make Aristophanes’ 
character look even sillier. 
 Frogs 665 moves beyond simple linguistic and imagistic collision to exploit the humor 
latent in both appropriate and inappropriate applications of tragic language.  The line in question 
is a quotation from Sophocles’ Laocoon (fr. 371, cited by the scholion to line 665), here placed 
in the middle of the scene in which Aeacus beats Xanthias and Dionysus by turns as a test of 
divinity.  Both victims cry out as they are struck, but immediately devise some spurious 
justification for their cries.  Dionysus first claims to be quoting from Hipponax (a prayer to 
Apollo, as it happens), and then resorts to Sophocles (664-6): 
    Δι. Πόσειδον – 
    Ξα.        ἤλγησέν τις. 
    Δι. ὃς Αἰγαίου πρωνὸς ἢ γλαυκᾶς μέδεις 
     ἁλὸς ἐν βένθεσιν.30 
 
    Di. Poseidon! 
                                                 
 
29
 One could legitimately ask why Cratinus would have brought Argus on stage after Sophocles’ treatment (as 
the title of his play suggests he did).  Perhaps a plurality of Argus-figures (Panoptai) was a sufficiently humorous 
extension of what Sophocles had done.  Unfortunately, Bakola 2010 has nothing to say about this play . 
 
 
30
 The final three words may or may not belong to Sophocles; the scholion quotes the fragment in full as 
Πόσειδον, ὃς Αἰγαίου νέμεις πρῶνας ἢ γλαυκᾶς μέδεις εὐανέμου λίμνας ἐφ’ ὑψηλαῖς σπιλάδεσσι †στομάτων†.  
Following Hermann, van Leeuwen 1968a reverses the speakers and transposes the last three words to the end of 664 
(which completes the trimeter, but still leaves 665 up in the air metrically); see Rau 1967: 119 for refutation of this 
position.  See also Pearson 1917 ad loc. for the textual difficulties with this fragment and the Aristophanic text. 
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    Xa. Somebody felt that! 
    Di. –who hold sway 
     on the cape of Aegae or in 
     the depths of the deep blue sea. 
As a result of this Sophoclean completion, Aeacus finally gives up and decides to take the two 
culprits inside to let Hades and Persephone determine which is the god. 
 The use of this tragic quotation falls into line with the other jokes in this scene, in which 
a character must devise on the spot a specious explanation for his interjections.  But the tragic 
quotation would stand out as a foreign element in the comic context most immediately because 
of the change of meter;
31
 it is no longer iambic trimeter, as the Hipponactean line was, and this 
makes it unnecessary for Aristophanes to name the source:  the collision of high and low 
registers is even more obvious with a lyric quotation than an iambic one.  In addition, the transfer 
of this quotation to the comic Dionysus is both appropriate and inappropriate to his character.  It 
is manifestly appropriate that the god of the theater should be able to quote from a tragedy off the 
top of his head, and one could even argue that this serves as a sort of shout-out to Sophocles as 
the preeminent poet of the theater, the one tragedian Dionysus should quote off the top of his 
head.  At the same time, there is something inherently ridiculous about the idea of a god praying 
(or pretending to pray) to another god,
32
 as Dionysus does here to Apollo and then Poseidon.  In 
terms of the dramatic action, Aeacus could have taken either of these facts as proof of Dionysus’ 
mortality or immortality:  mortality, in that he prays to the gods; immortality, in that (as the god 
of drama) he is so ready to quote from tragedy.  Perhaps that is why Aeacus chooses this moment 
                                                 
 
31
 Syncopated iambs?  Snell (TrGF IV) suggests that the meter of the original may have been something like: 
˰pher cr | cr ia ia | ia ˰pher, but Aristophanes’ rearrangement of the language and the textual difficulties surrounding 
the last three words (see previous n.) make it difficult to puzzle out the intended comic meter.  Schlesinger 1936: 
305 puts it in class 4 (passages identifiable by vocabulary), but he considers meter a less reliable criterion in general. 
 
 
32
 Cf. Ar. Av. 1614, where Poseidon interjects an oath by himself, and possibly Pax 433-59, where Hermes 
pours a libation to himself and several other gods (though not all editors have attributed these lines to Hermes). 
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to throw up his hands in despair and turn the matter over to Hades.  Aristophanes’ comedy 
profits from both appropriate and inappropriate applications of the tragic line. 
 A very similar dynamic may be at work in Thesmophoriazusae 870, an intriguing 
example since it falls in the midst of one of the most extensive parodies of Euripides in extant 
Aristophanes.
33
  The Kinsman has just begun to play “the new Helen.”  He gives his identity, 
parentage, and current location, ignoring the critical reactions of Critylla; as he tells of his fear 
for his “wretched husband, Menelaus” and hope of rescue thence, he slips in a hemistich from 
Sophocles’ Peleus (fr. 493, cited by the scholion to line 870):34 
   Κη. ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ αἰκάλλει τι καρδίαν ἐμήν. 
    μὴ ψεῦσον, ὦ Ζεῦ, τῆς ἐπιούσης ἐλπίδος. 
 
  Kinsman Yet something, as it were, tickles at my heart; 
    deceive me not, o Zeus, in my nascent hope! 
According to the scholion, Sophocles’ original line ran μὴ ψεῦσον, ὦ Ζεῦ· μή μ’ ἕλῃς ἄνευ 
δορός; possible speakers are Peleus himself or perhaps more likely Neoptolemus, and at any rate, 
given the spear, the line must have been delivered by a male warrior-figure – quite unlike the 
Kinsman in his current guise. 
 As it stands in Aristophanes, the quotation is not especially conspicuous, and for 
spectators unacquainted with that particular part of Peleus, the quotation would have sounded 
much like its surrounding Euripidean context.  If they remembered the Sophoclean scene, 
however, or recalled how the line ended – we cannot know just how memorable this passage 
                                                 
 
33
 Thesm. 21 may be another such example.  The Kinsman responds to Euripides’ intellectual pretentiousness 
with an allusion to tragedy; the scholion insists that it is from Sophocles’ Locrian Ajax (fr. 14), though Euripides 
may also have written something similar and it is attributed to him at Ar. fr. 323.  It would be appropriate for the 
Kinsman to quote Euripides on this point; it would be ironic to quote Sophocles. 
 
 
34
 These lines are simply labeled paratragic by Schlesinger 1937: 295 n. 4 – perhaps because they are not 
flagged as Sophoclean? 
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was
35
 – then they might have appreciated an extra gender-bending joke that contributes a little to 
the Kinsman’s characterization.  Dressed as he is in a woman’s garb, emulating the most 
beautiful woman in the world, the Kinsman’s eye for feminine paratragedy falters and his mind 
veers toward a more “masculine” scene in which a warrior prays, as it appears, to go down 
fighting.
36
  But he catches himself after the first hemistich and closes with something more 
appropriate to his pretended situation as Helen, dispensing with the spear in favor of “hope;” the 
fact that the tragic quotation ends at a punctuated caesura (here marked by a comma, in the 
fragment by a high dot) suggests that the Kinsman would pause after Ζεῦ, creating a moment of 
suspense for the audience as they wait to see whether he will give himself away by completing 
the quotation correctly.  Fortunately for the Kinsman, Euripides shows up at line 871 and saves 
him from the need for further improvisation. 
 My final example comes from Aristophanes’ Birds and contains most of the dynamics 
which I have discussed in this first section: collision of registers with the comic context and 
within the quotation, juxtaposition of tragic and comic images, paraprosdokian humor, and even 
mockery of Sophoclean style through free composition.  At Birds 851-8, after Peisetaerus has 
                                                 
 
35
 For the memorability of even simple phrases, consider the resonance of “Frankly, my dear…” or “I’ll be 
back” in almost any modern cinematic context.  The rare grammatical oddity of μή with the aorist imperative, noted 
by the Antiatticist, may have contributed to this passage’s memorability . 
 
 
36
 Pearson 1917 ad loc. considers possible interpretations of  ἄνευ δορός: “The meaning might conceivably be 
‘don’t slay me unarmed,’ as in Hom. Φ 50 γυμνόν, ἄτερ κόρυθός τε καὶ ἀσπίδος, οὐδ’ ἔχεν ἔγχος: but, apart from 
other objections, δόρυ was a weapon of offence.  We should interpret rather ‘without (using) the sword,’ i.e. far 
from battle; it is the prayer of the old warrior to hear once more the clash of arms…. On the other hand, δόρυ has not 
yet reached the meaning ‘war’ or ‘battle’ so decisively as e.g. in Eur. Ion 997…”  I am not sure how he can make 
this last statement, since Peleus is undated (the terminus ante quem being 424 B.C.); still, it is true that the phrase 
ἄνευ δορός generally refers to an actual spear rather than figurative “violence” (Aesch. fr. 132c.4, Sept. 399, Eum. 
289, Soph. frr. 210, 941), though Thuc. 1.128.7 uses ἑλεῖν δορί to mean “capture by force of arms.”  It has been 
suggested to me that μή μ’ ἕλῃς ἄνευ δορός could be idiomatic for “do not deceive me” (deception being the chief 
way to capture or destroy someone without using a spear).  Aside from the fact that this would be redundant coming 
after μῆ ψεῦσον, I have not found a parallel use of ἑλεῖν ἄνευ δορός to confirm this usage, and it seems unlikely that 
the audience could take the meaning if it were not well established as an idiom. 
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given his city a new name and patron deity, he proclaims an initiatory sacrifice.  As he waits for 
the necessary equipment, the chorus sings a short strophe: 
    ὁμορροθῶ, συνθέλω, 
    συμπαραινέσας ἔχω 
    προσόδια μεγάλα σεμνὰ προσιέναι θεοῖ- 
    σιν, ἅμα δὲ προσέτι χάριτος ἕνε- 
    κα προβάτιόν τι θύειν. 
    ἴτω ἴτω ἴτω δὲ Πυθιὰς βοά, 
    συναυλείτω δὲ Χαῖρις ᾠδᾷ. 
 
    I am with you, I concur, 
    I hereby endorse your advice 
    to approach the gods with grand and solemn hymns 
    as we curry their favor as well 
    by sacrificing a wee sheep. 
    Up up up with a Pythian cry, 
    and let Chaeris pipe as we sing. 
 Scholia on these lines indicate that the passage draws on Sophocles’ Peleus.  More 
specifically, the scholion to line 851, keyed to the word ὁμορροθῶ, reads Σοφοκλέους ἐκ 
Πηλέως, while those to 855 (προβάτιον)37 and 857 (Πυθιὰς βοά) read simply τοῦτο ἐκ Πηλέως.  
Radt recognizes two fragments in this passage (lines 851-2 = fr. 489; 857 = fr. 490),
38
 and while 
we cannot be certain, they may originally have occurred quite close together, as they do here.  
That none of the scholia actually quotes the original tragic passage causes immediate difficulty in 
determining just how much of this passage is really Sophoclean.  Except for several elements in 
lines 853-6, the language is Sophoclean,
39
 which could mean equally that it was written by 
Sophocles or that Aristophanes did a good job composing in the manner of Sophocles.  But (as 
                                                 
 
37
 προβάτιόν is Bentley’s metrically necessary correction of προβάτόν.  As a diminutive is highly unlikely in 
tragedy, Radt (TrGF IV) suggests that the scholion to this line was misplaced and should have been at line 857 
instead. 
 
 
38
 See TrGF IV for other proposed attributions of the opening lines to Sophocles (from ὁμορροθῶ, συνθέλω 
alone to ὁμορροθῶ… θεοῖσιν).  Several editors relate frr. 489 and 490 closely, and it is possible that both belong to 
the same ode as fr. 491.  If so, Av. 851-8 might also exploit the implications of a Sophoclean hyporcheme; see 
below, pp. 261-4. 
 
 
39
 Dunbar 1995 ad loc. notes the paratragic quality of the meter (esp. the syncopated iambic dimeters). 
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with Antiphanes fr. 1 above), the point of the parody remains either way, since the passage plays 
with a Sophoclean style of writing. 
 Both the content and the style of the tragic language fit well with the comic context:  that 
is, the sentiments of enthusiastic unanimity and celebratory sacrifice are appropriate to the 
dramatic action of Birds at this point, and particulars of the language suit the avian chorus nicely.  
Additionally, a bit of Aristophanes’ own free composition between the two fragments 
exaggerates certain aspects of Sophocles’ lyric style. 
 Stylistically, the passage gives a strong overall impression of amplification.  The first two 
lines express the same idea three times through verbs with prefixes expressing “togetherness.”  
Sophocles’ actual use of these words in other plays supports the idea that this type of 
repetitiveness and pleonasm might have been considered characteristic of his style.
40
  ὁμορροθέω 
in combination with at least one συν-compound occurs elsewhere in Sophoclean drama at 
Antigone 536-7 (Ismene’s attempted confession, in which she uses three verbs to claim a share of 
the blame; she uses ξύμπλουν at 541).41  The relatively rare word συμπαραινέω appears again in 
Soph. fr. 576,
42
 while the periphrastic construction of ἔχω with a participle is a particularly 
familiar feature of Sophoclean diction
43
 – all of which may explain why Radt attributes the first 
                                                 
 
40
 Cf. also the repetition of ὦ πόλις πόλις at OT 629 and Phil. 1213, mimicked by Ar. Ach. 27 and Eupolis fr. 
219.  The comic poets may also have been interested in this phrase as an apostrophe; cf n. 19 above.  For repetition 
in a different ode of Sophocles, see Stokes 1979. 
 
 
41
 Griffith 1999 ad loc. notes that “the prefixes (ξυμ-μετα-) belong with φέρω too.”  The only other occurrence 
of ὁμορροθέω in fifth-century drama is Eur. Or. 530.  Cf. also ξυπονήσεις καὶ ξυνεργάσῃ at 41, συνθάπτειν θέλω 
καὶ ξυμπονεῖν at Soph. Aj. 1378-9; Euripides has similar repetitions, e.g. at Hel. 1067-8.  For Sophocles’ fondness 
for συν- compounds, see Stanford 1963: 265 n. 11. 
 
 
42
 Elsewhere in fifth-century drama only at Ar. Ran. 687. 
 
 
43
 Noted by Rau 1967: 197 and Dunbar 1995 ad loc. 
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two lines in their entirety to Sophocles
44
 (while the scholion, strictly speaking, only comments on 
ὁμορροθῶ). 
 Though the middle three lines look less tragic or paratragic,
45
 the repetition of προσ- and 
προ- may be a similar commentary on Sophoclean style, counterpart to the parody of συν-
compounds in the first two lines, and at any rate, excessive alliteration and homoioteleuton 
effectively deflate the tragic tone.
46
  Of the final two lines, the first is given to Sophocles by Radt 
as fr. 490, minus two ἴτω’s; in fact, it might be reasonable to give him one more ἴτω (as Dunbar 
suggests
47
), for the doubling of that verb is also attested twice in Antigone (1328, 1331).  Though 
the last line must be Aristophanes’ own composition, at least as far as the name Chairis goes,48 it 
almost appears that he has arranged 857-8 as a rhyming couplet, and correspondences between 
individual words (ἴτω ἴτω ἴτω/συναυλείτω; δὲ/δὲ; Πυθιὰς/Χαῖρις; βοά/ᾠδᾷ49) in each line carry 
the normal Greek taste for parisosis and antithesis to an extreme.  So while the scholia give us 
reason to attribute some of these features directly to Sophocles in Peleus, there may also be 
deliberate allusion to Sophoclean mannerisms more generally.  Even if there is no specific 
                                                 
 
44
 See Dunbar 1995: 851-8n. for other judgments on how much of this passage is really Sophoclean. 
 
 
45
 But Dunbar 1995: 853-4n. feels that Aristophanes “is probably boldly extending, in the lyric manner, the fig. 
etym. πρόσοδον προσέρχομαι.”  The high style is then broken by 856 (where προσέτι and προβάτιον are alien to 
tragedy).  For a similar combination of unmarked quotation and free paratragic composition, cf. e.g. Ar. Thesm. 177-
80. 
 
 
46
 One must of course expect a certain degree of homoioteleuton in an inflected language, but the close 
placement of words with common endings (e.g. προσόδια μεγάλα σεμνά), the inclusion of indeclinable words that 
happen to have that same ending (ἅμα, ἕνεκα), and the alliteration of p’s suggest that the feature is not accidental 
here.  For both repetition and rhyming cf. Ar. Plut. 637 (in a Sophoclean context): λέγεις μοι χαράν, λέγεις μοι βοᾶν. 
 
 
47
 Pearson 1917 ad loc. also gives Sophocles two ἴτω’s, but adds θεῷ at the end of the line; the codd. read τῷ 
θεῷ, but other editors follow Dindorf in deleting these words.  Though Eur. El. 879 (ἀλλ’ ἴτω ξύναυλος βοὰ χαρᾷ) 
may also lurk behind 857-8, we have no reason to doubt the scholion’s attribution to Sophocles’ Peleus, and in fact 
συναυλείτω here is Hermann’s conjecture for συνᾳδέτω. 
 
 
48
 Schlesinger 1937: 300 n. 30 thinks that the line is Sophoclean except for Χαῖρις. 
 
 
49
 With all due caveats regarding our ignorance of Greek pronunciation (e.g. ά versus ᾷ), the similarities of word 
type and formation are remarkable. 
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reference to his style, the excessive repetition on all levels still has the effect of over-decorating 
the tragic lines to the point of absurdity. 
 If Aristophanes is going out of his way to make the song sound Sophoclean, then we may 
ask why.  One might argue that quoting tragedy lends dramatic weight to the birds’ support for 
Peisetaerus.  However, parodic intent seems clear:  lines 851-2 emphasize the redundancy of 
tragic tricola and words compounded with the same prefix, while 857 takes advantage of a 
recognizable Sophoclean tendency to duplicate the word ἴτω.50  The tragic lines are surely 
deflated by being transferred to a chorus of birds who seem to delight in hyperbolic expressions 
of anger or approval.
51
  The three lines in the middle contribute to the deflation through internal 
juxtaposition of registers, sandwiching lower, more mundane language between the elevated 
diction, which is made to look all the more grandiose by comparison.
52
  On the level of “visual 
collision,” Aristophanes toys with the common description of an oared ship as “flying;” the 
image, here implied by the birds’ use of the word ὁμορροθῶ, is peculiarly concretized and 
subverted by the presence on stage of birds who might actually “row” in unison with their 
wings.
53
  If the original Sophoclean chorus was agreeing to something more grave, 853-5 here 
may function as a sort of paraprosdokian joke:  the birds agree wholeheartedly with Peisetaerus’ 
decision – to sacrifice a sheep (and a diminutive sheep at that!).54  Lines 856-7 operate the same 
                                                 
 
50
 For similar duplication, see Aj. 627, 694-5; Trach. 96, 98, 221-2, 655; OT 1098. 
 
 
51
 Cf. their negative reaction at 310ff. to the two strangers and Tereus’ complicity in their scheme. 
 
 
52
 There is similar deflation through juxtaposition in the “Euripidean” lyrics of Frogs (see e.g. Silk 1993). 
 
 
53
 And the word may well have applied originally to sailors.  Though the literal meaning of the word may not 
have been foremost in a hearer’s mind, there is no reason to think that it could not have been evoked in an 
appropriate context; cf. Mitchell-Boyask 2007: 111:  “[a]n altered context can allow dead metaphors to be 
resurrected and inhabit human discourse with new force.”  For the association of flying and sailing, see e.g. Hes. 
WD 627, Pherecrates fr. 23, Ar. Av. 1203 (with Σ), 1229. 
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way: Πυθιὰς βοά55 recalls the lofty tone of a paean but turns unexpectedly into a joke on the 
aulete Chairis, and this in turn leads Peisetaerus to remark on the absurdity of a bird playing the 
aulos, which effectively caps off Aristophanes’ project of deflation. 
 
Level 2: Appropriation and Conversion 
 I have chosen the terms “appropriation” and “conversion” to describe the scenes treated 
in this section because they involve a process of change and assimilation, as opposed to simple 
collision.  In order for a thing to be taken over for a new purpose, to be converted into something 
else, it needs to lose certain elements and gain certain others.  We have already seen some of this 
at work in the last section, especially where the comic poet wanted to create juxtaposition within 
a tragic quotation; presumably there was not already a collision of registers within the quotation, 
so the comic poet had to change something to make that happen.  But the tragic quotations 
discussed in the last section function primarily as vehicles for creating amusing collisions.  In the 
current section, we will examine tragic quotations that hold some interest for the comic poet 
outside their loftiness of tone or diction.  These are passages contain a tragic idea that it was 
worthwhile to activate and adapt in more thorough and subtle ways than we saw in the previous 
section. 
 The process of recasting or redeploying a tragic idea necessarily entails transfer as well as 
change, and so in a sense we have already seen some of this as well.  But transfer at its most 
basic is just a type of juxtaposition – the mental juxtaposition of Lamius and Argus, for example.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
54
 Sommerstein 1987: 856n.: “on so important an occasion as the foundation of a city one might have expected 
an ox (if not several).  This anticlimax, however, is at once capped by another as the victim proves to be an even 
cheaper one, a goat.”  The diminutive is untragic, but in fact πρόβατον is also foreign to tragedy (though it does 
appear occasionally in Pindar). 
 
 
55
 Πυθιάς is strange in this context as well, since Peisetaerus has just established new bird-gods for his city in 
place of the Olympians, a theme which will be elaborated more fully in subsequent passages. 
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The passages discussed in this section involve both transfer and adaptation; they seem to 
presume that the audience will not only recognize the quotation’s relatively higher register but 
also its source and perhaps even some of the implications it had in its original context.  So while 
the fundamental tragic idea is transferred straightforwardly to comedy, many of its attendant 
details and implications are recast to suit the new context.  One rather surprising result of this – 
and another reason for treating these passages as a step up from the ones before – is the complete 
reversal or subversion of the original idea.  Even while the core is retained, its meaning is 
significantly altered and often expressed in comic terms (e.g. a political image becomes a 
description of food and drink). 
 Several of the passages in this section deal with imagery or the visual aspect of 
performance.  Two important methods of conversion that bear on this visual aspect are 
concretization and what I will be calling “mundanization.”  The first of these is a regular comic 
technique and requires little in the way of explanation:  the comic poet realizes and often puts on 
stage something that was only thought about or described in tragedy.  Mundanization takes this 
dynamic a step further by not only making the metaphor (say) a visual reality but even bringing 
it specifically into the “real world.”  In other words, the comic poet carries the metaphor to its 
extreme logical conclusion and thereby subjects it to whatever humble, mundane circumstances 
that might entail.  In all of these cases – conversion through adaptation, concretization, or 
mundanization – the comic poet appropriates the tragic idea and puts it to work somehow, 
redeploying it in such a way that it becomes no longer tragic at all but entirely comic. 
 My first example is a series of comic passages that all quote the same Sophoclean 
examplar; they begin by effecting simple collisions of registers and paraprosdokian humor, but 
they also use the quotation to create a quintessentially comic feature, the comic list. 
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 Sophocles fr. 890, from his Epigonoi, belongs to an anapaestic description of Argos as it 
prepares for war against Thebes:
56
 
    [c. 5]ω . [c. 3] π . . [ 
    [.(.)]α γὰρ στ[.(.)] . ων ὀξεια . . [ 
    πρίστις . [(.)]θίου βρύκουσα . [ 
    [.]υρειδα . [.]νης πάσης . . [ 
     θήγουσ’ αἴθ[ω]να σίδηρον. 
    ἄφαλοι δὲ κυναῖ κ[.(.)]κραν[ 
    φοινικοβαφεῖς σεί[ο]υσι λό[φους, 
    θωρακοφόροισι δ’ ὑφαντῆ[ρες 
    κινοῦσι σοφῆς κερκίδος ὕμνους, 
    ἣ τοὺς εὕδοντας ἐγείρει. 
    κολλᾷ δ’ ἅρματος [ἄ]ν[τυ]γα[ 
    [β]λῆτρόν θ’ ἁψῖδαθ[c. 5] ον[ 
    [c. 5] ιππ[c. 3] . [c. 7] . . [ 
    [c. 5] . τ . [c. 11] . . . [ 
 
    For the sharp saw [is passing through 
    tree-trunks (?)], making a gnashing noise [like the roar of the sea(?)], 
    and [the effort (?)] of every wh[etst]one is engaged (?) 
    in sharpening the glittering steel; 
    and helmets without covering plates [      ] 
    are shaking their crimson-dyed crests, 
    and for the wearers of corslets the weave[rs] 
    are making the clever shuttle raies its song, 
    which wakes men from sleep; 
    and [the carpenter] is gluing the chariot’s [r]a[i]l, 
    and its linchpins, and its wheel-rims… 
The passage clearly contains a number of colorful and distinctive words (e.g. φοινικοβαφεῖς, 
θωρακοφόροισι), and so it is striking at first that the one line that interested the comic poets is 
seemingly the least interesting of all:  ἣ τοὺς εὕδοντας ἐγείρει.  But it is quoted or adapted no 
fewer than three times:  Eupolis’ Ἀστράτευτοι (fr. 41), Aristophanes’ Ὁλκάδες (fr. 427), and 
Aristophanes’ Wealth (535-47):57 
                                                 
 
56
 Only κερκίδος…ἐγείρει (with two corrupt words preceding) is listed among the unplaced fragments in TrGF 
IV (preserved by Σ V Ar. Plut. 541), but a recently discovered papyrus has filled in some of the text; see ST ad loc., 
whose text and translation I have printed, and who also offer arguments that the fragment belongs to Epigonoi and 
that that play is the same as Eriphyle. 
 
 
57
 Eup. fr. 41 is preserved by Athenaeus, Ar. fr. 427 by Eustathius and Pollux, all without reference to 
Sophocles.  The translation of Eup. fr. 41 is mine. 
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 Eup. fr. 41:                 μήποτε θρέψω 
              παρὰ Περσεφόνῃ τοιόνδε ταὧν, ὃς τοὺς εὕδοντας ἐγείρει. 
 
                    Never will I raise  
               at Persephone’s this sort of peacock that wakes those who are sleeping. 
 
 Ar. fr. 427:             σπυρὶς οὐ μικρὰ καὶ κωρυκίς, ἣ καὶ τοὺς μάττοντας ἐγείρει 
 
               a sizeable creel and a punching bag, such as wakes up even the kneading- 
               boys 
 
 Ar. Plut. 535-47:           σὺ γὰρ ἂν πορίσαι τί δύναι’ ἀγαθὸν πλὴν φῴδων ἐκ βαλανείου 
               καὶ παιδαρίων ὑποπεινώντων καὶ γραϊδίων κολοσυρτόν; 
               φθειρῶν τ’ ἀριθμὸν καὶ κωνώπων καὶ ψυλλῶν οὐδὲ λέγω σοι 
               ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους, αἳ βομβοῦσαι περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀνιῶσιν, 
               ἐπεγείρουσαι καὶ φράζουσαι “πεινήσεις· ἀλλ’ ἐπανίστω.”  
               πρὸς δέ γε τούτοις ἀνθ’ ἱματίου μὲν ἔχειν ῥάκος· ἀντὶ δὲ κλίνης 
               στιβάδα σχοίνων κόρεων μεστήν, ἣ τοὺς εὕδοντας ἐγείρει· 
               καὶ φορμὸν ἔχειν ἀντὶ τάπητος σαπρόν· ἀντὶ δὲ προσκεφαλαίου 
               λίθον εὐμεγέθη πρὸς τῇ κεφαλῇ· σιτεῖσθαι δ’ ἀντὶ μὲν ἄρτων 
               μαλάχης πτόρθους, ἀντὶ δὲ μάζης φυλλεῖ’ ἰσχνῶν ῥαφανίδων, 
               ἀντὶ δὲ θράνου στάμνου κεφαλὴν κατεαγότος, ἀντὶ δὲ μάκτρας 
               φιδάκνης πλευρὰν ἐρρωγυῖαν καὶ ταύτην. ἆρά γε πολλῶν 
               ἀγαθῶν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀποφαίνω σ’ αἴτιον οὖσαν; 
 
               What benefits can you provide, except blisters in the bathhouse 
    and masses of hungry children and old ladies? 
    Not to mention the lice, gnats, and fleas, 
    too numerous to enumerate, that annoy us by buzzing around our heads  
    and waking us up with the warning, “get up or you’ll go hungry!” 
    And on top of that, you have us wearing rags, not coats, and sleeping not 
    on a bed but a bug-infested twine mat that doesn’t let you get any sleep,  
    under threadbare burlap instead of a blanket, with our heads not 
    on a pillow but a hefty stone.  And to eat, not bread 
    but mallow shoots, not cake but withered radish leaves. 
    We sit not on chairs but on broken crocks, and instead of a kneading  
    trough we get one side of a barrel, and that’s broken too. 
    Now haven’t I revealed the many blessings you bring to all humanity? 
The first of these suggests the basic reason for the comic poets’ interest in this phrase.  As a 
floating relative clause, ἣ τοὺς εὕδοντας ἐγείρει leaves the subject completely open and thus 
allows the comic poet, merely by changing the gender of the relative pronoun if necessary (as 
here), to be creative in imagining what might wake people up when they are sleeping.  Eupolis 
chose a peacock; the first Aristophanic passage changes both the subject (to σπυρὶς καὶ κωρυκίς) 
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and the object (by replacing one participle with another), so that the topic is no longer loud 
noises at night, much less preparations for war, but the hustle and bustle of the kitchen. 
 These changes operate in accordance with the principles outlined in the first section of 
this chapter but also anticipate the larger dynamic at work in the passage from Wealth.  I have 
quoted much more extensively from this play in order to provide necessary context; Chremylus 
is lamenting the hardships that attend a life of poverty (soon to be rectified by the healing of the 
god Wealth), but his argumentation breaks down into a comic list, marked especially by 
repetition of the phrase ἀντὶ δέ.  The Sophoclean line belongs to a different kind of catalogue, a 
tragic list as it were.  As in the first two comic reminiscenes, Aristophanes has used the line to 
create a sort of low comic humor (here it is bedbugs waking people up), but in a sense his 
passage also draws on the spirit of the Sophoclean passage – the busy-ness and excitement of 
military activity throughout the city – and converts that into a typically comic list of pathetic 
experiences with bedbugs and other pests.  The quotation itself is signalled by an inappropriate 
switch from the singular to the plural:  the one languishing in poverty is no longer a hypothetical 
“you” (σύ) but a third-person “they” (εὕδοντας); the relative pronoun also lines up imperfectly, 
given that it is not so much the pallet that wakes people up but the bugs in the pallet.  These 
small irregularities make obvious a quotation that probably already would have been known to 
the audience by this point (since Eupolis fr. 41 and Aristophanes fr. 427 had made it into 
something of a running joke), and this encourages the audience to compare the tragic and comic 
passages broadly and to appreciate Aristophanes’ attempt at converting Sophoclean lyric into a 
comic list. 
 My next example of this second level involves manipulation of a sententious statement 
about reciprocity and the image that lies behind it (Ajax 522): 
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    χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτους’ ἀεί 
 
    for it is always one kindness that begets another 
The context of this statement is Tecmessa’s appeal to Ajax to respect her helpless situation, 
repay the pleasure (τερπνόν) she has brought him, and refrain from suicide.  A line from a 
fourth-century comedy by Anaxandrides (fr. 69
58
) almost completely reverses the sentiment: 
    οὐχὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς ἡ χάρις τίκτει χάριν 
 
    not among many does one kindness beget another
59
 
The repetition of χάρις in sententious contexts is of course common, but the image of one χάρις 
giving birth to another is not and allows us to make the connection between Sophocles and 
Anaxandrides.
60
 
 I have included this example in the second level because, rather than effecting a simple 
collision of registers (in fact no collision is evident), Anaxandrides has borrowed a Sophoclean 
idea and modified it according to his own purposes.
61
  The point of the quotation does not lie in a 
juxtaposition of high and low elements (be they words, mental images, or costumes) but in what 
Anaxandrides has decided to do with the meaning of Sophocles’ words.  And what he has done, I 
think, is render the thought cynically realistic.  Tecmessa’s appeal was couched in language 
which she thought would resonate with Ajax’ absolute and idealistic approach to Greek ethics.62  
                                                 
 
58
 There is some difficulty with the lemma in Stobaeus where this fragment is preserved.  The same quotation is 
attributed elsewhere in the work to Apollonius.  It is equally possible that Apollonius quoted Anaxandrides on this 
count or that the attribution to Apollonius is mistaken; cf. also PCG V, p. 424. 
 
 
59
 The translation is mine. 
 
 
60
 Jebb 522n. also compares δίκη δίκην ἔτικτε καὶ βλάβην βλάβη (Zenobius 3.28).  Nesselrath 1993 (esp. 190-3) 
argues that, together with Aristophanes, Anaxandrides was chiefly responsible for conveying elements of Euripidean 
tragedy to Menandrian New Comedy by way of tragic parody (of both Euripides and Sophocles). 
 
 
61
 For more straightforward appropriations, cf. Ar. Eq. 84: Soph. fr. 178, Ar. fr. 652: Soph. fr. 954, Antiphanes 
fr. 263: Aj. 518.  Soph. fr. 811 was manipulated in various ways by Philonides (fr. 7) and Xenarchus (fr. 6), and the 
imagery of Cratinus fr. 258 may be inspired by Soph. OT 873. 
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We are led to believe that up to this point Ajax has had a very black-and-white view of the 
world, which for him was divided straightforwardly into friends and enemies and in which one 
good turn begat another, just as one bad turn begat another of its kind.  The crisis of the play 
revolves around his realization that human relationships and human morality are much more 
complex than that.  But since Tecmessa does not perceive his inner crisis, she addresses him as 
she would the old Ajax who would have agreed with her sententia and who in fact still wants to 
be an εὐγενὴς ἀνήρ, but in a very different way than she imagines. 
 So when Anaxandrides denies that χάρις begets χάρις he is in essence rejecting the 
tragedy’s notionally idealistic view – “notionally” because Sophocles’ purpose in this play is 
precisely to problematize such idealism.  But when the sententia is considered in isolation from 
Tecmessa’s rhetoric and Ajax’ self-discovery (as we must assume that it is in Anaxandrides’ 
comedy, since we have nothing left of its context), it becomes a tool to create a dichotomy 
between tragedy and comedy whereby the former deals in ideals and absolutes, while the latter 
considers human conduct more realistically.  If this interpretation is correct, then Anaxandrides’ 
commentary (unfair though it may be) on Sophoclean tragedy can be seen to play into a subtle 
polemic between the two genres, even in the fourth century. 
 Where Anaxandrides reverses a Sophoclean image, a passage in Aristophanes’ Birds can 
be seen to remove the meaning from a tragic citation through a process of concretization and 
mundanization.  At Birds 275, right before the parodos, Peisetaerus and Euelpides watch four 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
62
 Blundell 1989: 60-105 demonstrates Ajax’ devotion to honor but also emphasizes the one-sidedness of his 
ethics (harming enemies to the exclusion of helping friends) throughout his crisis.  Davis 1986: 148 speaks of Ajax’ 
“excessive morality” in which everything is purposive and “the best man always wins.” 
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birds enter just ahead of the chorus.  The cock’s63 entrance is marked by a slightly altered 
quotation from Sophocles’ second Tyro (fr. 654, cited by the scholion to line 275): 
  Ευ. ἕτερος ὄρνις οὑτοσί. 
  Πε. νὴ Δί’ ἕτερος δῆτα χοὖτος ἔξεδρον χρόαν ἔχων. 
 
  Eu. Here’s another bird! 
  Pe. Oh yes, that’s another one all right, and he’s also garbed in eccentric color. 
According to the scholion, what Sophocles actually wrote is τίς ὄρνις οὕτως ἔξεδρον χώραν 
ἔχων;  The changes in Aristophanes’ version are slight: the tragic line has been divided among 
two speakers and turned into statements rather than a question (“what bird is this with…?” 
versus “here’s another bird with…”).  More significant is the change from χώραν to χρόαν.64  As 
a technical term of augury, ἔξεδρον χώραν denotes an unfavorable quadrant of the sky for a bird 
to appear in.
65
  It is therefore perfectly natural for a prophet or seer to ask what type of bird is 
flying in this inauspicious quadrant.  On the other hand, it is also perfectly natural, especially for 
people in Peisetaerus’ and Euelpides’ position, to exclaim over a bird’s ἔξεδρον χρόαν.  This is 
not humor through juxtaposition, since ἔξεδρον χρόαν is a legitimate thing for two bird-watchers 
to say; rather, it relies on the audience’s recognition that ἔξεδρον χρόαν is a pun on a technical 
term with a very different meaning.  The effect is again one of mundanization:  what was once 
used of an omen, no doubt in a suitably tragic or heroic situation, is now being applied to just a 
                                                 
 
63
 Or some other crested bird; see Dunbar 1995: 277n. 
 
 
64
 The MSS give χώραν (where the scribe may have been led astray by ἔξεδρον), but the antiquity of χροιάν is 
confirmed by its appearance in the scholia.  Dunbar 1995 thinks that χροιάν, as a more elevated form, would be 
more appropriate to the paratragic context.  But given the concretization and deflation of the Sophoclean line, it 
might be in Aristophanes’ interest to import something of a lower register here near the end of the line.  
Sommerstein 1987, however, prefers to read ἔξεδρον χώραν on the grounds that “exedros ‘abberrant’, lit. ‘away 
from its proper abode’, makes a most unnatural adjective to describe a colour.”  But ἔξεδρος is not unlike English 
“exotic,” and the scholion seems to understand it just this way, with reference to color. 
 
 
65
 See Pearson 1917 (with ancient sources), Sommerstein 1987, and Dunbar 1995 ad loc. 
245 
 
real bird with fancy plumage
66
 – and in fact becomes a means for Aristophanes to compliment 
himself on the quality of his costumes.  He adopts the Sophoclean idea – augury, divination, 
profundity in the appearance of a bird in a particular place – and quite deliberately empties it of 
any serious meaning. 
 Both of these processes – reversal and removal of meaning – operate in two comic 
reminiscences of Antigone 712-4.  The Sophoclean passage falls in the middle of Haemon’s 
speech in which he tries to convince his father that the citizens of Thebes sympathize with 
Antigone and find her announced punishment to be excessively harsh.  Haemon opens this part 
of his speech with an appeal to Creon’s authority and wisdom (710-1); his first goal is simply to 
gain a fair hearing, and he plays to Creon’s pride by saying that a wise man should always be 
eager to learn.  Then he says (712-4): 
    ὁρᾷς παρὰ ῥείθροισι χειμάρροις ὅσα 
    δένδρων ὑπείκει, κλῶνας ὡς ἐκσῴζεται, 
    τὰ δ’ ἀντιτείνοντ’ αὐτόπρεμν’ ἀπόλλυται. 
 
    You see how when rivers are swollen in winter 
    those trees that yield to the flood retain their branches, 
    but those that offer resistance perish, trunk and all. 
The essence of his message to Creon is bound up in the image that follows of water rushing 
among trees, uprooting some and leaving others undamaged.  Creon is urged to heed Haemon, 
who has access to the opinions of the citizenry in a way that Creon does not, and in effect to 
bend before he breaks.  Implicit in this image is a difference in size; though not spelled out, most 
will probably think of willows or other smallish trees bending under the force of the water,
67
 
while large trees like oaks break or are uprooted.  Accordingly, Creon must adopt a more humble 
                                                 
 
66
 The very next line of this passage is from Aesch. Edonians, which is probably being misapplied in similar 
fashion. 
 
 
67
 Indeed, as far as trees go, only a smallish one would bend.  Jebb 713n. (followed by Griffith 1999) cites a 
fable of Babrius that features a reed and an oak. 
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attitude, to “think human thoughts,” as the Greeks might say.  To continue to resist his own 
family, citizens, and gods is hubristic and physically dangerous.
68
 
 The image also relates to other major themes and events of the play.  Creon, like the large 
trees, is in a position of resistance against a force that threatens to overwhelm him, and 
eventually does.  The smaller trees that bend succeed at saving not only themselves but their 
branches as well (κλῶνας ὡς ἐκσῴζεται); by refusing to bend, Creon will lose all of his little 
branches (i.e. his entire household).  Even the adjective αὐτόπρεμνος emphasizes the isolation 
and supposed self-sufficiency of individual trees, perhaps hinting that Creon, by willfully 
alienating his friends, bears the blame for his own downfall.
69
 
 Contrast Eupolis’ watered-down version of the same image (fr. 260.23-570): 
    ὁρᾷς παρὰ ῥείθροισιν ὅταν η[...]δ[ 
        ἢν μέν τις εἴκῃ τοῖς λόγοις ἐκσῴζεται, 
        ὁ δ’ ἀντιτείνων αὐτόπρεμνος οἴχε[ται. 
 
    (B) You see how whenever by the banks [of the lawcourts 
    the one who gives in to speech, is saved, 
    but the one who resists is destroyed from top to bottom? 
Though this passage retains some of the original language, it is rather bland and actually removes 
most of the imagery.  The only remnants of Sophocles’ vision of the natural world are ῥείθροισιν 
and αὐτόπρεμνος, and these seem out of place without any mention of trees, branches, or the 
type of stream that is being imagined; even ἀντιτείνων is less vivid when it means merely 
“resisting” instead of “stretching/straining against.”71  Where for Sophocles safety is to be found 
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 Ajax’ attitude is typical of the “heroic temper” as described by Knox 1964. 
 
 
69
 Cf. αὐτόνομος at 821 of Antigone’s self-destructive personality. 
 
 
70
 Preserved on papyrus.  The fragment belongs to his Prospaltians (probably produced in 429), though little 
can be said of its context. 
 
 
71
 Cf. Griffith 1999: 712-18n.:  “here [in Ant.] the victim contributes to the calamity by actively ‘straining’ 
against elemental forces.” 
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in yielding to the power of nature, for Eupolis it results directly from obedience to verbal 
commands.
72
  Sophocles’ passage is thus reduced to a dictate of compliance, one which would 
have been unadvisable for Haemon in his diplomatically delicate position.  It appears that 
Eupolis has retained just enough of the original language to make the passage recognizable to his 
audience.  This suggests that he expected them to be sufficiently familiar with the Sophoclean 
passage to remember it with only a little prompting.  In this case, quoting the Sophoclean 
opening and a few keywords (even if they have little bearing on the imagery used in the rest of 
the comic passage) would be enough to resurrect the original, naturalistic image in his audience’s 
minds, allowing Eupolis to compress his description or focus on other elements instead.  The 
audience would be able to compare the Eupolidean result to its Sophoclean model and appreciate 
the naturalistic overtones of an otherwise political image. 
 This passage of Antigone also caught the attention of the fourth-century playwright 
Antiphanes (fr. 228),
73
 though his appropriation and conversion result in a point-by-point 
subversion of the tragic text.  Antiphanes retains more of Sophocles’ naturalistic language than 
his comic predecessor, and as he was writing in the fourth century, perhaps as much as a hundred 
years after the premiere of Antigone, it may have been necessary to keep more of the tragic 
language in order to identify his model clearly.  Alternatively, we shall see that he was interested 
in exploiting and subverting certain features of the image, and the similarity of the language may 
point up the difference in meaning.
74
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 Cf. Eur. fr. 654.2: ὁ μὴ ἀντιτείνων τοῖς λόγοις σοφώτερος. 
 
 
73
 Cited by Athenaeus; Eustathius labels it a parody of Sophocles.  It might be suggested that Eupolis rather than 
Sophocles provided the model for Antiphanes, but the combination of extensive exact quotation and selective 
adaptation (resulting in a precise reversal of the Sophoclean image) indicates that Antiphanes did in fact have 
Sophocles in the forefront of his mind. 
 
248 
 
 Antiphanes’ introduction to the image is very different from Sophocles’.  Where Haemon 
spoke modestly and made concessions to Creon’s authority, Antiphanes’ character seems to be 
musing in pseudo-philosophical terms: 
      τὸ δὲ ζῆν, εἰπέ μοι, 
    τί ἐστι;  – ᴗ –  τὸ πίνειν φήμ’ ἐγώ 
    ὁρᾷς παρὰ ῥείθροισι χειμάρροις ὅσα 
    δένδρων ἀεὶ τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν 
    βρέχεται, μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος οἷα γίγνεται, 
    τὰ δ’ ἀντιτείνοντ’ {οἱονεὶ δίψαν τινὰ 
    ἢ ξηρασίαν ἔχοντ’}
75
 αὐτόπρεμν’ ἀπόλλυται 
 
      Tell me, what is life? 
    […] and I say it’s drinking. 
    You see along the resounding riverbanks the trees 
    That are watered night and day 
    How they increase in beauty and size, 
    But the ones that resist {as those that are 
    thirsty and dry} are destroyed utterly. 
His opening question sets a tone of profundity, which is promptly punctured by the answer in the 
next line (τὸ πίνειν φήμ’ ἐγώ) before being resumed again by the Sophoclean quotation.  Here 
the image allegorizes not familial conflict, political wisdom, religious insight, or any of the 
serious matters integral to the debate in Antigone, but the benefits of drinking.  So in the first 
place, Antiphanes has done the same thing we have seen already in the first section:  he has 
inserted an otherwise serious passage into a lower, obviously comic context.
76
 
 But closer examination of the fragment indicates that Antiphanes is playing fast and loose 
with Sophocles’ image and in fact reversing it entirely.  For Antiphanes, the rushing water and 
resistance to it are incidental, retained as a part of the original Sophoclean passage.  What he is 
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 Antiphanes’ career began in the 380s and extended to the 330s; at any rate, Dem. 19.247 demonstrates that 
Soph. Ant. was reperformed in the fourth century. 
 
 
75
 The bracketed portion was deleted by Naber; see PCG II ad loc. 
 
 
76
 In a sense, this is a simple conversion of a tragic image into its comic counterpart:  the tragic image consists 
of water, trees, etc. and is concerned with serious affairs; comedy’s way of expressing the same basic things is to 
turn the water into wine (so to speak) and trivialize anything serious – but the image remains fundamentally the 
same. 
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really interested in is wet (or bibulous) versus dry trees; those that are “watered” night and day 
become big and beautiful, while the dry ones are destroyed.  For Sophocles, resistance to an 
overwhelming force was key, and the image of a surging stream was meant to demonstrate that 
survival requires humility.  Though Sophocles did not make the relative size of his trees explicit, 
it is natural to imagine the smaller ones surviving while the larger ones do not, and Antiphanes’ 
description of the latter as “big and beautiful” shows that he is thinking in terms of large/small as 
well as wet/dry.  But for Antiphanes, size is a positive result of being well-watered, not a sign of 
hubris, and there is no suggestion that the large trees will be destroyed.  The dry trees, 
presumably, are not touched by the water at all and as a result remain puny and thirsty; in fact, 
since no tree actually resists watering (as a human might resist drinking), Antiphanes is also 
suggesting that it is natural to drink and unnatural to resist.
77
  In Sophocles’ use of the image, on 
the other hand, a dry tree would have no real point, no reason either to bend or to break, and 
rather than being puny, the smaller trees are the humble survivors.  So even while he apparently 
retains the tragic image intact, Antiphanes has brought Sophocles’ image into a more mundane 
context, deemphasized significant elements and replaced others, and ultimately turned the 
image’s meaning completely on its head.  And given the extensive and exact quotation of 
Sophocles, it stands to reason that Antiphanes expected his audience to recognize the source and 
appreciate his manipulation of it. 
 The same may be said of a passage in Aristophanes’ Knights, which adopts a Sophoclean 
line simple in meaning but striking in collocation.
78
  Rather than turning it on its head or draining 
it of meaning, Aristophanes redefines it subtly to suit the new comic context.  As the Sausage-
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 I owe this point to Alan Sommerstein. 
 
 
78
 The three-word line must have been especially memorable for the coinage γερονταγωγῶ (Pearson 1917, 
Sommerstein 1981 ad loc.; the word is also used more literally at OC 348).  Schlesinger 1936: 299 puts this 
quotation in his fourth class (identifiable by vocabulary). 
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seller and Paphlagon compete with each other at inventing favorable oracles, Demos finally 
awards the victory to the Sausage-seller (1097-8): 
    καὶ νῦν ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπω σοι τουτονὶ 
    γερονταγωγεῖν κἀναπαιδεύειν πάλιν. 
 
    I hereby request that you be my own steward, 
    “to guide me in my old age and retrain me.” 
The second line is a slightly adapted quotation of Sophocles’ Peleus (fr. 487, cited by the 
scholion to line 1098).  The tragic original seems to have been spoken by a servant woman or 
perhaps a female relative of Peleus, and she goes on to explain the apparently oxymoronic 
combination of γερονταγωγεῖν and ἀναπαιδεύειν in a third line:79 
    Πηλέα τὸν Αἰάκειον οἰκουρὸς μόνη 
    γερονταγωγῶ κἀναπαιδεύω πάλιν· 
    πάλιν γὰρ αὖθις παῖς ὁ γηράσκων ἀνήρ 
 
    I alone keep the house and tend the old age 
    of Peleus, son of Aeacus, and retrain him; 
    for as a man grows old he becomes a child once more. 
As far as we can tell, Aristophanes does not do much with the transfer of these lines from one 
character to another; it is perhaps a touch ironic that a servant’s words are now being spoken by 
the master, Demos. 
 More significant, however, is the precise connotation of those words in their new context.  
The Sophoclean character meant them in a straightforward sense:  since Peleus is an old man and 
therefore no longer in possession of his (mental, physical) faculties as he once was, he needs 
someone to take care of him.  Though Demos is also an old man, he is only pretending to be 
                                                 
 
79
 This fragment is also cited by Clement of Alexandria (Stromata) together with other similar expressions; it is 
parodied again at com. adesp. 740 (Rau 1967: 189).  Since the final line became proverbial (Pearson 1917 ad loc. 
with further citations; the image occurs, though in rather less pithy form, already in Aesch. Ag. 74-82), echoes at Ar. 
Nub. 1417, Cratinus fr. 28, and Theopompus fr. 70 may have no specific connection to Sophocles.  On the other 
hand, Soph. fr. 201h (καὶ γὰρ Ἀργείους ὁρῶ) also became proverbial, though in this case we know that it originated 
with him; cf. Alexis fr. 157, Aristophon fr. 5.4, Philonides fr. 11, and possibly Ar. fr. 60 (the citers connect 
Sophocles’ phrase, perhaps wrongly, to a stereotype of Argive thievery; for possible meanings of the original 
Sophoclean line, see ST: 68-70. 
251 
 
foolish and frail, as he reveals about twenty lines after this passage ( 1121-30), and he is not after 
simple care-tending.  He wants to be bribed lavishly, and that he is actually the one in control of 
this whole situation is implied by the active verb ἐπιτρέπω and the hint of command in his 
words:  if he can choose who will “take care” of him, he cannot be that helpless, nor in need of 
the kind of care described in the Sophoclean passage.  Kindly nurture has been transformed into 
political bribery, and language that originally described a more or less helpless character now 
applies to a devious political mastermind – though the audience can only fully appreciate this 
irony when they hear Demos’ manifesto a little later.80  Aristophanes’ deflation of the tragic 
thought is not made obvious in the immediate context of the quotation, but it resonates further 
and relies for its full effect on a later twist in the comic plot.  In this respect, it is similar to the 
examples I will discuss in the next section. 
 
Level 3: Integration 
 Now we turn to the highest level of generic interaction, which I will be calling 
integration.  What I have in mind here are those tragic passages which resonate more widely in 
the action of the comedy, affecting interpretation of the larger ode, scene, or even the play in 
which they stand.  In these situations, Aristophanes uses a tragic quotation to introduce certain 
motifs or deploys a recognizably Sophoclean pattern to establish (and sometimes frustrate) 
audience expectations regarding the direction the action will take.  These passages demonstrate 
how Sophoclean tragedy could inform Aristophanes’ work more fundamentally and contribute to 
a deeper level of meaning. 
                                                 
 
80
 But as Demos’ manifesto comes only twenty-three lines after his citation of Peleus, the audience would still 
remember his plea for care-tending and be able to notice the contrast in his attitude. 
252 
 
 I say “Aristophanes” because his comedies are the only ones from this period that are 
complete enough for this type of investigation.  The fragments of the other comic poets are 
insufficient – whether too short or lacking in context – to illustrate a more extensive use of 
Sophoclean tragedy than those we have already examined.  Therefore, all examples in this 
section will be Aristophanic.  That does not mean that similar passages did not exist at one time 
in the fragmentary playwrights, and the titles of certain comedies suggest that they did; perhaps 
if we had Strattis’ Troilus or Autocrates’ Tympanistae we could say more about large-scale 
treatment of Sophocles by the fragmentary comic poets.
81
  As it is, we must turn to Aristophanes 
for precise dynamics. 
 I begin with Birds 1337-9, which quotes three lines from Sophocles’ Oenomaus (fr. 476, 
cited by the scholion to line 1337).  This passage is very like those in the previous section, as it 
employs several strategies we have already studied – collision, concretization, manipulation of 
imagery – but its impact is not confined to the quotation alone.  Rather, the tragic lines provide a 
starting point for the scene, which in turn builds on and modifies the Sophoclean idea. 
 At this point in Birds, we have just been informed that all mankind has gone bird-mad, 
and Peisetaerus is preparing to receive potential new citizens with baskets of wings and feathers.  
The scene is a variation on a comic motif according to which a series of shifty characters attempt 
(with greater or lesser degrees of success) to share in the hero’s good fortune.  In the play’s 
earlier exploitations of this theme, a poet, oracle-monger, overseer, and decree-seller arrived, 
annoyed Peisetaerus, and were promptly sent packing.
82
  This later scene opens with a near-
                                                 
 
81
 On Strattis’ play, see Orth 2009,  Miles 2009.  For an attempt at reconstruction of Sophocles’ play (using a 
fragment of Strattis), see SFT.  It would of course be risky to reconstruct Sophocles’ tragedy on the basis of Strattis’ 
comedy and then use the results to determine the relationship between the two plays. 
 
 
82
 The priest also annoyed Peisetaerus and was sent away, but he was not an intruder like the others, since he 
was initially invited to lead the sacrifice. 
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reversal of the theme.  A would-be parricide enters wishing to become a bird so that he can abuse 
his father in accordance with the birds’ custom.  Rather than dismissing him with insults or 
violence, as he had done to the others, Peisetaerus reasons with him, corrects his understanding 
of avian piety, and outfits him with wings and a beak so that he can put himself to better use 
fighting the Thracians.  In spite of being an unsavory figure, then, the parricide is not rejected 
outright; though he is sent away, he is in some sense accepted as someone of use to the new 
city.
83
 
 The parricide’s tragic opening lines express in elevated language the wish to become an 
eagle and fly high over the sea: 
    γενοίμαν 
    αἰετὸς ὑψιπέτας, 
    ὡς ἀμποταθείην ὑπὲρ ἀτρυγέτου 
    γλαυκᾶς ἐπ’ οἶδμα λίμνας.
84
 
 
    Would that I could become 
    a high-flying eagle, 
    so that I could fly beyond the barren ether 
    over the waves of the gray sea! 
The original context of this quotation is not known, though there are two likely possibilities.  On 
the one hand, these lines strongly resemble a common type of ode in which one or more singers 
describe an ideal place, often a place of peace or solitude over against the turmoil in which they 
currently find themselves, and express the desire to escape to there from their current situation of 
                                                 
 
83
 It has been pointed out to me that any fighting in Thrace would have be on behalf of Athens, since we are not 
told that Cloudcuckooland has any interest in that region.  On the other hand, it is not obvious why, in the world of 
the play, Peisetaerus would send somebody off to fight on Athens’ behalf, while his new city is in some respects a 
replica of his old one.  On the cultural tension between fathers and sons in the fifth century, see Dunbar 1995: 1337-
71n. and Strauss 1993 (163-5 on this scene); see M. Griffith 1998 for the importance of this tension in Greek tragedy 
(esp. Aesch. Pers.). 
 
 
84
 For the textual and interpretative difficulties surrounding ὑπὲρ ἀτρυγέτου and ἐπ’ οἶδμα, see TrGF IV and 
Dunbar 1995 ad loc. 
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pain, toil, violence, etc.
85
  On the other hand, the lines could belong to an ode in which the 
chorus wishes to travel to the scene of some important event and witness the excitement; in the 
case of Oenomaus, that would undoubtedly be the chariot race between Oenomaus and Pelops.
86
  
And given the thematic similarities between these two types of ode, it is always possible that 
Aristophanes meant for his audience to think of the more common “escape” odes, even if the 
quotation orginally stood in a Sophoclean “exploration” ode. 
 The Sophoclean lines, in which a human wishes to become a bird, are obviously relevant 
to the general theme of the comedy, so on the simplest level, it looks as though Aristophanes has 
used this particular ode because its content happens to fit well with the rest of his play.
87
  A 
generic collision is immediately effected through the high-style vocabulary, change of meter,
88
 
and lyric Doric alphas, and is especially jarring since it comes on the heels of a quintessentially 
comic slave-beating sequence. 
 Additionally, depending on what type of ode we think the original was, the content of the 
quotation anticipates the reasons given by the parricide and others for wanting to become birds.  
In essence, the parricide wants to escape from his own society and join one in which parental 
abuse is considered legitimate.  Kinesias needs to fly high in order to find something – 
inspiration for his high-flown poetry.  The sycophant plans to use his new wings to issue 
summonses among the allies on the islands more efficiently and ruthlessly; with wings, he will 
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 Cf. Eur. Hipp. 732-51, IT 1089-1152, Tro. 197-229, Ion 796-9, Bacch. 402-16, Hel. 1478-94, as well as Soph. 
fr. 730d.6 (which looks like choral wish), and see Swift 2009 for discussion of these and other Euripidean choral 
fantasies with a particular focus on the erotic qualtiy of the locus amoenus. 
 
 
86
 Cf. OC 1081-4 and Pearson 1917: 1337-9n.: “For the general sense, no doubt a prayer of the Chorus to be 
transported to the scene of the victory of Pelops;” this seems to be the interpretation favored by ST: 89, 99, 105-6.  
For yet another meaning of becoming “an eagle in the clouds,” cf. Ar. Av. 978, Eq. 1013, 1087. 
 
 
87
 Lines 1300-3 suggest as much. 
 
 
88
 It appears to be dactylo-epitrite with an ithyphallic clausula (so Dunbar 1995 ad loc.), though Wilson’s 
colometry in the first line suggests rather bacchiac + hemiepes. 
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be able to cross large expanses of sea quickly and thus gain an advantage over his victims.  But 
the parricide is welcomed into the new community and ultimately sent off to face the Thracians.  
If the Sophoclean singer(s) wanted to fly out to see something exciting, then the parricide is also 
given his wish; if the Sophoclean passage was an escape ode, it is perhaps in ironic contrast to 
these original intentions that the parricide’s desire for escape is satisfied by a relocation to 
violence and battle (though it is also appropriate to this comic character’s aggressive nature).  
And as we have seen in previous examples, Aristophanes uses this subversion of the tragic 
sentiment to humorous effect. 
 First is the common Aristophanic concretization of what was meant to be merely an 
image or metaphor.  It is highly unlikely that Sophocles’ singer(s) actually wanted to become an 
eagle; rather, the eagle imagery was a vivid way of describing feelings of loss, desperation, and 
helplessness, or eagerness and excitement.  But Aristophanes recognizes the comic potential in 
such an image and duly literalizes it.  This singer really does want to become a bird, and he 
really succeeds at it.  In his redeployment of these lines, Aristophanes mocks this type of ode 
(whether it originally expressed a desire for escape or for exploration) as a tragic convention by 
focusing on a particularly vivid example:  not every tragic wish for escape or knowledge is put in 
terms of ornithological metamorphosis.
89
 
 But we can go further.  The image from Oenomaus is not only concretized, but also 
brought into the harsh real world (insofar as Birds depicts a version of the “real world”) and 
subjected to its mundanities and vicissitudes.  No longer is this ode sung by a noble or tragic 
figure, or even a horrified or excitable chorus, but by a minor character with questionable 
                                                 
 
89
 Of those listed in n. 74, Hipp. 732-51, IT 1089-1152, Hel. 1478-94 contain bird imagery, and only in the first 
does the chorus wish to become birds. 
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intentions.  Through his comic characterization of this figure, Aristophanes systematically 
undermines the ode’s original tragic mode while yet retaining the core of its ideas.90 
 Finally, a rather odd feature of this scene is that the parricide is not abused and driven 
out, as we might expect.  Instead, he is lectured by Peisetaerus and set straight morally before 
being given his wings.  His original, wrong-headed intention is corrected by the Aristophanic 
hero.  Can we say the same of Sophocles?  It is risky to identify the parricide too closely with his 
initial song, since he and the Sophoclean figure(s) invest these words with such different 
meanings and purposes.  Nevertheless, the preconceptions of both are unceremoniously 
debunked by the comic hero.  In his ornithological ignorance, the parricide imagines that birds 
are allowed to abuse their fathers, and though he is granted his request for birdhood, it does not 
turn out to be the means to the end he had envisioned.
91
  So also Sophocles imagined (perhaps) 
that an eagle would be able to fly over the sea and escape human troubles on the land.  In fact, 
the wings Peisetaerus doles out in this scene are used to fly over the sea only to reach Thrace, 
and arrival in Thrace means a commencement of warfare and violence – just the type of thing 
Sophocles’ singer(s) may have been trying to avoid.  The comic hero both corrects the 
parricide’s bird lore and demonstrates just how empty the original Sophoclean wish was: 
becoming an eagle would not deliver what is desired, but only its opposite. 
 Oenomaus is integrated into the action of the comedy in a relatively limited way.  The 
Sophoclean lines anticipate all three intruders but only apply directly to the first, and so their 
                                                 
 
90
 Unless the parricide is somehow recognizable from his costume, we do not learn what he is until 1348.  Thus, 
our first impression of him is probably one of puzzlement or curiosity:  who is this person singing so loftily about 
eagles and flying over the sea?  The frank revelation of his purpose in 1348 clashes with the previous line (μάλιστα 
δ’ ὅτι καλὸν νομίζεται) as well as the earlier Sophoclean lines, which must then be reinterpreted in retrospect. 
 
 
91
 He does succeed at a) escaping from home and b) flying out to see new things, and he is allowed to expend 
his aggressive energies against the Thracians.  But these are not the things he expressed interest in doing when he 
first arrived in Cloudcuckooland. 
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resonance does not extend even for an entire episode.  In the next two examples, Aristophanes 
puts Sophoclean tragedy to work on his own behalf in parabases.  Though the citations 
themselves are localized, Aristophanes works them into his larger program of comic agonism. 
 The chorus of Clouds remains nominally in character as they perform the parabasis, and 
when they get to Cleon, they have this to say (581-3): 
   εἶτα τὸν θεοῖσιν ἐχθρὸν βυρσοδέψην Παφλαγόνα 
   ἡνίχ’ ᾑρεῖσθε στρατηγόν, τὰς ὀφρῦς ξυνήγομεν 
   κἀποιοῦμεν δεινά, βροντὴ δ’ ἐρράγη δι’ ἀστραπῆς. 
 
   Furthermore, when you were about to elect as general 
   the godforsaken tanner Paphlagon, we furrowed our brows 
   and carried on dreadfully:  thunder crashed amid lightning bolts… 
It seems that the clouds benefit the city primarily by giving warning when the Athenians are 
about to do something ill-advised.  When Cleon stood to be elected general, the clouds reacted 
with stormy weather, thunder, and lightning (and by covering the sun and moon, as described in 
subsequent lines
92
).  The final clause of line 583 is a rather compacted version of Soph. fr. 578 
(cited by the scholion to line 583): 
      οὐρανοῦ δ’ ἄπο 
   ἤστραψε, βροντὴ δ’ ἐρράγη δι’ ἀστραπῆς. 
 
      And from heaven 
   came lightning, and through its flash burst thunder. 
The fragment derives from Teucer, and though little is known of this play, it is most likely that 
fr. 578 referred to actual stormy weather.
93
  In fact, since this short quotation is almost painfully 
redundant as it stands, Nauck may be correct in suggesting that Sophocles actually wrote δι’ 
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 See Dover 1968: 584n. on bad weather versus eclipses. 
 
 
93
 Pearson 1917 ad loc.: “The reference is to the storm which scattered the Greek fleet on its return from Troy,” 
an opinion held by several other editors and commentators; cf. fr. 576.  Schlesinger 1937: 300 puts this passage in 
his sixth class (unflagged parody) and continues, “It is worth noting that this passage definitely belongs to the first 
edition of the play, as performed in 423;” see also van Leeuwen 1968b: 581-94n. 
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αἰθέρος rather than δι’ ἀστραπῆς;94 if so, then Aristophanes, in the process of transferring an apt 
tragic description to his own personified clouds, has replaced ἤστραψε with κἀποιοῦμεν δεινά 
and then reintroduced the lightning at the end of the line, since lightning is more appropriate to 
the business of his clouds in this passage than aether is. 
 At the same time, it would be superficial merely to understand this passage as clouds 
speaking of themselves as clouds.  κἀποιοῦμεν δεινά at first glance may seem a rather colorless 
substitution for the more exciting οὐρανοῦ δ’ ἄπο ἤστραψε, but in fact Aristophanes had good 
reason for inserting this phrase.  The parabasis is not only the clouds’ speech to their negligent 
worshipers; it is also Aristophanes’ defense of himself as a playwright.95  κἀποιοῦμεν δεινά thus 
means something more like “I wrote a clever play” than simply “we did terrible things.”  The 
clever play is surely his Knights, which lambasted Cleon and immediately after which Cleon was 
elected general.  Though Knights won first prize in the dramatic competition, the Athenians 
ignored the substance of Aristophanes’ advice in that play.96  Describing his poetry in terms of 
portentous storm clouds lends gravity to the audience’s past errors and builds up Aristophanes’ 
                                                 
 
94
 For interpretation of δι’ ἀστραπῆς, see Pearson 1917 ad loc.  Even with Nauck’s conjecture, the passage still 
borders on redundancy with both οὐρανός and αἰθήρ, though that is not as harsh as a pair of cognate words for 
“lightning.” 
 
 
95
 That the clouds remain in character does not mean they cannot speak for Aristophanes as well; cf. 
Dicaeopolis in Ach. 498-508, 515-6 and the parabasis at Av. 1102-7 (where the chorus remains in character while 
discussing dramatic competition).  Sifakis 1971: 41-4 points out that the chorus always speaks as a comic chorus or 
from the perspective of its dramatic identity; but he also grants that different choral viewpoints may shift or meld 
with each other.  I have suggested that κἀπιοῦμεν δεινά may be read as “I wrote a clever play,” but it may be that the 
chorus is in fact speaking as a comic chorus:  “we put on a clever production;” though ποιέω is not the usual word 
for production (as opposed to composition), it may be the best one to describe choral activity without unwelcome 
ambiguity (such as would be produced by e.g. ἐδιδασκόμεθα).  It is also possible that the abnormality here is due to 
the incompleteness of the revision (which is especially noticeable in the parabasis; see the next n.). 
 
 
96
 The audience also failed to appreciate the cleverness of Aristophanes’ next play (the original Nub).  Though 
the revision is incomplete, it may be that the epirrhema, which belonged to the original version, has been retained so 
that the point about Eq. (which was successful dramatically but not politically) might balance the point already made 
in the parabasis proper about the original Nub. (which was not successful in any respect). 
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own poetry as a communicator of serious ideas and warnings; bolstering that description with a 
suitable tragic quotation raises Aristophanes’ poetic endeavors to the level of tragedy.97 
 The other parabasis is that of Aristophanes’ clever play, Knights.  At first glance, lines 
498-500 are unremarkable: 
    ἀλλ’ ἴθι χαίρων, καὶ πράξειας 
    κατὰ νοῦν τὸν ἐμόν, καί σε φυλάττοι 
    Ζεὺς ἀγοραῖος 
 
    Go, and good luck, and may you accomplish 
    our aims, and may Zeus of the Marketplace 
    watch over you! 
But they are also identical to Sophocles fr. 469 (cited by a scholion to line 498), attributed to a 
play called Oicles or perhaps Iocles, though the tragic provenance of the first three words may be 
doubted.  Since ἀλλ’ ἴθι χαίρων is used elsewhere by Aristophanes to open a parabasis,98 it is 
perhaps most likely that the tragic quotation does not begin until καί or thereabouts.  If so, then 
the most striking parts of this fragment are probably the idiom πράττω κατὰ νοῦν and Ζεὺς 
Ἀγοραῖος.  Zeus in this guise is singularly appropriate to the despicable Sausage-seller,99 to 
whom these words are addressed, and so on the lowest level the transfer of that epithet to 
comedy constitutes a severe deflation of the tragic invocation.  Whatever Zeus’ role in the 
tragedy, it was not symbolic of the worst elements of the Athenian agora, as in Knights. 
 Of greater interest for a larger scale interpretation is πράξειας κατὰ νοῦν.  This phrase is 
surprisingly uncommon in fifth-century literature, and it is significant that it appears again at the 
end of the chorus leader’s speech, where the subject is Aristophanes himself:  ἵν’ ὁ ποιητὴς ἀπίῃ 
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 Aristophanes puts his own work on par with tragedy more famously at Ach. 500. 
 
 
98
 Nub. 510, Pax 729; Sommerstein 1981 ad loc.  Pearson 1917 (who gives Sophocles ἀλλ’ – ἐμόν) is aware of 
the phrase’s comic provenance, but can also cite similar phrases from tragedy.   See also Rau 1967: 188 for citations 
of ἀλλ’ ἴθι χαίρων; following van Leeuwen, he also deduces that the scholion refers primarily to καὶ – Ἀγοραῖος.  
Bakola 2010: 128 notes that anapaests are often used paratragically. 
 
 
99
 Zeus Ἀγοραῖος has already been mentioned in this play (l. 410), though there in connection with Paphlagon. 
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χαίρων κατὰ νοῦν πράξας, φαιδρὸς λάμποντι μετώπῳ (549).100  Though this is not known to be a 
tragic quotation, the echo of κατὰ νοῦν πράξας links the sentiment to the one expressed exactly 
fifty lines earlier, making the overall scheme of this section of the parabasis look something like 
this:  Aristophanes, through his chorus, prays for the Sausage-seller’s success, then discusses his 
own poetic career vis-à-vis several of his rivals, and finally appeals to the audience for his own 
success in the dramatic competition.  Aristophanes uses Sophocles as a vehicle for identifying 
himself with his protagonist by linking them both to victory in their respective contests.
101
  Or 
more properly, the Sophoclean quotation provides an idiom with which Aristophanes both 
introduces and caps his agonistic commentary.  The repetition of this idiom creates a nexus of 
Aristophanes, the Sausage-seller, and victory; further, the Sophoclean quotation heightens the 
seriousness of the Sausage-seller’s mission before the council (against Paphlagon) and so also of 
Aristophanes’ struggle with Cleon.  Aristophanes is raised to the same level as his protagonist, 
both of them engaged in epic (or tragic?) contests against powerful opponents. 
 In fact, these parabatic dynamics appear again when Paphlagon finally admits defeat.  
Allusions both to the parabasis and to tragedy crop up thickly at lines 1248-52: 
    οἴμοι, πέπρακται τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ θέσφατον. 
    κυλίνδετ’ εἴσω τόνδε τὸν δυσδαίμονα. 
    ὦ στέφανε, χαίρων ἄπιθι· καί σ’ ἄκων ἐγὼ 
    λείπω· σὲ δ’ ἄλλος τις λαβὼν κεκτήσεται, 
    κλέπτης μὲν οὐκ ἂν μᾶλλον, εὐτυχὴς δ’ ἴσως. 
 
    Ah me, the god’s own fateful prophecy has come to pass! 
    “Roll me inside, utterly ill-starred!” 
    Begone and farewell, my crown; against my will do I 
    abandon you. “Some other man will take you as his own, 
    no greater thief, but luckier perhaps.” 
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 The connection between these two passages of Ar. Eq. is noted by Nauck.  πράττειν κατὰ νοῦν is used 
elsewhere at Ar. Pax 762 and twice in Plato (including one from his Letters), whose work was written later; cf. also 
OC 1768. 
 
 
101
 In the parabasis at Ar. Ran. 357, Sophocles (fr. 668) is used more aggressively to characterize Aristophanes’ 
old rival, Cratinus. 
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The first line of this passage is identified by the scholion as Sophoclean (fr. 885a, unfortunately 
without attribution to a specific play), the second parodies Bellerophon’s request at Eur. fr. 311 
to be carried inside, and the last two lines imitate Alcestis’ farewell to her marriage-bed at 
Alcestis 177-81.  Though the jab at the conventional use of the ekkyklema in line 1249 lends a 
touch of melodrama to the passage,
102
 the tragic quotations, all drawn from highly dramatic 
points in the action of their respective plays, raise the overall tone.  A tragic gravity attends the 
downfall of Paphlagon/Cleon and, by implication, the victory of the Sausage-seller/Aristophanes; 
that we are meant to think of the outcome on both levels is signaled by the phrase χαίρων ἄπιθι, 
an echo of 498 and especially 548 in the parabasis – only now the address is not to a would-be 
victor but to the crown itself as it proceeds to a new owner. 
 In studying the dynamics at work in the parabasis of Knights and Paphlagon’s defeat, we 
have already begun to move from tragic passages that are integrated into only part of a comic 
scene to those that resonate more widely.  Another such example is provided by a late passage of 
Clouds, which recalls a type of ode often specifically associated with Sophocles.  When 
Strepsiades must finally face his creditors, he returns to the Phrontisterion to find out whether 
Pheidippides has learned the skills necessary to get his father off the hook.  Socrates informs him 
that Pheidippides is capable of arguing his way out of anything at all, whereupon Strepsiades 
breaks into spontaneous song (1154-63):
103
 
    βοάσομαι τἄρα τὰν ὑπέρτονον 
    βοάν. ἰώ, κλάετ’, ὦβολοστάται 
    αὐτοί τε καὶ τἀρχαῖα χοἰ τόκοι τόκων· 
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 Strictly speaking, comedy uses the ekkyklema to bring characters inside, while tragedy only does so if the 
ekkyklema has already brought them out in tableau (which seems to be the sort of scene Paphlagon is attempting to 
recreate here; cf. e.g. Ajax’ withdrawal at Soph. Aj. 593).  On this passage, see also Sommerstein 1980b: 53-4. 
 
 
103
 It is possible that this fragment belongs to the same ode as frr. 489 and 490 (discussed above, pp. 232-7).  
Line 1162 also seems to be Sophoclean in style; the scholion states πρὸς τὴν ὀνοματοποιίαν. τὸν Σοφοκλῆν 
χαρακτηρίζει λέγοντα, and then quotes fr. 887 (Ζεῦς νόστον ἄγοι τὸν νικομάχαν καὶ παυσανίαν καὶ ἀτρείδαν). 
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    οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν με φλαῦρον ἐργάσαισθ’ ἔτι, 
    οἷος ἐμοὶ τρέφεται 
    τοῖσδ’ ἐνὶ δώμασι παῖς, 
    ἀμφήκει γλώττῃ λάμπων, 
    πρόβολος ἐμός, σωτὴρ δόμοις, ἐχθροῖς βλάβη, 
    λυσανίας πατρῴων μεγάλων κακῶν· 
    ὃν κάλεσον τρέχων ἔνδοθεν ὡς ἐμέ. 
 
    Then I’ll shout a fortissimo shout! 
    Hah!  Mourn, you moneylenders, 
    you and your principal and the interest on your interest! 
    No longer can you do me any harm, 
    with a boy like mine 
    being reared in these halls, 
    his double-edged tongue gleaming, 
    my fortress, savior of my domicile, bane of my enemies, 
    his father’s rescuer from heavy woes! 
    Run inside and tell him to come out to me. 
The underscored portion is cited by the scholion to 1154b as a quotation from Peleus (fr. 491), 
though the Sophoclean line ended with ἰὼ πύλαισιν ἤ τις δόμοις rather than ἰώ, κλάετ’, 
ὦβολοστάται.104  Rau rightly notes the similarity between this song and the so-called 
hyporcheme or joy-before-disaster ode,
105
 which appears five times in extant Sophocles, and he 
suggests on this basis that the fragment too comes from that type of song.
106
  I will attempt to 
take this observation a little further and then link this passage to similar sequences in Wealth and 
Peace. 
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 See Rau 1967: 148-9 for the scholiastic confusion on the point of authorship of this fragment and reasons for 
attributing it to Sophocles rather than Euripides.  Phrynichus also quoted fr. 491 in his Satyrs (fr. 48), but we know 
nothing of its comic use or context. 
 
 
105
 Properly speaking, a hyporcheme is a song accompanied by a dance; it is formally contrasted with the 
stasimon, supposedly a stationary song, though it is likely that even stasima involved some sort of choreography 
(Dale 1969: 34-40).  It is more usual to define a hyporcheme as an ode in which the chorus makes reference to the 
dance that it is currently performing (since this is the only way we have of deducing that such a dance happened at 
all); this is the angle taken by Heikkilä 1991 and Henrichs 1994/5. 
 
 
106
 Other Sophoclean hyporchemes include Aj. 693-718, Ant. 1115-54, Trach. 633-62, and OT 1086-1109.  Rau 
1967: 148-9.  Dover 1968 (followed by Sommerstein 1984 ad loc.) finds the meter to be similar to tragic monodies.  
Scholars’ fondness for comparing Eur. Hec. 154-215 in general is due to the fact that 1165-6 are a parody of Hec. 
171-4. 
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 The ode’s basic similarity to the Sophoclean hyporcheme is plain.  Strepsiades thinks that 
he has a foolproof plan which will cause all of his troubles to vanish – but being shortsighted and 
naïve, he fails to anticipate the changes wrought in Pheidippides and ends up defending himself 
from his own son rather than being defended by him against the creditors.  Rau compares this 
ode to two particular Sophoclean exemplars (Ajax 693-718 and Trach. 205-24), presumably 
because these two have stronger expressions of joy than the others.  I would add that Trach. 205-
6 is especially similar in terms of phrasing:  ἀνολολυξάτω δόμος ἐφεστίοις ἀλαλαγαῖς.  Like 
fragment 491, this ode opens with a futuristic (here, an imperative) verb calling for a celebratory 
cry and completes the idea with the cognate noun ἀλαλαγαῖς in the very next line, as in the 
combination βοάσομαι…βοάν.107  The close connection between a joyous shout and a δόμος in 
both of these passages perhaps lends additional weight to Rau’s contention that fr. 491 comes 
from a hyporcheme. 
 If this is true, then fr. 491, by virtue of being the very first words of Strepsiades’ joyous 
ode, immediately sets the tone for the passage as a whole:  we can suspect that Strepsiades’ 
confidence will turn out to be ill-founded for some reason and that disaster will ensue.  This 
feeling is intensified by further echoes of scenes in Ajax in which Ajax speculates about 
Eurysaces’ future; prominent in both passages are the father’s desire to have his son brought to 
him (Aj. 530, 538; Nub. 1163), the description of the son as a prospective warrior and defender 
(Aj. 574-6; Nub. 1160-1), and the father’s concern that his son show the quality of his lineage 
and upbringing (Aj. 545-7, 550-1, 556-7; Nub. 1158-9
108
).  This context of familial protection 
and the significance of Eurysaces in particular as one who needs his father’s protection now but 
                                                 
 
107
 In view of the preceding discussion of Av. 851ff. (pp. 16-20), we may also notice the repetition inherent in 
this kind of phrasing. 
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 Dover 1968 calls τοῖσδ’ ἐνὶ δώμασι in 1159 “highly tragic.” 
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will someday be great enough to defend others with his namesake shield lends pathos to 
Strepsiades’ expectation of the same from his son. 
 On the one hand, then, the various tragic texts and contexts which Aristophanes has 
arrayed behind Strepsiades’ joyous ode impart a sort of tragic weight and enable the spectators to 
understand and appreciate the ultimate hollowness of his rejoicing.  As a protagonist who sings 
about himself, Strepsiades collapses the roles of tragic hero and chorus into one, so we may see 
him either as a gravely mistaken one-man chorus or as a tragic hero who falls after we have been 
led to expect the opposite.  On the other hand, Strepsiades is not very much like a typical tragic 
chorus, which usually looks forward to a resolution of hostilities, release from fear, or even 
rescue from certain death; on the contrary, Strepsiades anticipates cheating his creditors of the 
money he owes them.
109
  The clash between the tragic chorus’ optimism and the comic hero’s 
greed is underscored in the second line of the ode, where Aristophanes has changed Sophocles’ 
words to ἰώ, κλάετ’, ὦβολοστάται – effectively a thumb in the creditors’ collective eye.  In spite 
of the tragic tones that follow and Strepsiades’ attempt to characterize his situation as a tragic 
hero’s, we already know what “salvation” means in this case and can recognize just how far 
short of a tragic hero Strepsiades falls.  Thus, the Sophoclean hyporchematic form provides a 
counterpoint and complement to the comic situation and prevents us from feeling as sorry for 
Strepsiades as we otherwise might have. 
 While Clouds appears to offer an Aristophanic play on a Sophoclean device, the joy-
before-disaster ode, there is some evidence that the broader pattern of joy before disaster, not 
necessarily featuring a choral ode, was also perceived to be peculiarly Sophoclean.  This may be 
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 Rau 1967: 149 notes the untragic quality of Strepsiades’ downfall (which of course is appropriate to his 
untragic circumstance and intent).  For a similar attempt at heroic characterization, cf. the echo of  Soph. Ant. 678 at 
Ar. Lys. 450 (see Rau 1967: 199). 
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the dynamic intended at Wealth 806-20, where the slave Cario emerges after the title character’s 
rehabilitation to enumerate his household’s newfound blessings.  The entire passage is included 
in TrGF IV as Soph. fr. 275, since the scholion to line 806 states that (πάντα) δὲ ταῦτα παρὰ τὰ 
ἐν Ἰνάχῳ Σοφοκλέους, ὅτε τοῦ Διὸς εἰσελθόντος πάντα μεστὰ ἀγαθῶν ἐγένετο.  Though it need 
not all be verbatim Sophocles, we have no reason to doubt that it at least echoes Inachus in a 
general way.
110
  The passage consists mostly of an exaggerated catalogue of riches, and if 
Aristophanes has altered the original text in any way, we cannot see it.  But perhaps it did not 
need altering.  Inachus was probably a satyr play, and so comic exaggeration (for example) 
would not be precluded from appearing there.  Like the Aristophanic passage, the Sophoclean 
speech described a god’s arrival in the house, and may even have been delivered by a slave (like 
Cario), in which case Aristophanes has transferred the passage wholesale, not only its language 
but also its approximate context.  In the absence of any other clear motivation for such an 
extensive imitation, it seems reasonable to follow Sommerstein ad loc. in adducing the pattern of 
joy before disaster in Inachus.
111
  As Sommerstein points out, Zeus’ arrival (which according to 
the scholion causes the sudden explosion of wealth) is soon followed by a slew of troubles:  Io is 
raped, transformed into a cow, and handed over to the hundred-eyed Argus.  “Well-informed 
spectators may therefore be led to suspect, wrongly, that some misfortune or danger may yet be 
                                                 
 
110
 πάντα is included only in MS V.  Schlesinger 1936: 309: “the schol. note this as a situation-parody of Soph. 
Inachos.”  He also puts it in class 6 (unflagged, possibly unintentional parody), perhaps because it would be difficult 
to distinguish the language of comedy and satyr play in this situation.  Pearson 1917 ad loc.: “The word παρά is used 
in scholia much in the same way as a modern commentator would say ‘compare (confer).’  Thus it is employed as 
well when it is desired to illustrate a single phrase. … Here there is a comparison of the whole description in the two 
plays (cf. fr. 273); but we need not infer that Aristophanes was closely imitating or parodying the language of 
Sophocles.”  But cf. TrGF IV: cave tamen ne scholiastae verba de Sophoclis imitatione ad solos versus 806/7 
referas. 
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 There may be some preparation for this at lines 627-40, where Cario seems to be cast as a tragic messenger 
and the chorus responds to his initial announcement in joyful dochmiacs (with ἀναβοάσομαι at 639; cf. βοάσομαι at 
Nub. 1154 above (pp. 261-2); see Rau 1967: 166-7. 
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in store for Chremylus.”112  Where in Clouds Aristophanes took advantage of the Sophoclean 
hyporcheme as a way of directing his audience’s expectations straightforwardly and 
manipulating their sympathies (or lack thereof) for the main character, here he uses the broader 
Sophoclean pattern to establish an expectation which he does not intend to realize. 
 Aristophanes may have found special inspiration for this passage of Wealth in Sophocles’ 
Electra (1232-87).  During the recognition scene between Orestes and his sister, Electra 
continually bursts into joyous song which Orestes attempts to hush lest she give the game away.  
In the end, Orestes succeeds in quieting her exclamations, and Electra’s tears of joy are put to 
good use (indistinguishable as they are from tears of sorrow).
113
  Orestes is able to put a stop to 
the joy-before-disaster pattern before it reaches a head, and the revenge goes off without a hitch. 
 Common to Wealth and Electra, then, is the hint of foreboding latent in excessive 
rejoicing which nevertheless turns out to be unfounded.  Both plays do end happily (at least 
ostensibly so) and the joyous outburst is not after all succeeded by a disaster of any sort.  Similar 
to Electra in a different way is Peace 301-60.  Though the passage in question is not an ode,
114
 it 
features a chorus whose rejoicing is premature and even dangerous.  Having discovered where 
Peace is imprisoned, Trygaeus calls the chorus out to help him drag her back into the light.  But 
the chorus is altogether too excited, and Trygaeus repeatedly pleads with them not to make so 
much noise or else they will draw the attention of War or ὁ κάτωθεν Κέρβερος (309-10, 313-5, 
318-9).
115
  This can be read as a sort of veiled commentary on the basic pattern of action 
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 Sommerstein 2001: 802-18n. 
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 Even here there is a resemblence to the more usual choral song in Electra’s use of dochmiacs and other lyric 
meters. 
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 The parodos of this play consists of a choral dialogue with Trygaeus in trochaic tetrameters catalectic. 
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common to Sophoclean hyporchemes:  if a chorus is singing joyously, there must be a disaster 
pending.  Like every good spectator of tragedy (and like Orestes), Trygaeus knows this, and 
therefore tries to stop the chorus’ performance before it is too late; he is allowed to give the 
warning that must be on every spectator’s mind when watching a Sophoclean hyporcheme (337-
9): 
   μή τί μοι νυνί γε χαίρετ’· οὐ γὰρ ἴστε πω σαφῶς· 
   ἀλλ’ ὅταν λάβωμεν αὐτήν, τηνικαῦτα χαίρετε 
   καὶ βοᾶτε καὶ γελᾶτ’… 
 
   Please don’t rejoice just now; you can’t be certain yet. 
   But when we’ve got her, then you may rejoice 
   and yell and laugh… 
Using language that may have a Sophoclean flavor,
116
 Trygaeus is allowed to point out the folly 
of every hyporchematic chorus, and what is more, he succeeds.  Because he recognizes the 
danger, he is eventually able to put a stop to the chorus’ carrying on and to organize them into an 
effective team.  In the end, they successfully recover Peace and the expected disaster does not 
take place after all – perhaps because the perceptive Trygaeus was there to balance and 
counteract the chorus’ mindless optimism.117 
 One of the most sustained Aristophanic engagements with Sophoclean drama is to be 
found in his Wealth of 388 B.C.; this is intriguing, given that Aristophanes’ obsession with 
tragedy (especially Euripidean tragedy) is traditionally dated to the years 425-405.
118
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 El. 1309-13.  Also comparable on  different grounds is the parodos of Eur. Or., where Electra attempts to 
silence the singing and dancing chorus while her brother sleeps. 
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 See Olson 1998: 338-40n.:  “The combination of ὅταν and τηνικαῦτα is found elsewhere in the dramatic 
poets only in Sophocles (El. 293-4; OT 76; Ph. 505).” 
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 In addition to the hyporchematic pattern, it is generally agreed that Sophocles’ satyr play Pandora lies 
behind the rescue of Peace, though it is more difficult to disentangle this source from others.  See Harrison 1900, 
Robert 1914, Olson 1998: xxxv-xxxviii, and Dobrov 2007; for a skeptical attitude, see Bakola 2010: 109-10.  
Aristophanes was mocked by other comic poets for this scene (Eup. fr. 62, Pl. Com. fr. 86, Sannyrion fr. 5), and one 
wonders whether that has anything to do with Aristophanes’ handling of his sources. 
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Nevertheless, his focus in this comedy does not seem to be primarily parodic.  In addition to the 
allusion to Inachus at 806-20 (discussed above), the comedy picks up motifs from two other 
plays, Oedipus at Colonus (passim) and Phineus (fr. 710 = Plut. 636).
119
  Oedipus at Colonus is 
of course the latest extant Sophoclean play, produced in 401 after its author’s death, but still a 
matter of thirteen years before its treatment in Wealth; Phineus is undated.  As the dynamics 
surrounding this nexus are investigated in a recent article by Gwen Compton-Engle,
120
 I limit my 
discussion here to a few important points that bear particularly on my larger argument. 
 At the lowest level, Wealth uses Oedipus at Colonus in a visual game of misdirection 
regarding the identity of the title figure:  the comedy opens with a blind old man clad in dirty 
rags being followed by two other characters (Chremylus and Cario).  Various clues (most of 
them visual), such as the old man’s physical appearance, his blindness,121 his connection to a 
Delphic oracle, his ability to benefit whoever possesses him, and an ensuing scuffle on stage all 
suggest that this character is the Sophoclean Oedipus, or as Compton-Engle puts it (6), “It is as 
though Oedipus has kept walking off the stage of Oedipus at Colonus and onto the stage of 
Wealth.” 
 In this respect, the deployment of Oedipus at Colonus and of Inachus in this comedy is 
similar:  in both cases, the audience is led to expect something (that the blind man is Oedipus, 
that disaster will attend Wealth’s rehabilitation) which turns out to be incorrect.  But whether or 
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 E.g. Silk 2000b: 49:  “The prolonged engagement [of Ar. with tragedy] seems in fact to have lasted a good 
twenty years, beginning with Acharnians (425 BC), where Euripides lends Dicaeopolis his stage properties and his 
lines in the cause of peace, and ending with Frogs (405 BC), where Euripides competes with Aeschylus before the 
god of tragedy, Dionysus, himself.”  The footnote (22) on this passage reads: “We know of no play outside this 
period with any substantial tragic presence.” 
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 Cited by scholia to lines 635 and 636.  Sophocles wrote two Phineus plays, one of which may have been a 
satyr play, though the two cannot be usefully distinguished in their fragments (only 711 and 712 look positively 
satyric). 
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 Forthcoming in CW 106.  I am grateful for the chance to see advance drafts of this article. 
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 Which must have been evident from his mask and is in any event explicitly mentioned at line 13. 
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not we are ultimately surprised to learn that the old man is actually the god Wealth and not 
Oedipus,
122
 Aristophanes’ use of key Sophoclean themes and stage action encourages the 
audience to make an identification between these two characters, and that identification in turn 
informs the rest of the comedy.  Like the heroized Oedipus, Wealth is in a sense restored to 
honor and able to benefit mankind if treated properly.  Of course a comedy cannot end the way 
the tragedy does, with the old man dying after he has cursed his sons to mutual fratricide, so 
instead, in true comic fashion, Wealth is successfully healed of his blindness and showers 
humanity with abundance.  In other words, the disaster foreshadowed by the allusion to Inachus 
at 806-20 does not play out in the end because Wealth turns out to be a more propitious and more 
identifiably comic figure than Oedipus.  Thus Aristophanes successfully works a whole nexus of 
Sophoclean ideas into a comedy without either making a mockery of the tragedy or betraying the 
atmosphere of his own genre. 
 While there are echoes of Oedipus at Colonus throughout the play, they are definitely 
concentrated in the beginning, when the audience is still trying to guess the identity of the blind 
man and forming expectations of the subsequent dramatic action on that basis.  However, 
Oedipus at Colonus can provide a model only for a decrepit Wealth who is restored to power.  It 
appears to be Aristophanes’ own strikingly original move123 to heal Wealth of his blindness, and 
though the blind Oedipus gains a mysterious inner vision that enables him to lead the other, 
sighted characters from the stage at the end of the tragedy, he is never truly healed.  Rather, that 
motif is drawn from a different model, the Sophoclean Phineus, whose blindness is apparently 
healed by Asclepius, just as Wealth’s sight is restored after incubation in the Asclepieion.  
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 If comic titles were announced at the proagon, as tragic titles were, then the audience may have been able to 
guess the blind man’s identity, but as Compton-Engle points out (1), we cannot say whether Wealth had ever 
appeared on stage as a character before. 
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 Compton-Engle (forthcoming): 1 n. 2. 
270 
 
Sophocles’ importation of Asclepius into his story is itself an important innovation;124 
traditionally, Jason was responsible for restoring Phineus’ sight.  That Wealth is also healed by 
Asclepius points specifically to the Sophoclean play but also suits the world of the comedy in 
several ways:  1) Asclepius is the one we would expect anway, since he had become the standard 
healing god by the early fourth century, 2) as a god, Asclepius (as opposed to Jason) is really the 
only suitable healer for another god, 3) using Asclepius provides the opportunity for Cario’s very 
comic description of incubation in the Asclepieion. 
 A paratragic tone is set at line 627 with Cario’s dramatic arrival from the Asclepieion and 
the chorus’ excited dochmiacs; together with these features, the quotation of Phineus125 casts the 
healing of Wealth in elevated terms, and the whole passage is somewhat akin to a tragic 
messenger scene with the chorus’ joyful reaction to the messenger’s good news.126  The tragic 
tone of these lines adds momentousness to the miraculous healing of Wealth but the gravity soon 
collapses when Cario’s “messenger speech” turns out to be full of stock comic material.  In this 
comedy, Sophocles’ three plays afford a basis for simple collisions of registers, provide 
Aristophanes with impetus for his own dramatic innovations, and lend significance, tension, or 
intensity to key moments in the action. 
 I said in the beginning of this chapter that Greek comedy treats Sophoclean drama in all 
the same ways as it treats Euripidean drama.  Accordingly, the one thing that seems to be 
missing so far is explicit parody of Sophoclean tragedy.  But there is a good example in 
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 Sophocles was thought by the ancients to have had a personal connection to Asclepius, whom he supposedly 
received into his house; see above, p. 21 n 6. 
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 Cited by scholia to lines 635 and 636. 
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 Rau 1967: 166-7.  Fr. 710 may itself be an echo of Aesch. Eum. 104. 
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Aristophanes’ Birds, which makes complex use of the title figure of Sophocles’ Tereus.127  
Gregory Dobrov has written extensively on the “contrafactual” relation between these two 
plays,
128
 and while I do not agree with all of his points (especially regarding the Sophoclean 
Tereus), his discussion allows me to be relatively brief here.  Instead of contrafact, I will focus 
on a few of the ways in which Aristophanes turns Tereus to both humorous and constructive 
uses. 
 Aristophanes’ Tereus is a bird-man.  When he first appears, Peisetaerus and Euelpides 
laugh at his crest and his beak (probably his most recognizeable features
129
), whereupon he tells 
them “this is what Sophocles did to me in his tragedy” (100-1).  The connection with a specific 
tragic source is as explicit as it could be.
130
  Most commentators have suspected that 
Aristophanes is pulling one of his usual tricks by concretizing something that was only discussed 
in tragedy; that is, the transformation of the Sophoclean Tereus was described or predicted 
verbally, while the Aristophanic Tereus actually appears as a bird, and what was originally left to 
the audience’s imagination is brought on stage in full costume. 
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 Ar. Av. was produced in 414, which provides a terminus ante quem for Tereus.  The date may be pushed 
back further, as this tragedy also seems to have been used by Cantharus (below, n. 148, and see SFT: 157-8 n. 56) 
and by Eupolis in his Taxiarchs (fr. 268 = Soph. fr. 595b); the usual date of Taxiarchs is 428 or 427 (but see also 
Storey 2003: 246-8).  Sometime between Tereus and Av., Philocles wrote a Pandionis which evidently featured the 
same story as Tereus.  Aristophanes notes Sophocles’ priority in a passage immediately preceding the parodos, 
where the Hoopoe claims to be the father of Philocles’ hoopoe, which suggests that Sophocles’ treatment was not 
only earlier but also more influential – influential enough to “beget” another hoopoe of the same type, not to 
mention Aristophanes’ own Hoopoe.  That Philocles’ is downgraded to mere offspring indicates that his version was 
relatively insignificant in Aristophanes’ view, perhaps little more than a reiteration of the Sophoclean Tereus. 
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feathers. 
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 The reference to αἱ Κρανααί at 123 may also be a gesture to Sophoclean style; see Rau 1967: 185-6. 
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 Tereus’ outfit cannot be a complete surprise for Aristophanes’ audience.  We have 
already been informed that Tereus is now a hoopoe,
131
 and the servant-bird who greets the 
protagonists at the door is the first to appear in an avian costume.   He gives the game away, so 
to speak, and now we know that other bird-characters, including Tereus, will wear feathers, 
wings, beaks, etc.
132
  We expect Tereus to be a bird-man; we expect a hoopoe. 
 And we get a hoopoe, but maybe not quite the one we anticipated.  At line 103 
Peisetaerus asks Tereus where his feathers are; the Hoopoe responds that all birds lose their 
feathers in the winter and then regrow them later in the year, and after answering this question, 
he promptly changes the subject.  It is difficult at first to see the dramatic or comic point of this 
exchange about feathers, but the reference is probably to an aspect of Tereus’ costume, namely a 
lack of feathering.  It is debatable just how many (or few) feathers Tereus actually wore, but at 
any rate he is surely not what we expected after seeing the servant-bird.  We thought that 
Aristophanes would concretize the Sophoclean figure of Tereus the Hoopoe, and he has, but he 
has also stopped short of giving Tereus a full-blown spectacular costume.  Instead, he has 
brought Tereus into the ugly real world by taking the concept of the bird-man to its logical 
conclusion:  if Tereus is a bird, then he must molt, and birds in molt may look lopsided and ill-
fashioned (and comic birds especially so).
133
  The Aristophanic Tereus is thus simultaneously 
grandiose (with his crest, beak, and πτέρωσις134) and laughably ragged – a clear collision of 
tragic and comic worlds. 
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 Lines 46-7, even if 16 is excised. 
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 It is generally assumed that part of the fun of a play like Av. lies in visually spectacular ornithological display 
(where, for instance, each member of the chorus represents a different species and wears a different costume). 
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 We have already been told by the servant (line 82) that Tereus eats μύρτα and σέρφοι, as any good bird 
should. 
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 While humorous in its own right, Aristophanes’ Tereus also brings out some of the 
apparent illogicalities or weaknesses of Sophocles’ play.  Sophocles seems to have made at least 
two important changes to the details of the myth as it stood in the fifth century:  though our 
evidence is spotty, we have no sign that Tereus was a Thracian or transformed into a hoopoe 
before Sophocles.
135
  More usually, he was Phocian and was ultimately transformed into a hawk 
of some type, perhaps a sparrowhawk.
136
  This version of the myth of Tereus makes sense as an 
aetiology of the hawk’s pursuit of smaller birds (like the nightingale and swallow into which 
Procne and Philomela are changed).  Hoopoes, on the other hand, are much less assertive around 
other birds, and relatively tame toward humans. 
 Though we cannot be certain of the nature of his τριλοφία,137 it must reflect the hoopoe’s 
highly distinctive crest, at least in part.  When Peisetaerus and Euelpides laugh at these features, 
Tereus offers Sophocles’ tragedy as an explanation.   
 The original myth also makes sense in cultural terms:  as a Phocian Greek, Tereus was a 
natural match for an Athenian princess and one who would already understand her language.  
Cast as a barbarian, he suddenly becomes savage by nature, and a non-native speaker of Greek.  
Though these traits might suit tragedy well in some respects, given the loathsome acts committed 
by the mythical Tereus, they could also impede some basic dramatic presumptions (such as why 
an Athenian king would marry his daughter to a Greekless foreigner).  Further, the change from 
hawk to hoopoe wrecks the avian aetiology as well as being at odds with the stereotypical 
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 Thucydides goes out of his way to make this point, leading some to conclude that Sophocles is his imagined 
interlocutor – though he also notes that Phocis was inhabited by Thracians at the time.  On the types of bird, see 
Dunbar 1995: 15n. 
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portrayal of a Thracian king which must have characterized Tereus throughout the tragedy.
138
  
Aristophanes’ version brings out these disparities:  his Tereus is a barbarian warlord, perhaps 
equipped with a crested helmet and later accompanied by spearmen,
139
 but at the same time 
dressed in an unevenly feathered costume with comically over-large beak.  The humor lies not 
only in imagining what a bird-man would actually look like but in thinking about what it would 
mean for a barbarian warlord to become a timid, molting bird.  And though Sophocles did not 
present Tereus in quite this light, the implication is that he has inflicted precisely this 
ignominious fate on the mythical king. 
 But Aristophanes’ purpose is not only to mock Sophocles’ dramatic decisions.  He points 
out that much of what Sophocles has done is in fact not very tragic; but that means that it is, 
potentially at least, very useful comic material.  In addition to the humor created by his portrayal 
of Tereus, Aristophanes also uses the Sophoclean material as a sort of support or plot device for 
the dramatic action.  The specific combination of barbarian king and hoopoe is actually quite 
perfect for Aristophanes’ own rather different story.  In his scheme, men and birds are at odds for 
the very plausible reason that men kill, eat, and otherwise exploit birds as a natural resource.  In 
order for the dramatic action to proceed, this conflict must be resolved, and the best way to effect 
a resolution is through some sort of arbitration, here provided by Tereus.  It is thus very helpful 
indeed for Aristophanes to have at his fingertips a mythical figure who represents both sides, 
men and birds – but that was the case with Tereus anyway.  What makes the Sophoclean Tereus 
especially useful to Aristophanes? 
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 Cf. e.g. fr. 587: φιλάργυρον μὲν πᾶν τὸ βάρβαρον γένος.  Dunbar 1995: 15n. cites evidence that the 
sparrowhawk and hoopoe were once thought to be the same bird at different times of the year; but nothing 
compelled the tragedian to make that connection in his play, especially if it resulted in a less tragic figure! 
 
 
139
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 To begin with, his being a hoopoe instead of a hawk means that he will be less fierce, less 
aggressive, less confrontational – in short, a better peacemaker.  Further, as a barbarian he is 
well-acquainted with the birds’ twittering language to which the Greeks were so fond of 
comparing foreign tongues.  We are told that the Hoopoe has taught the birds to speak like men 
(199-200), though their speech still contains a generous smattering of chirps and twitters; being a 
native speaker of chirps and twitters, the Thracian Tereus would be more at home with them in 
the first place, better at communicating with them, and better at teaching them human speech.  
So even though Tereus the Thracian Hoopoe throws awry the traditional myth and aetiology and 
threatens to undermine tragedy’s elevated tone (or so Aristophanes would have us believe), he 
fits very well in the world of Aristophanic comedy, where he is not only a source of humor but 
also a necessary mover of the dramatic action.
140
 
 
Conclusion: A Glance at Aristophanes and Euripides 
 In the introduction to this chapter I noted a basic disparity in our evidence for comedy’s 
use of Euripides versus Sophocles:  Aristophanes’ treatment of Euripides (especially in 
Acharnians, Thesmophoriazusae, and Frogs) is more explicit and more extensive than anything 
we see for Sophocles.  We cannot acquire a proper appreciation of comedy’s deployment of 
Sophocles by measuring it against Aristophanes’ parodies of Euripides; that is, as long as we 
hold Thesmophoriazusae to be the standard for tragic parody, we are destined to be disappointed 
with the results for Sophocles.  A better approach is to describe the relationship between 
Sophocles and comedy on its own terms, and then to compare it to what we know of the 
                                                 
 
140
 Thus Rau 1967: 195:  “es wird aber nicht das Soph.-Stück parodiert, wie v. Leeuwen u. Schroeder ӧfter 
vermuten; die kom. Fabel baut ja auf dem Ergebnis des „Tereus”erst auf” is essentially correct, though perhaps 
overly simple. 
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relationship between Euripides and comedy.  In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate the 
various dynamics and devices through which the comic poets engaged with Sophoclean drama, 
and a brief survey will suffice to show that Aristophanes deals with Euripides according to all of 
the same dynamics and devices. 
 As with Sophocles, Aristophanes uses short, unflagged passages of Euripides to create a 
collision of generic registers, whether internally or between the tragic quotation and its comic 
context; he also exploits the transfer of lines from a tragic Euripidean figure and situation to his 
own comic ones.  For example, at Acharnians 893-4, Dicaeopolis prepares to cook the eel he has 
recently acquired from the Boeotian, and his address to it alludes to Euripides’ Alcestis 367-8: 
    ἀλλ’ εἴσφερ’ αὐτήν· μηδὲ γὰρ θανών ποτε 
    σοῦ χωρὶς εἴην ἐντετευτλιωμένης. 
 
    Now place her on her bier, “for even in death 
    may I never be parted from you,” enshrouded in beet! 
Aristophanes retains Euripides’ language up to the final hemistich, where he replaces τῆς μόνης 
πιστῆς ἐμοί with the comic coinage ἐντετευτλιωμένης.141  This word creates a paraprosdokian 
joke dependent on both the collision of linguistic registers and on the contextual collision of 
Alcestis’ funeral with Dicaeopolis’ celebratory feast.  For those who remember Alcestis, the 
quotation evokes the image of the dying Alcestis (a visual reminiscence of Euripides’ play) 
alongside the (mental or actual) sight of the beet-green-wrapped eel – an effectively ridiculous 
combination of both emotional and generic extremes.  Aristophanes’ adaptation of the final 
words of the original jars with the rest of the quotation and thus creates a collision of registers 
within the tragic quotation, in addition to the collision between its funerary language and its 
surrounding culinary context.  Finally, even disregarding ἐντετευτλιωμένης, the passage is made 
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 The manuscripts read ἐντετευτλανωμένης, but Blaydes conjectures ἐντετευτλιωμένης; see Olson 2002 ad 
loc. for discussion. 
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amusing by the transfer of the tragic lines from one pair of characters to another:  words 
originally spoken by a grieving husband to his dying wife are now being spoken by the delighted 
and economically savvy comic hero to his next meal.  Though these lines have no dramatic or 
parodic resonance beyond the moment of their utterance, collision of tragic and comic registers 
still results in several layers of humor.  All members of the audience would find something to 
like here, and those who know Alcestis could appreciate the intertextuality a little more than 
those who do not. 
 Aristophanes’ mockery of Euripides’ supposedly philosophical or Socratic ideas is well 
known, though in such cases the comic poet generally selects a Euripidean passage to mock more 
because it is Euripidean than out of any real interest in the idea or image it conveys; the passage 
is taken on its own terms, as it were, but not truly appropriated or converted.  The fun lies either 
in taking a sophisticated-sounding line out of context, in which case a certain foreignness to the 
comic genre is presumed, or in exaggerating those sophisticated elements.  While these passages 
are more personalized than the ones we have been discussing, they operate according to the same 
principles of collision of registers and stylistic imitation that we examined in the first section of 
this chapter.  But Aristophanes does sometimes find a real use for Euripidean ideas, and not just 
the idiosyncrasies of their expression. 
 One instance is the argument between Pheidippides and his father in Clouds, which draws 
on a particular line of argument used also by Pheres to Admetus in Euripides’ Alcestis.  At 
Clouds 1415, Pheidippides argues for the justice of father-beating with a line adapted from 
Alcestis; the sentiment is almost the reverse of the original: 
  Alc. 691: χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς· πατέρα δ’ οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς; 
 
    You enjoy looking on the light. Do you think your father does not? 
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  Clouds 1415: κλάουσι παῖδες, πατέρα δ’ οὐ κλάειν δοκεῖς; 
 
    “The children wail; you think the father shouldn’t?” 
Aristophanes has converted a delight in life into wailing as the result of physical discipline.  But 
more to the point is his manipulation of the logic underlying Euripides’ line and his reapplication 
of it – illegitimately – to the comic context.  Pheres’ point was based on a simple statement of 
fact:  both he and his son enjoy life.  But Pheidippides implicitly recasts it into a normative 
conclusion about what should be the case, rather than what is; because children get beaten, 
fathers should be beaten as well.  Euripides’ logic was different, but the basic strategy of drawing 
out the similarity between fathers and sons allows Aristophanes to appropriate the Euripidean 
line and stretch it further than it was intended to go.  The effect is not only a superficial 
strengthening of Pheidippides’ position through his ability to cite an outside authority,142 but also 
a jab at Euripides as one of the “sophists” (like Socrates) responsible for this new type of 
argumentation – even though he did not attempt any such thing in the passage being alluded to!  
By sleight of hand, Aristophanes successfully appropriates a perfectly legitimate tragic line and 
modifies it for an outrageous comic situation without appearing to have changed anything except 
the word χαίρω.  As in Antiphanes’ subtle subversion of Antigone 712-4, the general idea 
remains intact and only after a moment’s thought do we realize that it has been disingenuously 
reapplied or turned on its head altogether. 
 Various techniques of conversion are evident in Wasps 111-2, which quotes briefly from 
Euripides’ Stheneboea (fr. 665).  Xanthias, explaining the household’s troubled situation to his 
fellow-slave, sums up Philocleon’s attitude and reaction to attempts to restrain him thus: 
    τοιαῦτ’ ἀλύει· νουθετούμενος δ’ ἀεὶ 
    μᾶλλον δικάζει. 
                                                 
 
142
 He goes on two lines later to cite the proverb (also used in fr. 487 of Sophocles’ Peleus, discussed above, pp. 
249-51) that old men are like children again. 
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    That’s how crazy he is, and the more you reason with him, 
    the more cases he hears. 
The context of the Euripidean passage was Stheneboea’s ἔρως which similarly refused to be 
quieted and continued to crush her (πιέζει).  The change of πιέζει to δικάζει creates a 
paraprosdokian joke operating on an internal collision of registers; external collision is prepared 
by the more specific description of Philocleon’s obsessive activities which immediately precedes 
the tragic quotation and culminates in his habit of collecting a beach’s worth of pebbles to use in 
voting.  Mad indeed, and the metrical change to heavier iambs without resolutions (in contrast to 
previous lines) would signal the shift to a higher register of poetry even if the audience did not 
recognize the source of the quotation. 
 Aristophanes adapts the image in this quotation to the comic world by means of the word 
δικάζει (though it is more specific to this comic plot than to the genre in general):  in tragedy, 
people are crushed; in comedy, they sit in court.  A subtler change is the application of the 
participle νουθετούμενος to Philocleon himself, where it originally described ἔρως.  Euripidean 
love, a personified abstraction or perhaps a force of nature, balked at instruction and 
admonishment.  Aristophanes transfers this incorrigibility, appropriately, to a person instead of 
an abstraction, thus making the interplay of admonishment and madness more concrete and 
specific.  It is not abstract love but a particular person being restrained from mad activities, and 
when that restraint fails, the subject – goes back to judging cases.  The mundanity and absurdity 
of Philocleon’s obsession are brought out by their contrast with the seriousness of Stheneboea’s. 
 Just about two hundred lines later, during an exchange between the chorus-leader and his 
son, is a double quotation from Euripides’ Theseus (frr. 385-6).  The boy has asked his father to 
buy figs (apparently a treat); the father refuses because his only income is his juror’s fee, which 
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pays just enough money for them to get by on.  There follows a paratragic lament on the subject 
of hunger (309-15): 
   Χο. ἀπαπαῖ φεὐ, ‹ἀπαπαῖ φεῦ› 
    μὰ Δί’ οὐκ ἔγωγε νῷν οἶδ’ 
    ὁπόθεν γε δεῖπνον ἔσται. 
   Πα. τί με δῆτ’, ὦ μελέα μῆτερ, ἔτικτες; 
   Χο. ἵν’ ἐμοὶ πράγματα βόσκειν παρέχῃς. 
   Πα. ἀνόνητον ἄρ’, ὦ θυλάκιόν, σ’ εἶχον ἄγαλμα. 
 
   Ch. Alas and ah me! 
    I surely don’t know 
    where our dinner’s coming from. 
   Boy Why then, miserable mother, did you bear me? 
   Ch. So that I’d have the problem of feeding you! 
   Boy Ah shopping bag, it seems you’ve been 
    a useless ornament to carry! 
Line 312 is a direct, unchanged quotation of Euripides (fr. 385), though the original tragic 
speaker cannot be determined.
143
  Lines 314-5 are not so much a quotation as an adaptation of 
Eur. fr. 386:  ἀνόνατον ἄγαλμ’, ‹ὦ› πάτερ, οἴκοισι τεκών. 
 The chorus-leader’s cry of ἀππαπαῖ φεῦ begins the paratragic language, but when the boy 
attempts to join in at line 312, the chorus-leader immediately lowers the tone by cynically 
answering what was surely meant to be a rhetorical question.  The boy nevertheless resumes the 
parody, but without bringing the language all the way back up to the tragic register, for now he is 
addressing his food-bag (with the diminutive θυλάκιον) which has shown itself to be an 
ἀνόνητον ἄγαλμα by being empty.  In Euripides, ἄγαλμα was figurative:  children adorn a 
household, and a wretched child makes a poor adornment for any family.  Aristophanes both 
concretizes and mundanizes the image, so that the ἄγαλμα is no longer a person but a thing, and 
at that a mere sack for carrying food, which, though it is worn like a physical adornment, is 
hardly a tragic item and hardly a thing someone would ever wear for the sake of beauty or family 
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 The scholion to line 314a says that fr. 386 is spoken by Hippolytus, but that cannot be the case if the play 
treated Theseus’ youth.  The scholion to line 312 much more plausibly attributes fr. 385 to the Minotaur’s intended 
victims, which may also be true of fr. 386 and would be appropriate to Aristophanes’ play with hunger here. 
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pride.  And yet, in spite of the deflation, Aristophanes’ own scene is not entirely humorous.  The 
man and his son are hungry because his only gainful employment is in the courts, and their 
difficulty is symptomatic of a larger problem affecting society.  But they are hungry, and this 
hungry child might be considered an ἀνόνητον ἄγαλμα, a wretched adornment for his household, 
on the same grounds as his tragic counterpart.  There must be something pathetic in the boy’s 
empty food-bag and his father’s aporia about where their next meal will come from.  Though 
Aristophanes’ juxtaposition of the tragic situation with the comic shows the latter to be more 
mundane, it is perhaps just as serious, and this also is brought out formally by their tragic 
lamentation. 
 As we continue to move up the scale of Aristophanic-Euripidean intertextuality, we turn 
next to Peace and the parody of Euripides’ Bellerophon, which lies behind some eighty lines of 
the comedy (76-155).  Though this parody clearly belongs at the third level of intertextuality and 
the audience would be left in little doubt as to which tragedy is being mocked, it still stands a 
step below parodies like those of Helen and Andromeda.  The tragic model for Peace 76-155 is 
less immediately identified, and less use is made of direct quotation or even close paraphrase; as 
far as we can tell, there are only two quotations from Euripides’ tragedy, the first at 76 (= Eur. fr. 
306) and the second at 154-5 (= Eur. fr. 307), bracketing the parody.  Instead, the source is 
identified obliquely by references to Trygaeus’ tragic appearance (136) and to lame Euripidean 
heroes (147-8), and the impact of the parody relies primarily on the stage action, especially the 
flight on the mechane, rather than adaptation and mockery of the original tragic language. 
 Hints of Euripides’ Bellerophon are sprinkled throughout the lines leading up to the 
parody proper.  We hear of Trygaeus’ “new madness,” and he cries aloud from backstage, 
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wondering despairingly what Zeus will do to the Greeks (56-63).  At 76-7, the slave, still 
repeating his master’s words, offers up a rough paraphrase of Euripides fr. 306: 
   Eur. fr. 306: ἄγ’, ὦ φίλον μοι Πηγάσου ταχὺ πτερόν
144
 
 
     Come, my dear Pegasus with your swift wings… 
 
   Peace 76-7: “ὦ Πηγάσιόν μοι,” φησί, “γενναῖον πτερόν, 
     ὅπως πετήσει μ’ εὐθὺ τοῦ Διὸς λαβών.” 
 
     “My little Pegasus, my thoroughbred wings, 
     you must pick me up and fly me straight to Zeus.” 
Aristophanes’ language is not especially close to Euripides’, but that we are to imagine Trygaeus 
in the role of Bellerophon is signaled by his desire to fly “straight up to Zeus” and of course his 
address to “Pegasus” (repeated at 135-6, where Trygaeus’ scheme is explicitly linked to tragedy).  
Some in the audience would no doubt recognize this as an allusion to the Euripidean line, while 
others would simply understand it as a reference to the story of Bellerophon and his flying 
horse,
145
 but the specifically tragic parody no doubt becomes plainer when Trygaeus appears 
mounted on his dung-beetle on the mechane.  Trygaeus’ flight from behind the skene, with the 
hero urging on his beetle in anapaestic dimeters (82-90), visually evokes a similar and no doubt 
memorable scene from Bellerophon.
146
  Though the paratragic language continues, the only other 
sure quotation of Bellerophon is at 154-6:
147
 
   Eur. fr. 307: ἴθι, χρυσοχάλιν’, αἴρων πτέρυγας... 
 
     Go, my golden-bridled one, lift your wings… 
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 The scholion to line 76 reads Πηγάσου πτερόν; the Suda adds ταχύ. 
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 Kaimio 2000: 59-60 elides the difference between the myth of Bellerophon and Euripides’ particular 
treatment(s) of it. 
 
 
146
 Olson 1998: 80-1n.: “The stage-mechanics are doubtless borrowed in the first instance from E. Bell.”  
Anapaestic dimeters were also used in the corresponding tragic scene (frr. 307-8). 
 
 
147
 Olson 1998 characterizes 114-7 as “a loose pastiche of tragic tags and diction;” Euripides’ Aeolus may lie 
behind this passage and 119.  124-6 is Euripidean, though the balance of evidence seems to tilt in favor of 
Stheneboea.  Allusion to this play points more to the story in general than to specific scenes in Bellerophon.  Lines 
147-8 connect the scene to the “standard” lame and ragged Euripidean hero. 
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   Peace 154-6: ἀλλ’ ἄγε, Πήγασε, χώρει χαίρων, 
     χρυσοχάλινον πάταγον ψαλίων 
     διακινήσας φαιδροῖς ὠσίν. 
 
     Now giddyup, Pegasus, and bon voyage; 
     strike up the rattle of curb chains 
     on your golden bit, with ears laid back. 
Again, there is not a very close correspondence between comic and tragic passages, except for 
the word χρυσοχάλινος and the general theme of departure.  Aristophanes is most concerned to 
link Trygaeus’ endeavor to the flight of Bellerophon, which he can do visually rather than 
linguistically and which also allows him to have a little fun with the operation of the mechane in 
subsequent lines. 
 As with his redeployment of Sophocles’ Inachus in Wealth, Aristophanes may be using 
Bellerophon to lead his audience astray with a false anticipation of the action.  Bellerophon 
wanted to fly to heaven, but instead he was thrown from his mount and injured, thus becoming 
“a tragedy for Euripides,” as the Παῖς puts it.  If the spectators identify Trygaeus as a second 
(Euripidean) Bellerophon, then they may suspect that he too will fall or be otherwised punished.  
That this does not happen after all is Aristophanes’ own dramatic twist as well as emblematic of 
the difference between the tragic and comic genres:  where the hubristic tragic hero falls and 
suffers pathetically, the comic hero (aided by a suitably comic mount) succeeds on an incredible 
scale, not only reaching heaven but also winning the help of Hermes and eventually rescuing 
Peace from her prison for the benefit of all mankind.  A fate more opposite than Bellerophon’s 
can hardly be imagined. 
 The best known Aristophanic parodies of Euripides go farther than what we have seen for 
Sophocles in this chapter.  At the same time, even these parodies of Euripides involve many of 
the basic dynamics I have sketched here – collision and juxtaposition, appropriation and 
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conversion, integration into the comic scene or plot – only more openly and on a larger scale.148  
Though shorter than some of its fellows in Thesmophoriazusae, the parody of Euripides’ 
Palamedes (765-84) provides a good example of this more explicit brand of parody.  After the 
Kinsman has been captured, he attempts to send a message to Euripides (who has promised to 
rescue him) using a device from his Palamedes, named outright in line 770.  He is unable to find 
the oarblades that featured in Euripides’ tragedy and must settle for some other tablets, probably 
votives; in anapaestic song, he describes the difficulty of scrawling a written message on wood 
before finally scattering the tablets into the “sea” to float off to Euripides.  When Euripides has 
still failed to show himself after the parabasis, the Kinsman concludes that he is ashamed of his 
“frigid” play and turns to “the new Helen” instead.  The parody of Palamedes thus openly 
appropriates a Euripidean scene, and in particular the idea of sending a message via oarblade, 
makes fun of that scene by placing it in an entirely incongruous setting (the Kinsman’s captivity, 
with neither oarblades nor sea anywhere nearby), mundanizes it by considering just what it 
would be like to carve a message on wood, and thereby mocks its tragic potential through 
deflation.  The parody creates humor and tension just before the parabasis, before we can find 
out whether or not Euripides will respond to the message, and on a broader scale, it introduces 
the theme that will run through the end of the play:  Euripides’ failed attempts to rescue his 
Kinsman using devices from his own tragedies. 
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 It seems likely that certain comedies homonymous with Sophoclean tragedies were in fact engaged centrally 
with those tragedies.  In the fifth century, Cantharus wrote a Tereus (and Aristophanes’ use of the Sophoclean 
tragedy demonstrates that it was influential), and Autocrates wrote a Tympanistae (perhaps related to the Sophoclean 
satyr play).  In the same period, Diocles and Strattis wrote a comic Thyestes (Sophocles had three) and Troilus (the 
only play of that name, besides Sophocles’); these both deal with topics that might be considered adventurous for 
comedy in their own right, and one of the two surviving fragments of Troilus contains a tragic quotation.  
Aristophanes’ Cocalus is also thought to have drawn on the Sophoclean Camici.  Much more cannot be said about 
these comedies, but it remains possible at least that they dealt with Sophoclean tragedy as extensively as 
Thesmophoriazusae deals with Euripidean tragedy. 
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 Aristophanes’ uses of Palamedes and Tereus are very similar.  In both cases, the comic 
poet openly cites a tragic model, which he simultaneously deflates and incorporates into the 
larger fabric of his plot.  The difference between these and the parodies of Helen and Andromeda 
(say) is one of quantity rather than quality.
149
  Just as several of Aristophanes’ “favorite” 
Euripidean plays are cited multiple times in his comedies (e.g. the hostage scene of Telephus, 
Hippolytus 612, numerous scattered passages of Alcestis), so he had favorites within the 
Sophoclean corpus as well.  Peleus is quoted more than any other Sophoclean play in a variety of 
contexts, and Aristophanes shows particular interest in Inachus as well.  Outside of the 
Aristophanic corpus, Antigone 712-4 seems to have been a popular image and scenes from 
Electra, Tereus, and Inachus again continued to interest comic playwrights in both the fifth and 
the fourth centuries.  That some parodies of Euripides, like those in Thesmophoriazusae, are 
more extensive than anything we have for Sophocles I have already conceded in the beginning of 
this chapter.  But this disparity in the comic treatment of Sophocles and Euripides at the highest 
level is exactly what we should expect.  Ever since Cratinus, it has been recognized that 
Aristophanes’ interest in Euripides is extreme and idiosyncratic.  We would be ignoring that 
simple fact if we expected Sophoclean intertextuality – or intertextuality with any other poet – to 
manifest itself to the same degree.  We already knew that Aristophanes treated Euripidean drama 
at the highest possible level of generic interaction; we already knew that that pair stood at the 
farthest point on one end of the spectrum.  What is remarkable is how much of that spectrum 
Euripides shares with Sophocles.  The fact that we do not have a Thesmophoriazusae featuring 
                                                 
 
149
 I set aside the agon of Ar. Ran., since it engages with tragedy on different terms than other parodies, 
discussing and evaluating passages of Aeschylus and Euripides as external literary works rather than working them 
into the fabric of the comedy; for similar reasons, I set aside the references to Sophocles as a person at Pax 698, 
Ran. 82, and Cratinus fr. 17. 
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Sophoclean tragedy is no reason to disregard the evidence we do have for the comic poets’ use of 
Sophocles, appearing as it does at several levels of complexity and in many different guises. 
 This chapter has sought to fill an important gap in modern scholarship regarding the 
comic poets’ use of Sophoclean drama and thus to establish the importance of Sophocles’ work 
as a part of the dramatic context of the late fifth century for playwrights other than Euripides.  
We have seen that the comic poets found Sophoclean drama to be useful for many purposes and 
that they exploited it in essentially the same ways as Euripidean drama; the comic poets’ interest 
in paratragedy was no doubt due in part to the creativity and innovation of both tragedians.  
Moreover, since it is simplistic to reduce paratragedy to mere criticism or correction of the 
tragedian’s dramatic decisions, we should see comedy’s engagement with Sophocles in terms of 
productive intertextuality:  it is the comic poet’s own inventive wit, when applied to a rich tragic 
environment, that brought about such diverse and effective paratragedy. 
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General Conclusion:  Sophocles Θεατρικός 
 
 
 
 
 
 This study has surveyed some of the ways in which playwrights of the late fifth century 
interacted with each other in their plays and has described, if only partially, how drama happened 
in that period; it has also sought to say something about the style of Sophocles in particular by 
bringing him into contact with Aeschylus, Euripides, and the comic poets.  Our attempt to flesh 
out the immediate dramatic context of individual plays has provided an opportunity to explore 
connections that have generally been overlooked and to offer new readings of the plays from that 
angle.  In situating Sophocles firmly within the infinitely creative, constantly evolving world of 
late-fifth-century drama, we have challenged popular views of Sophocles as isolated, 
homogeneous, or conservative.  Instead, we have seen that he was willing to learn from other 
poets, keen to find dramatic potential in their ideas, and able to contribute original and 
interesting work to the pool of dramatic material and thus to inspire further innovation and 
development. 
 In each of his late plays, Sophocles reworked other poets’ earlier ideas (as well as his 
own).  As we saw in chapter 2, he noticed the potential in Aeschylus’ conjunction of divine 
powers in Choephoroi and experimented with the opposite strategy, combining a decidedly un-
Aeschylean fragmentation of the divine world with a Sophoclean tendency to keep the gods at a 
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mysterious distance.  The result is a tragedy in which the gods are not only distant but possibly 
even absent, in which the poet’s “humanism” takes a psychological turn into the motivation 
behind people’s religious beliefs and their attempts to justify questionable moral behavior.  Far 
from rejecting Aeschylus’ version, Sophocles uses it as impetus to explore new dimensions of 
the story. 
 Again, in chapters 3 and 4, we see Sophocles joining Euripides in a conversation about 
dramatic performance and production or using Euripides’ innovative characterization to build on 
his own previous treatments of Labdacid myth.  Philoctetes picks up Euripides’ interest in the 
roles of poet, actor, and spectator in creating a successful dramatic performance and develops 
these ideas further, extending them throughout the play and raising new questions (such as the 
ethical and dramaturgic difficulties that arise from a conflict between an actor’s nature and his 
role).  Oedipus at Colonus shows Euripidean influence in the presentation of some of Sophocles’ 
most famous figures (Oedipus, Antigone, and Polyneices).  These figures are not simply 
extensions of earlier Sophoclean versions nor even representations of what each was like before 
or after the impact of familial disaster – though they are both of these things.  But they also draw 
significantly on their counterparts in Euripides’ Phoenissae and even Hypsipyle.  Oedipus, for 
instance, is simultaneously an older, wiser, more bitter version of the hero of Oedipus Tyrannus 
and an amalgamation of two themes in Phoenissae (pollution and κράτος).  Both poets’ Theban 
plays belong to the “immediate dramatic context” of Oedipus at Colonus insofar as Sophocles’ 
own previous work on a topic was always immediately relevant for him, while Euripides’ plays 
were recent and mythically as well as dramaturgically innovative.  The characters and themes of 
Oedipus at Colonus do not derive from one group or the other but both at once – and this 
complexity of poetic interaction was essential to the inspiration and composition of Attic drama. 
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 But putting Sophocles in context means showing not only how he responded to others’ 
ideas but also the importance of his work for contemporary poets’ conception and composition of 
their own plays; this side of the coin emerges especially in chapters 3 and 5.  Chapter 3 argues 
that Philoctetes both engages Euripides’ self-conscious discussion of dramatic performance in 
Helen and the other “romances,” and makes room for Euripides’ extreme formulation of the 
same problems in his “most Euripidean” tragedy,1 Orestes.  In chapter 5, we see several 
generations of comic poets experimenting with Sophoclean material in many different ways.  
Sometimes they create fairly simple humor (whether at the expense of the tragedy or of the 
comic figure) from the juxtaposition of tragic and comic language, action, or ideas.  But they 
also adapt Sophoclean material more thoroughly for their own purposes, by converting a 
promising idea into a quintessentially comic one or using Sophoclean assumptions as the basis 
for an entire comic scene or plot.  These comic poets, from Aristophanes to Strattis to 
Antiphanes, did not consider Sophocles “too tragic” to be mocked; and they did not stop with 
mockery but found dramatic potential of all kinds in his tragedies and satyr plays.  Sophoclean 
drama gave both tragic and comic poets new material to work with. 
 While this study has been concerned to relate Sophocles to a variety of dramatic contexts, 
we have been continually preoccupied with Euripides, who remains for us the most visible and 
the most controversial tragedian of the late fifth century.  By observing Sophocles’ close 
interactions with Euripides, we have been able to find some (perhaps unexpected) similarities 
between the two.  We have seen Sophocles developing Euripidean material and contributing to 
his “untragic” experiments (chapter 3); we have seen how even material often considered 
fundamentally Sophoclean derives in part from Euripidean sources (chapter 4).  Where Euripides 
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 Zeitlin 1980: 51. 
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provokes his audience by giving them dubious characters or unconventional religious views, 
where Euripides comments self-consciously on his own art and discusses the creation of 
dramatic meaning, where Euripides reworks a myth and its characters in unexpected ways  – we 
have seen Sophocles doing the same kinds of thing.  Sophocles and Euripides continually fed on 
each other’s innovations, and when two poets spend several decades borrowing each other’s 
ideas, developing them, and experimenting with them, it is unlikely that they can be entirely 
dissimilar. 
 I have posited that what we have seen of Sophocles’ engagement with his dramatic 
context can be extended in essence to all playwrights of the fifth century.  Though many poets 
produced plays less frequently than Sophocles did, it is likely that anyone with the leisure to 
write tragedy also attended the festival performances regularly; and even an amateur writer of 
tragedy would probably be more tuned in to technical innovations and dramatic strategies than 
his fellow spectators.  It is hard to imagine that someone like this could produce a tragic tetralogy 
(or a duology at the Lenaea) without being influenced by what he saw in the theater every year.  
Indeed, the statement about “Sophocles the honeybee” in the ancient Life is clearly wrong on one 
count: 
 καὶ ἄλλοι μὲν πολλοὶ μεμίμηταί τινα τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν καθ’ αὑτούς, μόνος δὲ Σοφοκλῆς 
 ἀφ’ ἐκάστου τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀπανθίζει·  καθ’ ὃ καὶ μέλιττα ἐλέγετο. 
 
 And many others have imitated one of those before them or in their own time, but only 
 Sophocles gleans what was splendid from each; for this reason he was also called “honeybee.”
2
 
 
Sophocles was not the only tragedian to draw on multiple sources at once; we need look no 
further than the elaborate combination of Aeschylean, Homeric, Euripidean, and Sophoclean 
material in Orestes.  However, the Life does claim that other poets engaged with the poetic 
tradition (including both older and more recent material) but in a more limited way than 
                                                 
 
2
 The translation is mine. 
291 
 
Sophocles did, and certainly playwrights who were less active in the theater may have been less 
aware of recent experiments and innovations.  Nevertheless, it is likely that their basic approach 
was fundamentally similar to Sophocles’:  they drew on recent plays and famous plays 
(especially those which had recently been reproduced); they experimented with the ideas they 
found in those plays; and their new creations became available for still other poets to build on or 
rework.  While Sophocles was more successful in competition and remains more visible to us 
now, his methods and experiences were, I think, essentially representative. 
 For a long time it was usual to equate the end of the fifth century with the end of classical 
drama.  Even if we no longer blame Socrates or Euripides for the “death of tragedy,” we still 
often feel that tragedy was becoming less serious and less recognizable as tragedy in this period.  
This is in part because we read Euripidean tragedy with an awareness that it eventually gave rise 
to New Comedy.  But critics have been uncomfortable about more than the unexpected light-
heartedness of tragedy in the late fifth century.  The variety and degree of dramatic 
experimentation has seemed to reflect a desperation to find original twists in an old genre, and 
the chaotic innovation of a play like Orestes becomes a sort of last gasp before the tragedians 
finally run out of ideas.  The deaths of Sophocles and Euripides, whose work was produced as 
“old” drama at the City Dionysia only about twenty years later, marks the moment when the 
golden age of Greek tragedy became only a memory. 
 But quite aside from the fact that tragedy (and comedy) continued to be produced in the 
fourth century and was actually enormously popular,
3
 I would argue that the rampant dramatic 
innovation and experimentation at the end of the fifth century reveals that drama was not only 
alive but thriving.  The poets were intensely and creatively involved in their theater; and even if 
                                                 
 
3
 The continuing popularity of tragedy in the fourth century is attested by Arist. Poet., the inscriptional records 
of dramatic and histrionic competitions (esp. IG ii
2
 2318-2325), and the rise of celebrity actors. 
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Aristotle’s contention that tragedy drew on fewer and fewer myths is correct,4 the pool of 
material could not help but grow as poets continued to produce plays with new ideas and new 
techniques.  Every innovation, far from being a “last gasp” of any kind, could only offer a basis 
for further experimentation and development.  Literature dies out, it seems to me, when it is 
abandoned by its authors and audiences, when no one is interested in taking the next step or 
trying new techniques just to see how they will work.  The atmosphere of extreme dramatic 
interaction ensured that tragedy remained vital and strong through the final decades of the fifth 
century. 
                                                 
 
4
 Arist. Poet. 1453a.17-22. 
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